In re Luis N.

Full title: In re Luis N. [1] In re Marializ N.

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Nov 15, 2016

H12CP1114190A (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2016)

Opinion

H12CP1114190A H12CP1114191A

11-15-2016

In re Luis N. [1] In re Marializ N.

Nicola E. Rubinow, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Nicola E. Rubinow, J.

This memorandum of decision addresses issues raised by the petition filed by the Commissioner, Department of Children and Families (DCF or the department) for Luis N. and Marializ N. seeking to terminate parental rights (TPR) of the children's father Santos N. and their mother Belinda F.

The court has jurisdiction over the proceedings; notice of all hearings were provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book; and no evidence or pleadings establish that either Luis or Marializ is an Indian Child as contemplated by Practice Book § 32a-3(c). All parties were represented by skilled and experienced counsel; during the latter stages of the litigation, the children's best interests were served by their court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL).²

2 The attorney for the minor children was clearly " knowledgeable about representing . . . children" who, during the early stages of this highly contested custody litigation, were incapable of expressing their wishes to their lawyer. General Statutes § 46b-129a(2)(A), (C). See General Statutes § 46b-129a(2)(D) (court may appoint GAL to perform an independent investigation of the case who, subject to cross examination, may present information pertinent to the court's determination of the children's best interests).

DCF alone bears the burden of proving each essential allegation of the TPR petition by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to the applicable provisions of § 17a-112(j).³ Although each respondent has vigorously defended himself or herself in the face of the TPR petitions, the court has not imposed any undue burden of proof upon either respondent.⁴

3 See § 17a-112(j); In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 87-88, 10 A.3d 100, 111 (2011); Practice Book § 32a-3(b).

4 Thus, in this case, the court has not improperly imposed any burden of proof upon the mother, and has properly avoided doing so. See, e.g., In re J.R., 161 Conn.App. 563, 127 A.3d 1155, (Nov. 17, 2015) (court did not require " anyone other than the petitioner to bear the burden of proof."

After considering the verified petitions, the parties' motions, the facts as found by clear and convincing evidence, and applying the relevant standards and law to those facts, the court resolves all issues in favor of the department.⁵ Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the court orders termination of parental rights.

5 In deciding the TPR issues, the court had adhered to General Statutes § 17a-112(q) providing that related legislative " provisions . . . shall be liberally construed [by the court] in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND INITIAL FACTUAL FINDINGS

Portions of the parties' attenuated child protection litigation history is relevant to the TPR issues.⁶ Accordingly, after hearing, the court ruled that judicial notice would be taken of the appropriate content within the juvenile court files maintained for Luis's and Marializ's half-siblings.⁷

6 " In order for the court to make a determination as to the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation, the court [is] required to obtain 'a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities.' In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). 'Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate the respondent's parental rights . . . The parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time. The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority.' In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998)." (Emphasis added.) In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696 (2007). See also In re Christopher L., 135 Conn.App. 232, 243, 41 A.3d 664 (2012). Furthermore, the trier of fact may consider evidence of the respondent's prior misconduct as that evidence is relevant to establish that whether the respondent's behavior has or will deny a child the parental care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. See In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 828-29, 719 A.2d 907 (1998) (no error in admitting evidence of the respondent's arrests which did not result in conviction); In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814.

7 See In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 480, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013); In re Tremaine C., 117 Conn.App. 591, 597, 980 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 920, 984 A.2d 69 (2009). See Docket Nos.: H12-CP10-013376-A, In re Nayeliz C.; H12-CP12-014512-A, In re Santos N., Jr.; H12-CP12-014512-A, In re Yamaria N.; and Docket No. H12-CP15-015995, In re Elian T . The court has limited its attention to the uncontroverted aspects of these court files, as contemplated by In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 354-55, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006).

The court has used appropriate standards for assessing the weight of the evidence as a whole.⁸ Witnesses, each of whom was subject to cross examination, included: DCF workers Wendy B., Ama T., Zaira R.; Valarie Williams, the mother's counselor; Liarian Santana, a case manager with Catholic Charities; Perspectives Counseling Center's Director Amy Korte, LMFT and Dilice Robertson, APRN; Meghan Molcyk, RN, of Associated Woman's Health; Family Intervention Center's LCSW Sandy Vargas; Klingberg Family Center's LMFT Debra Crivello, Program Coordinator LCSW Mary Dineen-Elovich, and parent counselor Aida Claudio-Cruz; Martina Jackson, The Connections staff member working with Supportive Housing; Maritza M., the children's foster mother; Edwina Miller, CRT Intake Coordinator; Justine Rakich-Kelly of Rebuilding Families; Atty. Samuel Christodlous, the GAL; Radiance Innovative Services' (Radiance) mentor, Gregory Davis; ⁹ and Bruce Freedman, Ph.D., the court-appointed psychological evaluator.¹⁰ The court also received testimony from Belinda F., the mother; and Santos N., the father.¹¹ Exhibits included: court records; photographs; laboratory test results and a specimen receptacle; and the court-appointed psychological evaluator's written reports and curriculum vita; documents and correspondence from providers; and documents and correspondence created by DCF, including the department's social study in support of termination of parental rights and addendum.¹²

8 " 'It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony . . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any . . . testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.' . . . In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 781-82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999)." In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 611-12, 9 A.3d 417 (2010). " 'Furthermore, [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases.' . . . In re Tabitha P., [ supra, 39 Conn.App. 364-65 n.8]." In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 161, 962 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). " As the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court [is] free to believe all, some or none of [a witness's] testimony. See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 729, 994 A.2d 233 (2010), appeal dismissed, 300 Conn. 294, 12 A.3d 566 (2011). " The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010). Moreover, " '[i]t is the right and the duty of the [trier of fact] to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.' . . . Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 642, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). 'In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . .' In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004)." Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666-67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006). " As a general matter, the trial court may . . . draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances [that] it finds established by the evidence . . .' (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 635-36, 847 A.2d 883 (2004) . . . [An] inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 857, 37 A.3d 700 (2012)." In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 595, 122 A.3d 1247, 1263-64 (2015).

9 Otherwise employed and a practicing attorney, Davis receives an hourly rate as a consultant with Radiance. A founder of Radiance, he has worked with that provider mentoring young men, providing parent education since 2010, and has co-facilitated a domestic violence program since 2012. (Tes. Davis.) While appreciating certain aspects of Davis's factual testimony and his written records, as further discussed in Parts II.A. and III.A, the court gives little credit to his opinions concerning Santos N.'s responses to Radiance's reunification efforts. Davis has admitted that he had grown fond of Santos N.; Davis's testimony indicates that he, as the provider, took tremendous pride in the quality of his personal devotion to Santos N. and the reunification process and that this witness was fond, as well, of the services provided by Radiance, the program he had helped found. (Tes. Davis.) This fondness and pride tainted the impact of Davis's testimony and written documentation proffered in support of the respondent father. (Exs. Fa-G, Fa-I, Fa-H, Fa-J, Fa-K, Fa-L; Tes. Davis. Compare Ex. 41.) Davis has acknowledged that part of his work for Radiance was to advocate to make sure that the respondent father " won" the child protection litigation. (Tes. Davis.) Overall, Davis's opinions lack weight because they were not objective, were overtly slanted in favor of Santos N., were inclined toward promoting the success of the Radiance program, and were inconsistent with the other evidence establishing that despite repeated one-on-one parent education, coaching and mentoring sessions, the respondent father may have been in Davis's presence, but he neither benefitted from reunification efforts nor did he make functional progress toward achieving the goal of reunification.

10 The court credits and gives great weight to the majority of the evidence adduced through Dr. Freedman, a licensed psychologist. The findings and opinions presented through his reports and testimony were founded upon his considerable skill, training, education, experience and expertise; his contact with the respondent parents and such providers as made themselves available; and his review of information and analysis of collateral resources made available by the court relevant to the parenting skills of Belinda F. and Santos N. and the particular needs of Luis and Marializ. Subject to vigorous and sustained cross examination, and further tested by the evidence adduced through other witnesses, the court found Dr. Freedman's expert opinions to be independent of bias, detailed, consistent with other reliable and relevant evidence, well-founded, " thorough and perceptive, and based on substantially accurate information and observations, and therefore, credible." In re Cesar G., 56 Conn.App. 289, 296-97, 742 A.2d 428 (2000), cited in In re Santiago G., 154 Conn.App. 835, 857, 108 A.3d 1184, aff'd, 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708 (2015). (Exs. 6, 7, 18; Tes. Freedman.) See also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161; In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 772-73, 23 A.3d 18, (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). Using the appropriate standards for measuring the value of expert testimony, this court has determined that the opinions of Dr. Freedman, which are consistent with the opinions of the GAL, are entitled to great weight, and credits Dr. Freedman's testimony and opinions over that proffered by Gregory Davis, who had longer contact with Santos N., but lacks the psychologist's professional expertise or independent perspective on the issues related to the respondent father. See In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn.App. 857, citing In re Cesar G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 296-97.

11 At the commencement of evidence and again immediately prior to their voluntary testimony, each parent was provided with the information and advisement concerning their right to remain silent and the implications. See Practice Book § 35a-7A. (See Memorandums of Hearing, 11/24/14, 5/25/15, 4/27/16.) The court drew no inference whatsoever from a parent's occasional absence from trial; as previously observed, the respondents were represented by well-qualified attorneys at all times.

12 " Practice Book § 35a-9 provides in relevant part that 'no disposition may be made by the judicial authority until any mandated social study has been submitted to the judicial authority. Said study shall be marked as an exhibit subject to the right of any party to be heard on a motion in limine requesting redactions and to require that the author, if available, appear for cross examination.'" In re Harlow P., 146 Conn.App. 664, 682, 78 A.3d 281, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 957, 81 A.3d 1183 (2013). Both Wendy B., the author of the TPR social study and Zaira R., the author of the addendum, were subjected to extensive cross examination at the TPR trial. In assessing the content of these documents, as required by Practice Book § 35a-9, the court has remained aware that they were prepared by the plaintiff-department in anticipation of litigation.

Upon consideration of the verified pleadings and the evidence in its entirety, the court finds the facts set forth in this memorandum of decision to have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Luis was born to Belinda F. and Santos N. on July 12, 2008. (Ex. 24.) Marializ was born to Belinda F. and Santos N. on June 20, 2009. (Ex. 23.) DCF became involved with the children in February of 2011. (Tes. Wendy B.)

Just prior to October 11, 2011, when Luis and Marializ were in Belinda F.'s physical custody, the department removed them pursuant to General Statues § 17a-101g. (Exs. 2, Fa-O-1, Fa-O-2, Fa-O-3.) On October 11, 2011, DCF obtained an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) for the children (Wollenberg, J.). The court provided specific steps for Belinda F. and Santos N. to aid in their post-removal reunification with Luis and Marializ. (Exs. 19, 20; Tes. Wendy B.)

On October 21, 2011, the court (Wollenberg, J.) sustained the OTC for Luis and Marializ.

On May 31, 2012, the court (Frazzini, J.) adjudicated Luis and Marializ neglected as to Belinda F. based on exposure to conditions injurious to their well-being.

On August 9, 2012, the court (Frazzini, J.) adjudicated Luis and Marializ neglected as to Santos N. based on exposure to conditions injurious to their well-being, ordered their commitment to DCF, and issued specific steps for both Santos N. and Belinda F. to facilitate each parent's reunification with the children, consistent with § 46b-129. (Exs. 21, 22.)

On December 12, 2012, DCF filed its TPR petitions for Luis and for Marializ. The TPR petition was amended after hearing on September 6, 2013.¹³ As amended, the petition alleges has made reasonable efforts to locate each parent and to reunify each parent with Luis and Marializ, that each parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, that neither parent has achieved personal rehabilitation, and that TPR is in the best interests of the children.

13 The adjudicatory date for these proceedings is September 6, 2013 when, after hearing before trial, the court granted the department's motion to amend the TPR petitions by adding substantive allegations that no reunification efforts were required for either parent because of permanency plan approvals that had implicated the provisions of General Statues § 17a-111b. See Practice Book § 34a-1(d) (child protection " petition may be amended at any time by the judicial authority . . . prior to any final adjudication"). To correct technical or scriveners' errors, additional amendments were permitted on November 24, 2104. At closing argument on August 3, 2016, the petitioner withdrew its substantive amendments as to the reunification issue, resting on its allegations that it had made reasonable efforts for each parent prior to the amended adjudicatory date and/or that the parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts. (Memorandums of Hearing, 9/6/13 and 8/3/16.)

The evidentiary portion of the trial commenced on November 24, 2014 and continued on divers days thereafter.

On January 15, 2016, the court granted the oral motion made by the children's attorney and joined by Belinda F., and appointed a GAL for Luis Marializ to enhance the court's consideration of the children's best interests in the event DCF met its burden of proof on the adjudicatory issues.

On January 29, 2016, the court provided both respondents with the canvass contemplated by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).¹⁴

14 See, In re Daniel N., 163 Conn.App. 322, 135 A.3d 1260, cert. granted. (2016); and In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn.App. 538, 541, 147 A.3d 147 (2016). In re Yasiel R., supra, was decided by our Supreme Court on August 18, 2015, long after the evidentiary portion of the TPR trial for Luis and Marializ had commenced. See, In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 560. The purpose of the Yasiel canvass is as follows: " . . . public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system would be enhanced by a rule requiring a brief canvass of all parents immediately before a parental rights termination trial so as to ensure that the parents understand the trial process, their rights during the trial and the potential consequences." (Emphasis added.) In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 559, quoting In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 793-94. However, " [o]ur Supreme Court [has] determined that due process does not require a Yasiel canvass. See, In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 787-88." (Emphasis added.) In re Sydnei V. supra, 168 Conn.App. 558-59 n.18. Both the mother and the father were represented by well-qualified and highly attentive counsel throughout the present trial proceedings, which commenced with motions hearings in the fall of 2013, and continued with presentation of evidence from November 2014 through the summer of 2016. To the extent that a Yasiel canvass may be found applicable to trial of the TPR petitions filed in 2012 for Luis and Marializ and amended in September 2013, " [t]he record demonstrates that at trial, [each] respondent " exercised all of the rights of which the Yasiel canvass was intended to inform her" and/or him. In re Sydnei V, supra, 168 Conn.App. 557.

On August 3, 2016, the GAL delivered his report, subject to cross examination. On that date, the parties presented closing argument.

I. A. THE FATHER

Born in 1981, Santos N. is a high school graduate. (Exs. 23, 24; Tes. Davis.) He is the father of a number of children, some of whom are only a few months apart in age. (Exs. 23, 24.) He has custody only of his daughter, Cindaliz, born to him and Giselle G. on August 31, 2004. (Exs. 34, Fa-O-3.) The child Santos, Jr. was born to Santos N. and Tamara F. on January 3, 2008.¹⁵ Approximately seven months later, Luis was born to Belinda F. and Santos N. on July 12, 2008. (Ex. 24.) The child Yamaria N. was born to Santos N. and Tamara N. on April 18, 2009, approximately two months before the birth of Marializ to Santos N. and Belinda F.¹⁶ The child Nayeliz C. was born to Santos N. and Mariely C. on June 13, 2009.¹⁷ Just a few days later, on June 20, 2009, Marializ was born to Santos N. and Belinda F. on June 20, 2009.¹⁸ (Ex. 23.) Notably, the pattern of Santos N.'s brief, relatively simultaneous romantic liaisons with a number of female partners has resulted in his paternity of his oldest child, Cindaliz; of two sons born in January and July 2008 (Santos, Jr. and Luis N.); and of three daughters born in the spring of 2009 (Yamaria N., Nayeliz C. and Marializ N.).¹⁹ (See Tes. Wendy B.)

15 On May 11, 2012 in Docket No. H12-CP12-014512-A, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of Santos, Jr. naming Santos N. and Tamara F. as respondents. On August 14, 2012, mere days after the neglect adjudication for Luis as to Santos Sr., the court (Cofield, J.) adjudicated Santos, Jr. neglected based on exposure to conditions injurious to his well-being, and ordered a disposition of protective supervision as to both Santos N. and Tamara F.

16 On May 11, 2012 in Docket No. H12-CP12-014512-A, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of Yamaria N. naming Santos N. and Tamara F. as respondents. On August 14, 2012, also mere days after the neglect adjudication for Luis as to Santos Sr., the court (Cofield, J.) adjudicated Yamaria N. neglected based on exposure to conditions injurious to his well-being, and ordered a disposition of protective supervision as to both Santos N. and Tamara F.

17 On August 13, 2010, the court (Wollenberg, J.) granted DCF's ex parte OTC for Nayeliz, naming Santos Sr. and Mariely C. as respondents in the matter alleging neglect; DCF identified Santos, Jr. as a non-perpetrator in that matter. (Ex. 34; Tes. Ama T.) On August 17, 2010 in Docket No. H12-CP10-013376-A, DCF filed the OTC and a neglect petition on behalf of Nayeliz, naming Santos Sr. and Mariely C. as respondents; the court (Wollenberg, J.) sustained Nayeliz's OTC on September 1, 2010. On August 1, 2011, the court (Epstein, J.) adjudicated Nayeliz neglected and ordered her commitment to the department. On February 23, 2012, while the child protection litigation was pending for Luis and Marializ, the court (Epstein, J.) revoked commitment and modified Nayeliz's disposition to protective supervision as to both Santos N. and Mariely C.

18 DCF received an unspecified referral for Marializ in 2009. (Tes. Wendy B.)

19 DCF identifies father as having eight children. (Tes. Zaira R.) One exhibit proffered by the respondent father, reflecting events of November 2, 2013 recorded by the Radiance staff member who, as discussed below, had been working with Santos N. since May 2012, indicates that a family visit was had with Santos N. and " 8 of his children, including Luis and Marializ." (Ex. Fa-G.) The children listed as having attended that visit include: " Luis [N.] (son: 5y), Marializ [N.] (daughter: 4y), Cindaliz [N.] (daughter: 7y), Jamaida [N.] (daughter: 5y); Miguel (son: 9y), Santos [N.] (son: 6y) . . . (Twins (1y)." (Ex. Fa-G.) Santos F.'s wife, Tamara F., also attended that visit. That exhibit does not clearly establish whether some of the young attendees identified by the Radiance's Davis were progeny of Tamara F., but not biologically related to Santos N.; Davis has admitted that although he had started working with the respondent father in May 2012, and that " blended" visits with the respondent father's children other than Luis and Marializ started in May 2013, Davis did not know the names of the other children. (Tes. Davis; compare Ex. Fa-G.)

DCF met with Santos N. on multiple occasions commencing in February 2011, when Luis and Marializ were in Belinda F.'s custody and when her feeling of being overwhelmed had become known to the department, as discussed in Part II.B. As of February 2011, Santos N. had custody of Cindaliz, who lived with him, with a female companion, his sister and with his parents; the other adults provided care for Cindaliz before and after her elementary school day ended, while the respondent father worked at a car wash.²⁰ In the spring of 2011, working with DCF, Santos N. agreed to take care of Luis and Marializ on some weekends, as a way of lessening Belinda F.'s feeling of being overwhelmed. DCF made in-home family preservation services available to Santos N. from February through October 2011; however, the respondent father never availed himself of the in-home family preservation services claiming that his work schedule intervened. Santos N. did not provide the agreed-upon weekend care for his younger children; while Santos N. had reported that he could make accommodations so that Luis and Marializ could move into the home of their paternal grandparents, this never occurred.²¹ (Tes. Wendy B.)

20 The evidence consistently establishes that Santos N. relies on other family members, such as his sister or his parents or his domestic partner, to care for Cindaliz. (Tes. Wendy B.) Other than loving this child, there is scant evidence that the respondent serves Cindaliz in a paternal role, other than providing a home in which she can reside.

21 Santos N. purchased beds and furniture for Luis and Marializ in 2011, although his DCF social worker never informed him at the time that reunification would occur. (Tes. Wendy B.)

As discussed above, DCF obtained its ex parte OTC for Luis and Marializ on October 11, 2011, removing them from Belinda F.'s care and from parental custody. Specific steps were issued by the court for Santos N. pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129. To decide whether Santos N. would be an appropriate placement resource for the children, DCF used its assessment tools, its understanding of his role as a parent, and conducted a criminal history; because the department found no convictions for assault or domestic violence, notwithstanding the rather remarkable history of convictions related to firearms, sale of drugs, and violation of court orders, DCF apparently decided to keep the father under consideration as a temporary custodian for Luis and Marializ. (Tes. Wendy B.)

On October 30, 2011, DCF commenced providing two hour visits once per week for " Santos N. with Luis and Marializ; visits were supervised by Radiance's credentialed personnel and by DCF.²² On October 30, 2011, in addition to supervised visits with Luis and Marializ, DCF also commenced providing Santos N. with the Dove Program's behavioral health services at Wheeler Clinic to comply with his specific steps' domestic violence component; Santos N. completed this program.²³ In November 2011, Santos N. completed a substance abuse evaluation at the Institute of Hispanic Families, operated by Catholic Charities; no further drug-related treatment was recommended. Also in November 2011, in lieu of the Klingberg Parenting Services referenced by the OTC Steps, the department referred him to one-on-one parent education through Radiance; the court concludes that this multi-faceted father-based program, implemented and directed for the respondent father by Davis, could meet any of Santos N.'s cognitive limitations or literacy issues that first had been brought to DCF's attention by the DOVE program providers.²⁴ (Exs. 36, 38; Tes. Wendy B., Davis.)

22 The visitation schedule was subsequently modified so that Santos N. was offered access to the children twice per week, with DCF supervising one visit and Radiance personnel providing supervision and parent mentoring services at the other visit, as part of Radiance's one-on-one fatherhood training program. Santos N. preferred visits once per week. (Tes. Wendy B.)

23 DCF was aware that Santos N. had a history of domestic violence with Belinda F. Notwithstanding conclusory comments contained in some of the documents DCF submitted to the court, the department identified no mental health issues for Santos N. other than those that were addressed through the DOVE program. (Tes. Wendy B., Ex. Fa-E; see Ex. 2.)

24 The Radiance program is based on a father-to-father model, offering instruction on basic parenting issues, child development and age-related needs, supervised visitation and parent-coaching at visits. Given the skills and dedication of the assigned Radiance mentor, Gregory Davis, the court concludes that like the DOVE program, Radiance capably modified all aspects of its parenting curriculum so as to meet Santos N.'s needs so that, although it would be difficult for him to understand advanced parenting techniques, the adaptations would be adequate to meet the respondent father's cognitive needs. (Tes. Wendy B., Davis, Freedman.)

At some point in late 2011, Santos N. secured employment, working thirty hours a week as a school bus driver/monitor. (Exs. 34, Fa-E.)

Santos N. is married to Tamara F., the mother of his children Santos, Jr. and Yamaria; the respondent father of ten lives separate and apart from Tamara F.²⁵ (Tes. Ama T.) At some point after October 2011 when the children were removed from the custody of Belinda F., Santos N. proposed that Luis and Marializ also move into his parents' three bedroom home. Santos N.'s plan was for him and his wife to sleep in the living room; for Cindaliz, Marializ and his wife's daughter, a younger child, to occupy one bedroom; for the grandparents to occupy another bedroom; and for Luis to occupy the third bedroom with Santos, Jr. and the wife's older son. The respondent father's plan would have involved two couples and at least six children living in that home. DCF deemed this plan to be inappropriate because it would involve too many people.²⁶ (Tes. Wendy B.)

25 Santos N. married Tamara F. on October 5, 2012. (Ex. 2.) In addition to the two children she shares with Santos N., Tamara F. is the mother of another son, Miguel, and young twins. (Tes. Freedman, Ama T.) As such, Tamara F. is the primary custodian and responsible for the care of many children. The court received insufficient evidence upon which it could base any reasonable determination about the amount or quality of child care Tamara F. is willing or able to provide for Luis and Marializ, if they were reunified with her husband Santos N.

26 Even if accommodations at the paternal grandparents' home had met DCF's criteria, although DCF was concerned about the role the degree to which the paternal grandmother, who suffers from Parkinson's Disease and required in-home health assistance, could provide care for young Luis and Marializ, along with care for all the other children. (Tes. Wendy B.)

On May 17, 2012, DCF referred Santos N. to Radiance for that agency's wrap-around services and visitation, and to access its " parenting" education and " Father-to-Father" programs for the respondent. By May 25, 2012, Santos N. had commenced one-on-one father-mentoring services with Gregory Davis, a Radiance volunteer who was highly motivated to help Santos N. succeed in reunification with Luis and Marializ. Radiance and Davis were well aware of the respondent's " limited cognitive capabilities" and addressed them through provision of repeated " face-to face sessions 'as well as " time and patience" during individual parenting education interventions, personal and parenting mentoring, and supervised visitation with a coaching component provided by Radiance staff.²⁷ (Ex. Fa-K. See Exs. 40, Fa-G Fa-H, Fa-I, Fa-J, Fa-K; Tes Davis.)

27 A experienced provider who has worked with approximately fifty fathers as a mentor and parent educator, Davis credibly explained that Radiance personalized the methods it would use in accomplishing the reunification goals to meet Santos N.'s needs. (Tes. Davis.) Thus, at the commencement of Radiance services, Davis identified that " Dad's primary goals are to participate in parent education, learn to read and write, and get assistance for his mental health and SSI needs (reapply)." (Ex. Fa-K.) From time to time, Davis provided written handouts and worksheets to Santos N., always ensuring that the respondent father was made aware of the content of the papers, and consistently working toward achieving the stated goals through individualized, personalized and intensive mentoring services. (Tes. Davis.)

On May 31, 2012, the court (Frazzini, J.) adjudicated Luis and Marializ neglected children, as to Belinda F.

In late June 2012, Santos N. participated in a court-ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Freedman, with an observed assessment of his interaction with the children. Through receipt of the psychologist's report, DCF was made aware of the respondent-father's cognitive limitations; those limitations were, as previously found, adequately addressed through the DOVE program's modifications and through Radiance's one-on-one mentoring, parent education and parent-coaching delivered through Davis. (Ex. 6; Tes. Freedman, Davis.)

On August 9, 2012, the court (Frazzini, J.) adjudicated Luis and Marializ neglected children, as to Santos N., committed them to the custody of the department, and issued new specific steps for both Belinda F. and Santos N. consistent with § 46b-129.

As of October 4, 2012, Radiance's parenting mentor, Davis, was supervising the respondent father's visits with Luis and Marializ. On occasion, Santos N.'s other children and/or Tamara F. and her children also attended visits supervised by Davis. (Exs. Fa-G, Fa-J; Tes Davis.)

As noted, DCF filed its TPR petitions for Luis and Marializ on December 12, 2012.

On May 1, 2013, Radiance began providing.

By June 2013, Santos N. was participating in the Hartford Literacy Program.²⁸ Referred by DCF, he also was working with the Supportive Housing Program through The Connections.²⁹ Santos N. was married to Tamara F., but lived apart from his wife. At the time, Santos N. resided with Cindaliz in a two-bedroom apartment with assistance from Supportive Housing. (Ex. 2; Tes. Ama T., Jackson.)

28 Radiance's parenting mentor Davis had introduced Santos N. to literacy providers in May 2012; a program for the respondent father was available as of August 27, 2012. By April 2014 when Radiance ceased supervising visits, Santos N. had become able to read some early childhood stories. (Ex. Fa-K; Tes. Davis.)

29 All of Supportive Housing's clients have some DCF involvement. In addition to rent assistance, the Supportive Housing staff met weekly with Santos N. providing him with help in budgeting, accessing Section 8 subsidies, and locating an alternative residence. By April 8, 2014, DCF had been informed by Supportive Housing that he would " be upgraded to a three bedroom [apartment] should he be reunified" with Luis and Marializ. (Ex. Fa-E; see Tes. Ama T.; Zaira R., Jackson.)

In November 2013, having received positive feedback from providers concerning the progress being made by Santos N., DCF decided to forgo pursuit of the TPR petitions and instead to reunify Luis and Marializ with their father by February 10, 2014. The department planned to use Radiance's services to facilitate reunification, increasing visits from two hours twice per week to full day visits with supervision, followed by unsupervised visits and overnight stays with Santos N.; DCF planned to keep the children under commitment and to use Radiance's services for at least three months after reunification to support the father. At the time, Luis was five and Marializ was four years old. It was Santos N.'s plan that Luis would sleep in one of the bedrooms at his apartment, Cindaliz and Marializ would sleep in the other bedroom, and he would sleep in the living room. While Santos N. and Tamara F. lived separately during the work week, they spent every weekend together either at his apartment or at hers. Thus, if Luis and Marializ were reunified with Santos N., during each weekend the children and their father would reside in the same apartment together with Cindaliz, Tamara F., Santos, Jr., Yamaria, and any other children for whom Tamara F. was responsible, including Miguel and her young twins. On those weekends spent in residence at Santos N.'s apartment, even if the married couple slept in the living room, all of the children would be occupying the two bedrooms in the apartment, with Tamara F.'s twins sleeping together in a crib. Santos N.'s goal was to have his children living full time in the same household as Tamara F.'s children; he was working with Supportive Housing but had not succeeded in obtaining an apartment large enough for this family group. (Tes. Ama T., Zaira R., Freedman.)

On December 9, 2013, after providing Santos N. with a year and a half of face-to-face parent mentoring services, Radiance started providing him with its Intensive Family Reunification (IFR) services through Davis. (Ex. Fa-H; Tes. Davis.)

In late December 2013, Santos N. participated in another court-ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Freedman, with an observed assessment of his interaction with the children. (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.)

The plan for the children's reunification with Santos N. was initially interrupted when, on December 10, 2013 and while the TPR petitions for Luis and Marializ remained pending, DCF received a referral from a school social worker concerning the father's conduct in the course of his work as a school van driver; that referral was processed through DCF's administrative investigative protocols.³⁰ (Ex. 34; Tes. Ama T.) The report related the complaint from one seventh grade and one tenth grade student who, after they were transported to school by Santos N. and were waiting with him inside the van in front of the school, observed the respondent father watching an inappropriate video on his phone, displaying " exposed private parts" on the phone in the presence of these children. (Ex. 34.) When Santos N. became aware that the children were aware of his conduct, " the driver pulled his phone away and tried to exit it." (Ex. 34.) In the past, the seventh-grader had observed Santos N., in the course of his work, " watch a 'twerking' video" on the phone. (Ex. 34.) The tenth-grader had on two occasions seen " the driver looking at naked pictures" on his phone; on both occasions the driver " was shaking his leg so much that the van was shaking . . ." and the driver was holding up his phone so the students could easily see its display. (Ex. 34.) Cooperative with DCF's investigation, Santos N. denied any allegation that he was " looking at 'porn', " but admitted that he frequently looks at pictures on his phone, and that " there were pictures of women in Lingerie . . . on his Facebook page" which he accesses on his phone. (Ex. 34.) Although his route was changed, Santos N. remained in the employ of the school transportation service after this incident for a while following this incident.³¹ DCF substantiated allegations of physical neglect as to both the seventh grade and the 10th grade student.³² (Ex. 34.)

30 The department generated a report of the results of its investigation that was approved by a DCF supervisor on January 23, 2014. (Ex. 34.)

31 As found below, Santos N. admits having been " laid off" from that employment some time prior to his trial testimony, delivered in late April 2016. (Tes. Santos N.)

32 DCF made the decision to substantiate physical neglect of these students " as there is sufficient evidence to show that [Santos N.] placed the children in circumstances injurious to their well-being, provided the children with inadequate supervision and failed to provide the children with proper care and attention. The information gathered suggests [Santos N.] was viewing inappropriate sexual material on his cell phone while he was entrusted with the care of the two students in his van. [Santos N.'s] judgment in viewing this material while the students were in the van and able to see the sexual content on his phone shows a serious disregard for their welfare. According to DCF Policy 34-2-7 evidence of physical neglect includes negligent exposure to pornography. [Santos N.'s] actions showed a lack of proper care and attention to the [students'] welfare." (Ex. 34.)

During visits supervised by the respondent father's Radiance mentor, Davis, Santos N. was attentive, affectionate and engaged with his children, often expressing his love for them. Luis and Marializ enjoyed the visits with their father during this time period. The father was often patient, applied appropriate discipline when was required, and comforted the children when circumstances so required during the visits supervised by Davis. (Ex. Fa-G; Tes. Davis.)

DCF's reunification plan was further interrupted when, on February 7, 2014, mere days before she and Luis were to move into Santos N.'s household, four and a half-year-old " Marializ disclosed that her half-brother [Santos, Jr.] who is a six-year-old male, sexually molested her." (Ex. Fa-C; see Tes. Ama T.) These events were reported to DCF's Care Line by Belinda F. and the foster mother just prior to the effectuation of reunification: this abuse occurred at the residence in which Santos N. was living, while Marializ and Santos, Jr. were left unattended while the respondent father was in the bathroom, perhaps using the shower.³³ (Tes. Dineen-Elovich; see Tes. Davis.) However, during the therapy she has received, as found in Part I.C. below, Marializ has disclosed details sufficient to establish the validity either of her claim and/or of her concerns about being subjected to contact with Santos, Jr.; Marializ has credibly stated that the abuse involved Santos, Jr.'s sexual touching of her genitals, Santos, Jr.'s exposure of his own genitals to her, and Santos, Jr.'s statements that he wanted to have sex with Marializ and " to plug her." ³⁴ (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Santos, Jr. was already receiving therapy when he engaged in his sexual abuse of his half-sister Marializ. Santos N. is well aware of Marializ's disclosure Santos, Jr.'s sexual misconduct, of which he was informed by DCF.³⁵ (Tes. Ama T.) Santos N. discussed the report of Marializ's sexual abuse with his son Santos, Jr.; after their conversation, the respondent-father did not believe that neither sexual abuse nor sexually suggestive comments had been made by Santos, Jr. to Marializ.³⁶ (Tes. Davis.)

33 Marializ first made her disclosure to her foster mother. (Tes. Zaira R.) Notwithstanding the grave implications of the child's disclosure, the sexual abuse was not substantiated by DCF. (Tes. Ama T.)

34 The court found Dineen-Elovich to be a highly credible witness concerning Marializ's specialized needs, providing reliable expert opinions relevant to the TPR evaluation. Although this provider did not directly treat, evaluate or directly observe Marializ, Dineen-Elovich had acquired detailed information about the child in the course of her professional work, reviewing relevant records and clinically supervising the Klingberg CATS staff members who worked with the child and Santos N. The high degree of reliability and objectivity attached to Dineen-Elovich's testimony is based, as well, upon her general expertise as an LCSW, her extensive skills and training in diagnosing and providing treatment strategies for children who have been exposed to trauma, and her consistent, detailed testimony that was evident on both direct and cross-examination, and her obvious clear understanding of the dynamics involving the child and the environments to which she is currently exposed.

35 The court received no specifics concerning the nature or extent of therapy Santos, Jr. was receiving at the time, or had received in the past. Tamara F. has admitted, however, that approximately two years prior to February 2014 when Marializ claimed to have been sexually abused by Santos, Jr., Santos, Jr. himself had witnessed his older brother being sexually molested. (Tes. Zaira R.)

36 Tamara F., Santos, Jr.'s mother, did not believe, either, Marializ's reports of sexual misconduct by her son. (Tes. Davis.)

DCF continued to contemplate reunification with the respondent father and/or the respondent mother but also considered pursuing its December 2012 TPR petition. The department determined that a three-month period of reassessment was sufficient to meet the needs of Luis and Marializ. (Exs. Fa-E, Fa-H, Fa-J, Fa-N; Tes. Davis, Zaira R., Wendy B.)

Radiance had discontinued its IFR services for Santos N. as of February 10, 2014. (Ex. Fa-J; Tes. Davis, Zaira R.)

DCF referred Marializ to Klingberg's Child Abuse Treatment Services (CATS) program for services. At DCF's referral, Santos N. attended an intake interview at CATS in early April 2014; he participated in individual one-on one parent counseling and then participated in therapy sessions with Marializ as scheduled by the provider through the end of October 2014.³⁷ The provider did not observe any limitations on the part of Santos N. to absorb the information delivered during treatment, and the masters-level parent counselor who provided psychoeducation for the respondent father reported no difficulties in communicating with him; the court accordingly finds that the CATS parent counseling services, like those of the Radiance mentoring program, were one-on-one and/or sufficient to meet the father's cognitive needs.³⁸ The CATS parent-counseling covered issues related to the impact of sexual abuse on the child; the need for parental insight into the difficulties experienced by the abused child; the need for boundaries and supervision to protect the child, and the need for safety planning. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C, Fa-D, Fa-E; Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Ama T., Claudio-Cruz.)

37 The respondent father never informed his CATS parent counselor that he once had been directed to attend the DOVE program in response to reports of his perpetration of domestic violence; he never told the CATS staff that a TPR petition had been filed in 2012 seeking to end his legal relationship with Marializ. Had he informed counselor that the TPR petition was pending; Klingberg would not have provided him with parent services. (Tes. Claudio-Cruz.) Given the one-on-one nature of the CATS parent counseling provided by Klingberg to Santos N. in response to the events of February 2014, the court concludes that the provider had made accommodations appropriate for any cognitive or communication limitations with which the father presented. (Tes. Santos N., Dineen-Elovich, Claudio-Cruz.)

38 The CATS parent counselor modified her instructional methods to address father's difficulty or inability with regard to reading. With those modifications, Santos N.'s lack of literacy skills did not impede any aspect of the CATS parent counseling provided to him. (Tes. Claudio-Cruz.)

Radiance discontinued its parent coaching and mentor-supervised visits as of April 23, 2014.³⁹ (Exs. E, Fa-E, Fa-J; Tes. Davis, Zaira R.)

39 DCF admits that as of April 8, 2014, Santos N. had a good relationship with Luis and Marializ and demonstrates " appropriate parent interaction during his [supervised] weekly visits. The children and their father enjoy each other's company during their visits. The children also enjoy seeing their other siblings monthly and Mr. [N.] ensure[s] that their time together is productive and fun." (Ex. Fa-E.)

When Luis started individual therapy at Klingberg Family Centers in June 2014, as detailed in Part I.C., below, Santos N. sometimes came to clinic visits for his son. On one occasion, he answered some inquiries contained in an ADHD assessment tool; Luis's therapist read the questionnaire to the respondent father, who had commenced working with the Hartford Literacy Program a year earlier, as described above. (Tes. Crivello, Ama T., Zaira R.)

By August of 2014, Santos N. was still residing with Cindaliz in a two bedroom apartment.⁴⁰ (Tes. Zaira R.) Although DCF had been satisfied by Santos N.'s progress in addressing his parenting deficits before the December 2013 report of his own misconduct involving students on the school van, and before the February 2014 report of Marializ's exposure to Santos, Jr.'s sexual misconduct the respondent father was supposed to have been supervising the children, DCF was not satisfied with his response to the parent-element of the CATS therapy Marializ started in the spring of 2014. In September 2014, DCF received a letter from CATS opining that Santos N. had gained knowledge about the implications of Marializ's sexual abuse and that he had developed the ability to respond to this child's needs. However, notwithstanding all the parenting education and coaching he had received through Radiance and Davis starting in May 2012, and despite his attendance at the CATS family sessions, in the fall of 2014 Santos N. lacked a concrete, viable plan to keep Marializ safe when she was visiting with any of his other children, including but not limited to Santos, Jr. The respondent-father's only proffered safety plan assumed his personal, physical supervision of Marializ; the insufficiency of this plan was evident in the fact that during the previous winter while Santos N. was supposed to have been watching over Marializ, that child was sexually abused by Santos, Jr. during the time the father took to use the bathroom. Santos N. did not and/or could not identify which other adult he would rely upon to supervise Marializ or any other vulnerable child, if he had to engage in private activities. (Ex. Fa-A; Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Ama T., Zaira R., Claudio-Cruz.)

40 Santos N. receives case management, rental and budgeting assistance from Supportive Housing through The Connections. (Tes. Zaira R., Jackson.)

DCF has acknowledged that the long course of Santos N.'s supervised visits with Luis and Marializ, visits that had commenced upon the children's October 2011 removal from Belinda F.'s custody, had gone very well. (Exs. E, Fa-E, Fa-J; Tes. Davis, Zaira R.) However, in view of the totality of the circumstances, in the fall of 2014 DCF elected to forgo paternal reunification and to proceed in 2014 with the TPR petition that had been filed in 2012. (Tes. Ama T.) As of January 2015, CATS discontinued involving Santos N. in parent-child counseling with Marializ. (Tes. Zaira R.)

By April 27, 2016, Santos N. had lost his employment as a school bus driver. He had, however, returned to work at a car wash from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. Tuesdays through Saturdays. He brings Cindaliz to the bus stop on school mornings and relies on his father or his sister to pick her up. After school, Cindaliz stays at Santos N.'s sister's house until he retrieves her. If Luis and Marializ were returned to his care, Santos N. would use this method of providing them with transportation to and from school, and for after-school care. (Tes. Santos N.)

I. B. THE MOTHER

Belinda F. was born in October 1989. Having left school in the tenth grade, she reports a history of having utilized counseling services since her youth, and has seizures.⁴¹ (Exs. 2, 25, 27, 31.) She reported a history of being removed from her mother's care due to neglect, and having been raised by her grandmother who adopted her at age ten. During this placement, Belinda F. was raped and abused while a child; her abuse included an uncle's use of cigarettes to burn her genitalia. Belinda F. also reports having been involved in domestic violence. As an adult, she has had dreams of being raped more and more.⁴² (Exs. 2, 25, 31.)

41 The court received insufficient evidence from which it could conclude how, if at all, Belinda F.'s seizure condition impacts her parenting capacity.

42 Belinda F. specifically reports " a history of trauma beginning at age 6. Client reported having been raped, molested, beaten and burned starting at that age." (Ex. 27.) She has explained that she was removed from her biological mother's care due to neglect; that there is a significant family history of mental health issues with her five siblings; and that there is a family history of drug and alcohol abuse, significant on the part of Belinda F.'s mother. (Ex. 31.)

As previously noted Luis was born to Belinda F. and Santos N. on July 12, 2008; their daughter Marializ was born June 20, 2009 while Santos N. was incarcerated. (Ex. 23.)

Belinda F. has held occasional temporary and short-term employment, working at two jobs closing video game stores, one day at an election center, and at a barber shop.⁴³ (Tes. Williams, Belinda F.)

43 As discussed below, Belinda F. first found full time employment in October 2013. (Tes. Belinda F.)

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF became involved with Luis and Marializ in February of 2011, while they were in the sole physical custody of Belinda.⁴⁴ (Tes. Wendy B.) In March 2011, DCF referred Belinda F. for in home services through intensive family preservation (IFP), Birth-to-Three (B-2-3) to address Luis's speech delays and unspecified developmental issues affecting Marializ, and to My People Clinical for parenting classes with case management services. (Tes. Wendy B., Zaira R.) As the months progressed, DCF and the providers noted that although the children were growing older and, Belinda F.'s participation in services had become inconsistent; that Belinda F.'s mental health seemed to have deteriorated; that Belinda F. presented as isolated in her apartment; that she and the children were unkempt; and that Belinda F. did not respond to Luis's or Marializ's cues for attention. Encountering difficulty paying her rent, Belinda F. also had a third adult with a child living in her home; although Belinda F., who was having difficulty attending to the needs of her own children, she was also apparently expected from time to time to provide care for that third party's child. Belinda F. regularly informed the in-home service providers that she was " overwhelmed." (Tes. Wendy B.) Accordingly, the in-home service providers recommended a referral for individual therapy and medication management. (Ex. 35; Tes. Wendy B.)

44 As found in Part I.A., DCF received a referral for Marializ in 2009. (Tes. Wendy B.) However, the evidence is insufficient to permit the court to determine what action, if any, the department took in response to that referral.

In July 2011, DCF referred Belinda F. to clinical assessment by Valarie Williams, MA, LPC.⁴⁵ Williams was informed of the mother's history of bipolar disorder, depression, and PTSD. 'To Williams, the mother admitted a long history of symptoms manifest in insomnia, crying spells, poor concentration, mood swings, irritability, and an extremely limited circle of friends. She also admitted having aggressive behaviors and poor impulse control, consistent with her self-report of being on probation for robbery in the second degree and receiving the medication Klonopin.⁴⁶ Williams diagnosed the mother with Major Depressive Disorder Recurrent Moderate and PTSD, recommended weekly individual counseling sessions, and referred the respondent mother first to Dr. Kurtakoti and then to another prescription-capable provider for mental health medication. (Exs. 25, 26; Tes. Wendy B., Williams.)

45 Williams provides individual, family and group therapy for DCF-referred clients and others through the Circle of Life Transition Center, LLC of which the is the chief executive officer. (Tes. Williams; see e.g., Ex. 26.)

46 Belinda F. disclosed to another counselor that she had been arrested " at age 16 for conspiracy 2nd degree and robbery 1st degree. Client was incarcerated for 11 months in York CI." (Ex. 31; see Ex. 2.)

Belinda F. has a pattern of using illegal drugs, participating in treatment, remaining drug-free for a time, then relapsing; this pattern has persisted even when she has had a baby in her care. She commenced using drugs ate age thirteen. (Ex. 31.) In July 2011, DCF referred Belinda F. to Catholic Charities for serial drug testing; in October 2011, DCF referred Belinda F. for an additional evaluation and drug screening at Catholic Charities. (Ex. 36; Tes. Wendy B.)

As noted, on October 11, 2011, DCF obtained the previously referenced ex parte OTC for Luis and Marializ, who were in the physical care of Belinda F. At the time, Belinda F. was not working outside the home, but reported being overwhelmed from. As criteria for concluding that the children were exposed to immediate risk of physical harm if they remained in the care of their mother, DCF identified her inadequate supervision of the children and that the children were living in substandard conditions.⁴⁷ DCF also identified that Belinda F. was affected by the previously referenced but continuing substance abuse issues, deteriorating mental health and cognitive functioning. (Tes. Wendy B.)

47 Related to the mother's inadequate supervision of her two toddlers and their substandard living conditions, DCF identified: the presence of trash, including trash bags and food wrappers, on the floor and uncleaned dishes piled in the sink, conditions that remained unaddressed by Belinda F. notwithstanding the department's requests that she remove these hazards from the children's easy access. Belinda F. was also wont to leave the children unattended; she had moved to another apartment, but left the children sleeping in their prior apartment, with Marializ left behind a gate. DCF and the in-home service provider had told Belinda F. to removed her conditions from these dangerous, unsupervised conditions, but the respondent mother did not comply. (Tes. Wendy B.)

In October 2011, at or around the time of the children's removal from Belinda F.'s custodial care through execution of the ex parte OTC, DCF referred the mother to individual therapy and intensive out patient substance (IOP) abuse treatment at Catholic Charities's Institute for the Hispanic Family, and also referred her to individual therapy through Radiance. (Ex. 37; Tes. Wendy B.) On October 30, 2011, DCF commenced providing two hour visits once per week for Belinda F. with Luis and Marializ, supervised by Radiance's credentialed personnel. (Ex. 36; Tes. Wendy B.)

Belinda F. was evicted from her apartment in the fall of 2011 after Luis and Marializ were removed from her care. Homeless for months thereafter, she stayed with family and friends. (Ex. 2; Tes. Wendy B., Belinda F., Williams.)

On December 21, 2011, DCF commenced providing Belinda F. with a twelve week course of parent mentoring, with two hours of parent education and three hours of case management each week through Radiance's Young Mother's Support Services; twice weekly visits with the children were provided, with Radiance supervising one visit and DCF supervising the other visit. Belinda F.'s drug use continued, despite the Radiance support and despite her knowledge that she would be subject to recurrent random testing. Subsequent substance abuse test results at Catholic Charities, some submitted to laboratory facilities for analysis, were as follows: February 1, 2012, was " positive for THC substance use" by way of urinalysis; March 21, 2012 " was positive for THC substance use" by way of urinalysis; April 11, 2012 showed " positive for THC substance use" by way of urinalysis; April 25, 2012 showed that " urine specimen result was positive for cocaine and THC substance use" which was subsequently confirmed by laboratory examination; May 16, 2012 showed " possible positive for marijuana"; June 5, 2012 showed " possible positives for marijuana and cocaine June 12, 2012 reported laboratory results that " showed positive for marijuana and cocaine"; June 21, 2012 showed " possible positive for marijuana"; June 26, 2012 showed " quantitatively negative" for marijuana." (Exs. 29, 37, 39; Tes. Wendy B.)

In June 2012, Williams discharged Belinda F. from individual counseling sessions, due to the mother's non-compliance with the recommended medication consultation, and to non-attendance at scheduled sessions. (Tes. Williams.)

In late June 2012, Belinda F. participated in a court-ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Freedman, with an observed assessment of her interaction with the children.⁴⁸ (Ex. 6; Tes. Freedman.)

48 The court fully credits Dr. Freedman's determination that Belinda F. is at the low end of the average range of intelligence. (Tes. Freedman.)

In July 2012, Belinda F. obtained an apartment.⁴⁹ (Tes. Wendy B.) Belinda F. successfully completed her probation on August 1, 2012. (Ex. 2.)

49 Belinda F. was served with a notice to quit in September 2012 and was subsequently evicted from this apartment, as well. (Tes. Wendy B.)

As previously noted, the court adjudicated Luis and Marializ neglected children on August 9, 2012; committed them to the custody of the department; and issued new specific steps for Belinda F. consistent with § 46b-129.

In September of 2012, DCF referred Belinda F. to the Community Renewal Team (CRT) to address her mood instability, PTSD symptoms, and marijuana use through another IOP. She was seen in the outpatient clinic on September 12, 2012, and received a prescription for antidepressant medication. Although she " reported having had some improvement in mood with use of medication" and with group counseling, the mother " had poor attendance, and missed psychiatric medication management" that was available to her at CRT.⁵⁰ (Ex. 27; see Tes. Wendy B.)

50 Given the other more reliable evidence presented by CRT's own records, the court declines to credit DCF social worker Wendy B's statement that the respondent mother completed the CRT program with any measurable success.

As noted, DCF filed its TPR petitions for Luis and Marializ on December 12, 2012. By that time, Belinda F. had become involved with Victor G., who had a long history of criminal charges related to violent acts, including risk of injury to a minor; the couple resided together in an apartment in Hartford. During their partnership, Victor G. subjected Belinda F. to repeated episodes of domestic violence, leading to her physical injuries. The respondent mother refused to engage in the domestic violence prevention services recommended by DCF. On January 3, 2013, Belinda F. was again evicted, based on nonpayment of rent, from the apartment she still occupied with Victor G. (Ex. 2.)

On January 25, 2013, Belinda F. tested positive for use of marijuana at CRT, indicating her continuing use of that drug despite the specific steps' prohibition of drug use. CRT discharged Belinda F. from its services on March 8, 2013, noting that her participation was " unsatisfactory Failure to Comply with Reporting." (Ex. 27.) The provider referred Belinda F. to further services by way of entering IOP treatment at the Institute of Living (IOL).⁵¹ (Ex. 27.)

51 The court received no evidence establishing that Belinda F. followed through with CRT's recommendation for treatment at the IOL. (Ex. 27.)

In the summer of 2013, at DCF's referral, Belinda F. was enrolled in anger management, domestic violence, and parent education programs at the Family Intervention Center (FIC). By September 2013, Belinda F. had completed attendance at FIC's LOP, a three-day per week, three-hour per day program where her substance abuse issues were to have been addressed.⁵² However, Belinda F. did not complete the domestic violence, anger management FIC services in which she had engaged, nor did she engage in the follow-up after substance-abuse relapse prevention program, nor did she engage in the individual counseling FIC recommended after she finished these IOP services, although FIC decided this was necessary to address the mother's PTSD.⁵³ After working cutting hair in a salon, in October 2013 with the assistance of a cousin, Belinda F. had obtained employment at the same Waterbury laundry company where Luis T. was employed; because she worked 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. Mondays through Thursdays, she claimed to be unable to participate in any DCF-proffered services due to her employment schedule. (Ex. Fa-E; Tes. Ama T., Zaira R., Vargas, Freedman.)

52 In view of Belinda F.'s continued drug use, as described throughout this decision, the court declines to credit any evidence proffered to establish that the mother had acquired coping skills, how to deal with environmental changes without relapsing, and trigger-identification through successful completion of the FIC's IOP. (See Tes. Vargas, Zaira R.) The mother's use of illegal drugs, recurring for several years following her June 2013 entry into the FIC IOP and her September 2013 completion of the program, supports the inference that even if Belinda F. intended to become abstinent, she did not reach that goal through the FIC's IOP services.

53 There is insufficient basis upon which the court could credit Belinda F.'s claim that she could not attend FIC's recommended parent education program during the summer of 2013 because these classes conflicted with scheduled visits with Luis and Marializ. (Tes. Vargas.)

In late December 2013, Belinda F. participated in a repeat court-ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Freedman, with an observed assessment of her interaction with the children. (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.)

By January 2014, while the TPR petitions were pending, Belinda F. was still using illegal drugs; she admitted using " 7-8 blunts per day" before January 2014. (Ex. 31; see Tes. Zaira R.)

In March 2014 Belinda F. moved to Waterbury, to live with her chosen domestic partner Luis T. in a two-bedroom apartment she had obtained with the assistance of a cousin and her grandmother.⁵⁴ (Ex 7; Tes. Ama T., Zaira R., Belinda F.)

54 By the time Belinda F. became involved with him, Luis T. had acquired a history of criminal convictions that is sufficiently grave to support the inference that the respondent mother knew the nature and extent of his pattern of unlawful conduct. On April 29, 2004, Luis T. engaged in Sale of Narcotics; on November 7, 2004, he received a sentence of seven years to serve, suspended after three years with five years of probation. On July 6, 2008, Luis T. engaged in an unspecified violation of his outstanding drug-related probation. On July 28, 2008, Luis T. engaged in driving under suspension; a bond was set for this offense, which was resolved by an unconditional discharge on November 17, 2008. On August 5, 2008, Luis T. engaged in criminal possession of a firearm; days later on August 9, 2008, he twice engaged in Possession of Narcotics with Intent to Sell. He was arrested and charged with the firearms offense on September 4, 2008. On January 13, 2009, Luis T. was arrested and charged with the August 2008 narcotics offenses. On April 21, 2009, convicted of the firearms offense, Luis T. was sentenced to serve four years in jail; his previous drug-related probation was terminated and he received an unspecified sentence for the July 6, 2008 violation of probation. On April 22, 2009, having been convicted of two counts of possession with intent to sell illegal drugs, Luis T. was sentenced to serve six years in jail for each drug offense, to be served consistent with his firearms sentence. (Ex. 28.)

In April 2014, although Belinda F. was not engaged in services, DCF had procured visitation supervision by Family Connections so she could spend time with Luis and Marializ in the community or the DCF office rather than at the foster mother's discretion. (Ex. Fa-E.)

In August 2014, Belinda F. became pregnant with her third child. (Tes. Belinda F.)

On September 26, 2014, in response to her prenatal care provider's advice that she needed therapy, Belinda F. presented herself to and was evaluated at Perspectives Counseling Center (Perspectives) in Waterbury, reporting " I need to do counseling." ⁵⁵ (Ex. 31.) She admitted her history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, trauma due to domestic violence, lengthy involvement with counseling services, criminal history, and history of having been administered psychotropic medications including Depakote, Zoloft and Trazodone. Pregnant and in a domestic relationship with Luis T., she described her partnership as being good, and that Luis T. was supportive.⁵⁶ Perspectives diagnosed Belinda F. with Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent Episode, Moderate, and recommended[ed] . . . individual therapy to process trauma, [and] establish support during current stress surrounding termination of parental rights hearing." (Ex. 31.) Perspectives made individual counseling available to Belinda F. along with group therapy for relapse prevention, in view of her recognized co-occurring mental health diagnosis and substance abuse history. (Tes. Korte.)

55 Perspectives offers individual, couples and group counseling as well as parenting classes; the provider uses a team approach for clinical decisions about the need to change or continue a client's treatment. (Tes. Korte.) Although Belinda F. claims to have referred herself to Perspectives, it is notable that she admits having been informed that she needed counseling by the provider from whom she sought pre-natal care. (Ex. 31; Tes. Belinda F.)

56 Belinda F. claimed that Luis T. was employed at the same laundry in Waterbury where she worked, and that he provided her with financial support. (Tes. Zaira R.)

Although Belinda F. had told Perspectives that she had stopped using drugs as of January 2014, and although she reported to DCF during the fall of 2014 that she was not involved in substance abuse treatment and that she has been sober, credible drug testing reflected that on November 20, 2014, pregnant Belinda F. was positive for use of marijuana when Luis and Marializ were in foster care, after the TPR petitions had been filed and when she was receiving prenatal care. On December 23, 2014 Belinda F. again was positive for use of cocaine. On January 6, 2015, Belinda F. was again positive for use of marijuana. (Exs. 7, 30, 32, 33; Tes. Molcyk.)

In February 2015, as her pregnancy continued, Belinda F. obtained a subsidized two-bedroom apartment and moved back to Hartford with Luis T. Also in February 2015, DCF referred Belinda F. to Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse and mental health evaluation and treatment. Placed on bed rest in March 2015, Belinda F. did not access any services at Wheeler Clinic. (Tes. Zaira R., Belinda F.)

On April 5, 2015, baby Elian T. was born to Belinda F. and Luis T. In view of the mother's drug use during pregnancy, DCF became involved with the new family and filed a neglect petition on behalf of the infant; Elian remained in the care of Belinda F. and Luis T. under protective supervision.⁵⁷ Belinda F. had help in caring for Elian from Luis T.'s mother, Elizabeth R.; from her own grandmother Sol A.; from Luis T.'s sister Lisette T.; from Elian's Godmother and aunt Carmen R.; and from the MAYOP program.⁵⁸ DCF transported Luis and Marializ to once weekly visits at their mother's home during the late part of her pregnancy and after Elian was born. Under supervision, Belinda F. was appropriately attentive to all three of her children during visits. (Court Ex. 1; Tes. Zaira R., Belinda F.)

57 DCF had concerns for Elian's well-being given Belinda F.'s lack of substance abuse and/or mental health services in the months prior to his birth, and given Luis T.'s criminal history. The court received, but does not credit, evidence proffered in an effort to establish that when he lived with her, Luis T. had lawful employment and provided lawful financial support for the respondent mother. (Tes. Zaira R.) On May 8, 2015, DCF filed a neglect petition for Elian naming Belinda F. and Luis T. as respondents. See Docket No. H12-CP15-019995, In re Elian DCF filed a neglect petition for Elian naming Belinda F. and Luis T. as respondents. On November 17, 2015, upon the respondent mother's plea of no contest, the court (Woods, J.) adjudicated Elian neglected and issued a disposition of protective supervision as to both Belinda F. and Luis T. (Tes. Belinda F.; see Court Ex. 1.)

58 MAYOP is a short-term parenting education program directed at providing supplies and support for infants such as Elian. In the absence of sufficient details concerning any MAYOP referrals, the court declines to credit the respondent mother's testimony proffered to establish that MAYOP had referred her to, or that she would participate, in subsequent a twelve week parenting program directed at all three of her children. (Tes. Belinda F.)

In May 2015, after Elian's birth and while DCF was involved with that child as well as with Luis and Marializ, DCF referred her to relapse prevention with Catholic Charities. Belinda F. returned on her own to Valarie Williams for individual counseling. (Ex. E; Tes. Zaira R., Belinda F.)

Belinda F. admits that she used both cocaine and marijuana during October 2015, when she was the legal guardian of baby Elian, remained on maternity leave, and remained responsible for the safety of the sole child in her care. (Tes. Belinda F.; see Tes. Rakich-Kelly.)

In approximately November 2015, Belinda F. finally responded to DCF's referral for additional substance abuse treatment, and began regular attendance at Catholic Charities. (Tes. Belinda F.)

On December 21, 2015, a segmented hair analysis established Belinda F.'s very recent use of both Cocaine and Marijuana.⁵⁹ (Ex. 42.)

59 All samples of the mother's hair collected on December 21, 2015, ranging from 0cm to 3.9cm and including but not limited to the segment representing " Sample Length: 0 to 1.3cm, " were all positive for relatively recent use of both cocaine and marijuana. (Ex. 42.; see Tes. Rakich-Kelly.) In view of this reliable laboratory testing, the court declines to credit Belinda F.'s testimony that she did not use marijuana or cocaine in November or December 2015. The totality of the clear and convincing evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that, as discussed throughout this decision, the respondent mother's specific steps constituted court orders prohibiting such drug use at anytime. Moreover, given her years of counseling and substance abuse services, Belinda F. knew then, or should have known, that use of marijuana and cocaine was contraindicated for a person seeking to retain or attain legal responsibility for the care and safekeeping of young children and that her use of such drugs would be apparent upon laboratory testing. (Exs. 21, 42; Tes. Miller, Rakich-Kelly.)

On January 6, 2016, while the TPR trial for Luis and Marializ was ongoing, Belinda F. still tested positive for use of cocaine and marijuana, as she had many times in the past.⁶⁰ (Ex. G.) By that time, she had been receiving individual therapy with Valarie Williams for approximately eight months. Soon after these test results became available, DCF moved visits from Belinda F.'s well-furnished home, where she had clothes, toys and electronic items available for Luis and Marializ, to the home of Elizabeth R. Those visits were supervised by DCF. (Tes. Belinda F.)

60 On January 5, 2016, DCF reported to the court that all segments of Belinda F.'s hair " collected on 1/4 /16 . . . indicated that mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana . . ." (Court Ex. 1.) The department did not imposed a hold on Elian pursuant to § 17a-101g, but applied for and was granted (Woods, J.) an ex parte OTC, removing him from his mother's care. (Court Ex. 1.)

By January 13, 2016, Luis T. was no longer living with Belinda F. in her two bedroom Sec. 8 subsidized housing in Hartford; although she claimed that Luis T. had moved back to Waterbury, she also claimed that he was continuing to co-parent young Elian.⁶¹ Belinda F. was planning to enroll in classes to prepare her to take her GED. (Tes. Belinda F.)

61 Belinda F. admits that as of January 15, 2016, she was aware that Luis T. had been arrested. However, while she claimed to be willing to allow Luis T. to supervise and provide care for Elian, she was unwilling or unable to ask her romantic partner " certain things." (Tes. Belinda F.) The court has considered the implications of this aspect of Belinda F.'s poor parental judgment in the context of her parenting history overall, which is relevant to the TPR issues concerning Luis and Marializ. See, In re Christopher L., supra, 135 Conn.App. 243; In re Anna Lee M., supra, 104 Conn.App.128; In re Tabitha P., supra, 39 Conn.App. 361; In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814; In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn.App. 828-29.

On January 14, 2016, a motion was filed seeking to open Elian's disposition of protective supervision and to modify the disposition to commitment. On March 21, 2016, in the midst of the TPR trial for her older children, the court (Woods, J.) granted the motion for modification and ordered Elian's commitment to DCF.

On April 15, 2016, again while the present TPR trial was ongoing, Belinda F. participated in a segmented hair analysis at a provider of her own choosing. This test established that Belinda F. had been drug-free for several months. (Ex. F.)

In the late spring of 2016, the court met with Luis and Marializ, as contemplated by the Practice and in conformity with guidelines established by counsel for all parties and with the consent of the GAL. Ably represented by their attorney and in the presence of their GAL, the court had the opportunity to observe the children in the absence of the respondents or their attorneys; given their circumstances, neither Luis, then aged eight, nor Marializ, then aged seven, the highly active children did not provide testimony the court has used in determining any aspect of the TPR issues.

On July 28, 2016, a repeat segmented hair analysis conducted by the respondent mother's own choosing again yielded negative test results, establishing that Belinda F. had been drug-free for several months. (Ex. H.)

Belinda F. has had regular supervised visitation with Luis and Marializ since their October 2011 removal from her custody. The visits are cordial, involving physical activities, watching movies or using a computer to access child-appropriate websites. Belinda F. always brings food or a toy or an activity to visits, and neither child wants to leave the respondent mother when visits come to an end.⁶² Belinda F. is well-informed about the location at which Luis and Marializ go to school. However, she does not understand the nature or extent of either their special educational and/or behavioral health needs, and has drawn the conclusion that she can provide adequate parental care for her older children even though she has a young child because the baby will sleep most of the time. (Tes. Belinda F.)

62 During the months immediately preceding Elian's birth on April 5, 2015, DCF transported the children to visits at their mother's apartment. (Tes. Belinda F.)

I. C. THE CHILDREN

Luis was three years old at the time of the OTC and is now eight; Marializ was two and is now seven. Placed in the same foster home since October 2011, the children are closely bonded to each other.⁶³ Both Luis and Marializ had eczema and asthma when they were removed from Belinda F.'s care, although Luis's conditions were more involved.⁶⁴ During the first days of their foster placement, Luis sometimes had tantrums and engaged in sexualized behaviors with his younger sister.⁶⁵ In April 2012, at DCF's referral, Luis started therapy at the Village for Families and Children (the Village). The provider deemed him too young to benefit from this care; physical separation of the children was sufficient. Luis had difficulty with potty-training and delayed entering day-care until this was accomplished at approximately age three and a half. In December 2013, DCF again referred Luis to the Village for treatment as he was having a difficult time at school and at his foster home, exhibiting tantrumming and crying in way that was inappropriate for a five and a half-year-old, acting in a defiant way and not following directions.⁶⁶ The foster mother did not reliably bring Luis to his second round of scheduled therapy sessions at the Village; the foster mother rejected DCF's offers of assistance with transportation even though the provider desired the child's treatment sessions to be held during the time of day when the foster mother was at work. Luis's negative and oppositional behaviors escalated after Marializ was sexually abused by Santos, Jr., which led to the failure of the reunification with Santos N. planned for February 2014. In the first part of 2014, Luis spent time with his school social worker when he was not being brought to treatment at the Village.⁶⁷ (Ex. 7; Tes. Wendy B., Maritza M., Ama T.)

63 Once a neighbor of Belinda F. and the mother of a young man who became Belinda F.'s friend, the foster mother has known both Luis and Marializ since their births. (Tes. Maritza M., Belinda F.)

64 Luis's eczema can involve significant areas of his skin, causing pain, irritation and burning discomfort to the child. The condition requires medical attention, a specific bathing routine, and prescription therapy when severe outbreaks occur. Any caretaker for Luis and Marializ must protect them from exposure to multiple identified allergens. (Exs. 13, 14; Tes. Maritza M., Zaira R.)

65 Noticed by the foster mother in 2011 after their placement with her, these behaviors included young Luis's asking Marializ to get on top of him, and his statements related to sexual play. (Tes. Wendy B., Maritza M.) Luis's behaviors during the early part of his foster placement, also included smearing feces, urinating on himself, and other signs of trauma. (Tes Ama T.)

66 Although Luis's behaviors had improved after his initial treatment at the Village, after two years in foster care in addition to having difficulty controlling his emotions and crying, DCF reported that he was using language inappropriate for his age, such as " fuck you bitch." (Tes. Ama T.)

67 Luis had been identified as requiring special education services when he was found to have speech delays upon entering kindergarten. A PPT led to termination of his first round of special education services later during his kindergarten year. (Tes. Zaira R.)

In June 2014, just before his sixth birthday and when he had been in foster care for two and a half years, DCF referred Luis to Klingberg Family Centers in Hartford for assessment of the possibility that he had ADHD or PTSD. Luis's oppositional and defiant behaviors had continued and included assaultive conduct at his after-school program, lying and his distressed response to the foster mother's directives. Klingberg diagnosed Luis with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) with symptoms of hyperactivity, problems sleeping, fears and problems concentrating.⁶⁸ Through weekly individual counseling sessions which were continuing as of January 2015 and through consistent responses to his needs by the foster mother, as instructed by the therapist, Luis's behaviors temporarily improved. He became more calm and school reports indicated that he was able to sit still for longer periods; he did not require medication. However, given his lack of academic progress and in view of his specialized behavioral needs, DCF arranged for a PPT meeting to be held for Luis, and for Marializ as well, in the spring of 2015, leading to the implementation of special educational services at school. (Tes. Crivello, Ama T., Zaira R.)

68 For a school aged child like Luis, the symptoms of GAD are similar to those of ADHD. (Tes. Crivello.)

Marializ has special emotional needs related to her history of sexual trauma.⁶⁹ As found in Part I.A., just prior to the planned reunification with Santos N. in an environment that would have allowed Santos, Jr. to have access to her, Marializ revealed that her half-brother Santos, Jr. had " sexually molested her" while the respondent father was not providing the children with supervision. (Ex. Fa-C; see Tes. Dineen Elovich.) Thereafter, Marializ displayed " sexually reactive behaviors; sleeping with her hands on her private parts using inappropriate language and struggling with limits and boundaries." ⁷⁰ (Ex. Fa-C.) This type of sexual contact is traumatic and damaging for a child; its impact is severe, creating a hyperarousal condition within the architecture of the victim's brain that leads to difficulties in regulating physical status and conduct, concentrating in school settings, fear, nightmares, and untoward socialization. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) After DCF referred Marializ to Klingberg Family Center's CATS program, many symptoms consistent with trauma were there observed in Marializ: a lot of fear; physical and verbal aggression toward others; difficulty with fine motor skills, sitting still, paying attention and concentrating, and difficulty learning what is taught in school. Also consistent with trauma, Marializ intentionally urinated on herself at school; through this, she could obtain attention from the school nurse, with whom the child had a positive relationship. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.)

69 In deciding the nature and extent of Marializ's emotional and behavioral health needs, the court has remained aware of the relative inconsistency with which the child was brought to scheduled treatment sessions, and the fact that regular attendance would have enhanced the rate at which she would have benefitted from counseling services. (Ex. Fa-D; Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Valoy, Maritza M.) As found Part IV.I.A., below, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to support any inference that Marializ's attendance at treatment or the role played by the foster parent in obtaining or transporting her to services in any way impacted the respondents' maintenance of a relationship with the child. (See Tes. GAL.)

70 Marializ's precocious sexual activity, which includes public masturbation and sexual exploration that is not age-appropriate, is a symptom of her traumatic sexual abuse. The PTSD symptoms displayed by a child exposed to sexual abuse are in part very similar to the symptoms of ADHD. The court credits the evidence at trial establishing that Marializ does, indeed, suffer from PTSD although she may also be affected by ADHD; either or both conditions is competent to have a significant deleterious impact on the child's academic and social development. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich; Zaira R.)

After evaluation on April 23, 2014 Marializ was diagnosed as a child victim of sexual abuse; the provider recommended " psychoeduation on safe and unsafe touches" through a six-month program of trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy (TFCBT)sessions. (Ex. Fa-C; see Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-D.) A developmentally appropriate model of TFCBT treatment and instruction started on May 23, 2014 for Marializ, utilizing extensive play therapy, painting drawing, and dictation activities conducted by Aurelis Valoy, a Marriage and Family Therapist employed by Klingberg and supervised by LCSW Mary Dineen Elovich who has special skills and experience in working with traumatized children.⁷¹ Marializ has also been taught relaxation skills appropriate for her age, in an effort to enable her to better control her nervous system's response to the past trauma.⁷² Despite some improvement over the years, Marializ has a very difficult time in school, struggling each day to stay on task, requiring removal due to behavioral issues, and exhibiting symptoms of conduct-changes related to her trauma notwithstanding the treatment she has received. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C, Fa-D; Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Zaira R.)

71 In early 2015, Valoy had completed her professional education but was accumulating treatment hours, in conjunction with LCSW Dineen-Elovich's supervision, as a predicate to becoming a licensed Marriage and Family. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Valoy's progress notes are recorded through an electronic system known as " Harmony Social Services." (Ex. Fa-D; Tes. Dineen-Elovich.)

72 Some of the CATS TFCBT sessions also involved Santos N. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C, Fa-D; Tes. Dineen-Elovich.)

Marializ consistently has expressed to CATS staff that she does not trust Santos, Jr. and that she does not want to be near him. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) This child's specialized emotional needs are such that her caregivers must be able and willing to identify and adhere to a designated and appropriate " safety plan at home to prevent Marializ from future sexual victimization." (Ex. Fa-A.) Marializ is only seven years old; while she may know how to engage in age-appropriate actions to avoid sexual abuse, she must rely on the adults in her life to keep her physically and emotionally protected and secure. This child's history of trauma and sexual reactivity requires her to have zero access to her perpetrator Santos, Jr. and mandates that she is supervised on a " 24/7" basis to protect her from future involvement in sexual misconduct of any type. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Like her brother Luis, Marializ's behavioral health needs have been apparent in school, where she is often fidgety, off task, and has difficulty retaining new information and, like Luis, requires special education services in school.⁷³ (Tes. Zaira R.)

73 To address her school issues, Klingberg had referred Marializ to Wheeler Clinic for evaluation by a child psychiatrist. There in May 2015, Marializ was diagnosed with ADHD for which Concerta was prescribed. (Tes. Zaira R.)

Both Luis and Marializ still suffer asthma, and Luis is still affected by eczema; these conditions are chronic, and require a high level of dietary supervision and medical attention children of their ages can only obtain at the direction of qualified health care providers and with the assistance of their caregivers. Luis's asthma is moderate and he uses a nebulizer, as needed, under the supervision of his foster mother. His eczema has been addressed by a physician and an ointment is applied to lesions as they occur. Marializ's asthma is controlled with an inhaler; she uses ointment to address her eczema, as well. (Tes. Wendy B., Maritza M., Zaira M.)

Although the children have been in foster care for many years, they love their biological mother and father, whom they continue to visit regularly under supervision, whom they are happy to see, and with whom they maintain positive bonds. Neither child has asked to live with Santos N. since unsupervised visitation with him ceased. At times, Luis appears very attached to Belinda F., offering spontaneous hugs and at least once asking his DCF social worker why he cannot live with her; Marializ can be diffident and sometimes uncooperative at visits, even though the respondent mother brings toys to visits and engages in appropriate play activities with them. Both children enjoy seeing their half-brother Elian, whom Belinda F. brought to visits while she had custody of her youngest child. (Exs. 2, 5, 6, 7; Tes. Maritza M., Zaira R., Freedman.)

II. ADJUDICATION--INTRODUCTION

General Statutes § 17a-112(j) sets forth the elements DCF must prove by clear and convincing evidence to prevail in this TPR matter as to either or both respondent parents: that " (1) the Department . . . has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."

" '[A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence . . .' (Internal quotation marks and parentheses omitted.) In re Adelina A., 169 Conn.App. 111, n.10, 148 A.3d 621, (2016), quoting In re Joseph M., 158 Conn.App. 849, 859, 120 A.3d 1271 (2015).⁷⁴ In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that continuation of the [parent's] parental rights is not in the best interests of the child." In re Adelina A., supra, 169 Conn.App. 120 n.10, quoting In re Joseph M., supra, 158 Conn.App. 859.

74 In addressing the adjudicatory issues relevant to this case the court has relied upon the adjudicatory date of September 6, 2013. (See Memorandum of Hearing, August 3, 2016.) Generally, " [w]hen making its reasonable efforts determination during the adjudicatory phase, the court is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . . See Practice Book § 35a-7(a) . . .; In re Melody L., [ supra, 290 Conn. 148-49] (reasonable efforts finding is distinct from analysis of whether there exist grounds for termination of parental rights); In re Shaiesha O., [93 Conn.App. 42, 48-49, 49 n.5, 887 A.2d 415 (2006) (in determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child . . . the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed)." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483-84. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, as discussed below, the clear and convincing evidence establishes department made reasonable efforts to reunify both Santos N. and Belinda F. with Luis and Marializ whether the adjudicatory date is September 6, 2013, when the substantive amendment to the TPR petition was implemented, or whether the adjudicatory date is December 12, 2012 when the petition was originally filed. Whichever adjudicatory date applies, as discussed below, the clear and convincing evidence further establishes that both Santos N. and Belinda F. are unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. Accordingly, DCF has prevailed on the relevant elements of § 17a-112(j)(1).

Construing § 17a-112(j)(1)'s " reasonable efforts . . . to reunify" element, our courts have explained that " 'The reasonableness of the department's efforts must be assessed in the context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible . . . [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872-73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014)." In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 183, 104 A.3d 805 (2014), aff'd, 319 Conn. 775, 127 A.3d 948 (2015). See also In re Chevol G., 125 Conn.App. 618, 621, 9 A.3d 413 (2010). " '[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.' (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)" In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 205, 15 A.3d 194 (2011), quoting In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552-53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).

The court first addresses the adjudicatory location efforts made by the department in the context of the pending TPR issues related to its § 17a-112(j)(1) allegations as to Santos N. and Belinda F. So doing, the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to maintain consistent contact with the respondents in this case, although both Belinda F. and Santos N. have moved from time to time. Accordingly, DCF has met its burden of proving that it made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parents, as alleged in the TPR petition.

II. A. SANTOS N.--§ 17a-112(j)(1) EFFORTS

The court next finds that clear and convincing evidence also establishes both that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Santos N. during the adjudicatory period and that the respondent-father was " unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).⁷⁵ Thus, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

75 See, In re Paul O., supra, 141 Conn.App. 483-84; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 621; In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn. 205.

II. A.1. REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

DCF's reunification efforts for Santos N. during the adjudicatory phase were reasonable in view of the father's status as the parent of many young children including Santos, Jr. who is alleged to have sexually abused Marializ, and his working memory and cognitive challenges, identified by Dr. Freedman during his first evaluation.⁷⁶ DCF's multiple reasonable reunification efforts for Santos N. during the relevant adjudicatory phase included: case management and administrative case reviews, some of which were attended by Radiance staff to support Santos N.; foster care, medical attention, educational and developmental support for Luis and Marializ; written communication and oral conversation concerning referrals to service providers; and close exploration of paternal relatives as placement resources, albeit the paternal grandmother's medical history impeded her provision of care for Luis and Marializ. Also, as described in Part I, those efforts for Santos N. extended prior to September 6, 2013 included referrals: in February through October 2011 for in-home family preservation services; to Radiance for two-hour weekly visits with the children commencing October 2011, supervised by credentialed personnel, commencing in October 2011, and with transportation to visits provided by Radiance for the children; to Wheeler Clinic's twelve-week Dove Program with an anger management component to address his identified issues related to domestic violence; direct DCF assistance in securing an apartment; to the Supportive Housing service which provided rent, general budgeting and relocation assistance; to Radiance's one-on-one parenting mentoring services incorporating supervised visitation and the support of close monitoring by Radiance's Davis.⁷⁷ (Exs. 2, 6, 36, 38, 40; Tes. Wendy B., Ama T., Davis.) In addition, through Radiance Santos N. was engaged in the Hartford Literacy Program for many years in an effort to acquire basic reading and writing skills.⁷⁸ (Exs. 2, 6, 7; Tes. Ama T., Davis.)

76 As found in Part I.A., both the DOVE which commenced in October 2011 program and the Radiance fatherhood program, which commenced in May 2012 and continued through February 2014, delivered services to Santos N. that met his cognitive needs. (Tes. Wendy B., Davis, Freedman.) Dr. Freedman specifically and credibly opined that the one-on-one Radiance program had established a clear rapport between mentor and the respondent father, enabling him to learn to the best of his capacity, and providing services, including the parent-mentoring, that were not only reasonable, but were fully appropriate for Santos N. (Tes. Freedman.)

77 As previously discussed, the court has concluded that Radiance's one on one parenting education and parent-coaching services were reasonable and appropriate reunification efforts for Santos N., particularly in view of the dedication and flexible instructional methodologies demonstrated to the respondent father by his mentor, Davis. (See Exs. 2, 7; Tes. Davis, Freedman.)

78 Neither Santos N. nor Belinda F. has provided any basis, in law or reason, upon which the court could conclude that in providing reunification services, DCF is obligated to duplicate services already available to a parent. See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

As found in Part I, at DCF's referral, Luis started treatment at the Village in April 2012 to address his sexualized behaviors toward Marializ. Although the provider determined that Luis was too young to benefit from treatment, at DCF's referral Santos N. participated in Luis's therapy while it was available. DCF also offered the foster mother assistance with transportation to facilitate both children's attendance at behavioral health treatment. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C, Fa-D; Tes. Crivello, Dineen-Elovich, Valoy, Maritza M., Ama T.) These referrals by DCF during the adjudicatory period constitute a reasonable effort at reunification within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(1) insofar as the respondent father is concerned.

II. A.2. UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO BENEFIT FROM EFFORTS

Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is manifest in many aspects of the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial. Starting in February of 2011, when DCF made in-home family preservation services available to him in an effort to prevent the children's removal from parental care, Santos N. was unable or unwilling to participate, asserting that his work schedule prevented him from meeting with the provider. For many months after their removal Santos N. was unable or unwilling to comply with the instructions clearly provided by DCF informing him on numerous occasions that Luis and Marializ could not be given certain foods to eat, as the children had allergies to those foods; he so long remained unable or unwilling to accept the fact that ingesting these identified allergens would cause or exacerbate the children's eczema conditions that the court declines to credit his claim that he now adheres to feeding protective protocols based on his understanding of the risk of exposure.⁷⁹ (Tes. Wendy B., Santos N.; see Tes. Maritza M.)

79 By the time of Santos N.'s testimony, Luis was nearly eight years old and Marializ was nearly seven. Despite their behavioral health issues, the court received no evidence from which it could infer that are not yet at the age or stage of development at which they can understand their need to refrain from eating certain foods to avoid eczema outbreaks.

Further evidence of the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification services is apparent in the very limited progress he made in developing adequate parenting or personal skills, despite Radiance's intensive one-on-one mentoring services. By December 2013, although he was holding part-time employment, Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from all the individual father-related, impulse control and parent-behavior monitoring services provided by Radiance and Davis was clearly and convincingly apparent in his use of his phone to view inappropriate images on the school van, in front of students who were subjected to his misconduct when he was supposed to be supervising them.⁸⁰ By February 2014, despite Radiance's services and Davis's mentoring, Santos N. was still unable to perform without full support the basic management tasks required of a parent, such as locating community supports for the children, assessing available day care facilities, communicating with social service support agencies, enrolling or registering the children for school and other services; he required a significant amount of support and could not manage these fundamental parental obligations on his own.⁸¹ Again notwithstanding his Radiance services and the high degree of support he received through Davis's individual mentoring, the respondent father did not benefit even by acquiring a minimum level of parental judgment regarding the need to provide an appropriate environment in which to be reunified with Luis and Marializ. This is apparent in the evidence clearly and convincingly establishing that he remained unable or unwilling to follow DCF's reasonable instruction, given prior to the February 2014, that although Luis and Marializ could have weekend visits with him, Cindaliz, Santos, Jr., Yamaria, Tamara F. and her children, there could be no accumulated family overnights at Santos N.'s residence.⁸² Instead of following DCF's directive to prohibit mass overnights at his home, a directive reasonably related to keeping Luis and Marializ safe and able to secure the attention of their biological father during overnight visits, Santos N. and Tamara F. made their own decision to create a less stable, more risky environment with multiple children assembled for overnight stays. Also, as found in Part I., Santos N. had commenced working with the Hartford Literacy Program in June 2013; Radiance assisted Santos N. in accessing this service. However, by June 2014 after a year of work with literacy instruction and after years of support by Radiance, Santos N. had not yet benefitted from his reading instruction and required help from the Klingberg therapist in completing the parent's ADHD screening form for Luis. (Ex. 34; Tes. Criveilo, Ama T.)

80 Reasonably DCF informed father's mentor, Davis and the Radiance service provider about the subject of the school social worker's report to the Care Line; reasonably, DCF determined that Davis and Radiance would be the appropriate resource to address and word to remediate this aspect of Santos N.'s conduct. (Tes. Ama T.)

81 Even after Radiance transitioned him to IFP, the documents placed in evidence by Santos N. reflect the high degree of support he still needed, after a year and a half of individual parenting education and counseling sessions with his mentor, to begin to participate in such basic parental tasks as identifying school providers, housing resources and access to rental deposits, locating the children's records and obtaining health insurance for the children. Just as he had been unable or unwilling to benefit from prior aspects of Radiance's individual support efforts, Santos N. was unable or unwilling to benefit from this IFP service sufficiently to be able to accomplish any of these tasks on his own from December 6, 2013 through February 10, 2014; on that latter date, when IFP ended, it was Davis, not Santos N., who contacted Luis's proposed elementary school and Marializ's proposed day care center " to inform them of the 'hold' on reunification . . ." (Ex. Fa-H.)

82 Reasonably, as soon as DCF learned that Santos N. was allowing Marializ and Luis to have overnight visits with all the other available half-siblings including Santos, Jr. and Miguel C., sleep overnight at the respondent father's two bedroom home, the department instructed him that such overnight arrangements could not occur. (Tes. Ama T.)

Similarly, by April of 2014, Santos N. after almost two years of parenting education, support and one-on-one services through Radiance, although Davis, the father's Radiance mentor, " believe[d] reunification is appropriate, " the father still had not benefitted from the exhaustive efforts extended to him and still had not acquired sufficient skills in the fundamental areas of household management and managing blended families.⁸³ (Ex. L.) As of April 16, 2014, Radiance's Davis admitted that Santos N. still required work even more work with the fatherhood program on subjects he had previously discussed with the respondent-father; the subjects still requiring discussion included: " a focus on safeguarding and providing closer supervision" of his young children, along with " household management" and " managing blended families . . ." ⁸⁴ (Ex. 41.) Thus, there is sufficient basis for concluding that even though Santos N. had participated in Radiance's intensive parent education program for months and months, which one-on-one program delivered through a dedicated, well-intentioned mentor was reasonably appropriate to meet the respondent father's cognitive and functional levels, Santos N. had remained unable or unwilling to measurably benefit from that program within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(1).⁸⁵ (Ex. L; Tes. Davis.) This conclusion is further supported by the clear and convincing evidence establishing that on April 17, 2014, the day after writing to inform DCF of his opinion that Santos N. had sufficiently benefitted from services that he was ready for reunification with Luis and Marializ, Radiance's Davis changed his mind, having been informed that the result of the department's investigation of the events of February 2014, described in Part I. involving Santos, Jr.'s misconduct with Marializ, even though although the respondent " [f]ather was unaware that this had occurred as he was in the bathroom at the time." ⁸⁶ (Ex. 41.) Under these circumstances, Radiance's Davis not only identified Santos N.'s continued need for efforts related to identification and implementation of safety plans and supervision for Luis, Marializ and Cindaliz, as well as household management in general and management of blended families; he also expressed concern about the findings related to Marializ's sexual abuse while unsupervised by Santos N. While not foreclosing the option for reunification, although the respondent father had already received an extraordinary level of support from Radiance at DCF's referral, on April 17, 2014 Davis found it " clear that a supervision plan should be in place prior to reunification and the resumption of weekend visits." (Ex. 41.) This need, identified by Davis after years of parenting and personal development services, again establishes that Santos N. was unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts.⁸⁷

83 By April 30, 2013, Radiance's parenting mentor Davis had already provided Santos N. with instruction and guidance regarding issues related to " 'blending' successfully . . ." (Ex. Fa-K.) While Davis then opined that " Santos continues to do well in the parenting program" by that date, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father needed continual reinforcement and supervision to retain or implement any of the information that had been provided to him; that he still needed instruction and information on the subject of blending families a full year later; and that he only appeared to be benefitting from the Radiance program without actually doing so. (Ex. Fa-K.)

84 At trial, Radiance's parenting educator and mentor admitted that when he stopped working with Santos N. in the first part of 2014, the respondent father's ability to be an agent for his own change was " still a work in progress, " or using words of similar import. (Tes. Davis.) The court acknowledges Davis's testimony proffered to establish that by the end of his work with him Santos N. had, all by himself, procured a driver's license, a cell phone, and a motor vehicle properly registered in his own name. (Tes. Davis.) Nonetheless, the evidence of Santos N.'s circumstances in subsequent years indicates no change from that condition observed in 2014 after he was the recipient of long-term, intensive services. The respondent-father's stagnant status supports the court's conclusion that he is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).

85 Davis had rendered other opinions that were extremely supportive of the defendant father, writing on November 30, 2013, for instance, that " Santos has done a tremendous job with the parenting education program." (Ex. Fa-I.) Given the evidence as a whole, the court finds insufficient basis upon which to give any credit to this opinion other than to accept the fact that Santos N. had attended one-on-one parent education sessions with Davis for a year and a half by the date his mentor tendered that conclusion. (Ex. Fa-I.) As discussed below, Santos N.'s trial testimony, which clearly and convincingly evinced his inability or unwillingness to utilize any knowledge or information about the parenting education he received through Radiance and/or the tools he was taught at Klingberg relevant to the impact of sexual abuse on a child and the need to protect children from such harm, is markedly inconsistent with the April 16, 2014 written opinion rendered by the father's Radiance parenting mentor Davis. (Ex. Fa-L; Tes. Santos N., Davis.) Balancing the weight of the evidence overall, including but not limited to evidence of Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from the efforts represented by his long one-on-one fatherhood services through Radiance, and considering the highly credible written and testimonial opinions rendered by Dr. Freedman and Dineen-Elovich discussed in other parts of this decision, if Davis's April 16, 2014 opinion is to be credited at all, it may reflect that Santos N. was able to demonstrate some benefit from the Radiance program when he was under Davis's direct supervision. The court otherwise declines to credit the content of Davis's April 16, 2014 opinion concerning reunification not only because of the better, weightier evidence establishing Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to retain the content of any safety-related instruction he had learned, but also because Davis was aligned with and so biased in favor of the respondent father; his testimony evinced a high degree of interest in having the Radiance program succeed notwithstanding Santos N.'s actual benefit. As discussed herein, after submitting his April 16, 2014 written opinion in support of reunification Davis himself recognized that this conclusion was premature and-based on insufficient information; (Exs. 34, 41, Fa-C; Tes. Davis, Santos N., Freedman, Ama T., Zaira R., Dineen-Elovich.)

86 The court does not condone DCF's April 2014 solicitation of an opinion from Davis regarding reunification without first having informed the Radiance mentor that Marializ had been exposed sexual abuse in father's home during February 2014. However, the department's delay in disclosure does not enhance the reliability of Davis's premature opinion that reunification should proceed, written on April 16, 2014. (Exs. 41, Fa-L.)

87 In concluding that Santos N. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court credits Davis's testimony establishing that despite the firm relationship the parent educator had ostensibly developed with the respondent father during approximately two years of work together, the client contacted Radiance or Davis a few times in the summer of 2015 and into early 2015; but despite this contact, Santos N. never asked Davis for additional guidance, assistance or support. (Tes. Davis.)

Moreover, as late as September 3, 2014, DCF was still working with Klingberg CATS staff to address Marializ's particular needs and to assess whether or not Santos N. was developing any insight into the implications of Marializ's sexual abuse in his home; aware of Klingberg's opinion as to his progress as measured by his response to the CATS family sessions, at that time DCF was still conducting its own independent evaluation of the respondent father's actual understanding of his need to protect his children from harm and his overall parenting capacity, taking his entire history into consideration while considering the CATS providers' impressions.⁸⁸ (Exs. FaD, Fa-F; Tes. Zaira R.) Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is further manifest in the outcome of his participation in the parent counseling element of the CATS program, designed to ensure that Marializ was protected from sexual victimization. (Exs. Fa-A, Fa-B.) Although Santos N. appeared to " join in and engage in treatment, " to respond appropriately to the child's needs during family sessions, to know how to set and implement behavioral limits, and to have, with the CATS therapist, " created a safety plan" to be implemented at home, clear and convincing evidence compels either the inference that the respondent father never really learned the skills CATS showed him he needed to implement to keep Marializ safe, the inference that he was unwilling to apply the safety plan, or the inference that he was unable or unwilling to accept the fact that his daughter's specialized needs required the security inherent in such a plan.⁸⁹ (Ex. Fa-B; see Exs. Fa-A, Fa-C.) In the summer and fall of 2014, although a CATS therapist concluded that Santos N. could " understand and proactively meet Marializ's emotional needs, " the totality of the clear and convincing trial evidence establishes that this conclusion is entitled to little weight. (Ex. Fa-B.) For instance, although Santos N. had informed the CATS staff that he would depend upon family for support and supervision of his children to prevent any future sexual assault upon Marializ, the respondent father was unable or unwilling to provide any specifics as to which family members he could rely upon for this purpose.⁹⁰ Similarly, he was unwilling or unable to provide any specifics as to how he would protect Marializ if he was the only adult available and had, as an example, to temporarily absent himself to use the bathroom.⁹¹ He had only one concrete response to the instruction CATS had taught concerning the need for a safety plan that would protect Marializ by setting boundaries; this involved Santos N.'s decision that, for privacy, she would dress and undress in the bathroom. Such a plan, however, did not take into consideration the child's need for protection at times other than when she was changing her clothes. Without these fundamental specifics, although Santos N. had attended the CATS parenting counseling and family therapy services and even if he had developed some insight into the impact of Santos, Jr.'s sexual abuse upon Marializ, the respondent father proved unable or unwilling to benefit to the extent necessary to create and implement a plan that would be sufficient to keep her, or any vulnerable child, safe and secure if the child was in his custody. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich; Claudio-Cruz.)

88 In addition to the referrals prior to September 6, 2013, DCF also referred Santos N. to the CATS program which he attended as required from April through October 2014, as found in Part I.A.; Marializ was treated and evaluated by CATS therapists during this same period. The respondent father attended CATS family sessions with Marializ through October 2014. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C.)

89 The court acknowledges that Santos N. told the CATS parent counselor that he was benefitting from the psychoeducation she was providing, and further acknowledges that he seemed to understand the impact of the sexual abuse on Marializ. (Tes. Claudio-Cruz.) Neither aspect is sufficient to mitigate the other clear and convincing evidence establishing that despite Klingberg's services to him, Santos N. remained unable or willing to benefit sufficiently to be able to identify or implement a valid, reliable and functional safety plan that would protect Marializ who did not want to be near her abuser, Santos N. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.)

90 Although no details about these resources were made known to the department or to the court, DCF was aware that Luis and Marializ's paternal grandfather was sometimes available to assist Santos N. with transporting children to medical appointments, as was Santos N.'s sister. (Tes. Zaira R.)

91 For instance, Santos N. had never informed the department of a safety plan according to which he would forgo bringing Marializ into a family setting in which Santos, Jr. was also present, even though Marializ had made it clear that she did not want to be around her perpetrator. Instead, he persists in finding more value to having all of his many children assembled together, even in overnight settings although they may not all live in the same household, than he finds in the need to reassure Marializ that she will be protected from the potential of further sexual abuse by Santos, Jr., which could easily be accomplished by keeping the half-brother in a physically separate environment from that occupied by Marializ. Tamara F. cannot serve as an adequate supervisor for Marializ when Santos, Jr. is present; as of November 22, 2014, Tamara F. did not believes that the sexual abuse occurred. She have never indicated a willingness, let alone any ability, to act so as to prevent any contact between these children in the future. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Zaira R.)

Santos N.'s own testimony at trial poignantly, but emphatically, further establishes his inability or unwillingness to benefit even from combination of the broad-based, wrap-around, parenting and life-skills services extended to him through the one-on-one Radiance fatherhood program, through his more recent work with Luis at Klingberg, and/or parent element of the CATS program in which Marializ remains involved. During his trial testimony in late April 2016, Santos N. was unable or unwilling to recall any particular content of the therapeutic services that Klingberg had rendered to Luis and/or to him during the summer of 2014, less than two years earlier; without such recollection of what he had been taught, even if Luis had finished his treatment at Klingberg, Santos N. had not acquired a benefit from this reasonable reunification effort.⁹² As previously found, when the events of February 2014 involving Santos N.'s sexual conduct with Marializ were reported to him, Santos N. did not believe that anything of that nature had actually occurred. At trial, when asked about those events, Santos N. demurred and deflected questions asked of him, proving unable or unwilling to discuss the event in any meaningful manner.⁹³ Despite his involvement with the parenting aspect of Marializ's work at the CATS program, his inability or unwillingness to have benefitted from that service was clearly and convincingly apparent in his inability or unwillingness to relate what he had learned; he merely reported that his daughter had been taught a lot of things, and that her caretakers had to show her a lot of love so she could forget that it had happened. Santos N. claimed to have worked with the CATS staff to have developed a plan to keep Marializ safe but, at trial, he was unable or unwilling to reliably recall anything about such plan, other than that he would have another adult in the house to watch the children if he was off taking a shower. (Tes. Santos N.)

92 Santos N.'s trial testimony which, as previously discussed, clearly and convincingly evinced his inability or unwillingness to utilize any knowledge or information about the tools he was taught at Klingberg relevant to the impact of sexual abuse on a child and the need to protect children from such harm, is markedly inconsistent with the August 29, 2014 opinion rendered by Klingberg and inconsistent with the related evidence adduced from the author at trial. Balancing the weight of the evidence overall, including but not limited to evidence of Santos N.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from the efforts represented by his long one-on-one fatherhood services through Radiance, and considering the highly credible written and testimonial opinions rendered by Dr. Freedman, if Klingberg's August 29, 2014 opinion is to be credited at all, it could establish that the respondent father had benefitted from services to the extent table that he could demonstrate that benefit during sessions supervised by CATS staff, but not under any other circumstances. (Exs. 34, 41, Fa-F, Fa-L; Tes. Claudio, Santos N., Freedman, Ama T., Zaira R., Dineen-Elovich.)

93 This aspect of Santos N.'s testimony is further evident in his choice of words to at trial with which to describe the events that the CATS treatment providers have identified as Santos, Jr.'s sexual misconduct with his younger sister, or using words of similar import. (See Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Santos N. now refers to the unsupervised physical and provocatively verbal contact between his son Santos, Jr. and his daughter Marializ in February 2014 as being an " accident" or even an " incident, " although Marializ, DCF and the foster mother had told him what happened. (Tes. Santos N.) Even after his parenting education through Radiance, and even after his involvement with Klingberg's CATS program, Santos N. minimized the sexualized nature of the contact between his son and his daughter, accepting Santos, Jr.'s explanation that he had given Marializ " a wedgie" without acknowledging the sexual abuse that had occurred. (Tes. Santos N.; see Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) The poignant lack of benefit from reasonable reunification efforts is further evident in Santos N.'s response to school-aged Luis's decision to use a camera to take a photograph of his " private parts." Santos N.'s response was limited to removing the camera from the child, telling him that it was not a " nice" thing to do, and denying any responsibility for the conduct because the child had not learned such conduct from the father. (Tes. Santos N.) Santos N.'s failure to benefit from the CATS counseling and therapy with Marializ is clearly apparent in that even in 2016, he remained unable or unwilling to access appropriate professional attention to ensure that Luis did not engage in further like behavior; the respondent father and was unable or unwilling to provide or implement any safety plan that would restrict Luis's access to any camera other than the video-game the child had used to take that photograph. (Tes. Freedman, Dineen-Elovich.)

Thus, by the summer of 2016, if Santos N. in fact had benefitted from this reunification effort by actually gaining that understanding and capacity to provide proper care for this child, that benefit no longer had any effect.⁹⁴ Without the direct supervision of the CATS therapist, Santos N. remains unable or unwilling to implement a safety plan to protect Marializ from further sexual victimization, unable or unwilling to access appropriate and available family support to ensure her safety, and unable or unwilling even to identify the parameters of the safety plan that this child requires. (Tes. Santos N., Zaira R.) Thus, the court is constrained to conclude that Santos N. has not benefitted from the CATS parent element of the reunification efforts within the application of § 17a-112(j)(1), just as he had not measurably benefitted in developing even minimum parenting skills despite his years of work with Radiance and Davis.⁹⁵

94 Asked at trial how he would protect Marializ from any sexual misconduct in his home if reunification occurred, the respondent-father was evasive, and stated that this line of questioning was too much for him. Pressed, he merely naively and poignantly informed the court that such events would not occur again, and that if it did, Marializ would call 911. (Tes. Santos N.) Such a response clearly and convincingly indicates his inability or unwillingness to benefit from § 17a-112(j)(1) efforts, and his continuing inability or unwillingness to either understand the severity of the impact of the sexual abuse Marializ has experienced, or the need to provide appropriate parental supervision to protect such from occurring in the future.

95 Santos N. may argue that DCF cannot prevail on the § 17a-112(j)(1) element of its TPR claim because the department failed to timely inform him of his opportunity to be present at a PPT for Luis and Marializ that was held on a rescheduled day in May 2015 and/or because he was not referred to a new Reunification Assessment Plan at the Village even though he had made progress over the years. (See Tes. Zaira R.) While the court does not condone DCF's failure to provide the father with the opportunity to be present at the PPT, there is no evidence upon which it could reasonably conclude that Santos N.'s participation would have changed his inability or unwillingness to benefit from any aspect of reunification efforts. Similarly, he may argue that DCF cannot prevail on its claim that he is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts because the department did not refer him to individual counseling, such as an available non-offender's program, to address what had happened in February 2014. There is no evidence upon which it could reasonably conclude that if Santos N. had been referred to the Village plan or to individual counseling, even if he was able to find time to attend sessions notwithstanding his work schedule, he would have done nothing more than be present at sessions, without obtaining the benefit from such a reunification effort as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). (Tes. Zaira R., Davis, Ama T.) To the contrary, the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from other services such as the Radiance long-term one-on-one parent education and life-coaching program, would support the inference that he would not have obtained a benefit if he had been referred to any additional services.

II. B. BELINDA F.--§ 17a-112(j)(1) EFFORTS

Clear and convincing evidence also establishes both that although DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Belinda F. during the adjudicatory period and that the respondent-mother was " unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). Thus, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element as to the mother.

II. B.1. REASONABLE REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

DCF's reunification efforts for Belinda F. during the adjudicatory phase were reasonable in view of the mother's past trauma history, transience, poor personal judgment, parenting deficits and recurrent drug use.⁹⁶ DCF's multiple reunification efforts for the respondent mother during the relevant adjudicatory phase included: case management and administrative case reviews, medical attention, educational and developmental support for Luis and Marializ; referrals to domestic violence shelters and related services through the Hartford Police Department in response to abuse by Victor G.; bus passes for transportation to services; written communication and oral conversation concerning referrals to service providers; and close assessment of maternal relative placement resources, albeit the requisite paperwork was never submitted to the department by the identified maternal relative. Also, as described in Part I, those efforts extended prior to September 6, 2013 included referrals: in the first part of 2011: to IFP and to B-2-3 for assistance in developing Belinda F.'s understanding of and response to the needs of her two toddlers and to My People Clinical for case management and parenting classes. In July 2011, DCF referred Belinda F. to Williams for individual therapy and referral for medication management services, related to her Major Depressive Disorder Recurrent Moderate, PTSD, and limited support system. In the fall of 2011, the department referred Belinda F. for substance abuse evaluation and serial drug screening at Catholic Charities; to Dr. Kurtakoti and subsequently to a second medical provider, through Williams, so the mother could obtain medication to manage her overt depression and to improve her mental health functional status and; to CRT's intensive outpatient clinic for evaluation and treatment of mood instability, PTSD and cannabis use; transported the children to provided two hour weekly visits, supervised by the department and by credentialed Radiance personnel for a period of time; and provided twelve weeks of parent mentoring, parent education and case management through Radiance commencing in December 2011. During the summer of 2013, at DCF's referral, Belinda F. had started anger management, domestic violence, and parent education services at the FIC. (Exs. 2, 25, 26, 27, 29, 35, 36, 37, 39; Tes. Wendy B., Williams, Ama T.)

96 In determining both the reasonableness of reunification efforts and Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from such efforts, the court acknowledges that DCF never engaged the mother in CATS-related counseling. The court further acknowledges that Belinda F. was fully aware of the sexual trauma involving Marializ and Santos, Jr. in 2014 and that the mother was consistently engaged with DCF and/or service providers thereafter, yet she was never able or willing to focus enough on her daughter's needs to even inquire about access to family therapy directed at this subject. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) However, the court further acknowledges the extensive reunification efforts delivered to Belinda F. by the department prior to the October 11, 2011 OTC: the respondent mother " had participated in two rounds of family preservation services, with 'marginal results'; she participated only inconsistently with in-home services provided by My People Clinical Services; had support from Radiance for substance abuse issues; and had assistance from the Hispanic Health Council's parent aide. (Ex. 6.) Through Catholic Charities, she had started to attend GED classes, " and she also attended programs for young parents at the Village for Children and Families." (Ex. 6.) In addition, Belinda F. had received mental health care, and " had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder" in approximately 2010-2011. (Ex. 6.)

As previously noted and as found in Part I, at DCF's referral, Luis started treatment at the Village in April 2012 to address his sexualized behaviors toward Marializ. Although the provider determined that Luis was too young to benefit from treatment, this referral also constitutes a reasonable effort at reunification within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(1). Similarly, DCF's proffer of transportation assistance so the foster mother could better enable Luis to attend behavioral health sessions, also constitute § 17a-112(j)(1) reasonable reunification efforts as to Belinda F., as improvements in this child's behavioral health status was relevant to her capacity to parent the child. (Exs. 11, Fa-A, Fa-B, Fa-C, Fa-D; Tes. Crivello, Valoy, Dineen-Elovich, Maritza M., Ama T.)

II. B.2. UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO BENEFIT FROM EFFORTS

Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is manifest in the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial. Despite her access to in-home services such as IFP and B-2-3, and notwithstanding her access to My People Clinical for case management and parenting classes, by the summer of 2011 Belinda F. was still not responding to the children's cues for attention in addressing her own needs, and presented as isolated in her apartment. After DCF's July 2011 referral for individual counseling with Williams, the mother attended fourteen scheduled sessions but although she had no children in her care at that time, still had not attended five scheduled meetings with the counselor as of December 13, 2011.⁹⁷ Belinda F. made little or no progress despite the counseling she did attend with Williams, thus remaining continuing to struggle with her home, her finances, and her health insurance, as well as with her children's foster care status; even though she was involved in mental health treatment during this period, she regularly complained of being overwhelmed until the OTC was implemented on October 11, 2011, as found in Part I. (Ex. 26; Tes. Wendy B., Williams.) Moreover, as previously found, Williams referred the mother to Dr. Kurtakoti, a physician who could prescribe medication to help manage the depression which was " interfering with her ability to have the motivation to find employment and housing to help her situation, " and subsequently to another provider whose medication-prescription services Belinda F. did not attend. (Ex. 26; see Tes. Williams.) It was apparent, however, that despite the counseling she had received Belinda F. remained unable or unwilling to care for her own needs, even by following through in a way that would secure her needed access to medication for her depression. (Ex. 26.) Belinda F.'s lack of benefit from Williams's individual counseling is clearly and convincingly evident through that skilled and experienced provider's determination, in June 2012, that the respondent mother was non-compliant, and so should be discharged from Circle of Life services. (Tes. Williams.)

97 The court does not attach any weight to Williams's statement that " [t]he client is compliant" under the circumstances of this case, other than the application of the comment to Belinda F.'s decision to be present at counseling sessions. (Ex. 26.)

Belinda F. was unable or unwilling to benefit from the serial drug testing services provided to her by DCF at Catholic Charities. Even though the mother knew or should have known that she would be subject to random drug testing from her referral in the summer of 2011 and again in October 2011 through June of 2012 when her last test was performed there, Belinda F. consistently tested positive for marijuana use and of ten positive for use of cocaine; her test results were negative only one occasion, as found in Part I, clearly and convincingly establishing her inability or unwillingness to benefit from this valid surveillance service.

As found in Part I, Belinda F. also had mental health and substance abuse support treatment available for her through DCF's September 2012 referral to CRT, until her unsuccessful discharge by this provider in March 2013. Despite the medication and services provided through CRT, Belinda F. again she failed to make reasonable progress and did not measurably improve her functioning, or her ability to cope with the ordinary stressors or life. (Ex. 27; Tes. Ama T.) Even though she admitted " some improvement in mood" with the use of the various antidepressant medications provided by CRT, and even though had access to peer group sessions where she could process her internal struggles and receive support, Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from this reunification effort was manifest in her poor attendance and failure to attend scheduled medication management appointments.⁹⁸ Client was then compliant for a period of time before she stopped showing for appointments despite several attempts made by clinician to re-engage." (Ex. 27.) Her March 2013 unsuccessful discharge from CRT followed a month of absence from treatment after a last urine screen tested positive for marijuana use. She did not attain the provider's goals of experiencing less depression, reducing drug abuse, or learning coping skills, and had " unresolved goals" upon discharge despite the length and extent of services provided to and made available for her. (Ex. 27.) However, consistent with the pattern of using illegal drugs, undergoing treatment, relapsing and using drugs again as discussed in Part I, CRT's discharge report reflects the chronicity and intractable status of Belinda F.'s use of drug use which is refractory to treatment, resulting only in time-limited periods of sobriety, inconsistent from functional benefit of this valid, appropriate reunification service: " Client's use of cannabis decreased over course of treatment until final week when client reported relapsed a second time. Client's last urine toxicology screen (1/25/13) was positive for marijuana." (Ex. 27.) Moreover, although had CRT referred Belinda F. to additional treatment at the IOP, the evidence supports the inference that the respondent mother declined to follow this aspect of CRT's recommendations, either.

98 Belinda F. was unwilling or unable to attend, and thus unable or unwilling to benefit from, CRT's medication management notwithstanding the provider's use of a " behavioral contract due to non compliance with attendance." (Ex. 27.)

Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts also is clearly and convincingly apparent in use of illegal drugs which continued after attending FIC's IOP in the summer of 2013, and in her decision to start FIC's anger management, domestic violence and parenting programs in Hartford, but not to finish those services before moving to Waterbury to live with Luis T., even though FIC's services were designed to facilitate rehabilitation with her children.⁹⁹ Belinda F. claims that after completing IOP at FIC to address her substance abuse issues, attending three-hour sessions three days a week, she understood that the provider recommended further therapy; however, instead of following the provider's direction, Belinda F. decided to forgo further treatment and to obtain employment at the laundry instead. Her inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts by way of substance abuse and mental health treatment is further evident in the fact that after leaving FIC in the early fall of 2013, Belinda F. did not participate in any services at all, leaving herself without necessary support services until after mid-2014. In response to DCF's repeated efforts to encourage her to remain in treatment, however, the mother rebuffed DCF's support and recommendations, claiming to be unable to attend therapeutic sessions due to work obligations.¹⁰⁰ (Tes. Ama T., Zaira R., Belinda F.)

99 Belinda F. claims credit for having referred herself to a parenting class at the Hispanic Health Council in 2012. She admits that she started, but did not finish, another parenting class, supporting the court's conclusion that she was unwilling to benefit from the second round of parenting education, which was likely available through FIC. (Tes. Belinda F.)

100 The court credits the evidence clearly and convincingly establishing that DCF proffered continuing substance abuse and mental health treatment to Belinda F., and declines to credit the respondent mother's claim that she received no such referrals. (Tes. Ama T., Zaira R., Belinda F.)

Belinda F. did engage in an intake evaluation at Perspectives, a Waterbury-based provider, in September 2014 upon the recommendation of her pre-natal provider.¹⁰¹ However even the results of that evaluation emphasize the mother's inability or unwillingness to benefit from the counseling services and/or the substance abuse support that had been extended to her through B-2-3, Williams, CRT, and Catholic Charities. As found in Part I, the mother claimed to have stopped using drugs as of January 2014 and that she was " in remission, " but admitted to Perspectives that when she stopped her drug use, she was using " 7-8 blunts per day"; this would have been taking place during the approximately one year of her absence from mental health and/or substance abuse treatment. (Ex. 31; see Tes. Belinda F.) Belinda F.'s social judgment appeared to the Perspectives staff to be fair but, significantly and despite all the services she had received in the past, including the years of counseling she reported having undergone as a youth, her " insight into problems [still] appear[ed] to be poor." (Ex. 31.) While the mother may have attended a variety of counseling sessions, understood that she was engaging in group therapy as well as relapse prevention services, and while she on occasion cooperated with the mental health medication management offered to her by various providers, her depression and behavioral issues remained unresolved, unremediated, and intact. Even though she claimed to have learned at Perspectives how to avoid using marijuana if it was offered to her Belinda F. remained unable or unwilling to benefit from these reunification efforts available to her during the summer and fall of 2014, as is clearly and convincingly apparent by the relapse that always follows, as it did during late 2015 while the TPR trial was ongoing, any period of abstinence.¹⁰² (Ex. 31; Tes. Belinda F.)

101 See, In re Roshawn R., supra, 51 Conn.App. 56-57 (no need for DCF to duplicate services being provided to a parent).

102 The fact that Belinda F. continued to her substance abuse after leaving Perspectives renders unpersuasive any aspect of her claim to have benefitted from this provider by learning how to cope with what she has and doesn't have, how to express herself, and how to stay away from drugs. (Exs. 30, 32, 33, 42, G; Tes. Belinda F.)

Sadly, Belinda F.'s lack of insight into the severity and chronic nature of her mental health and substance abuse issues, and her lack of ability or willingness to benefit from services provided to her from DCF's first involvement with Luis and Marializ through the fall of 2015 is clearly and convincingly apparent from the respondent mother's naive assumption, held prior to her November 2015 return to Catholic Charities for treatment, that she thought she would never relapse again; because she held that erroneous assumption, she disregarded the recommendation of substance abuse providers who had consistently referred her to ongoing after care.¹⁰³ (Tes. Belinda F.) In appropriate response to Belinda F.'s apparent unwillingness or inability to comply with the service referrals as found in Part I.B. and further discussed in Part III.B., and in view of the respondent mother's continuing substance abuse and mental health issues, the department referred her for drug testing in November and December 2014 and in January and December 2015; results from each test clearly and convincingly established that Belinda F. was continuing to use marijuana and/or cocaine, despite her own admission that by the time of her May 22, 2015 trial testimony, she had " completed" three to four drug and alcohol programs, and had been in and out of therapy for the last three years. (Tes. Belinda F.; see Exs. 30, 32, 33, 42.) The respondent mother's inability or unwillingness to have benefitted from all this treatment but to relapse into drug use notwithstanding repeated services, constitutes behavior that is inimical to that of a parent who is able or willing to learn from what she has been taught.¹⁰⁴ (Exs. 30, 32, 33, 42.)

103 Belinda F. admits that when she re-engaged with Valarie Williams's services in May 2015, she never told her chosen individual counselor what drugs she was using; she further admits that even in November 2015 when she returned to Catholic Charities, she never told that provider that she had relapsed into the use of the narcotic cocaine. At trial, Belinda explained that she was trying to hide her use of cocaine, even from these providers, because it was " embarrassing" to let people know what she was doing, and because she felt that people would " judge" her if they knew about her use of narcotics. (Tes. Belinda F.) As such, Belinda F. proved further unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; by withholding such critical information about her personal status, the respondent mother effectively rendered Williams and also Catholic Charities unable or unwilling to assist in dealing with this issue in 2015, although it had been the subject of the specific steps imposed with the October 2011 OTC and again in August 2012, and although by 2015 she had already had access to years of counseling and substance abuse treatment. (Exs. 19, 21; Tes. Belinda F.)

104 In reaching this conclusion, the court is mindful of Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to cooperate with DCF's February 2015 referral to Wheeler Clinic where, while pregnant with Elian, she could have received substance abuse and mental health assessments and treatment. As found in Part I.B., however, Belinda F. did not attend Wheeler Clinic's services as recommended by the department. (Tes. Zaira R.) As Belinda F. was still testing positive for cocaine and/or marijuana use in late 2014 and early 2015 while she was carrying Elian, the evidence is sufficient to support the inference that she was unwilling to become involved with Wheeler Clinic in February 2015 because she knew her continued drug use would be apparent. (See Exs. 30, 32, 33, 42.) Even if her non-attendance at Wheeler Clinic was due to restrictions on travel imposed by her physicians due to her pregnancy, Belinda F.'s history of inability or unwillingness to benefit from other mental health and/or substance abuse programs impels the conclusion that she would not have gained any benefit from Wheeler Clinic's intervention in early 2015.

Further evidence of Belinda F.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is apparent in her lack of progress with her second round of individual counseling with Williams, to whom the respondent mother had decided to return in May 2015, following the birth of Elian. Belinda F. believed that, by May 2015, she had grown stable through the therapy sessions in which she had engaged over time, and that she acquired the personal and parenting skills to enable her to remain sober and to safely provide her children with appropriate discipline and parental support. However, while the respondent-mother showed some motivation in deciding to return to treatment, she had made little or no progress with Williams in the past, and along with other behavior-modification and insight-oriented treatment methods, the counselor was required to re-institute the TARGET training that had been provided to Belinda F. during her first round of services with this provider. Again, however, the respondent mother proved unable or unwilling to benefit from Williams's personally-directed counseling services at the Circle of Life, as is evident from two independent factors: first, despite approximately eight months of individual counseling, Belinda F. was still unable or unwilling to use the stress-management and coping skills she had been taught by Williams, and instead was again using illegal drugs in the late fall of 2015, testing positive for cocaine and marijuana in December 2015 and January 2016; second, despite the lengthy treatment course and personal relationship Belinda F. had built up with Williams in 2011-2012, sufficiently strong in nature that the client elected to return to Circle of Life in May 2015, Belinda F. withheld from her counselor the fact that she had relapsed and, when she did admit a return drug use, the mother provided no details as to any cause for the relapse. Belinda F. attempts to excuse her failure to disclose information related to her drug use because she was embarrassed; whatever the reason, her inability or unwillingness to benefit from Williams's second round of individual counseling is clearly and convincingly apparent. (Exs. 42, G; Tes. Belinda F., Williams)

Thus, despite access to Williams's professional counseling and despite the multiple family resources she claimed to have had available to assist her with Elian's care, Belinda F. proved unable or unwilling to benefit from the years of individual counseling ad substance abuse services she already had received, and again relapsed into drug use by late 2015.¹⁰⁵ The first valid and reliable results of testing hair specimens collected from Belinda F. in January 2016 reflected that she had used cocaine and marijuana within a relatively recent period before that testing was performed, reinforcing the durable and consistent pattern of drug use in which the respondent mother has participated as a prominent feature of her life. (Ex. G.)

105 The court infers that Belinda F. did not participate in drug testing from December 2014 to December 2015 or from January 2016. (See Exs. 30, 32, 33, 42, G.)

Thus, notwithstanding the longevity and wide scope of reunification services available to her, the evidence supports the conclusion that Belinda F. is unable or unwilling to benefit in a meaningful, measurable and predictable manner, from the efforts directed at keeping her free from use of illegal drugs; she is unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts directed at managing her mental health and substance abuse needs in any time frame that is relevant to the children with whom she desires reunification. Belinda F. may argue that the court should find her able and willing to benefit from reunification efforts because drug testing was negative based upon her hair specimens obtained on April 15 and July 28, 2016, near the final months of the TPR trial that had commenced in November 2014 nearly three years after the children had been removed from parental care. (Exs. F, H.) The mother's sobriety during the spring and summer of 2016 is certainly worthy of approval. However, insofar as supporting Belinda F.'s claim that she is able and/or willing to benefit from reunification efforts is concerned, as contemplated by the alternative prong of § 17a-112(j)(1), this brief period of refraining from use of marijuana and/or cocaine is far outweighed by the clear and convincing evidence of her persistent drug use as described in Part I: identified in 2011; documented in 2012, 2014, and throughout 2015; drug use that led her to be absent from recommended services for months at a time; a level of drug use that by her own admission has included using seven to eight " blunts" per day just prior to January 2014; drug use that persisted although DCF had intervened in 2011 not only to protect her two older children, but had led to Baby Elian's 2015 adjudication as a neglected child, and had further led to his removal from her care due to her recurrent drug use, as well.

Belinda F. may argue that DCF cannot prevail on its claim that she is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts because the department did not connect her with a new reunification program available at the Village in the spring of 2015. If Belinda F. was found eligible for this program she could have received supervised visitation, reunification assessment, and reunification services from the Village. At the time, Belinda F. was still living with Luis T., whose extensive criminal history made it extremely unlikely that the mother would have been found eligible for this reunification service. Even after Luis T. had left her household, the fact that Belinda F. had used poor parental judgment in selecting him as a domestic partner would still have made it highly unlikely that the Village would have accepted her into this new program. (Ex. 28; Tes. Zaira R.) Similarly, Belinda F. may argue that DCF cannot prevail on this element of its TPR claim because the department failed to timely inform her of the opportunity to attend a rescheduled PPT for Luis and Marializ in May 2015. (Tes. Zaira R.) While the court does not condone DCF's failure to provide the mother with the opportunity to be present at this PPT, there is no evidence from which the could reasonably conclude that Belinda F.'s participation would have had any impact on the reunification process. Accordingly, the court finds either aspect of Belinda F.'s potential argument to have no impact on its conclusion that, given the evidence as a whole, she remains unable or unwilling to benefit from § 17a-112(j)(1) reunification efforts.

The evidence as a whole supports the inference that while she may now have progressed so that she can maintain sobriety when she has little or few responsibilities other than caring for herself or one very young child, there is insufficient basis for concluding that Belinda F. has gained the insight into her personal situation that would establish her ability or willingness to remain drug free in the future, especially if two school-aged children with the particular needs of Luis and Marializ were returned to her custody. The court is constrained to conclude that Belinda F. has not benefitted from the department's efforts and that, if she has, any such benefit is so minimal in time and nature, and so untested in the face of the challenges presented by Luis and Marializ, as to establish her predictable ability or willingness to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. The court concludes to the contrary: that Belinda F.'s history and pattern of using drugs, undergoing treatment, and relapsing again into drug use clearly and convincingly establishes that this respondent is unwilling and unable to benefit from the statutory efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).

III. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)--FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

DCF has alleged that TPR should be granted at to both Santos N. and Belinda F. because in a prior proceeding Luis and Marializ have been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected, because each parent has been provided with specific steps to take to facilitate the return of each child to each parent and because neither parent has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the children at issue, either parent could assume a responsible position in the life of either child, within the application of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).¹⁰⁶ In determining whether a parent has achieved a sufficient " degree of personal rehabilitation" as contemplated by this statute, the court is required to consider not only what progress, if any, a parent has made in managing his or her own life, but must focus as well upon the particular needs of each child at issue, and determine whether or not the respondent has achieved the ability to meet that child's identified needs.¹⁰⁷

106 Our courts have also defined the ground of statutory rehabilitation for TPR purposes. " [P]ersonal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [ This ground ] requires the trial court to analyze the [ parent's ] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the] child's life . . . In re Kaitlyn A., 118 Conn.App. 14, 26, 982 A.2d 253 (2009)." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622. See also, In re Kamora, 132 Conn.App. 179, 187, 31 A.3d 398 (2011). TPR is properly granted where " '[T]he level of rehabilitation [a parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [the child's] life.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., [ supra, 290 Conn. 149]." In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). See also, In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622; In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597. " Rehabilitation does not require the parent to be able to assume full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs . . . An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities . . . In re Stanley D., [61 Conn.App. 224, 230-31, 763 A.2d 83 (2000)]." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597. Thus, " '[a]lthough the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation . . . [Even] if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issues of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsibl position in the life of her child.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005)." In re Etta H., 146 Conn.App. 751, 759-60, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).

107 As our Appellate Court has recently emphasized, " 'in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [ the parent ] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child [ or children ] at issue .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kasmaesha C., 148 Conn.App. 666, 680, 84 A.3d 1279, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 937, 88 A.3d 549 (2014)." (Emphasis added.) In re Adriana C., 153 Conn.App. 683, 688, 103 A.3d 173 (2014) (parent who had made personal strides but still lacked housing had not achieved rehabilitation sufficient to meet children's needs). " The sad reality is that sometimes, even parents who love their children are not equipped to provide their children with what they need, despite the parents' best efforts." Id., 691.

In addressing the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation brought by DCF as to both Santos N. and Belinda F., the court thus has kept in mind the specialized circumstances affecting both children, as identified in Part I.C. The children's specialized circumstances and particular needs thus extend far beyond the asthma and eczema that requires consistent, appropriate medical attention, and far beyond the emotional impact the children have sustained as the result of their lengthy stay in foster care, an inherently unstable placement.¹⁰⁸

108 When considering whether the degree of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may assume, within a reasonable time, a useful role in the child's life, the court may rely on events occurring after the filing of the TPR petition, and is not limited to considering by the events preceding the adjudicatory date. See, e.g., In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 233 (2011); In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 469, 21 A.3d 858 (2011); In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 457 n.12, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010); In re Sole S., 119 Conn.App. 187, 192 n.8, 986 A.2d 351 (2010); In re Selena O., 104 Conn.App. 635, 646, 934 A.2d 860 (2007); In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.

Luis has a long history of oppositional and aggressive behaviors that, whether caused by his need for attention from adults or his inherent defiance; those conditions have required repeated rounds of professional therapeutic care at the Village, and assessment and treatment at Klingberg where the child was diagnosed with GAD, showed symptoms of hyperactivity, and has difficulty sleeping and concentrating. Luis's behaviors are consistent with ADHD; his conduct and his limited ability to stay on task have had a negative effect upon his social and academic progress. He has a particular need for a parent-figure who is sufficiently organized and assertive so that his caretaker can advocate for the child, identifying and accessing professional support services in the community and at school, making sure the child is regularly brought to therapy sessions, and creating a home environment in which Luis can live with clearly established expectations and known appropriate consequences for misbehavior, as well as love.

Diagnosed with PTSD and also with ADHD, for which medication has been prescribed, Marializ also has exhibited defiant behaviors, challenging authority both in her foster home and at school. This child's history of sexual abuse requires that her full-time caretaker have an intact understanding and awareness of how this trauma has impacted her. Marializ's parent-figure must be aware of the child's psychological and physical symptoms related to her sexual trauma, and must be able and willing to meet her emotional needs for a trusting, empathetic relationship with an adult caretaker. Marializ's search for reliable, trustworthy connections is evident in her episodes of eneuresis at school, through which she enabled herself to access " alone time" with the school nurse, in whom the child can confide, upon whom she has relied, and by whom she has never been betrayed. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Like her brother Luis, Marializ's behavioral health issues have had a negative impact upon her social and academic progress at school, where she is easily distractable and where she has difficulty staying on task. In addition to the professional treatment for her mental health issues she receives at Klingberg, Marializ also requires special education services. She also has a particular need for a parent-figure who is organized and assertive, able and willing to advocate for her, locate and enroll her in appropriate professional support services in the community and at school, ensure that she regularly receives her medication as prescribed and attends her therapy sessions. Like Luis, Marializ's particular needs can only be met in a home environment in which expectations for her behavior have been clearly established, and in which she will receive predictable, consistent consequences for misbehavior. In addition to love and stability in her environment, given her history of sexual abuse, Marializ has a specialized need for a home environment in which she is always protected from exposure to any person who may cause her harm; she must be protected from exposure to sexual conduct in which others may engage and during her childhood, she must not have access to electronic or media depictions of sexually-oriented conduct that are inconsistent with the opportunity she deserves for healthy growth and development.

For the following reasons, the court finds that the department has met its burden of proof on the allegations of failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation as alleged for Santos N. and as alleged for Belinda F.¹⁰⁹

109 In reaching its conclusions, the court has analyzed each parent's: personal history, including trauma history if relevant; rehabilitative status as it relates to each child; parenting history including, where applicable, neglect adjudications as to a parent's other offspring; pattern of oppositional and/or criminal conduct; ability or of failure to benefit from services provided either by DCF or any other agency; and judgment with regard to conduct of his or her personal affairs, including decisions regarding living arrangements; and the degree of his or her involvement with Luis and Marializ. See, In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622-23; In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597.

III. A. TPR GROUND AS TO SANTOS N.D.--FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

DCF has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as to Santos N., supporting termination of his parental rights to Luis and Marializ. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it is uncontested that Santos N. is the parent of these children who were adjudicated neglected as to him on August 9, 2012, and that the respondent father has been provided specific steps to facilitate the return of the children to their parent as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). Incorporating the findings made throughout this memorandum of decision, including but not limited to the findings related to the children described in Part I.C., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that notwithstanding access to appropriate and sufficient services, Santos N. has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and specialized needs of Luis and Marializ, he could assume a responsible position in the life of these children. Accordingly, DCF prevails on this ground of each child's TPR petition as to Santos N.

Psychologically, Santos N. is notable for having engaged in romantic relationships with a number of women, having children with them, and then trying to juggle the different adult relationships and the different parenting responsibilities for many children of nearly the same age. When he first evaluated Santos N. in the summer of 2012, Dr. Freedman noted concern about this aspect of the respondent father's pattern of overlapping romantic liaisons and the extraordinary burden he thereby acquired as a paternal resource. The court-appointed psychologist also noted in the course of the 2012 evaluation that Santos N. had significant difficulty interacting with the children; the respondent father merely sat in a chair without engaging Luis and Marializ in conversation or activities, demonstrating a measurable absence of parenting capacity. In late 2013, having had approximately a year and a half of one-on-one parent-coaching and mentoring as well as long-term literacy training, Dr. Freeman noted considerable improvement in Santos N. 's parenting techniques in the interactional portion of the psychological evaluation, even though the respondent father still showed some social avoidance, shyness, and insecurity concerning his reading skills. Despite the father's improvement in direct application parenting skills while under supervision, when he conducted his re-evaluation of Santos N. in December 2013, Dr. Freedman found it to be of even greater psychological concern that although he was by then the father of many children, some of whom were nearly exactly the same age, Santos N. did not know their birth dates, and he did not even know the name of the elementary school attended by Cindaliz who lived with him. Given Santos N.'s the nature of his relationships with the mothers of his children, and his relatively casual understanding of what it meant to be the parent of so many children, Dr. Freedman had serious concerns about the respondent's capacity to adequately supervise and emotionally support his progeny, especially if Santos N.'s dream of blending all of his families, or even part of his families, came to be. Despite all the services that had been delivered to him, including Davis's parent-mentoring and parent-coaching, in late 2013 Santos N. had not yet achieved an adequate understanding of how challenging it would be, physically and emotionally, to parent such a large number of very young children in one residence, even for a few days at a time, and even if there was another adult present. Psychologically, by December 2013, despite the intensive parent-education and coaching services he had received from Radiance and Davis, Santos N. had no appreciation of the problems he functionally faced supporting eight children and finding time to spend with each of them. (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.) The respondent father did not have then, and has never achieved, any meaningful or measurable degree of insight into Luis's and Marializ's specialized needs, emotional or educational. As such, he has never achieved any meaningful or measurable degree of insight into the amount of care, patience, organization, knowledge of child development or capacity to apply that knowledge, attention, commitment and parental time and energy needed to meet the needs of the children who are the subjects of the pending TPR petitions so long as the respondent father is charges with their care and custody, even if they are never exposed to any of their siblings or half-siblings.¹¹⁰ Without that insight, Santos N. has not achieved the ability to avoid Marializ's re-exposure to past behaviors involving Santos, Jr.; he had not achieved the ability to manage the sibling rivalry likely attendant long-term reunification of Luis and Marializ with Cindaliz and/or with Miguel and Santos, Jr. all of whom are approximately the same age, and/or to manage the additional parental stresses presented by his wife Tamara F.'s responsibilities to care for young twins. (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.)

110 Recognizing that Dr. Freedman has never seen Santos N. in the presence of all the respondent father's children, the court finds ample basis for crediting this aspect of Dr. Freedman's opinion, which is based upon his psychological expertise and is consistent with the clear and convincing evidence related to the respondent father's lack of achievement with regard to parenting stability proper judgment overall. As Dr. Freedman noted in reporting the results of his June 2012 psychological evaluation of Santos N., he " By his irresponsible, overlapping relationships and pregnancies, he had created a web of young adults needing his help, and with strong feelings toward him and sometimes each other. This created many opportunities and chances of angry confrontations, and Santos himself could not possibly meet the needs of these four women and his children " even after the domestic violence program of appropriate length that had included some related individual counseling aspects, although he has never participated in general individual counseling other that inherent in the Radiance one-on-one parent coaching program. (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 6. See Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.) As previously noted, that evidence includes but is not limited to the events of December 2013 involving Santos N.'s use of his cell phone to view inappropriate content while other children were nearby on the school bus he was operating, the events of February 2014 involving Marializ's sexual abuse by Santos, Jr., and the respondent father's failure to have achieved, by the time of trial, the capacity to identify and specify an adequate safety plan for implementation in his home, despite years of services from Radiance and Davis, and despite the CATS counseling in which he participated with Marializ.

Moreover, Dr. Freedman clearly and convincingly observed how significant it was that Marializ had reported being sexually abused by her half-brother, Santos, Jr., while he, the parent figure, was present in the house; yet Santos N. had no appreciation for the safety issues attendant his desire to have Tamara F.'s older children, including her son Miguel, as well as Santos, Jr., live in the same household as vulnerable Marializ; Santos N. had never achieved an appreciation of the import that when Luis and Marializ were placed in foster care in October 2011, those very young children were already exhibiting sexualized behaviors that they had to have observed in their environment. Still, unrealistically and without having achieved the parental judgment necessary to protect Marializ and also Luis, the respondent-father remained eager to blend the older males with the younger children without an adequate safety plan in place.¹¹¹ He was committed to the unreasonable parental decision that seven to eight children and two adults could safely and healthily live into a two bedroom apartment, and for a prolonged period of time, despite the services of Radiance and Davis, impractically engaged in a process of having all of his available children and Tamara F.'s twins sleep over at his apartment or at Tamara F.'s; this parental decision focused not on the specialized behavioral health needs of Marializ and Luis, but on the respondent father's conclusion that his offspring would best be served by occupying such crowded conditions, physically stressful and lacking in any privacy though the housing situation may be. Notwithstanding DCF's decision to return Luis and Marializ to the respondent father's home, after the December 2013 re-evaluation Dr. Freedman had significant concerns about obstacles Santos N. who either did not recognize or had no remedial plan to put in place so he could keep these children safe in his home.¹¹² (Tes. Freedman, Ama T.) These obstacles were present although, despite his limited cognitive level, Santos N. " showed intact thinking" at his December 2013 psychological re-assessment, and presented no mental health diagnosis, and did not demonstrate the " anxiety" that Dr. Freedman had noted previously. (Ex. 7.) In the context of Santos N.'s failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation, it is remarkable that although Santos N. had been receiving intensive reunification services, with literacy training and parent-education through Radiance's Davis for more than a year and a half, and although he " showed adequate attention and concentration" when re-evaluated by Dr. Freedman in December 2013, the respondent father's " confused, disorderly personal life left him with limited knowledge of the specifics of his children's development, education, or problems. He missed several of his children's birthdays, sometimes by days, other times forgetting the month of their birth." (Ex. 7.) Santos N.'s limited understanding of Luis and Marializ's specialized needs was mirrored in his limited understanding of specialized needs presented by Tamara F.'s children in December 2013. That status has not improved over the ensuing years. Santos N.'s failure to achieve even a minimum parental understanding of Luis's and Marializ's specialized needs leaves him without the capacity to fulfil a responsible role in the lives of these children, as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).¹¹³ (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.)

111 Sadly, Santos N.'s unrealistic goal of having all of his available children live together with him and Tamara F., even for short periods of time, is fully consistent with the respondent father's psychological limitations. In 2012, Dr. Freedman found that Santos N. presented " with indications of psychological problems . . . He showed problems in judgment, significant anxiety and stress, some problems in reality testing, and a strong view of himself as victimized and mistreated by others. Lacking trust in others or a real sense of responsibility, Mr. [N.] had haphazardly impregnated four different women, of ten in overlapping relationships and pregnancies. The result was predictably to have different women arguing and fighting with him and sometimes with each other." (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 6.) The clear and convincing evidence establishes that Santos N.'s problems in judgment and lack of responsibility persisted notwithstanding the close attention and support of Radiance's mentor Davis, and notwithstanding the CATS counseling. Santos N.'s election to use his phone to view sexual content in December 2013 during the work day, in front of students he was transporting, and his failure to achieve the capacity to develop or even identify a valid plan to keep Marializ safe from sexual misconduct in his home, fully establish that by the close of trial in August 2016, the respondent father had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation and that he would not do so within a time frame that is reasonable given the specialized needs of Luis and Marializ.

112 Dr. Freedman's identified obstacles included the fact that Santos N. claimed to be married but was not living with his wife; that Tamara F.'s two older children had sexual behavior problems that presented the potential that they would prey upon Santos N.'s younger children in a blended-family setting; that Santos, Jr. remained a risk for sexual contact with Marializ, who remained fearful of her predator; and that credible reports of sexualized behavior by both Luis and Marializ had been made early in their foster placement, rendering them further at risk for sexual harm in a placement with Santos N. that lacked provision for consistent, continuous protection and supervision at all times. (Tes. Freedman; see Tes. Dineen-Elovich.)

113 In December 2013, after all the months of individualized serviced and parent-education he had received from Radiance's Davis, Santos N. had not made any strides in understanding the degree to which, as a parent, he would be required to access professional resources and support Luis's needs. Although he could interact with his son in a positive way during visits, Santos N. " regarded Luis as a moody, demanding child, who did not show appreciation or responsiveness to his parent." (Ex. 7.) The respondent father's remarks concerning his son at age five do not bode well for his capacity to provide the support, structured environment and emotional guidance highly active Luis will need more and more as he grows physically and chronologically.

Dr. Freedman's concerns about Santos N.'s failure to achieve sufficient parental rehabilitation, and the obstacles to reunification that have not yet been remediated, were manifest in several features of the evidence.¹¹⁴ After Dr. Freedman's late 2013 psychological evaluation, as found in Part I.A. and II.A., Santos N.: viewed sexually explicit content on his cell phone, in the presence of school children whom he was transporting in the course of his work, which children observed the respondent-father's behavior and the images on his phone; continued parenting education with Radiance and subsequently participated in Klingberg's CATS program, individually and with Marializ, to address Santos, Jr.'s sexual abuse of his half-sister in February 2014. At or about the time of that abuse, Santos N. worked with Davis to develop a plan the father, and even the mentor, felt was sufficient: this plan involved the children's constant supervision by an adult, with such supervision provided by either the children's paternal grandfather, who lived elsewhere, and/or Tamara F., who both lived elsewhere and was also the mother Santos, Jr., Marializ's abuser. This plan was inadequate and insufficient to meet the needs of any of the children involved, particularly in view of Marializ's previously noted fear of being in the same place as Santos, Jr. and the difficulties implicit in arranging for the paternal grandfather or Tamara F. to make themselves immediately available to provide supervision when they did had separate homes from Santos N. (Tes. Davis, Freedman, Ama T., Santos N.) Even if this plan was adequate, a conclusion rejected by the court given its impracticalities and the specialized behavioral health needs of both Marializ, by the time of his trial testimony in 2016, Santos N. had not achieved the capacity to remember, identify or express that plan he had decided upon with Davis. Even more troubling is Santos N.'s failure to have achieved the capacity to identify or express, at trial during the summer of 2016, any particular safety plan he would implement to protect Marializ. Given his behavior on the school bus in December 2013, Marializ's previous sexual abuse by Santos, Jr., both children's previous exhibition of sexualized behaviors, the denial by both Santos N. and Tamara F. that Santos, Jr. had been sexually involved with Marializ and Santos N.'s insistence that any sexual contact was " an accident, " and Luis and Marializ's specialized educational needs, the court concludes that Santos N. had, by the summer of 2016, no access to any valid or reliable plan that could be implemented to protect Marializ, or any other child in his care, from further sexual abuse or from inappropriate exposure to sexually explicit images such as those the respondent father had called up on his phone in the presence of other children. Santos N.'s only plan was to assume that whatever had happened to Marializ would never happen again; such a plan unreasonably diminishes the fact that Marializ reported such an occurrence, and demonstrates that Santos N. has never achieved the insight into his daughter's report that was required of a responsible parent when such a report is made. Under these circumstances, Dr. Freedman credibly opined that psychologically, Santos N.'s failure to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to meet the needs of Marializ and Luis was clearly and convincingly evident in his responses to the events in which his children had been historically involved, and the events likely attendant any effort by Santos N. to bring together as many of his children to which he had access. (Tes. Santos N., Freedman, Dineen-Elovich.)

114 In reaching this conclusion, the court has remained aware of Dr. Freedman's December 2013 comment that as a result of his " extensive parenting education and coaching, " Santos N. " had greatly improved his parenting." (Ex. 7.) Dr. Freedman's otherwise laudatory observation of Santos N.'s parenting skills is supported by the psychologist's statement, later in his December 2013 report, that even though the respondent father " was reported to be doing a good job parenting [Cindaliz, h]e would probably have trouble providing good care for three children as a single parent ." (Emphasis added.) (Ex. 7.) Thus, in the context of the evidence as a whole, the court finds this observation relevant only to Dr. Freedman's assessment of the interaction between the respondent father, Luis and Marializ that was conducted in the presence of the court-appointed psychological evaluator. No other aspect of the evidence, including but not limited to Santos N.'s inappropriate use of his phone in the presence of other children in December 2013 and his failure to identify a valid safety plan when he testified at trial in August 2016, impel this constricted interpretation of this particular element of the expert witness's opinion.

Thus, despite appropriate services, the respondent father had never developed a sufficient understanding of the impact that direct sexual behavior, or even exposure to sexual conduct, could have on young children. Because he lacked and had never achieved a sufficient degree of understanding related to those events, he had never developed, and never acquired the capacity to develop, parenting skills that were adequate to supervise children to protect them from such exposure and attendant harm. The respondent father has never achieved the capacity to understand the danger inherent in such exposure, has never achieved a mature understanding of the fact that young children in his care are in danger of being sexually abused by their siblings or half-siblings, and has expectations of his personal ability to protect children from harm that are unrealistic and impractical. In short, in Dr. Freedman's credible opinion, Santos N. has not achieved statutory rehabilitation because he has never developed the capacity to keep children in his care safe from the dangers of sexual abuse or exposure to observing sexual activity; his plan to bring his many children together as often as possible creates an unreasonable danger to Marializ and Luis, consistent with the respondent father's failure to achieve an adequate degree of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) rehabilitation. (Tes. Freedman.)

Despite all the lengthy, intensive and appropriate services he received through Radiance, Santos N. has never developed a mature understanding of Marializ's complex specialized behavioral health needs. He has the capacity to provide companionship for the child, but he has never acquired the skills necessary to create or utilize a valid, reliable and predictable safety plan to protect her from exposure to sexual or physical misconduct during the remainder of her youth. As found in Part I.A., after discussing Marializ's report of the sexual abuse and sexually explicit statements made to her by her half-brother Santos, Jr., the respondent father admitted to his parent-coach and mentor, Radiance's Davis, that he did not believe Santos, Jr. had engaged in any misconduct with Marializ. Even after months and months of work with Radiance and Davis, the only safety plan Santos N. had achieved the ability to formulate was altogether impractical and insufficient to meet the child's needs: Santos N. identified two individuals with whom he did not live, his father and Tamara F., who has custody of Santos, Jr. and who is charged with the responsibility of caring for him, as the persons upon whom he would rely to protect Marializ from harm if Santos N. was not physically present to supervise her.¹¹⁵ (Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Santos N.) He has not achieved the degree of personal rehabilitation that renders him capable of supporting Marializ by identifying or accessing community resources, or by acting as her advocate in school settings or even recognizing her need for such advocacy. In sum, with regard to Marializ, Santos N. has not achieved the capacity to meet her needs within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

115 In view of the totality of the evidence, including but not limited to the events in which Santos N. engaged while transporting school children in December 2013 and the opinions of Dineen-Elovich and Dr. Freedman explaining the insufficiency of this safety plan, even if Santos N. has come to admit that Santos, Jr. did engage in sexual misconduct with his younger sister, the court declines to credit Davis's testimony proffered in support of this safety plan. (Ex. 34; Tes. Dineen-Elovich, Freedman. Compare Tes. Davis.)

Generally, Santos N.'s failure to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the belief that he can assume a responsible position in the lives of Luis and Marializ is clearly and convincingly evident in his poor judgment regarding the fundamental issues related to providing a physically and emotionally safe residential environment for them.¹¹⁶ Santos N. is devoted to the concept of parenting all of his many children together, uniting them not only for special occasions but regularly assembling them to live and sleep in the same household. Even if Santos N. was able to secure a home in which he had a bedroom available for Luis and another for Marializ to share with Cindaliz, he still fails to recognize the dangers inherent in adding his own biological children to this household, even for short periods of time; despite the lengthy parent education and parent coaching, and despite seeming ability to parrot, in supervised therapeutic sessions, the need to a child to have appropriate parental supervision at all times, he has never achieved the capacity to formulate or implement a practical plan that could realistically ensure the safety for each child in his home whether during the night when sleep may be supposed to occur, or during the day when he may be called away from the children to attend to his private needs. He has not achieved the parenting skills necessary to reasonably assure the protection of any child under these circumstances; and he especially has not achieved the parenting skills requisite to addressing the need to protect Marializ, who has already been the victim of sexual abuse by Santos, Jr. in the respondent father's household.¹¹⁷ Moreover, despite the intensive one-on-one services Santos N. received through the long-term services of Radiance and Davis, the respondent father has never achieved the parenting skills requisite to understanding that both Luis and Marializ are affected by significant behavioral health issues that require consistent professional attention; even if he did come to understand this aspect of Luis's and Marializ's particular needs, Santos N. has never achieved the capacity to develop or implement a plan to ensure that he provides these children with appropriate advocacy at school to meet these specialized needs, nor has he achieved the capacity to develop or implement a plan to provide alternate support, such as identification of therapeutic services and reliable transportation to these services, to ensure that Luis's and Marializ's needs are met when he is not available to support them due to work or other personal limitations.¹¹⁸ In reaching these conclusions, the court has remained aware that statutory rehabilitation " 'does not require the parent to be able to assume full responsibility for a child without the use of available support programs . . .' In re Stanley D., [61 Conn.App. 224, 230-31, 763 A.2d 83 (2000)]." In re Ellis V., 120 Conn.App. 523, 529, 992 A.2d 362 (2010). The court also acknowledges the evidence establishing that, when under the supervision of Davis, the respondent father can facilitate talking to his children one at a time, can provide them with affirmations, can inquire about their school progress, and can communicate with them even while the children are actively engaged in physical activities and having fun. (Tes. Davis.) Even so, any inquiry into Santos N.'s capacity to achieve personal rehabilitation requires the court to examine, with a historical perspective, his " child-caring and parenting abilities" as they ma' have, or have not, progressed over time. Id. Historically, Santos N. has fathered eight children, but for many years only Cindaliz has been in his custody. The evidence supports the inference that in October 2011, when Luis and Marializ were removed from the care of Belinda F., Santos N. either knew or should have known of their neglected condition given their mother's untreated mental health and substance abuse issues, but that he then either could not or would not provide these children with appropriate parental attention. Sadly, despite access to available support programs such as Radiance's one-on-one parent education and coaching services, Santos N. still has not progressed in developing parenting skills sufficient to make or utilize plans necessary to identify or to meet Luis's and Marializ's specialized needs. Thus, even if Santos N. has improved his capacity to manage his own personal affairs, any degree of rehabilitation he has achieved falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that, at some reasonable future date, even with access to continuing community supports, he could assume a responsible position in the lives of Luis and Marializ, as anticipated by § 17a-112(c)(3)(B)(i).

116 In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that with the support and assistance of Radiance and Davis, Santos N. has voted, had gone to school to improve his literacy, has attended church, and loves his children " out of the park" compared to other fathers with whom Davis has worked. (Tes. Davis.) This evidence may indicate that Santos N. has made some progress in improving his personal functioning. However, together with the entirety of the evidence discussed throughout this decision, any personal progress the respondent father had made by 2014, or at any time thereafter, does not in any mitigate DCF's clear and convincing proof that Santos N. has not achieved a degree of statutory rehabilitation sufficient to encourage a belief that, given the ages and needs of the children who have been in foster care since October 2011, he could within a reasonable time assume a responsible position in the lives of Luis and Marializ. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

117 In reaching this conclusion, the court remains well aware that as of April 2, 2014, months after Santos, Jr. had sexually abused Marializ in the respondent father's household, DCF found that his proposals for his children's " sleeping arrangements . . . appear to be appropriate . . ." (Ex. Fa-N.) The court disagrees, finding that in April 2014, and through the conclusion of trial, Santos N. had not achieved the degree of statutory rehabilitation sufficient to provide a degree of physical and emotional safety necessary to protect Marializ whenever she was exposed to the respondent father's son Santos, Jr. during overnight visits, or under any conditions.

118 As previously noted, the court acknowledges that Santos N. has identified his own father and his sister as transportation resources for Luis and Marializ; the court does not credit any evidence proffered to establish that either third party is available as a reliable support resource for this respondent.

To further support its conclusion that Santos N. has failed to achieve the requisite degree of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) rehabilitation, the court next examines the nature and extent of this respondent's degree of compliance with the specific step ordered for him to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129.¹¹⁹ In general, Santos N. has only facially complied with a number of these steps; his mere attendance at services and/or his cooperation with providers does not support the conclusion that he has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage that belief that within a reasonable time, considering Luis's and Marializ's ages and needs, he could assume a responsible position in the lives of these children.¹²⁰

119 Upon execution, specific steps become enforceable court orders. See, In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 192, 196-97, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). " Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights." In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 500. " [S]pecific steps are considered to be 'fair warning' to a parent of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings . . . Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003); see also, In re Cheila R., 112 Conn.App. 582, 591, 963 A.2d 1014 (2009). Insofar as § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) is concerned, a parent's compliance with treatment programs, even when termed substantial, is relevant but not dispositive as to the rehabilitation finding. See, In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). See also, In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 508; In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, 945 A.2d 529 (2008).

120 Compliance with specific steps does not, in and of itself, evince a parent's rehabilitation in the context of a TPR proceeding based on § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) allegations. The Appellate Court has noted that " [w]hether the respondent was rehabilitated is demonstrated, not by mechanically tallying up his attendance at programs and services, but by whether he has gained insight into the problems that gave rise to the department's involvement in the life of the child and whether he has made appropriate changes in his behavior." In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 648, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012). " The specific steps [referred to in General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i)] facilitate, but do not guarantee, the return of the child to the parent. See, In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001)." (Emphasis in original.) Id. Thus, even a provider's opinion regarding a parent's ostensibly " [s]uccessful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254-55, 829 A.2d 855 (2003), citing In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 498-99, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).

In determining that Santos N. has failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the ground upon which DCF has asked the court to terminate his parental rights, the court acknowledges that the respondent father did comply with a number of the specific steps imposed upon him. (Ex. 22.) However, although he cooperated with the department and engaged in services, the totality of the clear and convincing evidence establishes that Santos N. nonetheless failed to make measurable progress toward the fundamental identified treatment goal of achieving the capacity to provide safe and nurturing parenting for Luis and Marializ.¹²¹ As ordered, Santos N. did participate in the court-ordered psychological evaluation; did attend all the sessions Luis's therapist at the Village recommended; did attend Klingberg's CATS therapy sessions as recommended by Marializ's therapist; visited with the children as DCF permitted; attended and completed an appropriate domestic violence program; did not engage in criminal conduct that led to his arrest; often maintained legal income; maintained housing that was adequate for him and Cindaliz, with the assistance of Supportive Housing; informed DCF about his goal to have all of his available children and Tamara F. join together with him, Cindaliz, Luis and Marializ in one household from time to time; and did, again with the assistance of Supportive Housing, became eligible for a subsidized three bedroom apartment that could have been available if Luis and Marializ were reunified with him.¹²² (Tes. Zaira R., Jackson.)

121 The steps at issue required Santos N., among other things, to: take part in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goal of providing safe and nurturing parenting; cooperate with Radiance for parenting services including in-home instruction with Greg Davis and with Richard Mello for individual counseling, including domestic violence counseling, or a comparable provider; and not get involved with the criminal justice system. (Ex. 22.) The court received insufficient evidence from which it could conclude that DCF ever provided Santos N. with a referral for specific individual counseling. However, as found in Part. I.A, DCF's provision of the one-on-one mentoring, parenting-education, and parent coaching through Radiance's Davis, with treatment modalities modified to meet the respondent-father's cognitive needs, so closely approximated the " individual" counseling that the department fulfilled its obligations as contemplated by the steps. (Ex. 22.) Similarly, as previously found, the domestic violence counseling provided to Santos N. contained an individual treatment component that was effective given the respondent's learning style, and thus also sufficiently approximated this component of the steps. Finally, by December 2013, Dr. Freedman's third psychological assessment of Santos N. disclosed that while he had learning disabilities, the respondent father did not present with any particular mental health issues and even the anxiety noted in July 2012 had abated, so that any other form of counseling not directed at parenting capacities would have been futile. (Exs. 6, 7.) See, e.g., In re Antony, 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

122 In determining that Santos N. has not achieved statutory rehabilitation, the court credits the testimony establishing that the largest subsidized apartment available through Sec. 8 would contain three bedrooms. (Tes. Jackson.) The court received no evidence of a viable, valid safety plan that could protect Marializ from exposure to Santos, Jr., the perpetrator of her sexual assault, or that would allow her to be supervised at all times if all eight of Santos N.'s children plus his wife Tamara were to spend even a weekend night at a home of this size.

All of this ostensible compliance with the steps, however, failed to adequately enhance the respondent father's capacity to provide Luis and Marializ with the " safe and nurturing parenting" which is the fundamental treatment goal identified by the specific steps. (Ex. 22.) As found above, Santos N. has made progress in his ability to engage with these children during visits; relatively remote and uninvolved during Dr. Freedman's July 2012 interactional evaluation, by December 2013 he had gained sufficient parenting skills from his work with Radiance that he was able to communicate and physically interact more effectively with Luis and Marializ. (Exs. 6, 7, Tes. Freedman.) As discussed in Part II. A. and herein, Santos N. engaged in risky behavior during December 2013, causing or allowing school children in his care to be exposed to sexually explicit images on his cell phone. (Ex. 31.) This behavior, in and of itself, clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father had not, despite all the attentive services delivered by Radiance's Davis, progressed in modulating his personal behavior so that children in his care would be safe. Despite numerous parent-education sessions at Klingberg's CATS program, by the conclusion of the evidence in August 2016, whether or not he believed Santos, Jr. had sexually abused Marializ in February 2014, assaulted Santos N. had not progressed in developing an insight or understanding into the impact such disclosure, or of such actual sexual abuse, had affected the daughter with whom he sought reunification. Despite all the treatment rendered to him, Santos N. never achieved the empathy expected of a parent whose child had claimed to have been sexually abused by a half-sibling, a child who desired to remain separated from her abuser; he never understood Marializ's need to trust in the adults around her so she would feel safe, and instead promoted again and again plans for bringing together Marializ, Santos, Jr., and the other children with whom the respondent father was permitted to have access. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Santos N. has never developed the capacity to identify, and has never developed the capacity to implement, a valid plan for providing supervision of Marializ so that she would never again be subject to sexual assault; as previously discussed, he relies instead on his personal wish and desire that such an event would never repeat itself in his household, or upon a wish and desire that his own father or the mother of Marializ's abuser would materialize whenever he needed another adult in his household to provide protection and supervision for Marializ. Santos N. thus had never made measurable progress toward achieving the specific steps' established goal of making progress toward provision of safe parenting for Marializ and Luis. Through the evidence establishing his failure to comply with this crucial, related specific step despite years of services that were largely tailored to meet his cognitive level, DCF has met its burden of proving that Santos N. has failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that could reasonably encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in the lives of his children, able to meet their particular and specialized needs, within the statutory time frame contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

Luis is now eight years old; Marializ is 7. (Exs. 23, 24.) The children's extraordinary behavioral health and educational needs have been identified in Parts I.C. and III. of this decision. Both children require consistent, reliable attention from an alert and available parental figure to ensure that their emotional, educational, medical and physical needs are properly addressed. Although Santos N. loves Luis and Marializ, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that since their entry into foster care, the father has expressed the personal concern over their health, education and general well-being, as would be expected of a parent, only when he is under supervision at visits. He has supplied the children with food and clothing only on rare occasion, and has not provided them with medical care or an adequate domicile since their removal from the custody of Santos N.¹²³ (Tes. Santos N.; see Tes. Davis) Santos N. may claim that because he loves his children, and because he has access to a three-bedroom apartment if Luis and Marializ are, reunified with him, and because he is able to retain lawful employment notwithstanding complaints about his misconduct, he has achieved statutory rehabilitation. However, a parent's love and even some rudimentary understanding of the children's needs are simply not enough when it comes to being capable of serving as an adequate parent for Luis and Marializ, whose specialized requirements for structured access to behavioral health care to enhance their academic and social development, to educational advocacy, and to physical safety and security are fully discussed in Part I.C.¹²⁴ Moreover, to the extent that Belinda F. may be found to have made any changes in her capacity to safely and adequately manage the care of Luis and Marializ, such changes came about years after these children had been out of her care, living either with Santos N. or in the foster placement selected by the mother.¹²⁵ The court acknowledges Santos N.'s expressed love for Luis and Marializ, his ardent wish for reunification, and his wish to have these children become a part of his extended family. However, such " thoughts and wishes are insufficient to sustain a child" and do not represent achievement of statutory rehabilitation. In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn.App. 538, 548, 147 A.3d 147 (2016). Moreover, in the context of the respondent father's failure, despite years of service, to achieve a degree of parental maturity that is necessary to recognize and implement a safety plan sufficient to meet Marializ's needs for physical safety and protection from further sexual assault, further considering the significant academic and behavioral needs with which Luis and Marializ present, given these children's history of having spent five years in foster care, even if the respondent-father is capable of caring for his own needs and the needs of Cindaliz, any improvement he may have made in his capacity to parent the children who are the subject of the pending TPR petitions represents progress that " has been too little and too late" for Luis and Marializ.¹²⁶ Id., 549.

123 See, In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193, 763 A.2d 37 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 941, 768 A.2d 949 (2001) (defining basic parental attributes).

124 Our Appellate Court " recently observed that '[t]he sad fact is that there is a difference between parental love and parental competence.' In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575, 877 A.2d 941, cert. granted on other grounds, 276 Conn. 903, 884 A.2d 1024 (2005)." In re Halle, 96 Conn.App. 815, 817, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). Similarly, in In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 164; we were reminded of the principle that " [ A ] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough [where the department] has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] cannot be a competent parent to these children because [the parent] cannot provide them a nurturing, safe and structured environment." (Emphasis added.) Citing In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718 cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).

125 See, In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 546.

126 As our courts have noted, " 'even if a parent had made successful strides in [the parent's] ability to manage [the parent's own] life and may have achieved a level of stability within [the parent's] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [the parent] could assume a responsible position in the life of [the children].' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kristy A., [83 Conn.App. 298, 318, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004)]." In re Halle, 96 Conn.App. 815, 838 n.18, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). As " [t]he question of rehabilitation turns on whether the parent is able to meet the needs of the child, not whether the parent is able to manage his or her own life, " a parent's progress toward rehabilitation must be sufficiently timely to avoid termination of parental rights. In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187. An improvement in parenting skills that is untimely would be " too little and too late" for a child who requires permanency now, not at some unforeseeable date in the future, when the child should not be burdened by having to wait any longer for a parent to attempt to improve his or her ability to fulfill a responsible role in the child's life. See, In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187; see also, In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 90-91, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).

Even if the father may be found to have made any changes in his capacity to safely and adequately manage the care of Luis and Marializ, such changes came about too many years after these children had been out of his care.¹²⁷ The court acknowledges Santos N.'s professed love for Luis and Marializ, his intention for reunification, and his wish to have them live with him as a part of his extended family. Moreover, in the context of the father's complex family circumstances involving his responsibility for a number of other children, some of whom have also required the intervention of DCF, and further considering the many years Luis and Marializ have spent in foster care, even though he may be capable of caring for his other children, if there has been any improvement in Santos's parenting skills, " that progress has been too little and too late for the child[ren] who [are] the subject of the present termination of parental rights petition." ¹²⁸ Id., 549.

127 See, In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 546.

128 It is the respondent father's lack of capacity to function as a parent capable of meeting Marializ's and Luis's particular needs, now or in the foreseeable future, even with reasonable support services, but not his cognitive level per se, that establishes his failure to achieve rehabilitation in the context of this case. See, In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356 cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999). See also, In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 607, 520 A.2d 639 (in TPR trial, mental status is relevant to extent it affects ability to parent), cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987), cited in In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 527-28, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 917, 879 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005).

Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proving each essential element of its allegation that Santos N. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation.

III.B. TPR GROUND AS TO BELINDA F.--FAILURE TO REHABILITATE

DCF also has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as to Belinda F., supporting termination of her parental rights to Luis and Marializ. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it is uncontested that Belinda F. is the parent of these children who were adjudicated neglected as to her on May 31, 2012 and were subjected to disposition on August 9, 2012, and that the respondent mother has been provided specific steps to facilitate the return of the children to their parent as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).¹²⁹ Incorporating the findings made throughout this memorandum of decision, including but not limited to the findings related to the children described in Part I.C. and III.A., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that notwithstanding access to appropriate services, Belinda F. has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and specialized needs of Luis and Marializ, she could assume a responsible position in the life of these children.¹³⁰ Accordingly, DCF prevails on this ground of both TPR petitions.

129 See, In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 507 (TPR is properly granted where a parent's level of rehabilitation, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [the child's] life); In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 149; In re Etta H., supra, 146 Conn.App. 759-60; In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622; In re Kaitlyn A., supra, 118 Conn.App. 26. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also, In re Kamora, supra, 132 Conn.App. 187; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622; In re Tremaine C., supra, 117 Conn.App. 597; In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 260.

130 For purposes of addressing Belinda F.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation with regard to Luis and Marializ, it bears repeating that " 'in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [the parent] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child [or children] at issue .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kasmaesha C., [ supra, 148 Conn.App. 680].'" (Emphasis added.) In re Adriana C., supra, 153 Conn.App. 688. Insofar as the issues related to terminating Belinda F.'s parental rights are concerned due to her failure to achiever statutory rehabilitation, the court has also remained mindful that, as previously noted and so eloquently stated by Judge Lavine, " [t]he sad reality is that sometimes, even parents who love their children are not equipped to provide their children with what they need, despite the parents' best efforts." Id., 691.

Belinda F.'s failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation is clearly and consistently evident from the pattern of recurrent substance abuse, identified in Parts I.B. and II.B. Again and again, by her own admission at trial, Belinda F. has, over the years, attended and ostensibly completed multiple substance abuse treatment programs. Notwithstanding her access to individual counseling through Valarie Williams from July 2011 through June 2012, and notwithstanding the referral to medication management available to her, or her attendance at CRT, Catholic Charities, or the services she received elected herself at Perspectives, the respondent mother has historically and consistently returned to using cocaine and marijuana after treatment. The use of such drugs, whether in response to stress or for recreational purposes, is highly inconsistent with the capacity to provide safe, reliable and consistent parenting necessary to assume a responsible position in the lives of Luis and Marializ. The court acknowledges that late in 2015, after approximately six months of return to individual counseling with Williams, Belinda F. finally decided to recommence substance abuse treatment at Catholic Charities where, as she explained, she attends weekly support group therapy; the court further acknowledges the evidence showing that more recent drug testing has been negative, indicating that by the conclusion of the lengthy TPR trial, the respondent mother was not using illegal drugs. This evidence is insufficient to allow the conclusion Belinda F. has acquired the necessary skills to maintain abstinence; to the contrary, the evidence, as a whole, clearly and consistently establishes the respondent mother's unremediated pattern of returning to drug use, especially if she is faced with the challenges and when her mental health needs are not stabilized by an appropriate level of medical support, support that Belinda F. has regularly rejected when it has been offered to her. As such, Belinda F.'s current sobriety is too fragile, too untested, and too unreliable to reasonably permit the inference that she has actually developed the internal resources that will ensure she will put the needs of Luis and Marializ above her own needs. Although she has been abstinent for a short time, measured against her long history of unremediated mental health and substance abuse issues, long periods of avoiding engagement with treatment and/or refusing to referrals for medication therapy as found in Parts I.B. and II.B., the court concludes that Belinda F. has not achieved the degree of rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, within a time frame that is reasonable given the highly specialized emotional, behavioral, and educational needs of Luis and Marializ, she could assume a responsible role in their lives, functioning as a predictable and reliable parent. Even if she has made strides in managing her own life, that progress is modest, and must be viewed in the context of a parent whose children have each required emergency removals due to her recurrent drug use. Crediting her good intentions yet balancing the weight of any progress Belinda F. has made against the circumstances permitting her to remain sober, the lengthy time still needed to verify rehabilitation given her history of repeated relapse despite treatment, her lack of insight into the serious and indurated substance abuse and mental health issues that continue to affect her as discussed in Part II.B., her lack of capacity to timely attend to relapse issues and her inappropriate decision to withhold from her individual counselor the relapse into drug use she is experiencing as also discussed in Part II.B., her continued mental health issues which have not been the subject of attention by any provider other than Williams with whom even when she resumed treatment in May 2015 she withheld critical information about the personal and parental instability that was affecting her and likely leading to her relapse into drug use. During her individual counseling with Belinda F. during 2011-2012, Williams had used a treatment modality called TARGET, a twelve-week program designed to teach the client how the brain responds to stress, and to develop coping mechanisms the client can use to make positive decisions in response to stress. Belinda F. may have attended TARGET-training sessions and seemed cooperative and easy to engage with Williams in 2011-2012, but the sessions had little impact on the respondent mother; when Belinda F. returned to Williams's in May 2015, the provider had to start all over again, using other treatment modalities but repeating the same TARGET training to re-teach the respondent mother healthy methods of dealing with the stressful events that all persons, but particularly parents, face in life. Despite attending treatment sessions in 2015, Belinda F. did not tell Williams that she had relapsed into drug use; instead, the respondent mother withheld until late 2015 or very early 2016 the fact that she had used marijuana and cocaine during the late summer and fall of 2015, notwithstanding the re-implementation of the TARGET-training. Significantly, even when Belinda F. decided to tell her counselor about her relapse into drug use, the respondent-mother never shared details of any particular triggers that had led her to again become involved with cocaine and marijuana, even though she then was responsible for the care of baby Elian. (Tes. Williams.) Belinda F.'s return to drug use, notwithstanding the individual counseling she was receiving from Williams as of May 2015, clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent-mother had failed to achieve a measurable degree of personal rehabilitation through this appropriate therapy; she certainly had not achieved a degree of insight into her own proclivity for returning to drug use when faced with stress, as would encourage the belief that she was even capable of learning to fulfil a responsible role in the lives of Luis and Marializ. Accordingly, the court is constrained to conclude that even if, by the first half of 2016, " . . . the respondent had made some progress in recovering from drug abuse and in improving her parenting skills . . . those efforts were too little and too late" to meet Luis's and Marializ's general environmental or particular needs. (Quotation marks omitted.) In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 480-81, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).¹³¹ Here, where the clear and convincing evidence reflects that the current degree of Belinda F.'s rehabilitation falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that, at some reasonable future date, she could assume a responsible position in lives of her older children, the department has met its statutory burden of proof for the ground alleged.

131 See also, In re Sydnei J., supra, 168 Conn.App. 549 (affirming termination of parental rights where trial court found the mother's progress in rehabilitation to be " too little and too late for the child who is the subject of the present [TPR] petition"). See also, In re Mindy F., 153 Conn.App. 786, 794-94, 105 A.3d 351 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 913, 106 A.3d 306 (2015); In re Adriana C., 153 Conn.App. 683, 690, 103 A.3d 173 (2014). As Belinda F. claims to have sought out substance abuse and/or mental health treatment on her own prior to her May 2015 return to Williams's individual counseling and prior to her November 2015 return to Catholic Charities, the clear and convincing evidence impels the conclusion that the respondent mother was well aware, prior to these dates, of her need to remediate these conditions in order to achieve reunification with her children. Compare In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48, 68, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016), citing In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 480.

Consistent with the court's findings set forth in Parts I.B. and II.B., Dr. Freedman's credible expert psychological analysis fully supports the court's conclusion that although she may sometime attain a period of sobriety, the clear and convincing evidence establishes Belinda F.'s pattern of recurrent relapse into drug use despite repeated access to and use of appropriate substance abuse services, a condition inimical to responsible parenting of Luis and Marializ and a condition marking her failure to achieve lasting, reliable statutory rehabilitation. Belinda F.'s history of ostensibly successful substance abuse treatment at Catholic Charities, with a period of sobriety followed by relapse into drug use and rejection of aftercare, is documented in the report Dr. Freedman prepared after completing his court-ordered December 2013 re-evaluation. That report similarly documents Belinda F.'s failure to achieve reliable, lasting sobriety despite substance abuse and mental health treatment at CRT, with thrice weekly group therapy sessions, psychiatric assessment and medical support available to her for six to eight weeks. Instead of responding positively to the CRT treatment, the still functionally-depressed respondent mother " found herself smoking marijuana" claiming this drug use was physically necessary to improve her appetite " and also to help her get to sleep at night." (Ex. 7.) A brief period of sobriety followed her completion of the CRT program, and Belinda F. was able to return to work in a barbershop, renting a room from the shop's landlord. However, the respondent mother had not achieved a reasonable degree of improvement in her personal self-esteem and thus she remained for more than a year in a romantic relationship marked by domestic violence until her male partner was returned to prison upon conviction for violation of probation. Without the support of her male partner, without services or access to medication therapy, and her weekly appointments at CRT having ended, Belinda F. found herself evicted from the room she was renting. Having decided to move from Hartford to Waterbury, Belinda F. there located an apartment, obtained the previously-referenced full-time work in a laundry, engaged in group therapy sessions at FIC, and did not exhibit drug use for a period of time; because she felt she was better, had an improved appetite and was sleeping without problems, however, despite her underlying depression issues, the mother declined to engage in FIC's recommendations for psychiatric assessment or medication support. Belinda F. admitted to Dr. Freedman that despite nearly a year of sobriety, she knew she " was supposed to complete a relapse prevention program" after finishing the FIC services. However, Belinda F. did not pursue that after necessary aftercare, claiming inability to attend due to transportation issues, which remained unresolved as of December 2013. (Ex. 7.) As found in Parts I.B. and II.B., the period of abstinence noted by Dr. Freedman in December 2013, while appropriate, proved too unstable and too unreliable to support Belinda F.'s continued sobriety. Upon her presentation to Perspectives at the end of September 2014, she admitted that she had last used drugs " in January 2014, " mere days following her second court-ordered psychological evaluation; moreover, she admitted the extent of her drug use as being " 7-8 blunts per day." ¹³² (Ex. 31.) This amount of marijuana use is significant in quantity, had a marked impact upon her capacity to function personally, and would impede or even eradicate her capacity to serve Luis and Marializ in a parental role.¹³³ Moreover, even if Belinda F. had achieved a period of sobriety during 2013, that sobriety was short-lived; instead, her failure to have achieved rehabilitation from her recurrent substance abuse, notwithstanding repeated appropriate treatment services, is clearly and convincingly evident in her pattern of predicable return to using marijuana and/or cocaine when she is stressed by internal or external environmental factors, even when she was pregnant with Elian in the fall of 2014, as established by reliable drug testing of specimens obtained in November and December 2014, in January 2015, and again in January 2016.¹³⁴ (Exs. 7, 31, 32, 33, 42, G; see Tes. Freedman.)

132 In the context of measuring the degree to which, if at all, Belinda F. has achieved statutory rehabilitation, the court credits the respondent mother's admissions to her Perspective clinician as, although these admissions are inconsistent with Belinda F's reports of abstinence made to Dr. Freedman; the Perspectives admissions are fully consistent with the respondent mother's election to avoid access to the after care and relapse prevention services recommended by FIC. (Ex. 31. See Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.)

133 The court acknowledges that while Belinda F. sometimes uses cocaine, she claims that marijuana is her drug of choice. (Ex. 31.) The evidence does not support a finding that Belinda F. has ever had a prescription permitting her medical use of marijuana. As our Supreme Court has observed, marijuana is " classified medically as a hallucinogen . . ." State v. Clark, 260 Conn. 813, 826, 801 A.2d 718 (2002). " ' Effects of smoking [marijuana] are generally felt within a few minutes and peak in [ten] to [thirty] minutes. They include dry mouth and throat, increased heart rate, impaired coordination and balance, delayed reaction time, and diminished short-term memory. Moderate doses tend to induce a sense of well-being and a dreamy state of relaxation that encourages fantasies, renders some users highly suggestible, and distorts perception (making it dangerous to operate machinery, drive a car or boat, or ride a bicycle). Stronger doses prompt more intense and often disturbing reactions including paranoia and hallucinations .' American Council for Drug Education, 'Basic Facts About Drugs: Marijuana, ' (1999) at http://www.acde.org/youth/Research.htm; see also, National Institute of Drug Abuse, 'Marijuana: Facts for Teens, ' (November 1998) at http://www.nida.nih.gov/MarijBroch/Marijteenstxt.html (' short-term effects of marijuana include: problems with memory and learning; distorted perception [sights, sounds, time, touch]; trouble with thinking and problem-solving, loss of coordination; and increased heart rate, anxiety ')." (Emphasis added.) State v. Clark, supra, 260 Conn. 825 n.8 (finding that effects of marijuana are within common knowledge of jurors). Accord, State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 151 n.14, 869 A.2d 192 (2005).

134 While finding Belinda F. to report positive responses to her past drug treatment, in the report of his 2013 re-evaluation of the respondent mother, Dr. Freedman identified a " bleak report" from the counselor who had previously provided her with substance abuse treatment at CRT. The counselor noted that prior to her unsuccessful discharge from CRT in early 2013, due to missed meetings, Belinda F. " was not doing well during her sessions with CRT [and] did not respond to his efforts to re-engage her after she stopped coming." (Ex. 7.) This " bleak report" presaged Belinda F.'s repeated episodes of attending treatment with periods of sobriety, but consistently and predictably followed by return to drug use, as found throughout this decision.

Thus, despite the services available to her throughout the years, even though she may be able to attain abstinence for periods of time, that abstinence from cocaine and/or marijuana is impermanent and unreliable. Despite prolonged treatment, the clear and convincing evidence impels the conclusion that, psychologically, Belinda F. has never achieved the capacity to appreciate the negative impact her repeated use of marijuana has upon her capacity to meet Luis and Marializ's needs for an attentive, available parent with the personal resources sufficient to withstand the stresses attendant raising any children, especially those with the particular specialized needs identified in Parts I.C. and III. She has never achieved the psychological capacity to dependably and use good judgment, to nurture them, protect them, and keep them safe. Even Belinda F.'s capacity to keep herself safe remains untested and insecure; as despite years and years of access to mental health and substance abuse treatment, she has never achieved the insight into the reality that the effects of marijuana are completely contradictory to effective parental functioning, the respondent mother has not yet achieved the capacity to be entrusted with fulfilling a responsible position in the lives of Luis and Marializ, and she will not do so within a period of time that is reasonable given these children's particular needs. (Exs. 6, 7, 30, 31, 32, 33, 42, F, G, H; Tes. Freedman.)

Even though the respondent mother had, between the mid-2012 and late 2013 psychological evaluations, become more calm and had somewhat improved her capacity to assert her authority over the children and to create a structured environment in which they could play and communicate with each other during a supervised setting, her decision to move from Hartford in 2013 and to go without substance abuse and/or mental health services, and/or her decision to absent herself from such support services for a period of time without adequate explanation raised concerns about her personal stability and commitment to remaining sober.¹³⁵ Noting that Belinda F. had improved her ability to the children in a closely supervised setting, Dr. Freedman cogently concluded that her relative personal stability was at least in part derived from her continuous employment at the laundry, which provided both earned income and structure to her life. While the respondent mother informed Dr. Freedman that she chose to move to Hartford in part to work at the laundry's division in that city, the evidence fails to disclose that Belinda F. ever returned to structured employment either before or after the birth of Elian.¹³⁶ Absent the structure attendant such employment, the mother would have less self-support and less psychological capacity to focus effectively upon her children's needs; thus, she would remain vulnerable to resume drug use to deal with the stresses of life. (Tes. Freedman.) As found in Parts I.B. and II.B., such stress was apparent in the fall of 2014 when Belinda F. was pregnant and carrying Luis T.'s child, and such recurrent drug use was apparent in November and December of that year, and into January of 2015, mere months before Elian's birth, indicating continuing personal instability and failure to achieve statutory rehabilitation sufficient to meet the needs of Luis and Marializ. Belinda F. had told Dr. Freedman in June 2012 that the removal of her children and the consequent " terrible circumstances had been a positive wake-up call for her . . . She was determined to use all the help she could get and improve herself for the sake of her children . . . After she was done with [her current] drug program, she was going to participate in an aftercare program to make sure she stayed clean." (Ex. 6.) Sadly, even if Belinda F. had actually experienced a " wake-up call" through the OTC, the results of that wake-up were not positive at all. Belinda F. has never achieved the capacity to be sufficiently independent of drugs or poor peer influences so as to render her ready, in any reasonably foreseeable period of time, to assume a reasonable role in the lives of Luis and Marializ. The court fully credits Dr. Freedman's opinion that Belinda F.'s choice to engage in a romantic relationship with an individual, such as Luis T., who had a lengthy criminal history involving possession of drugs with intent to sell and incarceration for related activities including drug sales, was a very negative factor in the context of her personal stability; even if the respondent mother interacted well with Luis and Marializ during the December 2013 evaluation, her election to remain involved with Luis T. coupled with her own recurrent drug use even while pregnant raised too many concerns to consider her capable, within any reasonable period of time, to assume a responsible role in the lives of the children from whom she had been separated since October 2011. (Exs. 30, 31, 32, 33; Tes. Freedman.)

135 As does the court, Dr. Freedman did not find credible or plausible Belinda F.'s decision to avoid IOP treatment and/or 12-Step Meetings because the programs dealt with drugs other than those she chose to use. (Ex. 7; Tes. Freedman.) Dr. Freedman had presaged the respondent mother's likely pattern of returning to drug use rather than remaining in treatment when, in reporting the results of his June 2012 psychological evaluation, he stated that although she had shown " promising participation in counseling and parenting services, " Belinda F. " minimized" her drug abuse, which " had continued until only a couple of months before this evaluation" that had occurred nine months after Luis's and Marializ's OTCs. (Ex. 6.) Dr. Freedman then predicted the respondent mother's return to drug use again and again, as found in Parts I.B. and II.B., credibly opining that " her functioning had too many problems to allow her to maintain any stability with the addition of illicit drugs to her mental state." (Ex. 6.) The overwhelming nature of those problems, and their interference again and again with any period of sobriety Belinda F. is able to achieved, was manifest in the respondent mother's return to drug use in 2014 and 2015; even if the evidence establishes Belinda F.'s capacity to have achieved a half-year of sobriety in 2016, that sobriety is again impermanent, unreliable, and untested as she had no children in her care during that period, and certainly had no responsibility to meet the extraordinary emotional, social and educational needs of her children Luis and Marializ. (Exs. 6, 7, 30, 31, 32, 33, 42, F, G, H.)

136 The court acknowledges Dr. Freedman's December 2013 report reflecting Belinda F.'s claim that " she had already been offered a position" at a laundry facility in Hartford, although she " did not want to leave her . . . situation" in Waterbury at that time. (Ex. 7.) In the absence of corroborative evidence, the court finds Belinda F.'s statements aboutjob opportunities in Hartford to be sufficiently self-serving as to render them without weight.

Further consistent with the determination that Belinda F. has failed to achieve the requisite degree of statutory rehabilitation under § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I), the court next examines the nature and extent of the respondent mother's compliance with the specific steps issued to facilitate reunification with the children who were removed from her care in October 2011.¹³⁷ (Ex. 21.) Upon review, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that while the respondent mother has facially complied with some of the steps, she has failed to substantially comply with a number of the crucial steps put in place to enhance her opportunity to regain custody of these children.¹³⁸ Those steps required her, among other things, to: take part in parenting and individual counseling so as to make progress toward the goal of addressing her mental health issues and developing coping skills . . . to effectively parent; follow the recommendations about substance abuse treatment, aftercare and relapse prevention; submit to random drug testing; attend individual therapy with Valarie Williams, and let DCF immediately know about any changes in the make up of her household. The steps also expressly prohibited Belinda F. from using illegal drugs, and specifically required her to timely sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with her treatment providers. (Ex. 21.)

137 The court has previously noted the import of specific steps in the context of a TPR case; those steps are an express element of a case alleging the statutory ground established by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), and failure to sufficiently comply with court-ordered steps serves as an adequate basis for terminating parental rights. See, In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 507-8; In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584; In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 569; In re Trevon G., supra, 109 Conn.App. 791; In re Ashley M., supra, 82 Conn.App. 72; In re Jeffrey C., supra, 64 Conn.App. 62.

138 In reaching this conclusion, the court declines to credit DCF's testimony suggesting that after resuming counseling services with Valarie Williams in May 2015, Belinda F. did not timely execute a release to enable the department's access to relevant information as to whether the respondent mother was making any " progress toward treatment goals and insight." (Ex. E; see Tes. Zaira R.)

In determining that Belinda F. has failed to comply with the specific steps in the context of this pending TPR litigation, the court acknowledges that, as found in Part I.B., the respondent mother did cooperate with a number of DCF's referrals to service providers who were capable of addressing her need to " [a]ddress mental health issues and develop coping skills . . . to effectively parent" Luis and Marializ although, as discussed throughout this decision, she failed to achieve lasting, reliable improvement in her personal stability or capacity to remain free from drug use notwithstanding that cooperation. (Ex. 21.) Similarly, Belinda F. submitted to substance abuse evaluations and testing on many occasions, as required by the steps; she from time to time maintained a legal income through her work at a barber shop and/or at a laundry; she acquired legal income through DSS and SNAP; she sometimes maintained stable adequate housing; she cooperated with court-ordered evaluations; she did not get involved with the criminal justice system; she informed DCF when she moved from Hartford to Waterbury and back to Hartford; she visited with the children as DCF permitted; and on many occasions, she signed releases as requested by DCF.¹³⁹

139 The court finds Belinda F.'s testimony sufficient to establish that, at some time in the past, she held relatively steady employment with a laundry in Waterbury. However, the court does not credit the mother's evidence proffered in an effort to establish that although she left this employment many, many months ago when she was pregnant with Elian, the position is being held open to her as she is considered to be on maternity leave. (Tes. Belinda F.)

However, as found in Parts I.B. and II.B., Belinda F. failed to comply with the steps' requirements in many ways that support the conclusion that she has failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time and considering the ages and needs of Luis and Marializ, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. In violation of the specific steps' requirement that she get and/or maintain adequate housing, as found in Parts I.B. and II.B., Belinda F. has been evicted for non-payment of rent in late 2011 after the children were removed from her custody and again in 2013, on at least two occasions, finding temporary shelter with friends or family in a manner that did not provide her with a stable home environment. Belinda F. violated the steps requirement that she keep DCF informed of the individuals living in her household, never informing her that Victor G. resided in her home even though he had active warrants for his arrest on charges related to violence and, as a result, placing herself in a position in which she was exposed to Victor G.'s assaultive conduct and rejecting, in December 2012, DCF's proffer of a referral to domestic violence treatment although the steps mandated her cooperation with a safety plan approved by DCF to avoid more domestic violence incidents. To the extent that the steps required her to cooperate with her providers' recommendations for treatment, Belinda F. violated this order in that she failed to engage with the medication-prescription services to which she was referred by Williams, and was discharged from individual counseling services at Circle of Life due to her non-compliance in June 2012.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Belinda F. violated the specific steps requirement that she follow recommendations for substance abuse treatment, failing to participate in FIC's recommended after care program and leaving the CRT services before her condition had stabilized and without accessing the recommended treatment at the IOL. (Exs. 2, 5; Tes. Wendy B., Zaira R., Williams.)

140 In reaching this conclusion, the court declines to credit any opinion Williams may have tendered about Belinda F.'s compliance in December 2011, finding that to opinion to be premature and inconsistent with clear and convincing evidence related to subsequent events. Furthermore, the court declines to credit Belinda F's proffered testimony that while enrolled in Williams's counseling services from July 2011 through June 2012, she sometimes did not attend sessions because of work obligations, and/or that she could not access medication management because she had no access to health insurance. During this period, Belinda F. was receiving attention from DCF and/or subject to the OTC specific steps that required the mother to cooperate with the department. (Exs. 19, 26; Tes. Williams, Belinda F.) These factual circumstances clearly and convincingly establish that if Belinda F. had informed DCF of her need to see a health care provider capable of prescribing medication, adequate medical insurance coverage would have been available; thus, the court reasonably infers that it was the mother's lack of interest, initiative, motivation and/or communication with the department, not her lack of access to health insurance coverage, that led to her failure to cooperate with referrals for mental health medication services.

Belinda F.'s recurrent relapses into use of cocaine and/or marijuana in and of itself violates the specific steps which order that she shall " [n]ot use illegal drugs . . ." ¹⁴¹ (Ex. 21.) In addition, to the extent that the steps required her to make progress toward specified goals of addressing her mental health issues and developing coping skills that would enable her to effectively parent Luis and Marializ, as found in Parts I.B. and II.C., notwithstanding all of the services made available to her over time, Belinda F. has violated this aspect of the specific steps. While she has, from time to time, maintained sobriety, she has violated the steps' requirement that she develop coping skills, again and again returning to drug use instead of dealing with stress in a healthy manner consistent with effective parenting. Despite the counseling available to address her mental health issues through each of the myriad providers to which she was referred by DCF or with which she elected to engage on her own, Belinda F. violation of the steps' prohibition against drug use is clearly and convincingly evident in her January 25, 2013 positive test for marijuana; her continued drug use through January 2014 reporting that she was smoking seven to eight blunts a day; her November 21, 2014 positive test for marijuana despite her pregnancy with Elian; her December 23, 2014 positive test for cocaine, again while she was pregnant and after the evidentiary portion of the TPR trial had started; her December 21, 2015 positive test for both cocaine and marijuana during her pregnancy; her January 6, 2015 positive test for marijuana while pregnant; and her January 6, 2016 positive test for cocaine in the midst of this TPR trial, and while DCF was involved with the respondent mother and Baby Elian, as well. (Exs. 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 42, G.)

141 Belinda F.'s recurrent violation of this aspect of the OTC specific steps is clearly and convincingly evident in the results of drug testing conducted at Catholic Charities from February 1, 2012 through June 27, 2012. (Exs. 19, 29.)

Belinda F.'s recurrent use of cocaine and marijuana, as found in Parts I.B., II.B. and described above, clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent mother was not making progress in her personal rehabilitation, perhaps following the letter of the steps by attending individual counseling with Williams commencing in May 2015, but falling again into drug use because she had failed to acquire the skills necessary to control and manage her response to stress notwithstanding serial weeks and months of counseling as ordered by the court.¹⁴² Belinda F.'s return to sobriety in the spring of 2016, aided by cooperation with DCF's referral to substance abuse treatment and relapse prevention at Catholic Charities, must be measured by her long and repetitive election to use drugs as a method of coping with stress in her environment. That recurrent drug use is of such long duration and those relapses and election to avoid treatment are so consistent and predictable that even if Belinda F.'s relatively recent period of sobriety shows some compliance with the steps, the weight of that compliance is completely overwhelmed by the clear and convincing evidence establishing the respondent mother's pattern of using prohibited drugs in direct violation of the court-ordered specific steps. (Exs. 2, 5, 21, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 42, G; Tes. Wendy B., Zaira R., Williams.) Through the evidence establishing her failure to comply with this crucial specific step despite years of services that were more than adequate to meet her needs for treatment and aftercare, DCF has met its burden of proving that Belinda F. has failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that could reasonably encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible position in the lives of her children, able to cope with the rigors of parenting these particular children and meeting their specialized needs without again succumbing to use of drugs that would markedly impede her capacity to keep them safe, secure and healthy, within the statutory time frame contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

142 In response to a question posed on cross examination, Williams candidly admitted that although she had treated Belinda F. for eleven months following the commencement of treatment in July 2011, it was difficult for the provider to measure the degree of any progress the client had made toward addressing her depression. Even though it did not seem to be impacting her functioning, when discharging Belinda F. from treatment in June 2012 due to multiple misses sessions, Williams had recommended weekly therapy with another provider. However, just as Belinda F. never went to Dr. Kurtakoti to obtain medication for her depression, she did not timely pursue the additional individual counseling recommended by Circle of Life. (Tes. Williams.) This aspect of the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that despite months of treatment by Williams in 2011 and 2012, Belinda F. had failed to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient then to encourage the belief that she could assume a responsible role in the lives of Luis and Marializ within a reasonable period of time.

As previously noted, Luis is now eight years old; Marializ is 7. (Exs. 23, 24.) Both children have extraordinary specialized needs, as found in Parts I.C. and III., that require consistent, reliable attention from an alert and available parental figure to ensure that their emotional, educational, medical and physical needs are properly addressed. Although Belinda F. has expressed love and affection for Luis and Marializ, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that since their entry into foster care, she has rarely expressed the personal concern over their health, education and general well-being as would be expected of a parent. She has supplied the children with food and clothing only on rare occasion, and has not provided them with medical care or an adequate domicile since their removal.¹⁴³ (Tes. Belinda F.)

143 See, In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193.

Belinda F. may argue that she has achieved personal rehabilitation sufficient to serve as a custodial parent for Luis and Marializ because she has access to support from her grandmother, mother and from Luis T.'s mother, both of whom live near her in Hartford. (Tes. Zaira R.) The court received insufficient basis upon which it could ascertain the degree to which either of these individuals are capable of meeting Luis's and Marializ's specialized needs; the evidence is insufficient to establish that either is even interested in supporting Belinda F. and/or her older children in this way. Accordingly, the court attributes no weight to this aspect of Belinda's potential claims as to her degree of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) rehabilitation.

Belinda F. also may claim that because she has achieved statutory rehabilitation as she is able to provide her older children with material goods, such as clothes, toys and electronic items, or because she loves them very, very much and knows that, at their age, the children have to go to school.¹⁴⁴ However, love and even some rudimentary understanding of the children's needs are simply not enough when it comes to being capable of serving as an adequate parent for Luis and Marializ, whose specialized requirements for structured access to behavioral health care to enhance their social development, to academic and educational advocacy, and to physical safety and security are fully discussed in Parts I.C. and III.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, to the extent that Belinda F. may be found to have made any changes in her capacity to safely and adequately manage the care of Luis and Marializ, such changes came about years after these children had been out of her care, living either with Santos N. or in the foster placement selected by the mother.¹⁴⁶ The court acknowledges Belinda F.'s professed love for Luis and Marializ, her desire for reunification, and her wish to have them live with her and Elian. However, as previously noted, such " thoughts and wishes are insufficient to sustain a child." In re Sydnei V., 168 Conn.App. 548. Moreover, in the context of the mother's complex circumstances including her pattern of involvement with male partners who prove insufficiently stable or responsible to remain a part of her household, and in view of her repeated relapses into drug use which is incompatible with assuming the role of a parent responsibility for the safe custody of school-aged children, and given her repeated need for intervention by DCF to render safe her youngest child, born when she had no obligations to provide structural, physical or financial support for Luis and Marializ, and further considering the many years Luis and Marializ have spent in foster care, even if the respondent-mother is capable of caring for her baby, if there has been any improvement in her parenting skills, " that progress has been too little and too late for the child[ren] who [are] the subject of the present termination of parental rights petition." ¹⁴⁷ Id., 549.

144 The court understands that in supervised settings when the children were younger, such as during Dr. Freedman's December 2013 interactional evaluation, Belinda F. had demonstrated the capacity to engage in creative play activities with Luis and Marializ. (Ex. 7.) These children are older now, highly active, with strongly developed characters and limited attention spans. Parenting techniques that may have been effective for four and five year olds are not indicative of parenting techniques sufficient to meet the needs of Marializ and Luis at ages seven and eight, particularly given Marializ's exposure to the events that led to her PTSD.

145 In the context of DCF's claims concerning Belinda F., it bears repeating that our Appellate Court " recently observed that '[t]he sad fact is that there is a difference between parental love and parental competence.' In re Christina M., [ supra, 90 Conn.App. 575]." In re Halle, supra, 96 Conn.App. 817. Similarly, in In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 164; we were reminded of the principle that " [ A ] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough [where the department] has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] cannot be a competent parent to these children because [the parent] cannot provide them a nurturing, safe and structured environment." (Emphasis added.), citing In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667.

146 See, In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 546.

147 As our courts have noted, " 'even if a parent had made successful strides in [the parent's] ability to manage [the parent's own] life and may have achieved a level of stability within [the parent's] limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, [the parent] could assume a responsible position in the life of [the children].' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kristy A., [83 Conn.App. 298, 318, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004)]." In re Halle, 96 Conn.App. 815, 838 n.18, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006).

Accordingly, the department has met its burden of proving each essential element of its allegation that Belinda F. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).¹⁴⁸

148 It is the respondent mother's lack of capacity to function as a parent capable of meeting Marializ's and Luis's particular needs, now or in the foreseeable future, even with additional support services, but not her mental health or substance abuse issues per se, that establish her failure to achieve rehabilitation in this case. See, In re Brendan C., supra, 89 Conn.App. 527-28; In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 673; In re Nicolina T., supra, 9 Conn.App. 607.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Having found all adjudicatory issues in favor of the department as to both respondent, the court next turns to the dispositional issues raised by § 17a-112(j)(2), focusing on the best interests of Luis and Marializ.¹⁴⁹ In so doing, the court has acknowledged and relied upon its relevant factual findings set forth in Part I and its conclusions relating to the elements of § 17a-112(j)(1) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) set forth in Parts II and III. In addition to the other clear and convincing evidence, when resolving the parties' contest concerning the children's best interests, the court has attributed great weight to testimony at trial delivered by Marializ's and Luis's GAL, who opined in favor of terminating parental rights, and who was subjected to extensive cross-examination by counsel for each respondent parent and counsel for the children, as well.¹⁵⁰

149 " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that continuation of the [parent's] parental rights is not in the best interests of the child." In re Adelina A., supra, 169 Conn.App. 120 n.10, quoting In re Joseph M., supra, 158 Conn.App. 859. " In the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding, the emphasis shifts 'from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.' In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356-57, 641 A.2d 378 (1994)." In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 553. " 'After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under . . . § 17a-112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, ajudge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest. That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged. Although a judge is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is intensely human. It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.' In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008)." In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 210 n.9. See also, In re Nioshka A.N., 161 Conn.App. 627, 128 A.3d 619, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 912, 128 A.3d 955 (2015).

150 Although appointed in the middle of trial proceedings in response to the request of the children's attorney pursuant to § 46b-129a(2)(D), the court credits the GAL's report indicating that he had ample time to complete his statutory investigation of the case and thereupon to report concerning the children's best interests. In addition to his previous work as a certified school teacher, the children's attorney-GAL has long experience representing parents and children custody matters at the Probate Court, and at both the Juvenile and Family Divisions of the Superior Court. The court found the GAL's report to be without bias, objective, detailed and based on the comprehensive understanding of the needs of his statutory wards and of the parties' lengthy involvement in litigation. His cogent, consistent opinions in favor of TPR were based upon his review of transcripts made available to him by the court, his attendance at trial proceedings held after his appointment, his examination of the evidence, his communications with all attorneys and with the family's assigned DCF social worker, the children's foster mother and Henry B., and his multiple meetings with and observations of eight year old Luis and seven-year-old Marializ. (Tes. GAL.)

In deciding the best interest element of § 17a-112(j)(2), the court has considered Luis and

Marializ's intrinsic needs for sustained growth, healthy development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment, along with the necessity for consistent, structured care by a responsible parent figure who is ready, willing and able to address to their needs without further delay.¹⁵¹ For these children, who have lived together in the same foster home since their earliest years, a lasting resolution of the questions whether or not it is in the best interests to continue the respondents' extant legal relationships with their children, or whether those ties should be severed, is of vital importance.¹⁵²

151 As the Appellate Court recently summarized in a termination of parental rights case based on the application of Probate Court legislation, largely parallel to legislation affecting TPR petitions brought by DCF: " 'The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). 'In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interests of the child.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005)." In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn.App. 554. See also, In re Joseph M., Jr., 158 Conn.App. 849, 868-69, 120 A.3d 1271, 1284-85 (2015).

152 The attributes of any DCF-proposed adoptive parent has been considered only after grounds for termination were shown to exist as to each respondent and specifically in the context of the children's emotional ties relevant to § 17a-112(k)(4), as discussed herein. See, In re Joseph M., Jr., supra, 158 Conn.App. 871.

Each respondent parent in the present TPR case asserts his or her love for Luis and Marializ. The children apparently enjoy visiting with Belinda F. and her younger son; they also apparently enjoy visiting with Santos N. However, given the children's ages and stages of development, and their particular educational and emotional needs, the court is constrained to conclude that allowing more time for either respondent to become able and willing to provide predictably safe, reliable and attentive custodial care for Luis and/or Marializ would unreasonably relegate these children's best interests to level of uncertainty, without any valid basis, current or historical, for determining that reunification with either biological parent can practicably be achieved within reasonable period of time, as discussed in Parts II and III. With Luis's and Marializ's life experiences in focus, the court finds that further delay in TPR would unduly interfere with these children's access to a permanent placement that will enhance their opportunities for healthy human growth and maximize their potentials.

In balancing the children's need for permanency against a benefit that might be achieved through denying TPR, the court has fully considered DCF's efforts to maintain Elian in the care of Belinda F., and had further fully considered the relationship Santos N. has with his other children, including his apparent custodial relationship to his daughter Cindy. The court has also considered the evidence proffered by both Belinda F. and Santos N. in an effort to establish that each respondent has access, through family or extended family, to some supportive relationships upon whom them have relied in providing care for their other children. The court has also carefully balanced each respondent's constitutionally protected relationship to Luis and Marializ against these children's respective needs for permanency, security, safety, the opportunity for healthy growth and consistency in their environment.¹⁵³ With this additional perspective it is overwhelmingly apparent that notwithstanding genetic connections, Luis's and Marializ's instinsic need for stability and permanency far outweighs any benefit from continuing a legal connection with either respondent.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, " termination is in the best interest" of both children. § 17a-112(j)(2).

153 A parent's " constitutionally protected right to raise and care for his own children . . . is not free from intervention by the state . . . when the continuing parens patriae interest of the state in the well being of children is deemed by law to supercede parental interests. See General Statutes § 17-43a [now § 17a-112] . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-DE), 190 Conn. 310, 318-19, 460 A.2d 1277 (1983) (discussing application of resjudicatato TPR proceeding). See also, Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 236-38, 571 A.2d 691 (1990) (discussing grandparents' motion for visitation pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59). For the reasons discussed throughout this decision, implicating the clear and convincing evidence establishing the adjudicatory grounds predicate to TPR, comporting with the requirements of procedural due process, the court finds that the department's prolonged intervention on behalf of Luis and Marializ is fully justified in the context of this litigation and the family's history. Thus, while the court has fully acknowledged and considered the respondents' constitutional relationship to the biological children who are the subject of the present TPR petitions, under the circumstances of this case, it is abundantly apparent that the actions taken by DCF in removing and maintaining the removal were not only reasonable but also warranted, supported by the GAL's opinion, and further remain lawfully and factually appropriate.

154 See, In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 495; In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 216 n.12.; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 623; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999) (" [T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider").

IV.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The § 17a-112(k) findings are based on the totality of the clear and convincing trial evidence, and incorporates all findings and conclusions reached throughout this decision.¹⁵⁵

155 " The court [has] thoroughly considered each of the seven criteria in its memorandum of decision before concluding that termination of parental rights [is] in the children's best interests." In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 530, 939 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 342 (2008).

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

Given the circumstances described throughout this decision, reunification services offered and/or provided by DCF in this case for Santos N., Belinda F. and the children were both timely and appropriate as articulated in Part II and as discussed in Part III. of this memorandum of decision. Services were extended to the respondents both before and after the TPR petitions were filed for the children at issue in this case. Even when the respondents participated in services, however, neither improved his or her ability to serve as a safe, effective parent.

(2) Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family in compliance with federal law.

Through the efforts described in Part II. and discussed in Part III., the department made reasonable efforts to reunite this family in accordance with federal law notwithstanding the respondent-parents' failure to benefit therefrom.

(3) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

As found in Part I., both Santos N. and Belinda F. were made subject to court-ordered specific steps issued with the OTC's for Luis and Marializ, and issued with the children's neglect adjudications. As found in Parts III.A. and III.B., while both respondents facially complied with some of the specific steps, neither Santos N. nor Belinda F. fulfilled the crucial obligations ordered as predicates to regaining custody of the children.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

As found in Part I.C., the children are bonded to each other. They know their biological parents even though they have lived in foster care since October 2011. Although both Luis and Marializ were so young at the time of the OTC that their extant emotional ties with the respondents are based on visits that have occurred regularly over the years, and their family connection, they are emotionally bonded to both Santos N. and Belinda F. Similarly, although both children have demonstrated in the past that they have a positive relationship with Tamara F., that relationship is derived from their contact during visits, alone, and remains untested in any unsupervised setting.¹⁵⁶ (Ex. 7; Tes. GAL, Zaira R., Ama T., Davis, Maritza M.)

156 The court credits Radiance's parent coach and mentor's testimony that during supervised visits in late 2013 and/or early 2014, Tamara F. was very affectionate with Luis and Marializ, and that the children went to her, as they went to Santos N., for guidance and comfort while in the presence of Davis. (Tes. Davis.)

Luis demonstrably loves Belinda F. and is attached to her and to his young half-brother Elian. Although Marializ loves Belinda F., their relationship is sometimes marked by the behaviors indicating that the child wishes to spend time all alone with her mother, in the absence of Luis. Both children also love Santos N.; although they had spent unsupervised time with him in late 2013 and early 2014, again, they were then too young to have formed actual memories of that experience, so their emotional ties to the respondent father are based on time spent together at visits.¹⁵⁷

157 The court acknowledges the evidence offered to establish that during Radiance supervised visits, both Luis and Marializ consistently demonstrated enthusiasm for contact with Santos N., and that Santos N. often provided appropriate parental supervision commensurate with their desire to spend time with him. For instance, at the visit on November 30, 2012, Davis recorded that when Santos N. arrived " a few minutes late . . . and Luis and Marializ were anxiously waiting for him to arrive. They ran, screamed and jumped into his arms when he walked in the door." (Ex. Fa-G.) Similarly, at the visit on March 10, 2013 held at a city recreational center, Davis recorded: " Marializ and Luis were excited to see their dad. They greeted him with hugs and kisses." (Ex. Fa-G.) At the visit on July 17, 2013, Davis recorded: " Dad told the kids how much he loved them and Luis and Marializ hugged and kissed Dad . . . when it was time to leave . . . [a]s usual, they did not want to leave so dad gave them an extra ten (10) minutes to play. Following their extra time Luis and Marializ agreed to leave without complaining. Dad hugged, kissed and told them he loved them. The kids reciprocated and thanked dad for having the visit" at the recreational center. (Ex. Fa-G.) At a visit on November 14, 2013, Davis recorded that when Luis, Marializ and Cindaliz asked him if they could go outside to play: " Dad took them outside and the kids played until it was time to leave. Dad watched them carefully . Dad was attentive, engaged and affectionate. He told Luis, Marializ and Cindaliz that he loved them and that he was proud of them." (Ex. Fa-G.) At the visit on February 20, 2014, when their reunification with Santos N. had been interrupted, Davis recorded: " Luis and Marializ were excited to see their dad. They greeted dad with hugs, kisses and 'I love you's.' . . . They seemed to enjoy dad's attention." (Ex. Fa-J.) At the visit on March 9, 2014, " Luis and Marializ showered dad with hugs, kisses and 'I love you's.'" (Ex. Fa-J.) On April 23, 2014, the last visit supervised by Radiance, Davis recorded: " Dad was waiting at the door [of his parent's home] for Luis and Marializ. They were happy to see dad. Luis and Marializ hugged and kissed dad." (Ex. Fa-J.) At the conclusion of this supervised visit, Santos N. " kissed Luis and Marializ and told them he loved him." (Ex. Fa-J.) In deciding § 17a-112(j)(2)'s best interests element, the court has weighed and balanced this evidence, noting that it is somewhat remote in time, against the other credible evidence relevant to the children's best interests including, but not limited to, their enthusiasm for visiting with Belinda F. and their baby half-brother Elian and their fanciful but charming desire, as ably communicated through their lawyer, to live with both of their biological parents, against the totality of the clear and convincing evidence reflecting the parents' failure to achieve rehabilitation, as found in Part III., their general age-related needs and their highly specialized behavioral health needs, Marializ's traumatic experience at the father's residence, and the well-founded, detailed, and fully credible opinion tendered by their GAL supporting TPR notwithstanding the children's love for their biological parents.

Similarly, their emotional ties to Cindaliz and Elian and to any of their other half-siblings are based only on visitation period spent together with them. (Ex. Fa.-G; Tes. Maritza M., Zaira R.) While enjoying their company and often expressing, during visits, a desire not to leave visits or to return to the custody of either Santos N. and/or Belinda F., insofar as emotional ties are concerned, neither child does not looks to either biological parent for environmental support.

Placed with Maritza F. since the October 2011 OTC, Luis and Marializ have close emotional ties to their foster mother, and are also bonded to their foster mother's two biological children. (Tes. Maritza F., Davis, Freedman.) They have developed emotional ties to and healthy reliance upon the foster mother's domestic partner Henry B. whose schedule as a public safety officer allows him to transport the children to services from time to time, with DCF's approval, when the foster mother is working in her capacity as a certified medical technician.¹⁵⁸ Familiarly, the children call their foster mother " Titi" and refer to the foster mother's domestic partner using his nickname " Maurice." (Tes. Maritza F.)

158 As the children have been placed with the foster parents for years, the finding regarding this aspect of their emotional ties is required by the text of § 17a-112(k)(4), and not offered for purposes of comparing any attributes of the foster parent to those of any biological parent. See, In re Joseph M., Jr., supra, 158 Conn.App. 871 (in TPR case, court was required to address child's bond with foster parents, in whose care he had been for the majority of his life).

(5) The ages of the children.

Born on July 12, 2008, Luis is eight years old. Born on June 20, 2009, Marializ is seven.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Although both Santos N. and Belinda F. have maintained contact with Luis and Marializ, as found in Parts I., II. and III., neither parent has adjusted his or her circumstances, conduct, or conditions so as to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts, to achieve statutory rehabilitation, or to make it in the best interest of either child to return to either respondent parent's home in the foreseeable future.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Although both the respondent father and the respondent mother have limited financial resources, neither unreasonable action or conduct by any other person nor either parent's economic circumstances has prevented the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with either child. Notwithstanding his criminal history, Santos N. has from time to time held lawful employment at a car wash and as a school bus driver; as found in Part I.A., he lost the latter position as the result of his own misconduct which was inconsistent with his role as an adult responsible for the safe transportation of other people's children, but was able to regain work at a car wash. Belinda F. matains that she has held lawful employment in a laundry facility in the past; at trial, she claimed that although she was on maternity leave related to the birth of Elian, that lawful employment had long remained available to her.¹⁵⁹ Both Santos N. and Belinda F. have benefitted from subsidized housing services. (Tes. Wendy B.) It was the respondent-parents' decisions about their personal lives, and their inability or unwillingness to benefit from available reunification efforts, not economic factors, that impeded their development of parent-like, meaningful relationships with Luis and Marializ.

159 In January 2016, Belinda F. testified that her year-long maternity leave with the laundry would expire in February 2016, approximately ten months after Elian's birth. (Tes. Belinda F.) The court received no evidence indicating that Belinda F. ever returned to work although, as found in Part I.B., the clear and convincing evidence establishes her return to drug use during the late part of 2015.

Either respondent may argue that their relationship with either or both children was impeded by the DCF-sponsored foster mother's inability or unwillingness to provide them with appropriate attention, and/or by the foster mother's inability or unwillingness to attend parent counseling at Klingberg, and/or to provide Luis with consistent attendance at Klingberg counseling sessions, and/or to provide Marializ with consistent attendance at her CATS therapy.¹⁶⁰ (Ex. Fa-D.; Tes. Crivello, Valoy, Dineen-Elovich.) The court does not condone any caretaker's inconsistency transporting foster child to necessary services; such inconsistency is unreasonable.¹⁶¹ Nonetheless, the evidence is insufficient to support that the foster mother's conduct in this regard in any way prevented either Santos N. or Belinda F. from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Marializ or with Luis. Similarly, the court fully credits the GAL's testimony establishing that the DCF foster mother has attempted to involve the respondent-mother in the children's activities such as birthday parties, and that she has reached out to Santos N. to try to engage him, as well, but that he has not regularly accepted her entreaties.¹⁶² (Tes. GAL.) Again, the evidence is insufficient to support that the foster mother's conduct in this regard in any way prevented either Santos N. or Belinda F. from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Marializ or with Luis.

160 By January 2015, Luis had attended 19 or 20 counseling sessions but had missed 6 or 7 scheduled sessions. A child of Luis's age must rely on his adult caretakers for transportation to therapy such as that provided by Klingberg. (Tes. Crivello.)

161 In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges the July 24, 2014 CATS progress note from informing DCF, then Marializ's legal guardian, " that child has not progress[ed] because missing sessions, and this therapist would like that child be evaluate[d] for ADHD because during session child is all over the place." (Ex. Fa-D.) CATS made DCF well-aware of Marializ's inconsistent attendance at therapy sessions and recommended medical assessment to ascertain whether her school-related eneuresis was caused by a biological condition or, as anticipated, impelled by the child's desire to seek attention from the school nurse whom she trusted. The parties responsible for Marializ's well-being should have timely provided her with regular, reliable transportation to the treatment deemed necessary for her healthy adjustment following her sexual trauma. (Tes. Dineen-Elovich.) Nonetheless, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that either child's inconsistent access to services prevented or even had any measurable impact on either respondent's maintenance of a relationship with either child.

162 The court credits the GAL's testimony establishing that Santos N. has not actively responded to the foster mother's entreaties in part, at least, because she finds Marializ's report of Santos, Jr.'s February 2014 sexual misconduct to be highly reliable, while Santos N. does not. (Tes. GAL.)

IV. B. BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS

As previously noted, in deciding the best interests element of § 17a-112(j)(2), the court has considered each of the findings relevant to Luis's and Marializ's particular specialized needs, identified in Parts I.C. and III., in the context of the respondents' response to reunification efforts and the respondents' failure to achieve, despite the children's lengthy stay in foster care, a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage the belief that either parent could assume a responsible position in the life of either child within a reasonable time. In deciding the best interests issue, the court has also fully credited the opinion and testimony of the GAL, who has extensive expertise in matters related to child protection litigation, who has represented numerous parental and child litigants, and who has long experience serving as a guardian ad litem in custodial contests. The GAL's opinion was based on his thorough, detailed, careful and compassionate but objective investigation of the children's and parents' circumstances, his careful consideration of the issues raised by the department's historical involvement with the family as well as its decision to litigate the issues now before the court. In forming his opinion, GAL, as has the court, remained highly cognizant of the bonds the children had with each respondent and with the foster mother in whose home Luis and Marializ had been placed by DCF since their 2012 removal; the GAL also, as has the court, remained highly cognizant that the sole purpose of the TPR litigation is to determine whether the department has met its burden of proving that parental rights should be severed.¹⁶³ " In the opinion of the guardian ad litem, termination of the respondent[s'] parental rights is in the best interests of the child[ren]." In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn. 547. The court concurs.

163 The court has not based its decision to grant the TPR petition " in order to substitute another, more suitable parent." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280; see also, In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009). The availability of " [proposed] adoptive parents" has been considered only after grounds for termination were shown to exist as to each respondent and specifically in the context of § 17a-112(k)(4), as discussed above. In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 666. Through his direct examination and extensive cross examination, it was clear that the GAL also had formed his opinions about the TPR issues without considering whether the current foster mother should be designated the children's adoptive resource, in which capacity she would effectively serve as a parental substitute. However, he had fully considered the length of time the children had spent in foster care, as such factor is fully relevant to his opinion that despite the that lengthy passage of time, neither Santos N. nor Belinda F. had yet achieved the capacity to meet his ward's particular needs, so that TPR alone would serve the children's best interests. (Tes. GAL.)

In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that Santos N. loves and cares about these children, and is mindful that this respondent had long, intensive services provided by Radiance and Davis in a sincere effort to develop and improve his parenting skills to render him capable of providing a safe, nurturing home environment for Luis and Marializ. While he had Davis at his side, Santos N. could fulfill some parenting functions. However, Santos N. never achieved crucial parental skill of being able and willing to reach out for help when it was required. Santos N. may be able to care for himself, he may be able to care for Cindaliz, and he may be able to put a roof over the heads of Luis and Marializ.¹⁶⁴ However, Santos N. lacks even an elementary level of judgment about his own conduct that would allow him to provide a safe environment for other people's children when they are placed in his care; the December 2015 incident involving his use of his cell phone to access sexually-charged content in the presence of two school-children, despite the years of support he had received from the Radiance fatherhood program, leads to the ineluctable conclusion that Santos N. lacks impulse control, a characteristic that is fundamental to providing safe care for young Luis and Marializ. Santos N. can enjoy play time with his children; he is able to engage them in physically active games outdoors and uses electronic devices to communicate with Luis and Marializ; these events, while appropriate, do not in any way indicate that the respondent father has, in the long term, the capacity to meet the children's specialized needs or to secure their best interests. (Tes. GAL.) Santos N. does not have the ability to perceive that the children who are the subject of this TPR petition have specialized behavioral health needs that will require their parent-figure to advocate forcefully and persistently to ensure that they receive appropriate emotional and educational support services during their remaining childhood years. Without this insight, Santos N. cannot provide a physically safe environment for Marializ, and he cannot provide an appropriately supportive emotionally secure and academically structured home in which either Luis or Marializ would enabled to grow and develop in a healthy, stable manner. Without this insight, and without the capacity to reach out, even to Radiance and Davis, for proactive assistance in raising these children, it is not in the best interests to continue Santos N.'s legal relationship with either child.¹⁶⁵ (Tes. GAL.) His parental rights should be terminated as contemplated by § 17a-112(j).

164 While the respondent father has custody of Cindaliz, that factor is neither dispositive, nor has the reason for that arrangement been addressed sufficiently to enable the court to vest it with any particular weight in the present TPR action, which focuses on the particular needs of Luis and Marializ. See, e.g., In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 760, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).

165 As the GAL so eloquently stated, the respondent father cares about his children, but he just cannot care for them. (Tes. GAL.)

Similarly, in concluding that TPR is in the best interests of Luis and Marializ, the court acknowledges that Belinda F. also loves and cares about these children, and that the respondent mother has had an exhaustive, intensive array of mental health, social support and substance abuse services available to her for five years, some of which she has accessed and some of which she has rejected. The court acknowledges, as well, that Belinda F. from time to time is able to remain sober and has, in the past, fulfilled some parenting functions, holding a job and sometimes remaining able to maintain her youngest son Elian in her care.¹⁶⁶ The court also bears in mind that Belinda F. was able to stay engaged in treatment and to be drug free during the last six months of a protracted TPR trial; this relatively recent sobriety, however, does not support a finding that if Luis and Marializ were returned to her care, the respondent mother could or would remain sober, even though such a characteristic is critical to providing safe, secure, nurturing care for any children. Belinda F.'s use of drugs when faced with stressful situations is manifest in her relapse during the fall of 2015, with positive laboratory test results catalogued in Part I, occurred relatively contemporaneously with the stress related to the arrest of Elian's father, her domestic partner, Luis T., on drug charges. (Tes. GAL.) Objectively viewed, Belinda F.'s sobriety remains untested by the rigors of having to provide mental health support and educational advocacy for two highly active children such as Luis and Marializ, both of whom have displayed conduct concerns and behavioral issues in school settings, requiring professional guidance. Belinda F. can engage Luis and Marializ in enjoyable play time, providing them with an abundance of toys, helping them to use enhanced effects on electronic devices and communicating with them successfully during supervised visits; these occurrences, while appropriate, do not in any way indicate that the respondent father has, in the long term, the capacity to meet the children's specialized needs or to secure their best interests. (Tes. GAL.) As found in Parts I.B., II.B. and III.B., Belinda F. relapsed into drug use while court orders prohibiting that use were in effect through the specific steps; she relapsed and used cocaine and marijuana during the course of the trial being held to determine whether she would retain her legal parental rights to her older children and when she had only her youngest infant, in her care; she withheld information about the specifics of her drug use when seeking re-treatment from her individual counselor, Williams, choosing to minimize her relapse into drug use because she was embarrassed that others, including DCF and the court, would learn of the nature and/or extent of the relapse. This conduct, on the part of Belinda F., impels the conclusion that despite all the treatment she has received over the years, she cannot deal with life's expected stressors without succumbing to further drug use, a condition that is inimical to provision of even minimally adequate parental care.¹⁶⁷ Viewed in the context of Belinda F.'s desire to raise Luis and Marializ, whose ADHD, PTSD, conduct and learning issues will place extraordinary stressors on their parent-figure, if these children are returned to their mother's care, the clear and convincing evidence of her past drug use, when stress, impels the finding that she will again use drugs, to the detriment of any child in her care. Therefore, although Belinda F. loves the children dearly, and can provide them with appropriate activities in which to engage during closely supervised visits, she lacks the capacity to provide the consistent, reliable, sober supervision and advocacy the children's best interests require. She simply cannot provide either child with the appropriately supportive, emotionally secure and environment free from substance abuse, which both Luis and Marializ fundamentally deserve and require in order to enhance the children's opportunity to grow and develop in a healthy, stable manner. (Tes. Belinda F., Williams, GAL.) Accordingly, it is not in the best interests to continue Belinda F.'s legal relationship with either child, and her parental rights should be terminated as contemplated by § 17a-112(j).

166 The GAL reported that DCF was considering, at the close of evidence, reunification of baby Elian with the respondent mother. (Tes. GAL.) However, the court attributes minimal weight to that event, should it occur, given the extraordinary differences between the nature and extent of parental care required for a baby, and the nature and extent of parental care required for a school-aged child like Luis, who has ADHD and behavioral issues, and a school-aged child like Marializ, who has been sexually traumatized, has PTSD and also has behavioral issues. In this case, as the court must focus upon the particular needs of the children subject to termination, DCF's decision to allow a sibling such as Elian to remain in a respondent's care does not establish that parent's " ability to care for the specific needs of [the] child at issue" in the TPR proceeding. In re Anthony H., supra, 104 Conn. 760.

167 As the GAL opined, for Belinda F.'s most recent relapse to have occurred some four years into Luis's and Marializ's TPR trial is a significant indicator that she would not be able to fulfil a responsible role in the lives of these children over the long term, and that their best interests cannot possibly be served by continuing their legal relationship with her. (Tes. GAL.)

In deciding that TPR serves the best interest of Luis and Marializ, and that it is not in their best interests to continue a legal relationship with either parent, the court also has considered each child's statements, made from time to time, indicating that they desire to return to the custody of either Santos N. or Belinda F. (Tes. Santos N., Belinda F., GAL.) The court has fully acknowledged the children's bond with their biological parents, and respects the children's statements. These bonds and these statements must be assessed in view of the children's ages, stages of development, specialized behavioral health and educational conditions, and their fundamental need for permanency, achieved through placement with a parent-figure who is able and willing now, not at some unascertainable date in the future, to assume a responsible, reliable and consistent position in their lives.¹⁶⁸

168 As previously noted, " [a]lthough the child may share a bond with the respondent, '[o]ur courts consistently have held that even when there is a finding of a bond between a parent and a child, it still may be in the child's best interest to terminate parental rights.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 531, 939 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 341; 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 342 (2008)." In re Daniel A., 150 Conn.App. 78, 104, 89 A.3d 1040, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 911, 93 A.3d 593 (2014). See also, In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001) (" [A] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough [where the department] has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] cannot be a competent parent . . . because she cannot provide them a nurturing, safe and structured environment"), cited in In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 164.

The evidence relevant to the respondent-parents' circumstances, over the course of the five years that have passed since DCF implemented its OTC's, viewed in the context of the children's needs, clearly and convincingly establish that neither Santos N. or Belinda F. has reached the point where, on a daily basis, he or she could meet the best interests of either of these children.¹⁶⁹ (Tes. GAL.) Thus, this court is constrained to find that notwithstanding Luis's and Marializ's sometimes-stated wishes to live with their biological parents, only termination of parental rights will finally enable them to spend their remaining childhood years in a " forever home" in which they are nurtured, kept safe, and supported on a continuous basis, without risk of further delay.¹⁷⁰ In re Heather L., 49 Conn.Supp. 287, 313, 877 A.2d 27 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 174, 874 A.2d 796 (2005).

169 The court acknowledges, as has the children's GAL, that granting the present TPR petition may well mean that neither Luis nor Marializ will again see their younger half-brother Elian. (Tes. GAL.) The court further acknowledges that terminating Santos N.'s parental rights may well mean that neither Luis nor Marializ will again see Cindaliz, with whom they have a positive relationship. These factors pale, however, in comparison to the clear and convincing evidence establishing grounds for granting the pending TPR petitions as to both Santos N. and Belinda F., to ensure that the best interests of Luis and Marializ are met overall.

170 The court has not based its decision to grant the TPR petition " in order to substitute another, more suitable parent." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280; see also, In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009).

V.

ORDERS

The court terminates the parental rights of Santos N. to Luis N. and to Marializ N.

The court terminates the parental rights of Belinda F. to Luis N. and to Marializ N.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(m), and within thirty days shall report to the court on a case plan which includes measurable objectives and time schedules for the children, and shall file such additional reports in a timely manner as required.

The Clerk of any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly this 15th day of November 2016.