Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD213476, JD219703, JD219799
NICHOLSON, J.
G.M. (appellant), the mother of L.P., F.M., and I.M. (the minors), appeals from orders of the juvenile court adjudging the minors dependent children of the court and denying appellant reunification services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further statutory references to sections of an undesignated code are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends the social worker’s report was inadequate for its failure to include an assessment of the bond existing between appellant and the minors. Appellant also claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her reunification services based on the best interests of the minors. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 4, 2007, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed original juvenile dependency petitions on behalf of the minors, who ranged in age from three to 15 years old. Those petitions alleged appellant had a lengthy substance abuse history, and that she had been arrested recently for possession of narcotics paraphernalia. The petitions also alleged appellant’s home was in “complete disarray” and that there had been previous dependency proceedings pertaining to five half-siblings of the minors, two of which resulted in termination of appellant’s parental rights.
The social worker’s report, prepared for the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, stated that appellant, who was 43 at the time began using marijuana when she was approximately 18 years old and methamphetamine at age 25. At one time, appellant was smoking methamphetamine on a daily basis. Appellant told the social worker she last used methamphetamine in late March 2007. DHHS had referred appellant to residential drug treatment. Unfortunately, appellant failed to drug test regularly.
DHHS recommended that the juvenile court deny appellant reunification services. According to DHHS, “it does not appear to be in the children’s best interest to offer the mother services, as it does not appear that similar services would be effective in alleviating the circumstances that brought the children to the Court’s attention. The mother participated in Reunification Services on two different occasions to address her substance abuse history, which was completed and Dependency was terminated on or about July 22, 2005. The mother has admitted to recent methamphetamine use and has not been forthcoming with the Department. A bonding assessment would be recommended to determine the level of bond between the children and the mother. However, it appears that the young age of the children, [I.M.] and [F.M.], and importance of stability is paramount.”
DHHS placed the minors in the home of their adult sibling. The minors were doing well there. Appellant believed that placement was the best one for the minors. Although the oldest minor did not wish to be placed there “due to the area,” she indicated she had lived with her older sister in the past and enjoyed spending time with her.
At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, social worker Christina Rodriquez testified she had not evaluated the relationship between the minors and appellant because, due to the latter’s incarceration, the social worker had not seen the minors and appellant together. The social worker also suggested her recommendation for denial of services for appellant was based on the need of the minors for stability. The social worker acknowledged that, in the past, appellant had completed a services program successfully and regained custody of the minors. Another social worker testified appellant was doing well participating in various programs.
Appellant testified she had not used illegal drugs since March 2007, and at one time had remained drug-free for 18 months. Appellant told the juvenile court she was honest now with herself and knew she had to learn the skills necessary for her recovery from addiction. Appellant stated she loved the minors.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petitions, adjudged the minors dependent children, and denied appellant reunification services. In doing so, the court stated in part as follows: “So whether it’s the end of 2006 or -- end of 2005 or beginning of 2006 you -- the evidence is that you resisted the prior court-ordered treatment because you began to use methamphetamine on a daily basis and ended up -- the mother admitted her last use was March 26, 2007. Before that she said she used two times daily before that. That’s on page 4 of the jurisdictional report. It’s not just a mere relapse where -- this would have been a different case, much different case had you returned to using illegal substances after dependency was terminated and then voluntarily got back into services. That’s one thing. The evidence to me -- it’s unfortunate. You kept on using and ended up unfortunately getting arrested and you know what happened after that unfortunately. [¶] I do find that [section 361.5, subdivision] (b)(13) applies by clear and convincing evidence in this case. I don’t think there’s been clear and convincing evidence that it would be in the best interest to provide services to the mother for all those reasons and because of the past history, the numerous attempts that have been made to help, the fact that the mother pretty soon after dependency got terminated she was back unfortunately to using drugs and the fact that she did not voluntarily seek services once she started to relapse, but ended up having to be involuntarily compelled to go to a residential treatment program which she is now in and doing well. You’re to be commended for following the criminal court’s orders and doing well in that, but this is too much of a very destabilizing situation for the kids in terms of the best interest analysis. They need to have some certainty about what is going to happen in their lives and not put in a state of limbo which I think services to the mother would do.”
DISCUSSION
I
Appellant contends the social worker’s report was inadequate for its failure to address the issue of the bond between the minors and appellant. According to appellant, DHHS improperly elevated stability of the minors over family preservation as the overriding factor in the dependency proceedings. Moreover, appellant argues, the issue of the adequacy of the report was not forfeited, as her counsel impliedly challenged it for lacking a discussion of the bond existing between the minors and appellant.
The difficulty with appellant’s claim in this case is that the record does not reveal counsel for appellant, or appellant herself, ever tendered in the juvenile court any objection to the adequacy of the social worker’s report or a request for a bonding assessment. The record reflects appellant had ample opportunities to bring that issue to the attention of the juvenile court if she had wished to do so. Yet she failed to avail herself of that opportunity.
The California Supreme Court has stated, “‘“An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.”’ (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1, italics in Doers.) ‘“The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .”’ (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) ‘“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, fn. omitted; Cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [stating that the correct legal term for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is forfeiture, not waiver].)
Here, as the record shows, at no time did appellant challenge the adequacy of the social worker’s report or request a bonding assessment. Instead, counsel for appellant merely questioned the social worker about any efforts she had made to assess the bond between the minors and appellant. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, such questioning does not constitute an attack on the adequacy of the report. Thus, appellant is precluded from raising the claim here. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198-1200.) Appellant has forfeited her claim. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293, fn. 2.)
Even if the forfeiture doctrine somehow did not apply to this case, appellant would not prevail on the merits of her claim. The social worker is obliged by statute to “investigate the circumstances leading to the removal of the child and advise the court whether there are circumstances that indicate that reunification is likely to be successful or unsuccessful and whether failure to order reunification is likely to be detrimental to the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) The record reflects the social worker conducted the required investigation. Understandably, as she testified, the social worker could not observe and report on any interactions between the minors and appellant due to the latter’s incarceration.
In any event, as appellant emphasizes in her opening brief, the record contains ample evidence that a strong bond existed between the minors and appellant, and in her testimony appellant made clear her love for the minors. In evaluating appellant’s request for reunification services, the juvenile court was obliged to consider all of the minors’ circumstances, as the record reflects it did. A stable environment, of course, was an important component of their situation.
In sum, we reject appellant’s claim that the social worker’s report was defective.
II
Appellant claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her reunification services based on the best interests of the minors. Relying on evidence that she was benefiting from services, appellant asserts the record reflects she and the minors were closely bonded to each other. Appellant also suggests that, due to the placement of the minors with a close relative, appellant would see the minors regularly, making the provision of services to her sensible.
The juvenile court may deny a parent reunification services under certain circumstances. (§ 361.5, subd. (b).) One of those circumstances is where the parent has a history of substance abuse and has resisted treatment or refused to comply with a treatment program. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).) In such a case, the court may not order services unless it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the minor. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).)
In reviewing appellant’s claim, we apply the familiar substantial evidence test. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881.) When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, at p. 1214. The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Here, DHHS based its recommended denial of reunification services to appellant in part on her previous history, even though at one time she had regained custody of the minors. Unfortunately, as the social worker’s report also noted, appellant had resumed using methamphetamine, did not drug test regularly, and had failed to engage consistently in services. Moreover, she had failed to maintain regular contact with the minors. On this record, it is not surprising that DHHS would conclude, especially where two young minors were involved, that providing appellant with reunification services again would not be in the best interests of the minors.
At the hearing, the social worker emphasized the placement moves necessitated by appellant’s substance abuse. According to the social worker, “[appellant] has a history of doing this where she will comply with services and then fall back. She’s admitted to using daily to me. She has currently engaged in services; however, those services were court-ordered due to the criminal case that she had before her. She was assessed as a substance abuser as well, and for those reasons I don’t believe that it’s going to be in the children’s best interest to offer services because of the history of substance abuse.”
When asked whether the recommendation of no services would change assuming the existence of a “strong bond” between appellant and the minors, the social worker replied in the negative, noting “that where the children currently are they’re stable, they have a home that’s healthy for them with their adult sibling . . . .”
On the record before it, the juvenile court concluded reunification would not be in the minors’ best interests, even as it expressed sympathy for appellant’s circumstances and acknowledged her efforts. That decision was well within the court’s discretion. The record reflects appellant’s history was marked by instability and periods of only sporadic contact with the minors. Appellant even missed some visits with the minors when she was not incarcerated. Under such circumstances, the prospects for appellant’s successful reunification with the minors were doubtful at best. Substantial evidence supports the court’s denial of services.
Appellant does not challenge the order of the juvenile court denying her services based on her substance abuse history. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J., HULL, J.