Opinion
H14CP14011149A H14CP14011150A H14CP14011151A
01-25-2017
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Stephen F. Frazzini, J.
The above matters are before the court on competing motions regarding the future custody and guardianship of the three children named above, who were committed to the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) on September 29, 2014, after adjudications of neglect pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129. The department and both parents have filed motions to modify the disposition by transfer of guardianship. Each parent seeks an order of sole guardianship and sole legal and physical custody, with the department supporting the mother's request. In addition, the father has filed motions for additional and unsupervised visitation, including his being allowed to attend children's events; for his mother to have supervised visits with the children; for the mother to have supervised visitation with the children; and for orders that reunification therapy be reinstated and that DCF refer the parents to co-parenting therapy. By agreement of the parties, hearing on the department's motion for approval of a permanency plan (MRP) for reunification of the children with the mother, to which the father has objected, was consolidated with trial of these other motions. For the reasons stated below, the mother's and department's motions are granted. The father's motions for transfer of sole custody and guardianship to himself, for additional and unsupervised visitation, for reinstatement of reunification therapy and referral to co-parenting therapy, and for the paternal grandmother to have supervised visitation are denied. Two motions filed by the father and identified as seeking " emergency relief" one dated January 22, 2016, and the other dated February 19, 2016, essentially pertain to his objection to the mother having custody and to his claims for sole custody and guardianship and are denied. His motion to attend children's events is granted in part, as set forth in the orders.
A complete list of the court's decision on the pending motions and objections is set forth at the end of this decision.
The parties appeared with their attorneys for hearing on the various motions on numerous clays beginning on October 19, 2015, as did the attorneys and guardian ad litem for the children. Trial on these motion continued for more than a year. The number of attorneys participating in this matter made it difficult to schedule trial dates, and there was also a delay of six months occasioned by a competency evaluation of the father. During hearing on these matters, the court heard testimony from the following persons:
At the beginning of trial, the father was represented by Attorney Richard Oles of the Georgia bar, who was admitted to appear in these matters pro hac vice. A few days into trial, Attorney Oles moved to withdraw as counsel. The motion on that matter was heard before the Honorable Henry Cohn, J.T.R., who granted the motion. The father then filed a written application for appointment of counsel, which was granted, as he was found to be indigent, and an attorney was appointed to represent him. For the remainder of trial; the father, who is an attorney licensed to practice law in this state (as is the respondent mother), and his appointed counsel both participated in the proceedings.
After this judge ordered the competency evaluation, all proceedings related to that issue were held before a different judge, the Honorable Holly Abery-Wetstone, who found the father competent.
the respondent father and mother;
the children's foster father, Gary G.;
the children's paternal grandmother, Shirley F.;
Amanda Colom, a therapeutic family time and reunification worker at Wheeler Clinic who oversaw the mother's visits with her children beginning in March of 2016;
Nadine Blackwood, a family support worker at Klingberg Family Center who has been supervising the father's visits with the children since June 2016;
Mike Susarchick, a social worker case aide for DCF, who supervised three of the father's visits with the children;
Maureen Billings, who was Logan's second grade teacher at Squadron Lines School in Simsbury during the 2013-2014 school year;
Megan Evans and Patricia Sullivan, the principal and school psychologist at Squadron Lines School that both Logan and Emma were attending when they were removed from parental custody in April 2014;
Christopher Bidorini, the DCF social worker currently assigned to these matters;
Melissa Riccelli, the DCF supervising social worker on these matters;
Joseph Koehler, a DCF social worker who, in his previous capacity as an intake social worker investigator, conducted DCF investigations in February and March of 2014 regarding various reports made to the DCF Care Line;
Michelle LaBoy, who was a DCF social worker supervisor overseeing and participating in the DCF investigations regarding these children in 2014;
Detective Jason Trombley of the Simsbury Police Department, who was dispatched on August 25, 2014, to a Subway restaurant across the street from the police department in response to a phone call made by the mother to the police;
Officer Timothy May of the Simsbury Police Department, who went to the parents' home twice in February 2014 in response to complaints made by the father;
Detective Scott Sagan of the Simsbury Police Department, who investigated the allegation that the mother caused a concussion to Logan, assisted in the investigation of the allegation that the mother caused bruising on Emma, and was one of several police officers responding to an incident in which the father was injured and arrested after an incident with his brother;
Dr. Carol Abbatiello, an emergency room physician at St. Francis Hospital, who treated Logan at the hospital on March 2, 2014, when he was brought there that day by the paternal grandmother;
Dr. David Wang, a licensed physician employed as the Medical Director of Elite Sports Medicine at the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC), who treated Logan in March and April of 2014;
Dr. Jeffrey Thomson, chief of orthopedic surgery at CCMC and formerly president of the physician's group there, who wrote a letter in July 2014 to the respondent parents stating that CCMC would no longer provide medical treatment to Logan because of disruptive behavior that had frightened the staff there;
James Bender, the CCMC security operations manager, who attended Logan's appointments there after " being alerted" by CCMC staff " about a possible situation" with " an irate father" (none of which was admitted for the truth of what he was told but to explain Bernier's subsequent conduct in attending Logan's appointments);
Lisa Murphy-Cipolla, the clinical services coordinator at the Greater Hartford Children's Advocacy Center, located at St. Francis Hospital, who testified about the procedures for conducting diagnostic forensic interviews of children who may have been sexually or physically abused and explained why no such interview of Logan occurred on the day that it was originally scheduled;
Dr. Barbara Bunk and Dr. Irene Grueneberg, licensed clinical psychologists who conducted (i) therapy for the three children from the fall of 2014 until the spring of 2016, and (ii) what they described as " family therapy" for the parents and children from April 2015 through January 2016;
Dr. Stephen Humphrey, a licensed clinical psychologist appointed by the court to conduct psychological evaluations of the parties, their children, the paternal grandmother, and a paternal aunt and uncle, as well as updated evaluations of the parties; and
Sue Cousineau, the attorney appointed at the beginning of these proceedings by agreement of all parties to serve as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for all three children.
This witness testified during a hearing in September 2016 on a motion to suspend the father's visits with Logan, and her testimony and the visitation reports that she authored and which were introduced into evidence during that hearing are only considered here on the motions relating to that child.
The testimony of this witness was also presented during the hearing on the motion to suspend the father's visits with Logan, and is thus only considered with respect to the matters considering that child.
In addition, the court held two days of hearings on motions to modify the father' visitation with Logan. The evidence heard on those motions is, by agreement of the parties to those motions, being taken into consideration here with regard to the post-disposition motions affecting Logan, but not for his siblings, whose attorneys did not participate in that hearing.
The parties also introduced numerous exhibits into evidence. By agreement of the parties, the court has also taken judicial notice of the evidence presented at the neglect trial before this judge (which had included evidence introduced during certain pretrial hearings held before this judge). In addition, pursuant to § 2-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the court has taken judicial notice of the contents of the three court files, except that factual assertions contained in pleadings, motions, or other documents filed by the parties are taken as substantively true only if (i) independent evidence thereof was introduced and found credible in this proceeding, or (ii) subject to principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata.
In the month before the neglect trial, the court heard the following motions: motions to intervene filed by paternal relatives, which were denied; motions for children's therapy filed by DCF, which were granted; motions for reunification therapy filed by both parents which were granted; a motion for release of the psychological evaluation to the parents' and children's mental health treatment providers; which was granted; father's motion to remove the guardian ad litem, which was denied; DCF's motion to suspend father's visits, which was granted; father's objection to that motion, which was overruled; father's motion to reinstate his visits, which was denied; and father's motion to transfer DCF office, which was denied. Witnesses who testified in those proceedings included the following:
I
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
These three children originally came into DCF custody after this court granted ex parte motions for an order of temporary custody (OTC) of each child on March 20, 2014. Affidavits submitted by DCF in support of the OTCs stated that:
The parents were alternating custody of the children during a pending divorce proceeding;
The two older children Emma and Logan, were speaking negatively about their mother and claiming that she physically abused them, and Logan had been recently diagnosed with a concussion that he claimed had been caused by his mother;
Both the school psychologist to whom Logan had spoken and an experienced DCF social work supervisor who had interviewed the older children stated that the reports of physical abuse appeared to be " scripted";
The mother was claiming that the children were being " brainwashed" by their father; and
The guardian ad litem appointed by the court in the divorce proceeding believed the children should be taken into DCF custody.
An affidavit of DCF social worker Joseph Koehler accompanied the motions for ex parte OTC and stated as follows: " Via the Department of Children and Families case record, it was documented that Patricia [S.] School Psychologist at [S.L.] Elementary School, called the department's Careline on February 28, 2014 in order to provide the following message. Parents are in the middle of a nasty divorce. Child, Logan [F.] shared with caller the following information a couple of days ago. Child stated that he did not want to live with Mother because she hits him and yells at him. Child could not say when he was hit. Child had no marks or bruises. Caller believes that Father is the one telling child to say these things about Mother. Child appeared to be very scripted in what he was saying."
Another affidavit accompanying the ex parte motions for the OTCs, from DCF social work supervisor Michelle Laboy, stated that she had spoken with the two older children and that " [i]n my 16+ years of experience, I find it unusual for Emma and Logan to make disclosures of being hurt without any prompting. Though they both report being hurt by their mother, they could not provide time frames and presented as scripted in their language. Though they did not present as fearful of their mother, at this time, the allegations of physical abuse toward Emma and Logan can not be ruled out."
The department simultaneously filed neglect petitions alleging that the children were living under conditions injurious to their well-being. At the preliminary hearing on the OTCs, both parents appeared with counsel, were advised of their rights, entered pro forma denials to the allegations of the neglect petitions, and stated their intention to contest the OTCs, which were referred to the Child Protection Session (CPS) in Middletown. By agreement of all parties, the GAL in the family case was appointed for the juvenile matters as well. The court also granted the department's motion for a psychological evaluation. At CPS in Middletown on April 4, 2014, the parties entered into an agreement to sustain the OTCs. After canvassing the parties, the court, Elgo, J., accepted the agreement, sustained the OTCs, and ordered amended preliminary specific steps. The court also granted the mother's motion for an increased number of visits with the children and ordered that each parent be given two one-hour visits with the children each Week.
On August 4, 2014, the department filed an " Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Cease Visitation" by the father, which the court, Cofield, J., granted on the papers. After an evidentiary hearing on that motion, the father's objection, and his motion to reinstate visits, this court granted the department's motion on September 5, 2014. Trial on the neglect petitions took place on three days in late September 2014 before this judge, the court taking judicial notice of the evidence and exhibits presented during pretrial hearings.
Through the third day of the neglect trial, the proceedings were highly contested. After the conclusion of Dr. Humphrey's testimony on the third day of trial, however, counsel requested that a trial management conference be held on the record. The court was then advised that counsel for the department and parents had engaged in settlement discussions, as a result of which, based on representations that father did not intend to introduce any witnesses, the state intended to rest its case following introduction of the mandated social study. Counsel for the department and father then asked the court to make summary findings of fact regarding neglect and disposition. After the state and father rested their cases, the mother entered a nolo contendere plea, as her attorney had previously informed the court that she would do to at the conclusion of the state's case-in-chief. The father also withdrew his motion for a forensic evaluation of Logan. After testimony from the GAL and brief closing arguments, the children were found to have been neglected and were committed to DCF. As had been requested by counsel for the father and the department the court's factual findings were summary and limited:
The following dialogue occurred during the trial management conference:
I find that testimony and reports of Dr. Humphrey with regard to the effects on the children of the parental conflict, and the testimony of people who interacted with the children, quite powerful. And Dr. Humphrey's testimony and reports are found credible and established as true.
The evidence shows here that the parental conflict, particularly after the filing of the divorce created a situation and environment and circumstances that were sufficient to establish neglect as of the date the petition was filed. It also warranted and makes a finding that continuation in the children's home is contrary to their individual welfare.
In pretrial interviews with Dr. Humphrey conducted as part of his court-ordered psychological evaluation, the two parents had presented starkly different version of their relationship and the home environment in which the children had lived. According to Dr. Humphrey, " Mr. [P.] essentially represent[ed] that Ms. [F.] mistreated the children physically and was in that sense, abusive toward them . . . Ms. [F.]'s representation was that Mr. [F.] was verbally aggressive, to an extreme, toward her, and treated her very poorly." Partial transcript of proceedings on September 23, 2014, testimony of Dr. Humphrey (Dr. Humphrey transcript, September 23, 2014), pp. 85-86. He testified " that regardless of which representation you choose, the negative consequences to children of being involved in a home where there's such conflict, and regardless of whether its mother's physical maltreatment, or father's verbal maltreatment, or both, the consequences for the children [could] be dire." Id., p. 86. The court also found credible Dr. Humphrey's conclusion that a " campaign of denigration [against the mother]"; Dr. Humphrey Transcript, September 3, 2014, p. 33; had been " psychologically toxic and harmful to the children." Dr. Humphrey transcript, September 23, 2014, p. 91.
The evidence at the neglect trial showed that the three children were suffering emotionally and displaying extremely dysfunctional behavior as a result of the parental discord and the campaign of denigration against the mother. According to Dr. Humphrey, whose testimony and reports the court found to be credible and proven to be true: " The children have . . . been exposed to a considerable amount of conflict, and as a result have begun to show, I believe, behavioral symptoms of that. . . . And so, as a result of all that, the kids are exhibiting behavioral patterns that are dysfunctional unique to their own personalities and styles." Dr. Humphrey Transcript, September 23, 2014, p. 93. " Both of the older children have exhibited a pattern of severe conduct problems over a number of years which has included oppositional defiant behaviors . . .; the use of very foul language from the age of three; exhibition of hostility; aggression; again, defiant behaviors . . . [These] externalizing or acting out behaviors . . . fit the criteria for one of the . . . disruptive behavior disorders, which is oppositional defiant disorder, which is marked by being difficult with adults, being engaging in sometimes aggressive or hostile behaviors, engaging in behaviors that are socially unacceptable to the level of where they may create social conflict for the children. And on top that--those kinds of disruptive problems there are significant emotional problem that I would attribute to a number of causes, but one of the primary ones being their parents' divorce and the level of animosity described by both parents as being present in the household for a number of years." Partial transcript of proceedings on September 3, 2014, testimony of Dr. Humphrey (Dr. Humphrey Transcript, September 3, 2014), pp. 3-4. Dr. Humphrey concluded, moreover, that
the primary psychological harm to the children has been the inculcation of a very negative and hostile perception of their mother which does not comport with their demeanor towards with her when seen with her and is consistent with other information suggesting that that perception of their mother has been fostered by paternal family.
Transcript of Testimony, August 27, 2014, p. 36.
II
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
The current proceedings began with the filing of motions from the department and both parents to revoke the current commitments, Under General Statutes § 46b-129(m) and Practice Book § 35a-14A, the court may revoke a commitment if the Causes for commitment no longer exist and revocation is in the best interests of the child or youth. The burden of proof on the first prong, that causes for commitment no longer exist, lies on the party seeking revocation of commitment: If that burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child.
General Statutes § 46b-129(m) provides, in pertinent part: " The commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests of such child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth . . ." Practice Book § 35a-14A, captioned " Revocation of Commitment, " provides, in pertinent part: " Where a child or youth is committed to the commissioner of the department of children and families, the commissioner, a parent or the child's attorney may file a motion seeking revocation of commitment. The judicial authority may revoke commitment if a cause for commitment no longer exists and it is in the best interests of the child or youth. Whether to revoke the commitment is a dispositional question, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether to revoke the commitment upon, a fair preponderance of the evidence, The party seeking revocation of commitment has the burden of proof that no cause for commitment exists, If the burden is met, the party opposing the revocation has the burden of proof that revocation would not be in the best interests of the child . . ."
Since revocation of commitment would also revoke the award of guardianship to the department, it would, seemingly, reinstate guardianship in both parents. Yet, in this case, each parent seeks an order of sole guardianship and urges the court not to reinstate the other's guardianship rights. The father argues that the mother is dangerous to the children. The mother argues that the father's alienating behaviors continue to affect the children and her relationship with them adversely. The department and GAL support the mother's position that the father's guardianship rights should not be reinstated. When the court pointed out to the parties these possible implications of a revocation of commitment, the parents and department then filed motions to modify the dispositions of commitment and transfer guardianship solely to either mother (her and DCF's proposal) or to the father (his proposal). During closing argument, all parties stated that these later motions superceded the prior motions to revoke.
A motion to modify the disposition of commitment and transfer guardianship is governed by General Statutes § 46b-129(j)(2)(C) and Practice Book § § 35a-12A and 35a-16. Curiously, the latter practice book section provides that a parent's motion to modify a disposition of commitment so as to regain custody without protective supervision shall be treated as a motion for revocation apparently with results that hone of the parties here want but that section expressly does not require similar treatment of such motions filed by the department.
General Statutes § 46b-129(j)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " Upon finding and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared for, neglected or abused the court may . . . (C) vest such child's or youth's permanent legal guardianship in any person or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court . . ."
Practice Book § 35a-12A, captioned " Motions for Transfer of Guardianship, " provides as follows: " (a) Motions to transfer guardianship are dispositional in nature, based on the prior adjudication. (b) In cases in which a motion for transfer of guardianship seeks to vest guardianship of a child or youth in any relative who is the licensed foster parent for such child or youth, or who is, pursuant to an order of the court, the temporary custodian of the child or youth at the time of the motion, the moving party has the burden of proof that the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and that transfer of guardianship is in the best interest of the child. In such cases, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the award of legal guardianship to that relative shall be in the best interests of the child or youth and that such relative is a suitable and worthy person to assume legal guardianship. The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of legal guardianship to such relative would not be in the child's or youth's best interests and suit relative is not a suitable and worthy person. (c) In cases in which a motion for transfer of guardianship, if granted, would require the removal of a child or youth from any relative who is the licensed foster parent for such child or youth, or who is, pursuant to an order of the court, the temporary custodian of the child or youth at the time of the motion, the moving party has the initial burden of proof that an award of legal guardianship to, or an adoption by, such relative would not be in the child's or youth's best interest and that such relative is not a suitable and worthy person. If this burden is met the moving party then has the burden of proof that the movant's proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and that transfer of guardianship to that proposed guardian is in the best interest of the child. (d) In all other cases, the moving party has the burden of proof that the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy and that transfer of guardianship is in the best interest of the child."
Practice Book § 35a-16 provides as follows: " Motions to modify dispositions are dispositional in nature based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether a modification is in the best interest of the child or youth upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. Unless filed by the commissioner of the department of children and families, any modification motion to return a child or youth to the custody of the parent without protective supervision shall be treated as a motion for revocation of commitment."
There are similarities between the two types of motions, however. Both require a finding that a parent seeking restoration of guardianship and custody rights has the burden of proving himself or herself to be a fit parent--either by proof that the causes for commitment (and earlier loss of custodial and guardianship rights) no longer exist or that the parent is now suitable and worthy to resume the role of guardian. Both also require a finding that return of parental guardianship and custody is in the child's best interest. In closing argument the parties all made clear that the operative motions on which they sought resolution were the motions for modification of the disposition and that those motions had superceded the earlier motions for revocation.
The department's motion for approval of permanency plan was filed on December 17, 2015. Such motions are governed by General Statutes § 46b-129(k) and Practice Book § 35a-14. Under each provision, the commissioner has the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plans are in the best interests of the child or youth. By agreement of the parties, the court found on December 17, 2015, that the department had made reasonable efforts to achieve the proposed permanency plans for reunification of the children with their mother.
General Statutes § 46b-129(k) provides, in pertinent part, as follows; " (1)(A) . . . The commissioner shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child or youth . . . (2) At a permanency hearing held in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection, the court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child or youth and takes into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency. The child or youth's health and safely shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan . . ."
Practice Book § 35a-14 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: " (d) Whether to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made are dispositional questions, based on the prior adjudication, and the judicial authority shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the child or youth to approve the permanency plan and to find that reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan have been made upon a fair preponderance of the evidence. The commissioner of the department of children and families shall have the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child or youth and that it has made reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing plan. (e) At each hearing on a motion for review of permanency plan, the judicial authority shall review the status of the child, the progress being made to implement the permanency plan, determine a timetable for attaining the permanency plan, determine the services to be provided to the parent if the court approves a permanency plan of reunification and the timetable for such services, and determine whether the commissioner of the department of children and families has made reasonable efforts to achieve the goal of the existing permanency plan. The judicial authority shall also determine whether the proposed goal of the permanency plan as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2) is in the best interests of the child or youth by a fair preponderance of the evidence, taking into consideration the child's or youth's need for permanency. The child's or youth's health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan. If a permanency plan is not approved by the judicial authority, it shall order the filing of a revised plan and set a hearing to review said revised plan within sixty days."
III
DISCUSSION
At the neglect trial, Dr. Humphrey recommended " there be a form of reunification counseling for the adults and children before actual reunification would take place with either" of the parents. Testimony, September 23, 2015, p. 8. The court's final specific steps adopted that recommendation and ordered each parent to engage in reunification counseling. The stated goals of reunification therapy for the mother and children were " to address and remediate any estrangement or alienation between them in order to restore the children to a more normative perception of her and to help them build upon and nurture the attachment behaviors toward her that they exhibited during the interactions observed by Dr. Humphrey." The goals of reunification therapy for the father and children were " to help the father to understand how his words and conduct may affect the children's relationship with their mother and then to help him actively support and promote that relationship." See final specific steps, incorporating portions of the Order dated September 12, 2014.
DCF engaged two clinical psychologists, Dr. Barbara Bunk and Dr. Ilene Grueneberg, to provide counseling for the children and, when efforts to obtain someone else to provide the reunification therapy were unsuccessful, they agreed to undertake that service as well (which they referred to instead as " family therapy"). In March 2015, by agreement of the parties, the court authorized the father to begin visiting with the children again, and since then he has had weekly supervised visits, By early April 2015, each parent was also meeting with the children and their therapists on a biweekly basis (although the parents' meetings with the children and the therapists ended in late January of 2016). In July 2016, the order for weekly visits with Logan was suspended, based on a letter from the child's therapist appended to a motion filed by the mother to modify that order; pending hearing on that motion, visits would " be in mother's discretion, " After two days of evidentiary hearings in early September 2016, the court ordered that the father's visits with Logan would resume, but occur only every other week unless his therapist recommended an additional visit in the interim week.
In determining the pending motions with regard to Logan, the court is also considering the evidence offered in those two days of hearings.
In March 2015, the court approved, over the father's objection and after an evidentiary hearing, the department's permanency plan for reunifying the children with their mother. The reunification process then took place over several stages, beginning with additional supervised visits, first at Wheeler Clinic, which supervised the process, then in the community, and finally at her home. Eventually, the children began visiting the mother in her home without a supervisor present. In November 2015, DCF returned the children to living in the mother's home. By agreement of the parties, in February 2016, the court entered an interim order of temporary guardianship of the children with their mother, under protective supervision of the court, until decision on the pending motions (and without prejudice to the father's request for guardianship).
Although it has been frequently observed that " an adjudication of neglect relates to the status of the child and is not necessarily premised on parental fault "; (emphasis added) In re David L., 54 Conn.App. 185, 191-92, 733 A.2d 897 (1999); the assessment of a parent's readiness to resume a custodial and guardianship role will often require an assessment of his or her contributions toward the " causes for commitment." In the present case, the evidence overwhelmingly established that the father's principal contributions toward the causes of commitment were the damaging impact on the children of his campaign of disparagement and vilification of their mother and his failure to understand and respond effectively to the children's many needs. The mother's principal contributions were both her failure to protect the children from such an environment and also her own ineffective responses (shared with the father) to the children's many challenging behavioral and psychological problems.
At trial on the pending motions, the father repeatedly asserted that the mother poses a physical danger to the children. His operative motion, for example, asserts that " placement of the children with the respondent mother would place them in danger of immediate physical harm." He has testified similarly. He bases this assertion primarily upon his claims about the mother's conduct toward the children before the neglect petitions were filed. Both his mother and he testified that Logan had told each one of them that the mother had slammed his head against the floor and that Emma had said that her mother pushed her so hard against a stairway railing as to cause bruising. The father also testified that he had personally observed " a long history" of " violent propensities exhibited by my ex-wife toward myself and towards others throughout our marriage"; transcript of testimony, October 20, 2015, p. 36; and had witnessed and been told by his children about " a pattern and history of violence directed toward the children." Transcript of testimony, October 22, 2015, p. 39, Those claims, if proven true, would warrant serious concern about the children's safely with their mother.
Respondent Father's Amended Motion to Modify Current Disposition of Commitment and Vest Sole Guardianship as well as Sole Physical and Legal Custody in Respondent Father (hereafter, Respondent Father's Amended Motion), filed and dated January 22, 2016.
See, e.g., Respondent Father's Amended Motion, paragraphs 1 through 7.
There was evidence to suggest that certain injuries actually occurred. Logan was diagnosed with a concussion, and a police officer saw a bruise on Emma's thigh. Moreover, Logan told an emergency room doctor that his mother had caused his injury, a circumstance that the law of evidence has generally regarded as sufficiently reliable to allow admissibility of such a statement despite its obviously hearsay nature. Although the affidavits in support of the OTCs had reported these claims, however, DCF did not proceed at the neglect trial on a theory of physical abuse. Those allegations thus played no part in the court's findings regarding neglect and commitment, which instead focused on the effect of the marital conflict on the children, with regard to which there was extensive evidence. Moreover the credible evidence introduced at the neglect trial did not resolve the question of whether any physical abuse had actually occurred.
Logan was taken to the Saint Francis Hospital emergency. department on March 2, 2001, by the paternal grandmother, Shirley F. (Seeking medical treatment for his own medical symptoms, the father had left Logan in her care.) Dr. Carol Abbatiello was the doctor who examined him there, and she testified that Logan reported, in his grandmother's presence, that his mother had " slammed his head" into a floor. Emergency Department Physician Report, contained in Father's exhibit Q, records of treatment at St. Francis Emergency Room on March 2, 2014. Dr. Abbatiello further testified that Logan showed no symptoms of a concussion and that she observed none of the objective characteristics for which she looks when someone has reported a head injury, including no report of dizziness and no reaction or sensitivity in his pupils to light or movement. She testified that she diagnosed him with a concussion based on his report of what had happened to him and his statement of an ongoing headache, see father's exhibit Q, medical records from Saint Francis Hospital dated December 8, 2015, Emergency Department Physician Report, p. 2 (" Diagnosis: Headache secondary to trauma") and Emergency Department Discharge Instructions, p. 1 (" Your diagnosis is: Post-concussion syndrome").
Under Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-3(5), statements made " for purposes of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment" are not excluded from evidence under the hearsay rule. " The rationale for excluding from the hearsay rule statements made in furtherance of obtaining treatment is that " we presume that such statements are inherently reliable because the patient has an incentive to tell the truth in order to obtain a proper medical diagnosis and treatment." State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1, 10, 792 A.2d 823 (2002). Although historically " statements regarding causation or identification [were] not generally allowed into evidence under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule"; State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn.App. 368, 372, 536 A.2d 600, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808, 541 A.2d 1239 (1988); our courts " have recognized an exception to this principle in cases of domestic child abuse." Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3(5), commentary. " Because child abuse cases often reveal a pattern of continued abuse, information regarding identity is often necessary to diagnose the extent and likelihood of further harm to the victim . . . Information that the abuser is a member of the household is therefore reasonably pertinent to a course of treatment which includes removing the child from the home." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maldonado, supra, 13 Conn.App. 374. Although this exception has been applied principally in cases involving child sex abuse, the logic for admissibility also applies to allegations of physical child abuse.
Thus, the court's earlier findings and conclusions about the neglect and causes for commitment do not, under principles of collateral estoppel, preclude the father from now raising the issue of physical abuse, as that issue was not " actually decided" or " necessary to the judgment" in the prior matter. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991) (holding that " [c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment . . . The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate." [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.])
In addition to the evidence about the children's claims of physical abuse, Dr. Humphrey had concluded that there had " been a calculated campaign on the part of Mr. [F.] and his mother to cause a disaffection of the children toward their mother." Report of 2014 Psychological Evaluation conducted by Dr. Stephen Humphrey (2014 Report), p. 75. Dr. Humphrey testified that the " children's comportment towards their mother during the interaction suggested affection . . . a bond . . . [and] closeness"; partial transcript of proceedings on August 27, 2014, testimony of Dr. Humphrey (Transcript, August 27, 2014), p. 44; and was " inconsistent with the notion that they've had those experiences in reality." 2014 Report, p. 42.
The trial on the present motions raises considerable doubt, however, about the reliability and veracity of Emma's and Logan's claims, and, hence the father's assertions, about how those injuries occurred. Logan's statements about the concussion, for example, were made to or in the presence of his father and grandmother, the perpetrators of a campaign of alienation against his mother and thus while under their sway. Dr. Ilene Grueneberg, who was Logan's therapist for many months, explained that Logan " has been extraordinarily influenced by the circumstance, the people around him, what he perceives as expected of him . . . So Logan, in particular, gets influenced by his situation and what he thinks is expected so it becomes impossible to determine for sure that that's [his original report of a concussion] a truer story than the one he told last May or last July [his later recantations]." Transcript of testimony, March 29, 2016, pp. 51-52. Thus, when asked at trial by the father whether it was " far more likely that Logan gave an accurate recounting of the events to multiple persons immediately after the event as opposed to much later after the event, " her answer was " No, " Id. Even Dr. Wang, the physician who diagnosed Logan's various symptoms as consistent with a concussion and testified that he believed the child had suffered a concussion, also said that sometimes what Logan said seemed pre-planned and that the reports he received to that effect from his staff were part of the reason he recommended therapy for the child. As concisely and credibly explained by Simsbury police Detective Scott Sagan, " Often times children in my professional experience you could lead them in their questioning or their answers and if somebody purports to them that an injury or incident occurred in a certain fashion a child would grab onto that and report that to others." FTR, February 23, 2016, 11:17:22 a.m.-11:17:42 am.
The court heard dramatic evidence showing the power of that campaign during the current trial; when the foster father testified about the children's first night in his home after their removal from parental custody:
Dr. Grueneberg also testified that she did not believe it was likely that Logan had been influenced to change his story. Transcript of testimony, March 29, 2016, p. 55.
An example of the effect of such adult statements on a child was vividly portrayed by the evidence concerning the aborted forensic interview of Logan regarding the allegation that his mother had smashed his head against the floor that had been scheduled for March 11, 2014. At trial on this matter, the paternal grandmother testified that, when informed that the forensic interview was not going to happen that day, Logan started saying: " I have to tell the truth, I have to tell what my mother did to me. I don't want to go back because she's going to hurt me, she's going to probably kill me tonight if I tell her what she did." Transcript of testimony of Shirley F., November 24, 2015, p. 24.
The police concluded that there were so many inconsistences in Emma's description of how she claimed that her mother had injured her to place her credibility in doubt. Emma also told her therapists that her original account of how she had been bruised " was not exactly what happened." Transcript of testimony of Dr. Grueneberg, March 29, 2016, p. 59. She told them that " she stumbled and had hit herself and it caused a bruise."
When questioning Dr. Grueneberg at trial, the father tried to get her to change this testimony by asking the following question:
The allegations of child abuse by Ms. F. were fully investigated by the Simsbury police department, which concluded that there was no probable cause for an arrest regarding either injury. As noted in the margin, Dr. Humphrey had testified at the neglect trial that the children's affectionate conduct toward their mother seemed inconsistent with the children's claims of physical abuse by her and their negative language about her in their statements to DCF and Dr. Humphrey before the neglect trial. The reliability of negative statements about one parent made by children who have been subject to a campaign of alienation by the other parent as these children were, is often suspect, and the susceptibility of young children to manipulation by such a campaign must always be considered.
Moreover in this case, the older children have shown an awareness that their conduct with and statements about their parents may affect the legal proceedings concerning them and what happens to them. For example, when Dr. Humphrey conducted patent-child interactional meetings in late December 2015, the children intentionally misbehaved in order to make their mother look bad. In addition, Logan recanted his claims of physical abuse by his mother on several occasions after entering foster care.
Pursuant to court order, in late 2014 Dr. Humphrey conducted two meetings of the children with each parent to help him make recommendations about whether and how the father's visits with the children should be resumed. Dr. Humphrey's written report described each of the four sessions and noted several instances during the children's first meeting with the mother when they would not respond to her efforts to manage their behavior. For example, the meals she brought for each child contained French fries, and Logan became weepy as he realized he was missing a French fry. He started sobbing. Ms. [F] responded calmly, reasoning that he still had more fries. She said she would get him an extra one the next time. He wept, " Nooooo . . . Get me two packs of fries."
During cross examination by the father, the foster father gave the following testimony:
Although cases tried before this judge have shown that a child's recantation of abuse does not necessarily mean that abuse did not occur, this court is also aware that not all claims of abuse are true. The father's testimony here that Logan probably knows that DCF believes he should live with his mother instead of his father and that Logan may well believe that he should recant the claim of abuse in order to please his mother is not completely implausible. On the other hand, these recantations were made to his foster father, with whom Logan ultimately developed a very close relationship, and to his therapist, and the circumstances of each recantation would appear to suggest that he was trying to be honest.
Compare In Re Tayjanar W., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford, Docket No. H12-CP-09-012603-A (November 18, 2013, Frazzini, J.), where this court found that a child's first report of being sexually abused was probably true despite numerous later recantations, with In Re Matthew M., Superior Court for juvenile matters at New Britain, Docket No. F04-CP-l 1-009363-A (August 12, 2013, Frazzini, J.), and Mettler v. Mettler, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA-064021437-S (April 22, 2009, Frazzini, J.), where in both matters, the court found that claims of abuse were probably not true and were instead the result of the other parent's influence over the child.
The father specifically testified as follows:
The court has carefully reviewed and considered all the evidence, which is conflicting, on the issue of whether the mother physically abused or caused these injuries to the children, The court finds and concludes that it has not been proven that the mother inflicted physical harm on the children or now poses any type of physical risk or danger to them. The credible evidence actually proves the converse--that she probably did not physically abuse Logan or Emma or strike them in the manner they originally claimed. The evidence further establishes that statements by the two older children to one parent about something said or done by the other parent or about an occurrence while in the custody, household, or presence of that other parent are not, by themselves, reliable or to be trusted. These children have been powerfully and demonstrably influenced by the conflict between their parents, by the campaign of denigration on the part of the father and paternal grandmother, and by the events before or since their removal from parental custody. Although the father claimed to have witnessed and been told about repeated violence on the mother's part toward the children, no credible evidence was introduced substantiating his assertion that the mother is dangerous to the children or has abused them in the past. His testimony and that of the paternal grandmother to that effect were not credible in light of all the other evidence casting doubt on their claims.
Similarly, despite the father's effort to prove that the mother caused Logan's concussion and Emma's bruise, the credible evidence does not support that claim. There is no doubt that Emma and Logan repeatedly claimed, prior to their commitment, that their mother had injured them. The suspicious circumstances under which the children's statements were uttered, however, cast significant doubt on their reliability. The circumstances of this case show the validity of Dr. Bunk's testimony that children are often unreliable reporters. The contradictions in Emma's statements, although prompting the police to find no probable cause, do not necessarily mean that her mother did not injure her, but they do raise doubt about the reliability of what she said. As for Logan, while a child's statements to a physician and others about whether and how he was abused might often be regarded as reliable or credible, that is not the case here. His recantations are, at minimum just as credible and seemingly reliable as his accusation (regarding the allegation of physical abuse by his mother). Logan probably had a concussion and Emma may have been bruised, but neither such injury has been shown to be inherently suggestive of child abuse, and the circumstances under which either injury happened have not been reliably or credibly established. The children's affectionate conduct toward and bond with their mother in that same time frame, moreover, suggest they were not afraid of her and, as Dr. Humphrey noted, were " inconsistent" with the conduct of children who had been abused by her. Furthermore, many of Logan's statements are additionally suspect because of his awareness of the potential effect of his statements on the legal proceedings affecting him and his apparent desire to influence those proceedings. The court thus concludes that the father's allegations that the mother physically abused the children in the past and is a danger to them now have not been proven and pose no obstacle to the court's determination of whether the mother is suitable and worthy to become their guardian and custodian.
The reliable and credible evidence presented during this proceeding proved, moreover, that the mother has appropriately, effectively and adequately addressed her contributions toward the causes for commitment and is today suitable and worthy to resume the role as guardian and custodian of the three minor children who are the subjects of these proceedings. First and foremost, the parents' separation and dissolution of their marriage have removed the mother from the home environment that had been so toxic to the children. She has lived apart from her ex-husband since before the filing of the neglect petitions, and now resides with the children in her own parents' home. She has demonstrated an understanding of how the environment of the marital home had been harmful to her children and developed and shown insight into her responsibility for allowing them to continue to be exposed to the martial conflict and the " campaign of denigration" against her.
In addition, through her own therapy and by working with the children in the therapy conducted by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg and during the supervised visitations, she has improved her parenting skills and become more proficient at managing their sometimes still challenging behaviors. For example, Dr. Grueneberg told Dr. Humphrey for his updated 2016 evaluation that " the children appeared to be doing well with their mother." " Dr. Grueneberg said the transition of the children to their mother's care (in the maternal grandparents' home) 'has overall been positive, ' and Ms. [F.] was seemingly 'dealing with the kids pretty well.'" Respondent mother's exhibit J (Dr. Humphrey's 2016 report), p. 18. Dr. Humphrey also concluded that the mother is " clearly finding her way to learning how to manage the children's behavior . . . Ms. [F.] is experiencing more comfort and confidence in providing the children with safe, consistent expectations and discipline." Id., p. 45. The court finds these opinions and conclusions credible and proven to be true. The court thus concludes and finds that the Commissioner and the mother have met the burden required in their motions to modify the disposition and transfer guardianship to the mother of proving that she is suitable and worthy to assume such a role.
The DCF Study in Support of Revocation and Permanency Plan, dated December 11, 2015, noted that " [h]istorically [mother] struggled with managing the children's behaviors and being able to discipline them and provide them with a structured home environment." Petitioner's exhibit 3, p. 9. The mother admitted to Dr. Humphrey in her interview for his initial psychological evaluation in 2014 that she " had a hard time disciplining" the children. Respondent mother's exhibit H (Dr. Humphrey's 2014 Report), p. 19. Similarly, Dr. Bunk testified that, at the beginning of the family therapy with the children, " In the first few months in our work with Mrs. [F.], we found her to be very passive. She seemed somewhat unknowledgeable about effective parenting skills and intervention." Transcript of testimony on March 28, 2016, p. 78, The " Written Treatment Updates" provided by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg stated that in the first session with the mother and children in May 2015, " Mom seems to struggle with being assertive, firm, and direct . . ." Their report on the second session similarly stated that " It was also notable that she continues to need help and support around parenting, particularly when the kids cycle off of each other." Petitioner's exhibit 6, " Treatment update--May 28, 2015, " p. 4. These remarks coincide with Dr. Humphrey's conclusion in 2014 after the first psychological evaluation that " [a]lthough Ms. [F.] exhibited insights that appeared to be representative of the children's functioning and needs, these insights did not appear to have translated into consistently responsive parenting behavior . . . I was not convinced she could assertively manage the children in a way that would help them overcome problems with behavioral dyscontrol, and about Olivia's safe in an environment where there might not be an authoritative, attentive parent figure." Respondent mother's exhibit J (Dr. Humphy's 2016 report), pp. 9-10.
In addition, " Dr. Grueneberg opined the children were doing very well with Ms. [F.] and every place except for therapy sessions with Mr. [F.], " and that the transition to Ms. F.'s care had " overall been positive" for them. Respondent mother's exhibit J., p. 44.
Although the children have repeatedly expressed a desire for more contact with their father, and Emma's attorney even asked in closing argument for a " 50-50" shared custody arrangement, the evidence does not support such a result. The father has not met his burden of proving that the causes for commitment no longer exist, that his own contributions to those causes have been successfully or adequately addressed, or that he is presently suitable and worthy to assume a guardianship role; furthermore, the reliable, credible and probative evidence shows that it remains in the children's best interest for him to have only limited and supervised access to the children. There are multiple sources in the evidence for these findings and conclusions, including evidence about the father's visitations, contact and interactions with the children both before and after their commitment to DCF, evidence about the father's behavior and statements since then, testimony from the children's former therapists, and the testimony and written reports of the court-appointed psychologist and guardian ad litem.
For example, Dr. Humphrey testified that " if you look at the supervised visits with Mr. [F.], there are a lot of positive things there, but there are times when he makes statements or says things that may exacerbate the children's behaviors and there are abundant examples in more recent September visits of the children being behaviorally dis-controlled and being rambunctious may be in a normative way but given their emotional functioning overall, I'd be concerned about that and so how does he respond to them in situations where there is that lack of control or where there are openings to make references to things that will be inappropriate, my concern would be, given this inflexibility and combining with my earlier testimony about the lack of demonstrated insight and the impact of that flexibility, it would argue against unsupervised contact at this time." Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, p.44-45.
The court recognizes that it is not bound by the testimony of any witness, or of any expert witness, and that it is the responsibility of the court here, as the trier of fact, to weigh and consider all the evidence and to determine how much credibility, if any, shall be assigned to the testimony of a witness. As this court has noted in other cases:
The evidence shows that, for the most part, the father and children are affectionate and loving with each other during his visits, which currently last only sixty minutes. He sees the two girls every, week and Logan at least once every other week. They are usually very excited to see him, and many of the visitation reports contain references to father and children hugging or kissing each other: But the reports about his interactions with the children during visitations and during the reunification therapy conducted by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg raise serious questions about his ability to meet their needs, with the father sometimes even blaming them for their placement in foster care. Instead, the evidence shows that too often he puts his own needs, concerns, and agenda ahead of the children's needs and interests. DCF has criticized the father, for example, for talking to the children about political and social matters that are too old for them, spending too much time reading books to them, not being able to manage the children's behavior adequately during visits and talking to the children about their mother; and the evidence shows that these concerns are legitimate. The social study submitted by DCF in support of its motion for review of permanency plan in December 2015 reported that the father " continues to struggle with managing the children's behaviors in that he has trouble de-escalating situations between them and disciplining them appropriately . . . [T]he children have expressed frustration with the arguing that occurs during visits with Mr. [F.]" Petitioner's exhibit 3, p. 10. A DCF status report dated August 18, 2016, similarly reported that the current visitation supervisor had informed the department that the children are still " rambunctious" during their visits with their father, and he continued to need " redirection" in dealing with them. Petitioner's exhibit 7, p. 3. The father admitted during his testimony that he is reluctant to punish or discipline the children during visits because he has so little time with them. DCF social worker Bidorini testified that the department does not support restoration of guardianship to the father because of ongoing concerns about his interactions with the children and said that he still struggles with demonstrating age-appropriate play and talk with the children during visitations. Bidorini also added that the father continued, as of December 2015 when Bidorini testified, to have difficulty staying child-focused during visitations.
Before returning the children to the mother, DCF had provided the therapeutic family time (TFT) service for both parents, and records of the father's TFT visits between April and June 2015 were introduced into evidence. At the last and next-to-last such sessions, Mr. F. " told the children that the main reason for the children not being with the parents is the children's behaviors" and emphasized to them that " they need to be good, not to be disrespectful, or fight with one an other [sic] in order for them to be returned to Mommy and Daddy." Child Logan's exhibit B, Therapeutic Family Time Note for June 29, 2015, p. 1.
In her testimony, Dr. Grueneberg testified that Dr. Bunk and she became concerned during the family therapy about Mr. F.'s " inability to put the children's needs above [his] own." When asked by Mr. F. to explain, she replied as follows:
For example, DCF social worker Bidorini testified that the father struggled with age-appropriate play and talk with the children, and gave examples of him spending time talking about political or economic issues that Bidorini said were not appropriate for children of their ages. One specific example was a time when the youngest child was playing with toy cars, but the father started giving her factual information about automobiles that was beyond her age.
For example, during the father's visit with the children at the DCF office on July 20, 2015, the youngest child, Olivia, asked to be excused to go to the bathroom, but while leaving the visitation room she " walked into the metal door frame injuring herself. Olivia was bleeding and her injury consisted of a gash on the upper left side of her forehead." After the visitation supervisor and father took her to the restroom and applied cold compresses to the injury, the incident was reported to a security guard and a call was made to the DCF social worker and a nurse. Rather than comforting the children, however, the father was apparently overcome by his own emotions. " After the incident, Mr. [F.] sat on the floor crying, both Emma and Logan sat quietly watching him. This writer [the visitation supervisor] asked Emma and Logan if they were okay and they both replied that they were scared." Child Logan's exhibit B., Supervised Visitation Report for July 20, 2105, p. 2.
The evidence contains written records of the father's visits with the children between April and October 2015, and those records do show some improvement during that time in the father's ability to manage unruly behaviors by the children and redirect them. Nadine Blackwood from the Klingberg Family Center has supervised the father's visits with the children for the last six months, but her testimony and written records about those visits were only introduced for the proceeding affecting Logan. The GAL's written report took the records of the more recent visits into consideration, however, and stated that the visitation now " appears to be going better, but it is still in the early stages. There is some progress reported by Klingberg, but it is noted to be slow going." Mother's exhibit L, Guardian Ad Litem's Report, dated November 29, 2016, p. 9. On the other hand, the evidence shows that even after many months of joint therapy with the children led by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg, more than a year of individual therapy with his own therapist, clinical psychologist Dr. Lisa Persaud, and more than two years of supervised visits, he still can be very insensitive to the children's feelings. An example of such sensitivity is a recent statement where he told them he was going on a picnic with his new girlfriend and her child; such a statement could only have caused hurt to his children, for, as the GAL testified, they would no doubt have wished they were the ones going on the picnic with their father and, the court notes, such a remark could only have reminded them that they no longer have those types of opportunities with him.
Contrary to the implied claims of the father's motions, the evidence affirmatively showed that he has not yet addressed his contributions to the causes of commitment and is not yet " suitable and worthy" to regain guardianship of the children. That circumstance begins with his failure to understand the nature of neglect the children endured while in parental custody, the origins of the severe emotional distress that the children were then experiencing as a result of that neglect and the parents' conduct, and the reasons that their commitment to DCF was in their best interests. Both in 2014 and today, the father's position is that the fundamental parental failure and neglect experienced by these three children were physical abuse by their mother, as shown in his testimony during this proceeding on October 20, 2015, when asked on direct examination by the mother's attorney why the children were committed to DCF, and he responded as follows:
My understanding as to why the children were committed is, if I recall correctly, there were concerns on the part of DCF as to physical abuse of Emma and Logan by the mother . . . that was one part of it. There were concerns as well by DCF of the inability of the two parents to co-parent the children . . . Those were two of the reasons. I believe an additional reason that I have been told is that there was verbal arguing in front of the children that this was not a good environment for the children by both parents.
Transcript of testimony on direct examination, October 20, 2015, pp. 59-60.
The father does sometimes acknowledge that his words or conduct may affect the children's relationship with their mother. As the above excerpt from his testimony shows, however, instead of understanding, acknowledging, accepting and trying to address the fact that the " campaign of denigration, " (in Dr. Humphrey's words) on the part of his mother and himself was the " central and chief element of the children's dysfunction at the time of their removal" from parental custody; transcript of testimony of Dr. Humphrey, November 1, 2016, p. 38; he reduces and minimizes his responsibility for the children's severe behavioral and emotional distress by describing the conflict between the parents as mere " arguing."
Thus, when asked at trial by his attorney why the children had been removed from the parents and committed to DCF, Mr. F.'s answer first emphasized arguments between the parents and only then mentioned that his words or conduct may have affected the children's relationship with their mother:
Moreover, he continues to insist that the children are at risk of physical abuse from their mother if placed with her:
Q Now--now, you understand that Mrs. [F.], [L.], has also asked the Court to revoke the commitment and have the children placed in her sole custody?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Do you have concerns that you would like to express to the Court about that happening?
A Yes.
Q What are your concerns?
A First and foremost, I am concerned that [L.] will physically harm the children.
Transcript of testimony on cross-examination, October 22, 2015, p. 35. He testified that same day that he believed that the mother had intentionally pushed Logan's head against the hardwood floor. He further said that he was opposed to her having unsupervised contact with the children because:
See also his earlier testimony on direct examination by the mother's attorney:
I have a fear that particularly when eyes are off her that she will because of a history of losing her temper and violent outburst directed at me and at the children that she will--because she has been in past incapable of exercising control or discipline over the children--she will lose her temper as she has done frequently in the past and she will hurt the children. Because usually she is very permissive to a point and then she explodes in rage, and then she gets violent and harms and will lash out.
Transcript of testimony on direct examination, October 20, 2015, pp. 95-96.
In his testimony thirteen months later, on November 22, 2016, the father reiterated his belief that the mother had caused a concussion to Logan by slamming his head into the ground and had injured Emma by pushing her into a railing. He admitted, however, that " [t]o the best of my understanding and knowledge, since about March or April 2014, she has not administered any kind of physical violence to the children, whatever the reason may be." Transcript of testimony, November 22, 2016, p. 23. He said that today they are probably " physically safe" with their mother " because of the presence of her mother and stepfather"; id., p. 24; but that he continued to believe that the children would be at physical risk if the mother was living by herself with the children.
In addition, he continues to maintain that any of the children's behavioral or emotional problems today stem back to physical abuse of the two older children by the mother when the family was still intact. As credibly explained by Dr. Humphrey,
to him [the father], there's only one main explanation for what's wrong with the children and that's that they were exposed to a very abusive and dangerous mother and the remedy is to be away from her, protected from her and so I believe that he doesn't have a meta awareness or step outside of himself to have an awareness of how he's contributed to this, would not believe that he has been one of the agents in causing the children to be psychologically damaged, that he made any contribution at all to their state of psychological dysregulation or dysfunction as of 2014 and for that reason, I don't believe he consciously aware that he has--his behavior has been a significant factor in his children's troubles.
Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, pp. 90-91.
It is apparent that the father has come to realize that during supervised visits he should avoid directly criticizing or disparaging the mother in front of the children, but the evidence shows no indication that he understands the devastating impact such behavior had, and could still have, on the children. The evidence also shows that his words and actions continue to suggest to the children that they are at risk of harm in her care. A prominent example of this latter fact is the exchange during reunification therapy about a remark made by Olivia concerning her maternal grandfather, whom she calls " Grandpa Stan, " during which Mr. F. suggested to the children that they were not (or might not be) safe in their mother's home, an incident discussed at more length in the margin. In Dr. Humphrey's testimony, he described how Mr. F.'s behavior could have been different in that situation if he now understood his role in causing the children's alienation from their mother and their emotional and behavioral problems and had learned how to change his interactions with the children:
For example, during direct examination conducted by the mother's attorney on October 15, 2015, the father variously stated as follows:
One purpose of the reunification therapy conducted by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg had been to help the children develop an appropriate relationship with each parent. In their sessions with each parent, they tried " assisting each parent in developing what we thought was necessary for effective or what I would call good enough parenting of the children which included, first and foremost, developing an ability to put what your child needs in front of your own needs." Testimony of Dr. Barbara Bunk, March 28, 2016, p. 14. Until the children were reunified with their mother, which occurred around the time that the hearing on the pending motions began, those two psychologists believed that the father had been making some progress in that respect. For example, Dr. Bunk testified that he " was responsive to our guidance . . . in the therapy"; id. ; and " making changes in his interactions with the kids in our sessions." Quoted in Dr. Humphrey's 2016 report., p. 18. She gave two examples during her testimony at trial:
[Y]ou have to look at whether . . . those changed behaviors and cognitions are applied in interactions, can he catch himself, for example, talking about the unnecessary comment about Grandpa Stan, can that be exempted from that session, can that not be made, I don't think it would be appropriate to make any comment about that in response to what the girls were saying . . .
Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, pp. 91-92.
The two therapists also became concerned that " the children's increased efforts" in their sessions with their father " to implicate each other in misbehavior derived from Mr. F.'s 'decision not to trust' the therapists." Dr. Humphrey's 2016 Report, p. 20. Dr. Grueneberg told Dr. Humphrey about one such incident that occurred after reunification: " Emma and Logan came in chomping at the bit to tell Mr. [F.] something about Olivia." She [Dr. Grueneberg] said Olivia had allegedly been 'mad at Grandpa Stan (i.e., Ms. [F.]'s father)' and said something about 'Grandpa Stan and cutting his dick.' Dr. Grueneberg said the older children reported Olivia was likely saying this because Grandpa Stan was making her go to bed." Dr. Grueneberg then told Dr. Humphrey that Mr. F. " 'inappropriately said' that Ms. [F.] had told him things about Grandpa Stan." Dr. Bunk added that Mr. F. was saying these things " in front of the kids without stopping." Dr. Humphrey's 2016 report, p. 20.
At trial, Dr. Humphrey explained how this remark could suggest to the children that they were not or might not be safe in their mother's home:
the context is that Emma has apparently, per the doctor, has been talking about these appendages and Olivia is upset that Grandpa Stan made her go to bed early and so Olivia, according to their description, kind of conflates . . . the topic of conversation with the anger and says this is what I'm going to do to Grandpa Stan. So the response to it should not be to in any way give the children the content that there's something about Grandpa Stan to be worried about and I've heard about him and I've heard about what could happen because children are very sensitive to this kind of information, they trust their parents and if a parent is telling them oh, yeah, I've heard about Grandpa Stan or anything like that or anything resembling that at all, it creates for the children potential--a whole host of potential problems including what their relationship will be like with their grandfather after that and whether they might presume that that information they were given by a parent that they love is factual so--and how they'll use that, so that's a serious problem . . . I kind of intended to include that in my previous response in that now they have this content in their minds that there's something about Grandpa Stan that's not right and mommy has told me about it. It's not just that he's saying it. He's saying she said it too. Both of your parents are telling you that we've heard about Grandpa Stan . . . [W]hat it risks for the children is this introduction of this content as genuine and factual, a disruption in their relationship with their grandfather and that household . . . I think the very clear and clean interpretation of what I heard from the doctor was that, in her opinion, the doctor's opinion, Mr. [F.] responded to Olivia's statement about cutting Grandpa Stan's genitals by saying that Ms. [F.] had told him something about Grandpa Stan. So that's just it, she told him something about Grandpa Stan. He doesn't connect that to what was said, but it's almost hard to avoid the children connecting it to what was said. THE COURT: Okay. So that statement you believe would probably cause the children to make some assumptions about their grandfather. THE WITNESS: There's certainly a risk I believe, Your Honor, of them saying oh, well, daddy is telling us that mommy told him something about Grandpa Stan connected to this and I'm not sure that they would then make that inference but I'm certainly concerned about the level of risk of them imputing something negative about Grandpa Stan based on his comment and the comment is very unfortunate for that reason. * * * * The impression left on me by the doctor is she makes a statement I'm going to cut him, he makes a statement saying that the mother has told him something about Grandpa Stan and that's really as far as I can go with even just representing what she told me, but I wasn't there. THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt. Okay? Does this exchange--do you think this exchange has any tendency to affect the feelings of safety that the children might have in their mother's home with the grandparents? THE WITNESS: It's my concern that they might, yes. Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, p. 68-74. Nor does he show any recognition of the tremendous progress the children have made emotionally and behaviorally since their removal from their parents in early 2014 and their return almost two years later to their mother's custody. Thus, Dr. Humphrey concluded that What I don't see changing is . . . is the acknowledgment that--of the basic premise that . . . these children have come a long way in terms of their dispositions toward their mother. They expressed hatred, fear and disdain for her in 2014. They were dramatically under control behaviorally. They were spouting vulgar language, they were oppositional, they were very obviously disordered and their progress--and I'm saying this to answer your question--their progress in that time has been remarkable. Their relationship with their mother by all accounts appears to have been largely repaired. Their acclimation back to a life with a parent as their guardian appears to be progressing well. What I don't see having changed in that time is any acknowledgment from Mr. [F.] of the role that engendering the disaffection of the children towards their mother caused, that the accusations, allegations and disdain expressed by him and his mother contributed to the children's marked dysfunction . . .Id., pp. 33-34.
Instead, the evidence shows that Mr. F. believes and consistently suggests to the children that they can be safe only in his own care and custody. By doing so, and with remarks suggestive that the children may not be safe in their mother's home, Mr. F. conveys his own anxiety about their safety and well-being in a way that can contribute to anxiety on the children's part about their environment. As explained credibly by Dr. Bunk at trial, " if his underlying belief is that their mother is not a safe person for them to be with, that gets communicated, especially to children who have lived this kind of conflict between the parents." Transcript of testimony, March 28, 2016, p. 85. Thus Dr. Grueneberg concurred with Dr. Humphrey's conclusion that Mr. F.'s interactions and visitation with the children should continue to be supervised: " Because I get concerned in the absence of supervision how Mr. [F.]'s underlying feelings about Lisa [F.], the ways in which those get communicated even in a supervised environment could really be damaging to the kids and so unless there was a better handle on his ability to manage his expression of that stuff, the absence of supervision is concerning." Transcript of testimony on March 29, 2016, pp. 119-20.
Another example of such a remark was described at trial by Dr. Bunk: " Later in the therapy, Mr. [F.] would say, well how could--something such as, well, how could I think that they're safe there when they're having problems in school. And so the meaning of how could I think that they're safe there to the children is we're not safe at our mother's house, he says we're not safe there." Transcript of testimony on March 28, 2016, p. 19. She also testified that " in session, Mr. [F.] said things like, you see, I told you they're not safe with their mother . . . in front of the children." Id., p. 87.
When asked at trial by Mr. F. to explain his concerns about Mr. F.'s interactions with the children, Dr. Humphrey explained as follows:
At trial and his written reports, Dr. Humphrey has stated that the prognosis for Mr. F.'s ability to develop a healthy and normative relationship with his children that does not interfere with their relationship with their mother and in which he responds adequately to their stated and unstated needs is " guarded." Dr. Humphrey explained this assessment by explaining that he has concluded that Mr. F. has a personality disorder, a psychological term indicating a method of thinking and functioning that is rigid and difficult to change. Although Dr. Humphrey's diagnosis suggests the difficulties facing Mr. F.'s efforts to change his behavior, the court has based has its decisions denying the father's motion to regain guardianship and ordering supervised visitation, and the subsidiary findings and conclusions supporting those decisions, on the demonstrated and proven evidence regarding the father's conduct. The evidence has established that Mr. F. has not yet shown himself ready to resume a role as a guardian or custodian of the children; whether over time he adequately addresses the causes of commitment and shows his suitability and worthiness to regain guardianship rights can only be determined by his future conduct.
Dr. Humphrey explained the significance of his diagnosis of a personality disorder at trial: " I diagnosed . . . Mr. [F.] with a personality disorder. It's the type of personality disorder that's very resistant to change because one of the aspects of that disorder is that a person does not believe they have that particular difficulty. They tend to react to claims that there is a problem by stating that that person who said that is wrong and that they don't have the problem and so, usually, an individual with that disorder will not enter into treatment until things reach a crisis point, they're forced there by circumstances or external forces and, in that case, that mindset still doesn't change, it's still the mindset, you don't know what you're talking about, You're wrong, I'm right and there's a lot of frustration that goes along with that--I'm generalizing, but that's the idea and so the reason for things being guarded or in my--you know, maybe another would be the prognosis is poor for overcoming that kind of difficulty and I recall my testimony earlier this month talking about how there would have to be some kind of frank acknowledgment of that personality style to get to the next step which would be working to address it. The hypotheticals presented, the information up until the last time I met with everybody suggests that that level of insight had not occurred and for that reason, I view the potential for overcoming that as extremely guarded or as a very poor prognosis." Transcript of testimony, November. 22, 2016, pp. 28-29.
In this respect, the court notes that the testimony of department employees and the reports and social studies it has submitted as evidence have cited Mr. F.'s litigation conduct--the motions he has filed, the positions he has taken in the pending litigation, and questions he has asked witnesses--as evidence in support of its position. Questions from some of the attorneys directed to doctors Humphrey, Grueneberg, and Bunk also did so. The GAL has also referred to his litigation conduct in her written report and testimony. The court, however, does not find it appropriate to rely on or to base its findings, conclusion, or decisions on the conduct of a litigant when acting as his own counsel and has not done so. See Travelers Property and Casualty Co. v. Christie, 99 Conn.App. 747, 762, 916 A.2d 114 (2007). Any such evidence here has not been considered.
At trial Mr. F. repeatedly stated that he believed the mother, with the children now living with her, was trying to alienate them from him. The evidence does suggest that there was at least one instance when Ms. F. may have said something negative about her ex-husband that the children could have overheard, and the evidence further shows that she is skeptical whether he will ever adequately address his contributions to the children's removal from parental custody, but none of the credible evidence amounts to any demonstration of intentional or systematic efforts by Ms. F. to alienate the children from their father or to harm his relationship with them. For example, she has been paying for half of the costs charged by Wheeler Clinic to supervise his visits with the children--the other half being paid for by DCF, as the father claims to have no current income or earning capacity. When asked in a contested family matter to assess the costs of supervision, this court would ordinarily deem it fitting and appropriate to impose those costs on the person whose conduct necessitates such supervision and finds the mother's willingness to pay for a portion of expenses that are required through no fault or responsibility of her own but are due solely to the father's past and present conduct to be a strong sign of her understanding and acceptance that the children want and need to see their father and have him be a part of their lives. Another such example is the fact the mother helped Emma to print out the pictures of her father that Emma has displayed all over the walls of her bedroom.
Having therefore found that the mother has proven that she has adequately addressed his contributions to the causes for the commitment of the children to DCF and has further proven that she is suitable and worthy to resume guardianship of the children, and having further found that the father has not adequately addressed his contributions to those causes and has not proven that he is yet suitable and worthy to resume guardianship, the court must address the question of the children's best interests. On the present motion for transfer of guardianship, the movants have the burden of proof. See Practice Book § 35a-12A(c), set forth in footnote 13 on page 13 above.
A revocation of commitment or transfer of guardianship for a child previously found neglected is regarded as a dispositional decision. See General Statutes § § 46b-129(m) and Practice Book § 35a-12A(c). " In determining the disposition portion of the neglect proceeding, the court must decide which of the various custody alternatives are in the best interest of the child. To determine whether a custodial placement is in the best interest of the child, the court uses its broad discretion to choose a place that will foster the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [the child's] environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ja-lyn R., 132 Conn.App. 314, 323-24, 31 A.3d 441 (2011). As this court has noted many times, the best interest standard governing dispositions in child protection proceedings is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.
The petitioner and respondent mother have proven that it is in the children's best interest to transfer guardianship of the children to the mother and, further, to award her sole legal and physical custody. The evidence shows that the children have done well since their return to their mother's home. Although the two older children are " still in a fragile place emotionally"; Dr. Humphrey 2016 testimony, November 1, 2016, p. 22; and remain vulnerable to renewed emotional distress, the extreme behavioral problems and emotional distress once regularly displayed by the two older children have abated significantly since returning to their mother's care. They " have made a lot of progress in many ways in their lives" and have gained an understanding about and modified their previous disposition toward their mother. Id. She has shown that she can manage their behaviors, provide them with proper care, guidance, and nurture, and support their relationship with their father. DCF, Dr. Humphrey, and the GAL all concluded and told the court that the children are best served now by being in their mother's physical and sole legal custody. The court finds those conclusions and the underlying reasons given by each of these professionals to be credible and proven. The testimony of doctors Bunk and Grueneberg and the records of their treatment sessions support that conclusion. The father has not shown that the mother poses a physical or emotional risk to the children or is actively trying to undermine their relationship with him. The court thus also approves the department's permanency plan for reunification of the children with their mother and finds that plan to be in the children's best interests. The father's objection to that motion is overruled.
As Dr. Humphrey further explained at trial, " these children have come a long way in terms of their dispositions, toward their mother. They expressed hatred, fear and disdain for her in 2014. They were dramatically under control behaviorally. They were spouting vulgar language, they were oppositional, they were very obviously disordered and their progress--and I'm saying this to answer your question--their progress in that time has been remarkable. Their relationship with their mother by all accounts appears to have been largely repaired. Their acclimation back to a life with a parent as their guardian appears to be progressing well." Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, p. 33.
The evidence also shows that it is in the best interest of both children that their direct contact with their father continue to be supervised by someone qualified to recognize and address behaviors that might have the effect of affecting the children's relationship with the mother and also able to recognize and correct interactions that do not meet the children's needs. At present, it is in the best interest of Emma and Olivia that those visits occur weekly, and for Logan that they occur at least every other week.
The court has considered the evidence offered at the hearing in September 2016 with regard to the order regarding the frequency of Logan's visitation.
The father's motions for a referral to co-parenting therapy for both parents or for a resumption of reunification therapy are also denied. For the time being, it is in the children's best interests that their mother be their sole guardian, have sole legal custody of them, and have physical custody of them. No period of protective supervision is necessary. The evidence shows that the mother has been ready and able to fulfill a normative parental role for more than a year, and has done so capably. Unfortunately, the same is not true of the father. For the reasons discussed in this decision, and as further discussed in the reports and testimony of the guardian ad litem and doctors Humphrey, Bunk, and Grueneberg (all of which the court found credible), it is in the children's best interests that their direct contact with their father be limited and closely supervised. On the other hand, the children want their father to be part of their lives, and his attendance at children's events at which he had no direct contact with them would serve that desire and be in their best interest, at least under the controlled circumstances set forth in the court's orders. The evidence shows that the father has not made sufficient progress to address his contributions to the children's emotional distress, behavioral problems, or causes for commitment for reunification therapy to be in the children's best interest. The parents' uneven and different roles in the children's lives are such that co-parenting therapy, or therapy designed and intended to help the parents confer on important matters related to the children's well-being, or to share in decision-making, is not yet appropriate, and will not be so until the father is closer to being ready to serve in a more normative parental role.
The final issue to address is the father's motion for the paternal grandmother, Shirley F., to have supervised visitation with the children. The mother objects to this motion. See Mother's List of Motions and Objections for Court to Rule On, dated January 12, 2017, p. 1, fn.1. In 2014, the paternal grandmother filed and later withdrew a motion to intervene for the purposes of seeking visitation. There has been no allegation or showing that she either had or has a parent-like relationship with any of these children or that denying visitation with her is or would be detrimental to the children. The mother now having been found to be a fit parent, with sole guardianship and legal custody vested in her, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an order for the grandmother to have visitation against the mother's wishes. See Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431 (2002). In fact, the paternal grandmother's history of having been an active perpetrator of the campaign of denigration against the mother and the serious consequences that campaign had on the children's emotional health counsels great caution in permitting her to have access to the children that is not closely supervised to prevent any recurrence of such conduct. Moreover, her testimony at trial suggests an unwillingness or inability on her part to acknowledge facts that are favorable to the mother or unfavorable to her son. Thus, the court will deny the father's request for an order that the paternal grandmother may visit the children.
On the other hand, the evidence about historical closeness of the paternal relatives, including the paternal grandmother, to the children does suggest some benefit in their having contact with their paternal relatives under controlled circumstances, and the court therefore finds it in the children's best interest to allow the father to bring his mother or other paternal relatives to one of his supervised visits per month, as long as the person providing the supervision is willing to end those visits as appropriate and as farther described herein.
IV
ORDERS
The court has reviewed the proposed orders submitted by the guardian ad litem and finds that, in most respects, they serve the children's needs and are in their best interests. It is hereby accordingly, ordered as follows:
A. CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP
The Mother shall have sole legal custody and guardianship of the minor children. She shall have an affirmative obligation to inform the father about major decisions regarding the children, and to do so in advance where practicable. This may be done via Our Family Wizard. The mother does not have an obligation to inform the father of her new address if she relocates. She does have an obligation to continue to provide information about major decisions affecting the children's health, education and religion, including the name of any new school or doctor.
B. PARENTING TIME
1. The Mother shall have sole physical custody subject to father having professionally supervised visits once a week with Emma and Olivia and at least once every other week with Logan. The visits shall be a minimum of one hour at a formal supervised visitation center chosen by the Mother.
2. The visitation supervisor shall be provided with copies of Dr. Humphrey's reports and transcripts of his testimony, and that of doctors Bunk and Grueneberg in this proceeding. Those documents shall not be further disseminated.
3. A paternal relative may attend one of the father's visits per month, subject to the following:
a. Both the paternal relative and father shall sign and date both pages of the attached visitation rules, a copy of which shall be provided to the visitation supervisor, and abide by its terms.
b. Prior to the first meeting that the particular paternal relative plans to attend, that relative and the father shall meet with the supervisor to review the agreement.
c. If the visitation supervisor is not confident that the paternal relative is willing and able to abide by these orders, the supervisor has the authority to disallow the relative's participation in the visit.
d. If either the relative or the father violates the orders, that visit will end early and the particular relative will not be allowed to attend any other visits without a further court order.
4. The visitation supervisor shall have authority to end a visit if the supervisor believes the father (or a permitted parental relative participating in a specific visit) is making statements or engaging in conduct that has the potential of undermining the children's relationship with their mother, or is harmful to the children, or is otherwise violating the visitation rules contained in these orders.
5. VISITATION RULES
a. In order to facilitate positive communication during visits and avoid any negative emotional impact to the children, these rules must be followed during the time period directly before, during and immediately after each visit.
b. Failure to abide by the rules may result in an immediate termination of the visit.
c. Visits will be supervised at all times. The father and any paternal relative attending the visit will follow the direction of the supervisor and abide by the supervisor's instructions.
d. There will be no whispering to the children, no separation of the children, no note passing, no letters, and no gifts to the children without prior inspection and approval by the supervisor.
e. There is to be no discussion of any court matter, in the presence of, in earshot of, or directly with any of the children.
f. There will be no discussion regarding the children's care at the mother's home.
g. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall accompany any of the children to the bathroom.
h. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall comment to the children regarding coming back home or his/their desire or intent to have the children back with him.
i. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall discuss or make any comments regarding the mother, their home with her, or any maternal relatives to the children.
j. If one of the children makes an unsolicited remark concerning one of the topics about which these orders prohibit discussion, the father or his relative will not respond. Instead, the visitation supervisor will answer the child that " we're not going to talk about that here" or respond in some other appropriate way redirecting the child.
6. Should a visit be canceled due to a reason other than behavior (on the part of any participant) at the visit or mother's vacation time, the visit will be made up as soon as practicable taking into consideration the children's schedules and the visitation center's availability.
7. Said center will have security provisions and specific rules to ensure the safety of the children and the mother. The parents shall follow all rules of the supervised visitation center.
8. Any increase in the length of a visit beyond one hour shall be by agreement of the parties and take into consideration the recommendation of the children's therapist(s), and agreement for longer visits shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any changes to the visitation schedule should be made based on the children's needs and not the needs of either parent.
9. The mother shall be entitled to two weeks of uninterrupted vacation time with the children per year. This time is not subject to make-up time.
10. The father may send correspondence to the children through their mother. She may open the correspondence and review it to determine if it is appropriate for the children to receive at her sole discretion. The mother may have a post office box for any such correspondence from the father to prevent the children from getting and opening the mail before she has seen it.
11. The father may not attend any of children's activities except as follows:
a. The father may attend school concerts, award ceremonies, sporting practices or meets, or religious ceremonies in which any of the minor children participate, after providing her with notice of his intention to do so at least one day in advance.
b. Mother shall provide notice of all such events to the father via use of the " Our Family Wizard" website in sufficient time to the father to allow him to attend such an event if he chooses.
c. If the mother is not present at the event, the father will not talk to or approach the children or do anything else to disrupt the event or that will embarrass or cause stress for the children. Indoors, he will remain at least 20 feet from the children at all times on such occasions. Out of doors, he will remain at least 100 feet from the children at all times on such occasions.
d. At events attended by both parents, the father will not approach the children or try to communicate with them, unless the mother, in her discretion, approaches the father for brief conversation between the father and children. During any such conversation the father will follow the visitation rules in terms of what he should not say or do. Otherwise, the father will remain at least 20 feet from the mother and children.
e. At any event encompassed by this order, neither parent will do anything to disrupt the event or that would embarrass or cause stress for the children.
12. Except as provided in these orders, the father is to have no other contact with the children without written agreement of the parties or further court order.
13. The father may have access to information about the children's education. He may contact any school being attended by any of these children and may provide them with his mailing address requesting duplicates of report cards and the like. He may attend parent teacher conferences provided he schedules his own conference at a time when mother will not be there.
14. The father may have access to information about the children's medical and/or therapeutic treatment. He may contact the children's medical and therapeutic providers and be allowed to request access to or copies of their treatment records. He is not, however, allowed to attend the children's appointments unless the mother agrees in writing in advance.
15. The mother may request limitations on the father's access to educational, medical, and therapy records and providers by written motion.
16. The father shall be allowed to speak with the children on the telephone, as set forth below, for Christmas, father's day, the father's birthday and the day before the first day of school, for no longer than fifteen (15) minutes total. (Each phone call will be no longer than fifteen (15) minutes total, not per child.) The father shall also be allowed to speak to each child on their birthday for a period of no longer than ten (10) minutes. To facilitate these telephone calls, the mother may set up a free conference call account (such as is available on " https://www.freeconferencecall.com/"). She shall inform the father of the specific time that thechildren will available for any and all telephone calls via Our Family Wizard. The mother may listen to and record any and all conversations. The mother may have a third party listen to the call, including, but not limited to, the children's therapist, the father's therapist, her own therapist, the visitation supervisor or one of her parents. The mother need not give father notice that anyone is listening to any particular call. The mother may share the recordings with the visitation supervisor, the children's therapist(s) or either parent's therapist.
C. THERAPY
1. Each parent and each child shall remain in their current therapy until successfully discharged from therapy or transitioned to a qualified replacement therapist.
2. The father's therapist shall be provided with a copy of the portions of Dr. Humphrey's evaluations and reports that refer to him and a copy of his testimony in this proceeding.
3. Each parent shall ensure that current releases are signed allowing their therapists to speak with the children's therapist(s) and/or the visitation supervisor and allowing the children's therapist to speak to the visitation supervisor.
D. JURISDICTION
The Juvenile Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter, excluding financial orders.
E. SUMMARY OF RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
1. Petitioner's Motions
a. Motion to Open and Modify decision, dated January 27, 2016--GRANTED.
b. Motion for Review of Permanency Plan, filed December 17, 2015--GRANTED.
2. Respondent Mother's Motions
a. Amended Motion to Modify Current Disposition of Commitment and Vest Sole Physical and Legal Custody in Respondent Mother and that the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters Retain Jurisdiction of this Matter Concerning Visitation and Parenting Related Issues Post Disposition, dated January 21, 2016--GRANTED.
b. Objection to Father's Motion for Increased Visitation, dated February 10, 2016--SUSTAINED.
c. Objection to Father's Motion to Allow Attendance at Children's Events, dated March 29, 2016--OVERRULED.
3. Respondent Father's Motions
a. Motion for Order Implementing Supervised Visitation between Paternal Grandmother . . . and Emma, Logan, and Olivia [F.], dated November 9, 2015--DENIED.
b. Motion for Order that Unsupervised Visitation with his Children Commence Immediately, and for a Greater Amount of Time than One Hour Per Week, and That the Father Be Allowed to Visit in Person with His Children on Thanksgiving Day, 2015, and Christmas Day, 2015, dated November 9, 2015--DENIED, except that the portion of motion requesting Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation is moot.
c. Amended Motion to Modify Current Disposition of Commitment and Vest Sole Guardianship as well as Sole Physical and Legal Custody in Respondent Father, dated January 22, 2016--DENIED.
d. Motion for Emergency Relief, dated January 22, 2016--DENIED.
e. Motion Re-Reunification Therapy/Contact with Children, dated January 26, 2016--DENIED.
f. Motion for Increased Visitation, dated February 8, 2016--DENIED.
g. Motion for Emergency Relief, dated February 19, 2016--DENIED.
h. Motion to Allow Attendance at Children's Events--Granted, in part, as set forth in Memorandum of Decision.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI SENIOR JUDGE
VISITATION RULES
1. In order to facilitate positive communication during visits and avoid any negative emotional impact to the children, these rules must be followed during the time period directly before, during and immediately after each visit.
2. Failure to abide by the rules may result in an immediate termination of the visit.
3. Visits will be supervised at all times. The father and any paternal relative attending the visit will follow the direction of the supervisor and abide by the supervisor's instructions.
4. There will be no whispering to the children, no separation of the children, no note passing, no letters, and no gifts to the children without prior inspection and approval by the supervisor.
5. There is to be no discussion of any court matter, in the presence of, in earshot of, or directly with any of the children.
6. There will be no discussion regarding the children's care at the mother's home.
7. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall accompany any of the children to the bathroom.
8. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall comment to the children regarding coming back home or his/their desire or intent to have the children back with him.
9. Neither the father nor any of his relatives shall discuss or make any comments regarding the mother or any maternal relatives to the children.
Kelly and Matthew G., a paternal aunt and her husband, who sought to intervene in the neglect proceedings; Melissa F., a paternal aunt and Emma's godmother, who also sought to intervene in the neglect proceedings; The respondent father; Dr. Stephen Humphrey; Trenita Covington, a DCF social worker who was assigned to the children's cases after the OTCs and through the neglect trial and testified during the pretrial motions hearing regarding the department's position on the paternal relatives' motions to intervene; Joyce Anderson, the executive director of Today's Youth, an agency supervising father's visits with the children: Melissa Riccelli, DCF social work supervisor, who testified regarding the department's motion to suspend the father's visitations; and Sue Cousineau, the guardian ad litem, who testified on the motion to remove her as GAL.
ATTORNEY PATTIS (father's attorney): " The posture in the case is an unusual one. We are prepared, subject to the state's resting, with the addition of one additional document to rest ourselves." We're not prepared however to enter a nolo . . . to enter an admission of any sort . . . * * * * ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL BESSO: " In light of attorney Pattis' comments regarding the position of [the father], the department would have no objection to that representation and upon that representation to proceeding as following . . . mark . . . as a full exhibit . . . the social study . . . The department upon the representation here would be prepared to rest its case at that point . . . The department is not, however, going to be asking the court necessarily to articulate all of the detailed findings but merely to note that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support those findings . . . I would make a very brief closing argument without asking for specific findings of fact other than a notation from the court that the evidence is sufficient both for a finding of neglect and dispositional order of commitment. * * * * THE COURT: I'd be interested in whether the other parties are joining in the state's request that the court's decision not include the subsidiary findings that are necessary for the various components of the decision. ATTORNEY PATTIS: We do join in that . . .FTR (FTR, or " For The Record, " is software used by the court monitor that digitally records court proceedings and notes the hour, minute and second of each recorded statement), September 29, 2014 at 12:03:43 p.m.-12:22:34 p.m.
Two days later, the paternal grandmother took Logan to the office of Dr. David Wang, who was found qualified as an expert in concussions without objection. Dr. Wang accepted the diagnosis of concussion made by Dr. Abbatiello, and he testified that he observed several objective symptoms suggestive of and consistent with a diagnosis of a concussion, including abnormal saccadae, or eye reactions, that had not been observed two days earlier by Dr. Abbatiello. Dr. Wang testified that although sometimes " the words that came out of Logan's mouth seemed to be preplanned"; FTR, December 9, 2015, 2:47:10 p.m.-2:47:33 p.m.; the doctor also said that he had no doubt that Logan had suffered a concussion, based on the various objective findings and observations made by the doctor. See father's exhibit O, CCMC Records (of his treatment by Dr. David H. Wang, M.D.), " Encounter Date April 29, 2014, " p. 1 (" Diagnoses Concussion; unspecified").
Furthermore, the other preclusion doctrine related to finality of judgments, res judicata, does not prevent the father from raising this claim, " The legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are designed to promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of issues or claims previously resolved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMilo & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 233 Conn. 281, 291, 659 A.2d 162 (1995). " Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim; but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose ." (Emphasis altered.) Id., 292. " We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. What factual grouping constitutes a 'transaction, ' and what groupings constitute a 'series, ' are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage . . . In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action." (Citations omitted; emphasis altered.) Id., 294. The court is persuaded that the pending motions involve the " same claims, " for purposes of res judicata analysis, as the original neglect cases. The pleadings in the original neglect petitions alleged that the children were living under conditions injurious to their well-being by virtue of conflict in the home and potential physical abuse, At issue today are whether the conditions necessitating the children's removal have now been remediated. The Restatement of Judgments tells us, moreover, that these preclusion rules apply to judgments determining status, such as in neglect cases. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 31 (1982), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) A judgment in an action whose purpose is to determine or change a person's status is conclusive upon the parties to the action: (a) With respect to the existence of the status, and rights and obligations incident to the status which under the procedures governing the action are ordinarily determined therein, in accordance with the rules of claim preclusion stated in § § 18-26 and subject to the qualifications stated in § 13 concerning judgments granting or denying continuing relief; (b) With respect to issues determined in the action, in accordance with the rules of issue preclusion stated in § § 27-28.The rule that the doctrine of res judicata bars claims in a second action that they could have raised in the first action is not apposite to the present case, however. First, as our courts have repeatedly explained, " the basic rule" of res judicata is that " [w]hen a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff : (1) [t]he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any part thereof, although he may be able to maintain an action upon the judgment . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lighthouse Landings, Inc. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 300 Conn. 325 347-48, 15 A.3d 601 (2011). Such a rule does not ordinarily apply to defenses or counterclaims that could have been raised in the first action, except where " [t]he failure to interpose a defense to the plaintiff's claim precludes the defendant from thereafter asserting the defense as a basis for attacking the judgment." 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 22, comment (b) (1982). Thus, in DeMilo & Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 233 Conn. 293, for example, a junkyard owner's failure to present certain issues as special defenses in a prior action barred him from raising those same issues as affirmative claims in a second action because " successful prosecution of [the second] action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action." Assertions by the father in the proceedings on the neglect petitions that the mother was abusive and dangerous to the children would not have defeated the department's claims that the children were neglected, however, but instead conceivably could have bolstered the department's original case. Moreover, he is not asserting that claim now as a basis for defeating the neglect judgment or the children's commitment to DCF. Even if the preclusive principles of res judicata were applicable to the failure to assert these claims in the original neglect proceedings, however, our cases recognize that application of the doctrine depends on a consideration of its underlying policies and other competing interests. " The doctrines of preclusion . . . should be flexible and must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 253 Conn, 416, 423, 752 A.2d 509 (2000). In a child protection case, the court has an independent responsibility to make decisions in the child's best interest, a " public policy interest [that] outweighs the interest of finality served by the preclusion doctrines, " Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 61, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002). In this case, the public policy in protecting the children of our state from harm is just such an interest.
[I]t's our habit to say prayers with the children, so that first night as they were getting ready for bed we said okay, we got to pray for your parents, mom and dad, and all three indicated to me that they weren't going to pray for mom and I asked them why would you feel that way, don't you want pray for both. They indicated to me that mom was the devil . . . * * * The children [later] told me that they had been told that they shouldn't love their mother, that their mother was evil, that their mother was the devil, that everything that had gone wrong was the mother's fault, that whenever they tried to say something positive about their mother, they were scolded, yelled at things like that, reprimanded. THE COURT: Did they say who did that? THE WITNESS: Yes, they did. THE COURT: Who did, they say did it? THE WITNESS: They indicated their father, they indicated . . . paternal grandmother . . . and they indicated some of their aunts and uncles . . . on their father's side.Transcript of testimony of Gary G., January 8, 2016, p. 59-61.
There are many reasons to doubt the credibility of the grandmother's testimony. She showed an obvious bias during her testimony in favor of her son, and said, rather conveniently, that she could not remember in response to various questions to which her probable answer would have likely damaged her son's position in this case. If Logan did utter the statements recounted by the paternal grandmother that day, however, he was probably influenced to do so by her earlier own actions and statements. According to Detective Sagan, whose testimony the court found credible, before the interview had been cancelled, he had been called into the room where the grandmother was because she was causing a " commotion" " within earshot" of Logan, who was sitting next to his grandmother. Detective Sagan described her as " yelling and screaming about the child's well-being and the fact that there was allegations of abuse and possibly sexual assaults and a whole litany of allegations that were being yelled and screamed." Testimony of Detective Scott Sagan, FTR, February 23, 2016 10:50:24 a.m.-10:50:45 a.m. Another example of Logan repeating his accusation against his mother in response to adult prompting occurred at the Connecticut Children's Medical Center on one of the occasions that Logan was there for treatment James Bernier, the CCMC security operations manager, credibly recounted the event in testimony at trial. As Logan, his mother and his father were entering the CCMC clinic from a lobby area, the father said in a loud tone towards Logan, " Tell him, tell him what she does to you." Logan responded " She's an abuser." FTR, March 1, 2016, 10:12:30 a.m.-10:12:49 a.m.
Q Do you remember a therapy session at which you were present, Dr. Bunk was present, myself and the children were present where Emma stated that her mother had pushed into a railing but it was an accident? Doctor Grueneberg answered, however that: A My memory was she said she had stumbled into a railing and it was an accident, I don't recall her saying that her mom pushed her. Transcript of testimony, March 29, 2016, pp. 59-60.
Emma admitted to taking the fry but refused to apologize to Logan. When her mother asked her to apologize, Emma insisted that she did not have to apologize. Emma was openly defiant of her mother in a quiet, smug way with their mother. She then exacerbated the issue by saying, " Thanks for the fry, Logan, " She smiled and chuckled as the mother asked her to apologize. She ultimately followed her mother's instruction to say " sorry" to Logan, but did so in an unenthusiastic way. Ms [F.] remained calm. Emma returned to chiding Logan, laughing and saying, " He was crying over a fry? Can you believe it?" Ms. [F.] suggested she might give Emma a Time Out, but did not. Emma made more comments about " one fry." Emma did not make any responses to her mother's suggestion there would be consequences (i.e., Time Out) for her behavior, Logan then began crying again, claiming someone took one of his chicken nuggets (it was not clear this actually happened). Emma again presented as smug, but denied taking the food. Respondent Mother's Exhibit F, " Psychological Assessment from Dr. Stephen Humphrey, " filed on January 5, 2015 (Dr. Humphrey's 2015 Report), p. 11. He later wrote in his report that there were " indications that Emma and Logan conspired to misbehave during their first interaction with their mother." Id., p. 17. The court had also ordered that the children meet with their therapists after each of the parent-child interactions, and Dr. Humphrey then talked with the therapists. One of them told him that " the children 'purposely' decided to be 'very difficult' in the [first] visit with their mother at this examiner's office. She said Logan reported that he 'told (Mr. G.) they had planned to act out (in this examiner's) office with Mom there because they did not want Mom to look good . . .'" Id., p. 16.
Q Okay. On how many occasions has Logan told you that his mother abused him? A Once. Q When did he tell you that? A The first night that he came into the home. Q March 20th, 2014? What exactly did he tell you? A He told me that he had been told he had a concussion and I told him I've had concussions too . . . * * * * Q How did Logan say he got this concussion? A At that point, he told me that his mother had hit his head on the floor. [30]* * * * Q On any other occasions did you and Logan have opportunity to discuss what happened with regards to him sustaining a concussion at the hands of his mother? A Yes. Q Yes? A Yes. Q Okay, On how many other occasions? A At least four, possibly five. Q What was--can you tell me about when each of those occasions was? A It occurred over different periods. Three times after telling me that the first night, he brought it up and told me that it did not happen that way, told me three different versions. Each of the versions indicating that his mother had nothing to do with it, that he was told to put on jamas or some clothes, the details change from story to story, and he didn't want to do it and ran away and tripped. I heard at least three different versions that way. Again, putting on jamas, putting on clothes. He ran--was running away from his mother and he tripped on his own. His mother had nothing to do with it. Q All right. A And eventually he recanted the claim completely telling me that it never happened. His mother wasn't even there when he bumped his head . . . * * * * A The first night, March 20th, 2014, Logan indicated that his mother had taken his head and hit it on the floor. Three times after that, he told a different version which did not indicate his mother had anything really to do with him hitting his head other than she told him to put on some clothing. The story is different. Sometimes it's jamas, sometimes it's something else. He didn't want to do it. He ran away and fell and hit the wall. Q Okay. Has A And then the recanting that it never happened, mom wasn't even there when he hit his head.Transcript of testimony, October 19, 2015, pp. 200-09.
Logan told me, " Daddy, I tried to tell the police what mommy did to my head, I tried to tell the DCF worker, I tried to tell--I told Dr. Wang, Daddy why am I still" . . . " Daddy, I told Dr. Sullivan at school, but I don't think anybody's listening to me. None of the adults are listening to me Daddy. Why--why do I have to go with mommy when she hurt me?" And so my--my surmise from that is that . . . he realizes . . . that the plan is to reunite him with the mother who abused him. Perhaps he's decided this is my--my understanding--that it makes sense to change the testimony to suit what the mother would want him to say because nobody has listened to him, nobody has . . . This child has been ignored, he's been kept from family members, he's been kept from me, he's been disregarded, he's been--he's been forced to be with the mother. What do you expect a small child to do? He has to protect himself.Transcript excerpt October 22, 2015, pp. 64-65.
Dr. Grueneberg testified however, that, by the end of the mother's " family therapy" sessions, the mother had made progress in all the goals set for that therapy. See transcript of testimony, March 29, 2016, pp. 77-79. More particularly, Dr. Grueneberg testified as follows:
Q All right. So the goal for mom was continue to work on clear statement of expectations and follow-through. Did that remain a goal throughout? A Yes. Q Okay. And how did mother do towards A Definitely progress was made on setting clear limits an following through on those. Q And I realize progress, there's minimal process, good progress, etc. so if you could qualify the extent, of the progress? A I would say good progress on that goal.Id., pp. 77-78. " [I]n sessions she seemed to be able to--she began to be able to set boundaries, set limits, discipline the children but also to express, you know, affection and caring." Transcript of testimony, March 28, 2016, p. 79. Similarly, Dr. Bunk testified that the children's " behavior in family sessions with their mother became far less symptomatic over the course of our time indicating-suggesting, clinically, that they began to feel safe and that she was kind of being consistent and setting limits and they were responding to that." Transcript of testimony, Id., p. 86. The records of the mother's supervised visitations during 2015, moreover provide examples of the improvement in her ability to supervise the children and manage their behaviors. In March 2015, DCF referred the mother to Wheeler Clinic's " Therapeutic Family Time" (TFT) program, which consisted of weekly supervised visits with the children and a separate weekly meeting each week with the reunification worker to reflect on past and upcoming visits; The purpose of the TFT program was to observe the mother with the children in order for Wheeler staff to determine whether to recommend reunification. One of the mother's goal during the TFT process was to " set goals and utilize proper techniques." " Action steps" she was supposed to take to implement that goal were to " set ground rules and implement them in each visit" and make the children " active participants in setting rules in each visit." A second goal was to " model appropriate behavior" and " [w]hen children display inappropriate behavior, mom will model alternative coping strategies." TFT Service Plan page two, contained in father's exhibit N, Wheeler Clinic records of mother's visitations. Amanda Colom, who supervised the mother's visits with the children for much of 2015, testified that initially " the kids were just kind of they were really struggling, with being redirect[ed] and just following through with rules that mom like set for them." Transcript of testimony, October 19, 2015, p. 22. The " Therapeutic Family Time Note" for the mother's sixth TFT visit with the children on April 15, 2015, for example, shows her unable on that occasion to manage difficult behaviors by the children. When the two older children made " racist comments, " she " provided education around slavery but never told the children to stop making comments." After " Logan made another racist comment, the worker had to intervene because mother failed to say anything. It appeared that mother knew the behavior was wrong but didn't have the ability to correct it." Later, when they went for frozen yogurt, three-year-old Olivia started jumping on her chair and " mother had difficulty redirecting the behavior." Father's exhibit N, Therapeutic Family Time Note for April 15, 2015. Three months later, however, the TFT notes show improvement in the mother's ability to manage the children's behavior. For her fifteenth TFT visit, in late June 2015, the mother told the children before a visit to a restaurant at a local mall " about the importance of being respectful" and their " manners, rules and expectations." Once at the restaurant, the youngest child, Olivia could not calm down, would not respond to redirection, and had a temper tantrum. The mother then had the children pack up their food and they left the restaurant. On the return to Wheeler Clinic, she " discussed the reason why she left the restaurant and shared that she was not picking on Olivia but using this situation as an example that she wanted the kids to act appropriately." Back at Wheeler, Olivia calmed down. The reunification worker's comments on the visit were that " Mom did a great job being firm and clear with the kids about rules and expectations" and " followed through with redirecting in the restaurant and came up with an appropriate consequence." Id., Therapeutic Family Time Note for June 24, 2015. Two visits later, on July 8, the children again became argumentative at a restaurant. The TFT worker's notes report that " Mom asked them to calm down and to relax several times. She tried different approaches to redirect them, and warned them to just sit down so that they can have a good time." When they would not do so, the mother made them leave before the meal was over. The TFT worker's notes remark that the children " were very surprised on how firm mom was with them" and became apologetic. Id., Therapeutic Family Time Note for July 8, 2015, p. 2. Colom testified that the mother had been appropriate during that incident had been " very calm and she was able to redirect the children. She gave them countless options. And then when it was time to leave the restaurant, she was able to say it's time to go. Later on she was able to explain to the children why they left the restaurant." Transcript of testimony, October 19, 2015 at 93-94. By August, Colom wrote in the Monthly Progress Report for the TFT program that " Mom has been able to set boundaries and utilize proper parenting techniques, " to " let the children know what the rules and expectations are, " and to " continue to demonstrate appropriate behaviors." Father's exhibit N, Monthly Progress Report for July/August 2015. Colom testified that the mother " made steady progress" toward meeting her goals; transcript of testimony, October 19, 2015, p. 95; and then achieved her goals of being able to redirect the children effectively and dividing her time appropriately between the three children. DCF decided, with support from Wheeler Clinic and the children's therapists, that it was appropriate to begin the formal reunification process. The next Monthly Progress Report stated that
Since visits started in the home, Mom has done a nice job setting boundaries and utilizing the parenting techniques she learned during TFT. Mom has set rules in the home, including homework time, dinner time, play time, etc. Thus far, the children have been observed following the rules and listening to the adults. At times, when the children attempt to push limits, mom asserts herself and ensures the rules are followed . . . Mom has demonstrated appropriate behavior with the children. She gives the children clear instructions and expectation and informs them as to what they will be doing after each activity . . . RTFT worker has observed consistency and structure by . . . mom . . .Id., Monthly Progress Report for August/September 2015. These remarks echo the conclusion contained in the final " Family Treatment Summary" provided by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg on January 28, 2016: " The children continue to adjust very well to reunion with Mom and maternal grandparents. All report that there are no major behavioral issues in the home . . . The children sometimes push limits in sessions, and then are fairly responsive to Mom's intervention." Petitioner's exhibit 6. A similar comment on the success of the children's reunification with the mother was made by Alison Miller, who is a social worker employed by the D.A.R.E. program, the agency that licensed and supervised the therapeutic foster home. In that capacity, she also " provided aftercare" for ninety days after reunification by visiting the children at the mother's home every other week, meeting with each one individually and also talking to the mother " 'if anything needed to be addressed.'" She told Dr. Humphrey for his updated 2016 evaluation that she had been concerned upon reunifying with Ms. [F.], the children 'would run the house' but her fears were not realized, and it 'was the total opposite.'" Respondent mother's exhibit J. p. 23.
In evaluating and weighing expert testimony, the trier of fact is never bound by the opinions and conclusions of the expert merely because of that individual's background, experience or expertise. In Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, 789 A.2d 1104 (2002), for example, the Appellate Court expressly upheld the trial court's decision to reject the recommendations of the guardian ad litem and court-appointed psychologist: " a trial court is not bound to accept the expert opinion of a family relations officer . . . [and] is free to rely on whatever parts of an expert's opinion the court finds probative and helpful." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 190, citing Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 281, 440 A.2d 899 (1981). " It is in the sole province of the trier of fact to evaluate expert testimony, to assess its credibility, and to assign it a proper weight." State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 706, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 1017, 98 L.Ed.2d 982 (1988). " It is the quintessential function of the finder of fact to reject or accept evidence and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert.'" (Citation omitted.) Tartaglino v. Dept of Correction, 55 Conn.App. 190, 195, 737 A.2d 993, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 929, 742 A.2d 364 (1999). Ultimately, the court is responsible for sifting through and evaluating all the evidence and then rendering its own findings and conclusions, In the present case, with such a stark contrast between the conclusions and opinions of the different experts, it is the court's role to decide which, if any, of those opinions and conclusions to adopt or reject."In re Matthew M, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. F04-CP-11-009363-A. After thoroughly considering and weighing all of the evidence in this particular case and the arguments of the parties, the court has found the testimony, reports, and conclusions of Dr. Humphrey about the children, the father, and the mother to be particularly insightful, valuable, and credible. He met with the parents on several occasions and with the two older children at least twice and has spoken to the mental health professionals working with all of them, as well as other collateral sources. His testimony and reports provide a credible explanation of the nature and causes of the children's distress, the parents' separate and joint contributions to that distress, the children's gradual but not yet complete relief from that distress, the remaining risks to the children, the beneficial role of the foster family in the lives of the children, and the success or lack thereof of each parent in addressing the reasons the children were committed and their role in that commitment. Dr. Humphrey's observations, conclusions, or opinions referred to herein are all found to be reliable, credible and proven to be true.
[W]hen something occurred that you felt strongly about or you had a need about, it was difficult to recognize the impact of your actions or your statement on your children and whether those were difficult or appropriate things for them to experience. One example might be, early on, if they were talking about sad things or scary things, you have a great need for your kids to be happy and so that would be superimposed on their expressions of sadness or anger? THE COURT: Can you be more specific? What do you mean by superimposed? THE WITNESS: What dad would say if the children were talking about things that they were scared about or mad about or sad about or worried about, dad would often say oh, you know, that will be okay, I just want you to be happy, I love you, which negated the children's need to express what they were trying to express. Transcript of testimony on March 29, 2016, p. 32. The written Treatment Update Reports prepared periodically by doctors Bunk and Grueneberg documented this inability during the father's first two family therapy sessions with the children in April and May of 2015. For the first session, they wrote that Dad struggled with being able to sit with the children's' sadness and anger--trying to tell them he loved them and wanted them to be happy. This tendency to move away from their painful feelings and try to absorb these with happy thoughts has become one focus of the family therapy work with Dad. Dad did reinforce that the divorce was not their fault. Dad exhibited a tendency towards self-referencing and needed many prompts to focus on the children's feelings and experience. For the second session, they again noted that Dad needed a lot of prompting to establish that he was able to take care of himself, and to say to the children that the doctors were helping him and that they did not need to protect him. There was, again, much self-referencing and a need for prompts to keep the focus on the children.Petitioner's exhibit 6, Treatment Update--May 28, 2015, p. 3.
His response on this occasion harkens back to the incident that led to a suspension of his visitation for several months during 2014. Logan and Emma had been temporarily removed from their foster home with the G. family and placed in respite care after the foster father had expressed great frustration with them for lying about their treatment in foster home. DCF did not immediately notify the father about this action, a failure that is inexcusable but does not justify Mr. F.'s subsequent reaction when he did find out, which did not occur until the next day when he was scheduled for a visitation with the children. Emma was the first of the children to arrive for the visitation, and she was very upset. Rather than comforting her, however, Mr. F. exploded with rage at the department and was unwilling or unable to respond to Emma's needs. While she lay curled into a fetal ball, desperately needing support and comfort, the father instead argued with department representatives and ignored their suggestions that he respond at that time to Emma's needs and wait until the visit had ended to address his concerns about the department's actions.
My understanding is a couple of parts. I believe one of the primary reasons was the verbal parental conflict of the--I believe that the judge found that the parents, meaning myself and Mrs. [F.], argued very, very frequently. There were arguments in which the children were present to witness the arguments. At times there may have been language used that should never had been used at the time, especially in front of children with regards to expletives and so forth. I believe also there was findings or at least that the home was untidy in particular. That there were a number of findings regarding the conditions within the home. My understanding as well as there may--I believe there was a concern and I was asked to address it in therapy and I've done so, a concern for me to be cognizant of any way in which my words and/or conduct have affected the relationship of my three children with their mother, Lisa [F]. I believe--certainly there were allegations contained when DCF took the children within their--the court papers when they took the children of allegations of abuse by the mother only as to Emma and Logan and I don't know what--how much that was considered as well by the judge, but that was also something that came up. Transcript of testimony on cross examination, October 22, 2015, pp. 3-4. He did the same thing when later questioned by the assistant attorney general as to why he needs to be in therapy, first emphasizing parental conflict and only then acknowledging the potential effect of his words or conduct on the children: My understanding is that the purpose in large part of the therapy is to recognize the role that parental conflict would have on the--the emotions and psychology of the children, that the role of the parents by having the verbal arguments would have affected the children. That's one. Also, the role any conduct or words that I may have affected in any way the relationship between Lisa and the three children is another one. Also, to try to help me so that when the children will ask me something, I don't try to immediately solve it or help them that I ask them, well; how does that make you feel and I try to go through the emotions and learn more about why they're saying things and not just, you know, as a lot of dads do, just try to solve the problem or help them solve the problem, that kind of thing.Id., pp. 67-68. When questioned by his attorney about what he had learned from the various professionals working with the children about " any unique special needs, " they might have, he again emphasized the need to avoid parental argument without mention of degrading comments or suggestions about the mother, stating, " I need to be very mindful of the role, as I said, that the parental conflict had in the past . . ." Id., p. 33.
Q Mr. [F.], do I then understand to that you object to the placement of the children with your ex-wife? A Oh yes, certainly. Q Why? A I fear for their physical safety if they are with their mother unsupervised. Transcript of testimony on direct examination, October 20, 2015, p. 36. I want my children to be reunified with me and placed into my legal and physical custody because I believe that it is in the best interest of my children and will keep them safe from possible physical abuse and neglect by their mother, Lisa [F].Id., p. 77.
In the supervision visitation my one hour per week, we're not allowed to mention anything related to the past, the mother . . . Transcript of testimony on direct examination, October 20, 2015, p. 42. the overriding goal . . . [of his therapy] is to ensure that I understand, you know, how any of my words or conduct may adversely influence the relationship between the respondent mother and the children.Id., p. 71. And Mr. F. told Dr. Humphrey, during their interview for Dr. Humphrey's 2016 updated psychological evaluation, that " he believes he has arrived at a place where he can 'be supportive of the other parent' and 'put aside . . . our own viewpoints.' He said he can be supportive of Ms. [F.] . . ." Respondent mother's exhibit J (Dr. Humphrey's 2016 report), p. 27.
Mr. [F.] was very cooperative with the therapists, with myself and Dr. Grueneberg, and when we attempted to give information about I would call psychoeducational information about child development, for example, Mr. [F.] would listen attentively and shake his head and nod in agreement. Early in the therapy, . . . when we had conversations about Mr. [F.]'s negative opinion of Ms. [F.]. Mr. [F.] would cooperate with us and attempt to--and say to the children, I want you to be, as an example, I want you to be happy at your mother's house.Id., pp. 15 and 19. The " [F.] Family Treatment Summary" dated February 15, 2016, summarized his progress:
Until recently it seemed that Dad had been engaged positively in the family therapy. He was responding adequately to the therapists' intervention during sessions, and seemed to be more able to appropriately respond to his children's needs with some guidance, specifically to see their needs as separate from his. It is our impression that he had learned (or decided) to trust the therapists during sessions, which allowed him to make that progress in sessions. Doctor Grueneberg told Dr. Humphrey that " the transition of the children to their mother's care (in the maternal grandparents' home) was 'overall positive, ' and the mother Ms. [F.] was seemingly 'dealing with the kids pretty well.'" Dr. Humphrey's 2016 report, p.18. After the children were reunified with the mother, however, their conduct in their sessions with their father began to deteriorate. Dr. Grueneberg told Dr. Humphrey that " [t]heir response to Dad's visit time (was marked by) more and more trouble of having a sense of how to have a relationship, how to juxtapose what they're experiencing with Mom with visits with Dad." Id. At the same time, Mr. F. became " less cooperative" with doctors Bunk and Grueneberg. Dr. Bunk testimony, p. 15. The February 15, 2016 treatment summary gave a specific example of this change in the father's conduct during therapy: " on 1/19 . . . Dad overtly challenged the therapists in front of the children in a manner that displayed disrespect and entitlement."
You were excessively preoccupied with the children's safety in the foster home telling them to be mindful of all the dangers they might encounter, having an EpiPen, not being around cats, about riding quads, about being around the swimming pool, essentially, conveying to the children that they had to be hypervigilant about dangers in their present home and positing that you had to remind them of those. I also found it interesting that you brought vitamins and PediaSure. To go back to the words " normative" and " common, " that's not a usual snack that children bring and it caused me concern that you might be implying or suggesting that they might be malnourished in their current placement and there was some degree of intensity and anxiety and rigidness. * * * * [Y]ou were expressing those anxieties to the children which could cause them to then be very anxious about their environment, rather than what most I think people would do in a similar situation, based on the evaluations I've conducted, is trust that the people who have the home with the swimming pool or people who have a cat know how to provide safely in their own home. These are children who I believe were made to be distrusting and fearful of many things in their environment and your choice to spend a great deal of time in the interaction with them; rather than playing with them or conversing with them, but pointing out dangers in their environment and how they need to avoid those dangers went beyond the bounds of what I would expect would be typical safety concerns and expression of safety concerns of the children and may have caused them to be more anxious and also caused them to generate reasons to feel anxious or to report being anxious in the foster home.Transcript of testimony, November 1, 2016, pp. 147-49.