The attorney disciplinary process is divided into two types of proceedings: the standard grievance procedure and the compulsory discipline procedure. See In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 306 (Tex. 2001). The standard grievance procedure applies in all instances of alleged attorney misconduct, except where an attorney is alleged to have committed an "intentional crime."

But Treffinger's crime—first-time possession not for purposes of sale of a controlled substance—does not inherently involve dishonesty, theft, or serious interference with the administration of justice. We recognize, as the Texas Supreme Court did in In re Lock , 54 S.W.3d 305, 309 (2001), a case involving similar facts, that "possession of a controlled substance may adversely affect a lawyer's ability to practice honestly and effectively." But "looking solely to the elements of the offense, we cannot say that the elements of [Treffinger's] offense mandate the legal conclusion that every attorney guilty of that offense is categorically unfit to practice law.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Texas has made clear that an attorney who violates the TDRPC may be disbarred, have his license suspended, or be reprimanded under the bar's standard grievance procedure. See In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 597 (Tex. 2008); In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. 2001). The reviewing body for such grievances may be a district court or a disciplinary body within the bar.

The Supreme Court of Texas, in hearing BODA appeals, is not permitted "to consider any underlying facts or mitigating circumstances in a compulsory discipline proceeding." In re Lock, 54 S.W. 3d 305, 309-10 (Tex. 2001). The Supreme Court only considers the elements of the crime and whether compulsory discipline was appropriate, not the validity of the underlying conviction.

The designated trial court - whether an evidentiary panel or a district court - has broad discretion in evaluating the factors to determine the consequences of professional misconduct. In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. 2001); State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1994). If "just cause" exists to proceed on a disciplinary complaint, an attorney-respondent may elect to proceed to trial either in a state district court or by an evidentiary panel of the grievance committee within that particular state bar district.

See generally, Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982) ("The judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice."); In re Stale Bar of Texas, 113 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex. 2003) (jurisdictional issue under the attorney regulatory scheme promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas presented issue of "statewide importance"); In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. 2001) ("[W]e rely on the Bar to impose appropriate discipline including suspension or disbarment when the facts so warrant, to protect the public from impaired attorneys, and to improve the reputation and integrity of the legal profession."); In re Ament, 890 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1994); (compulsory discipline protects the public from attorneys under the disability of criminal censure); Neely v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 196 S.W.3d 174, 187 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist] 2006, pet. denied) ("The disciplinary rules advance a substantial government interest in protecting the public from false, deceptive or misleading lawyer communications."); Rodgers v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 151 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) ("The purpose of the rules is to protect the public from deceptive advertising, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a substantial governmental interest."); Favaloro v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 994 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pe

And jurors know that cocaine is highly addictive and can cause physical harm and death to its users. In re Lock (Tex. 2001), 54 S.W.3d 305, 320 ("It is common knowledge that [cocaine] is highly addictive and potentially fatal" [emphasis added]). Cf. Torres v. State (Tex.App. 1988), 754 S.W.2d 397, 401 (prosecutor's statements in closing arguments, including "We all know what cocaine does" and "A lot of people are dying," were proper because that "information may easily be classified as common knowledge" [emphasis added]).

See Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881 ("The impeachment value of crimes that involve deception is higher than [for] crimes that involve violence, and the latter have a higher potential for prejudice."); Jones-Jackson, 443 S.W.3d at 403-04 (although felony drug convictions are generally not considered to be crimes of deception, whether a drug offense constitutes a crime of deception depends on the facts of the offense); see also In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. 2001) (felony drug possession convictions are not per se crimes of moral turpitude). Here, the first Theus factor weighs against the admission of Appellant's prior felony drug convictions because such convictions do not involve deception.

Compulsory discipline for an intentional crime turns solely on the record of conviction. In re Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 306-07 (Tex. 2001). Absent a conviction for an intentional crime, the standard disciplinary proceedings such as the proceedings brought against Wilkinson apply.

Theft is a crime of moral turpitude but not all felonies are crimes of moral turpitude. Ex parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); In the Matter of Lock, 54 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. 2001) (holding that felony possession of a controlled substance is not a crime of moral turpitude per se).