However, the court made no findings demonstrating such neglect continued at the time of the termination hearing or that there was a probability of a future repetition of neglect if the children were returned to respondent-father's care. See In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 799 S.E.2d 59, 62 (2017) ("The trial court's order must reflect the process by which the court reasoned and adjudicated facts, based upon clear and convincing evidence, which compel the conclusion that Respondents were likely to neglect L.L.O. if she were returned to their custody." (citation omitted)).

Initially, respondent-father asserts that the style of the trial court's finding of fact 11 impedes appellate review because the findings therein constitute a "stream of consciousness" rather than careful consideration of the evidence presented. See In re L.L.O. , 252 N.C. App. 447, 458–59, 799 S.E.2d 59, 66 (2017) (determining that a trial court's "stream of consciousness" style of findings "impede[d its] ability to determine whether the trial court reconciled and adjudicated all of the evidence presented to it"). We are not persuaded that the trial court's findings in finding of fact 11 amount to "stream of consciousness."

"Without adjudicated findings of fact this Court cannot conduct a meaningful review of the conclusions of law and ‘test the correctness of [the trial court's] judgment.’ " In re L.L.O. , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 799 S.E.2d 59, 66 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting In re M.K. , 241 N.C. App. 467, 471, 773 S.E.2d 535, 538 (2015) ). As a result, we must vacate the permanency planning order and remand to the trial court.

See, e.g., In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 799 S.E.2d 59, 63 (2017) (holding that lack of finding regarding probability of repetition of neglect was not harmless despite fact that "record contains evidence, which could support, although not compel, a finding of neglect"); In re E.L.E., 243 N.C. App. 301, 308, 778 S.E.2d 445, 450-51 (2015) (holding that although "competent evidence in the record exists to support such a finding" of the probability of repetition of neglect, "the absence of this necessary finding requires reversal"). Consequently, because the trial court failed to make any ultimate findings linking Respondent's past conduct to the likelihood of a repetition of neglect, the trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to uphold its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

Support for this ground requires the trial court to find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that (1) "a child has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or placement outside the home for over twelve months" and (2) "as of the time of the hearing, . . . the parent has not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child." In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 799 S.E.2d 59, 64 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this context, "[w]illfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort."

For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court's order terminating respondent's parental rights to Lacy and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 799 S.E.2d 59, 63-64 (2017) (vacating and remanding where the "termination order contain[ed] no finding of a probability of a repetition of neglect"). "We leave to the discretion of the trial court whether to hear additional evidence." In re F.G.J., 200 N.C. App. 681, 695, 684 S.E.2d 745, 755 (2009).

See In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 345, 648 S.E.2d 519, 524 (2007), aff'd as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008). Respondent argues In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, 799 S.E.2d 59 (2017) and In re E.L.E., ___ N.C. App. ___, 778 S.E.2d 445 (2015) require reversal of the termination order. However, unlike the order here, the orders in L.L.O. and E.L.E were completely devoid of any statement regarding the likelihood of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to the respondent-parents' homes.

Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232. In In re L.L.O., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (Apr. 4, 2017) (No. COA16-1098), the juvenile had not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing after having previously been adjudicated neglected. L.L.O., slip op. at 4.