Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct.No. JD15891
Duffy, J.
Juan L. and Veronica C. are the unmarried parents of L. L., a three-year-old girl. Juan L. appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and ending his parental rights under section 366.26. He claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his modification request to institute family maintenance services and vacate the hearing at which parental rights could be ended. He also claims, in essence, that the beneficial-relationship exception applies against the court’s order ending his parental rights. Veronica C. appeals from the court’s order ending her parental rights on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to support the order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The juvenile court relied on evidence that Veronica C. was incapable of safely raising L. L. because of her continued substance abuse and other problems and that Juan L., though not similarly afflicted, could not ensure that no harm would come to L. L. if she remained in his care. The court ruled correctly as it is the best interest of L. L. that governs in these circumstances, and we will affirm the orders.
FACTS
In 1993 the Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) received the first of at least 12 eventual referrals involving Veronica C.’s physical abuse and/or neglect of her children. One of the most recent concerned L. L., who was born in January 2005. L. L. was 10 weeks premature, underweight, and medically fragile. Veronica C. did not receive prenatal care while pregnant with L. L.
The social worker at the hospital in which L. L. was born informed the Department of the family’s circumstances, and the Department sought a protective custody warrant. L. L. was ordered to be placed in protective custody on February 10, 2005, before being discharged from the hospital, and was so placed on February 11.
The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling) on L. L.’s behalf on February 15, 2005. The juvenile court detained L. L. at the initial hearing on February 17, 2005, and set a jurisdiction hearing.
On March 10, 2005, the juvenile court found that Juan L. “is the presumed father [of L. L.] by virtue of . . . declaration of paternity.”
At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on April 7, 2005, both parents waived their trial rights and submitted the matter on a jurisdiction/disposition report dated March 10, 2005, and addendum dated April 7, 2005.
The jurisdiction/disposition report explained that Veronica C. had delivered three other children prematurely. Two were born with methamphetamine in their systems and as a result became the subject of dependency proceedings. Veronica C. was later able to reunify with one, but not with the other (C. M.). Juan L. said he was unaware that C. M. had drugs in her system until Veronica C. told him. He did not perceive that Veronica C.’s substance abuse posed a risk to L. L.
On April 7, 2005, the juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered reunification services for both parents, including parenting and drug-testing programs.
In an interim review report dated May 19, 2005, the social worker described the parents’ progress in meeting their case plans. Both had tested negative for drugs and alcohol at the tests for which they had appeared, but Veronica C. had missed three tests and Juan L. one. Both had attended two out of four sessions of a basic parenting class. Veronica C. said she had attended the 12-step program but did not provide proof. The parents were visiting L. L. twice a week under supervision.
The 90-day review report dated July 5, 2005, stated that the parents were doing better. Both had completed the basic parenting class. Veronica C. had attended 12-step meetings and not missed a drug test since the last court hearing. Juan L. continued to work and had located suitable housing.
In the six-month review report dated September 22, 2005, the social worker recommended that L. L. be returned home with family maintenance services, as the parents by then had demonstrated their ability to parent in various respects. L. L. was doing well. Numerous completed drug tests (Juan L. had missed one) had come out negative. In late July, the social worker had arranged additional three-hour visits on Saturdays, these ones unsupervised. L. L. would return from the visits “tired but happy.” Her parents were eager to reunite with her. They acknowledged past transgressions and mistakes and “appear[ed] motivated to be the best parents possible”; in particular, Veronica C. wanted to stop abusing drugs.
The juvenile court sent L. L. home on September 22, 2005, and accepted the social worker’s rating of both parents’ progress as good.
Ominously, a drug test of Veronica C. in December of 2005 came back positive. Nevertheless, the social worker recommended continued family maintenance services in a status review report dated March 9, 2006. L. L. continued to grow and was crawling and standing. Juan L. was working while Veronica C. tended to L. L.
The juvenile court continued family maintenance services to August of 2006 with an interim review on May 30, 2006. In an interim review report dated May 9, 2006, a recently assigned social worker, Octavio Munoz (hereafter Munoz), reported that Veronica C. had recently disclosed, during an office visit on April 28, 2006, that she was four months pregnant. Munoz and another social worker reported that they “observed [Veronica C.] to be agitated, jittery, itchy skin, and had a dry mouth.” She attributed her condition to her pregnancy. She failed to appear for many tests, although those she underwent proved negative. She justified her absences by alluding to her work schedule. Veronica C.’s drug-testing inconsistency greatly worried Munoz.
The next month, however, saw improvement. Veronica C.’s drug tests were negative in May of 2006. She tested on schedule, appeared calmer, and looked healthier. Munoz described Juan L. as a positive influence in family life. He provided for the family and was loving and playful with L. L.
There soon occurred, however, a major reversal in the family’s situation. In August 2006, Veronica C. delivered a baby girl, N. L., who, tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Veronica C. also tested positive and admitted to drug use. Munoz deemed her to have failed family maintenance services. All of the children, including L. L., were placed in protective custody. On May 9, 2006, the Department filed supplemental petitions under section 387 on behalf of Veronica C.’s four other children. The juvenile court detained them following a hearing on August 10, 2006, removing them to an emergency satellite home south of San Jose, but permitted both parents to have supervised visits.
In a jurisdiction/disposition report dated August 30, 2006, the Department alleged that Veronica C. had admitted using what she thought was cocaine on July 31, 2006, to treat a toothache. Rather, the substance was methamphetamine. She was evasive about drug-testing and continued to be in denial about her drug usage. Juan L. did not believe “that she was ever using drugs.”
After the children were removed, Juan L. continued to live with Veronica C. Both parents stated they planned to move to separate residences once Veronica C. recuperated from N. L.’s birth. They were still together, however, at the end of August 2006, and Juan L. showed no urgency about moving. On the other hand, Munoz observed that L. L. had a close relationship with Juan L.
For the August 30, 2006, jurisdiction hearing, Veronica C. and Juan L. submitted the section 387 petitions on Munoz’s reports, and the court sustained them. Juan L. requested a dispositional trial regarding L. L., a matter resolved at a settlement conference on September 14, 2006. By then the 18-month reunification period had expired, so the juvenile court set a hearing date to devise a permanent plan for L. L. At this point, the court accepted the Department’s evaluation that Juan L. had made fair progress and that Veronica C.’s progress was poor.
At the permanency planning hearing, held on January 11, 2007, Juan L. stated that he intended to file a modification request under section 388. Munoz recommended ending his parental rights and adopting out L. L. as the right permanent plan. The court set a contested hearing for February 13, 2007, and on that same day, Juan L. filed the request under section 388 asking that he receive family maintenance services and that the permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 be vacated.
Juan L.’s request asserted that his reunification services regarding N. L. were preparing him to be a good parent. He claimed that he had readied himself to provide L. L. with a suitable home, including by ending his relationship with Veronica C. His request stated, “Father has obtained suitable and stable housing, and is living in a two-bedroom apartment. Father is no longer living with the Mother, is no longer in a relationship with the mother, and has no contact with the Mother other than at the court ordered supervised visitation.”
Munoz submitted a written response to the court dated February 13, 2007, and it was admitted into evidence at the contested permanency planning hearing. In the report, Munoz acknowledged that Juan L. was not a bad parent insofar as his own interactions with L. L. were concerned, but stated that he had endangered L. L.’s health by allowing her to be cared for by the drug-using Veronica C. and had denied knowing that she was using drugs. He had been unable to find stable housing or, the report implied, childcare.
The juvenile court held a hearing on Juan L.’s modification request on February 28, 2007. Munoz gave testimony favorable to Juan L., describing his cooperative nature, eagerness to have L. L. and N. L. returned to him, and affection toward the two girls. Munoz also testified that Juan L. had ended the problematic relationship with Veronica C.
When the hearing resumed on April 3, 2007, however, Munoz’s testimony took on a more negative cast. He stated that he did not think Juan L. had made sufficient progress to ensure L. L.’s safety. Veronica C. had not resolved her substance abuse problem and Juan L. had never understood its seriousness. Munoz also doubted Juan L.’s ability to provide housing.
Munoz acknowledged that Juan L. had located a suitable day-care provider for L. L. should she be returned to his care. On the other hand, L. L. had been moved to a concurrent home in Modesto about three months earlier, and Juan L.’s visits there were supposed to be separate from Veronica C.’s. The Department had provided bus vouchers so that Juan L. could travel separately to Modesto. On two occasions, however, he joined her visits instead. Accordingly, Munoz doubted Juan L.’s assertion that he was no longer involved with Veronica C. Munoz felt that separate visits also were important so that Juan L. could spend time with his daughters and get a sense of the extent of the necessary commitment. Moreover, Juan L. continued to attend substance abuse meetings that did not address the issue he was facing, namely, drug abuse by a significant other person in his life. Furthermore, his counselor reported that Juan L. was resisting getting anything out of their therapy sessions.
Munoz further testified that it would not harm L. L., given her age and her current placement in a “stable” and “loving” concurrent home, to sever the relationship with Juan L. She was becoming attached to her concurrent-home caregivers; moreover, all but one of her siblings were residing in the same concurrent home.
Juan L. testified that after N. L. was born and the children were removed, he stayed in the home for a brief period before moving into a garage with a bathroom and kitchen. He was no longer involved with Veronica C. He had attended Alanon meetings and had learned about the perils of drug abuse.
When proceedings resumed a month later, on May 3, 2007, Juan L. continued his testimony. He stated that injury-related and financial reasons had made it impossible for him to see his counselor recently. He said that he had separated from Veronica C. about August of 2006, and he acknowledged that her abuse of drugs was a serious problem. He felt that he could care for L. L. properly and protect her from the dangers of Veronica C.’s substance abuse. He gave conflicting testimony on whether he could tell if Veronica C. was abusing drugs. Before N. L. was born, he thought Veronica C. was clean and sober.
Nicole Bueno, a social worker in the juvenile dependency unit of the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, testified on behalf of L. L. Bueno was qualified to testify as an expert in risk assessment, provision of services, and permanency planning. She stated that because Juan L. had failed in meeting his case plan, family maintenance services for him were not in L. L.’s best interest; rather, adoption was. Instead of attending Alanon meetings, he had participated in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings that were unsuited to his situation. He had not addressed codependency issues satisfactorily in counseling inasmuch as he had attended only three to five sessions. Returning L. L. to him would pose a risk of harm to her because the codependency issues had not been addressed.
The hearing was continued until June 12, 2007. Munoz prepared an addendum report, also dated June 12, 2007, for that session, which explained that as of June 7, 2007, Juan L. was living in substandard housing, consisting of a 350-square-foot studio without a fully functional kitchen. On May 26, 2007, Veronica C. told another social worker that she was seven months pregnant with a new child and that Juan L. was the father. Juan L. said that “he was unaware that [Veronica C.] was pregnant and has not had contact with her in the last 7 to 8 months.”
In further testimony at the June 12, 2007, hearing, Bueno questioned Juan L.’s progress in discontinuing his relationship with Veronica C., especially after reading the part of Munoz’s addendum report of that same day stating that Veronica C. was now pregnant with another child by Juan L. On cross-examination, however, Bueno acknowledged that she knew of no scientific evidence that Juan L. was the father and that only Veronica C.’s contention supported the claim. As we interpret the record, Juan L. was disavowing the possibility that he was the father of the unborn child.
The hearing on Juan L.’s modification petition concluded on June 12, 2007. The juvenile court stated that it had labored over the written reports, repeatedly reading them, and that the case was proving to be difficult inasmuch as Juan L. had made efforts, albeit limited, to fulfill the requirements of his case plan. According to the court, two factors weighed importantly in its consideration: Veronica C.’s continuing drug addiction problem and the court’s lack of confidence that Juan L. could protect L. L. by shielding her from Veronica C. and her dysfunctions. Because of Veronica C.’s recently revealed pregnancy, the court disbelieved Juan L.’s assertion that had disengaged himself from Veronica C. at the time he said he had. In the court’s words, “And now he’s probably got another child with her and in his life, and I think one can clearly infer that that will create a whole set of new possibilities for contact [between the parents]. And I don’t think it’s in the best interest of this child to take that risk at this point because I think there is a substantial risk if we were to return this child to [her] father and try family maintenance.” The court denied Juan L.’s petition.
At the permanency planning hearing, which followed immediately after the juvenile court’s section 388 ruling, Juan L. testified about the relationship between L. L. and her younger sister N. L.. He visited both of them at the same time and everyone interacted healthily. L. L. would cry when they were about to separate. He was receiving reunification services for N. L. and hoped to have her returned to him. He wanted L. L. and N. L. to grow up together. “I’m doing as much as possible,” Juan L. concluded.
On cross-examination Juan L. acknowledged that L. L. and N. L. were in the same placement, the implication being that they might stay together if Juan L. lost his parental rights. (Counsel for Veronica C., however, reminded the juvenile court at closing argument that Juan L. was still receiving reunification services with respect to N. L.)
In addition to the foregoing testimony, the juvenile court, following the parties’ stipulation, considered the evidence received for Juan L.’s modification request under section 388, along with a written report dated January 11, 2007, that detailed the Department’s request to end parental rights and have L. L. freed for adoption.
After considering the evidence and counsel’s arguments, the juvenile court found that adoption was in L. L.’s best interest. It found that the possibility of a permanent home outweighed the detriment of ending the familial relationships. The court stated: “I think the exceptions have not been met [i.e., as relevant on appeal, section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) , and I think it is in the best interest to have this child adopted. That’s not to say this was an easy decision and I do understand that this is a terribly difficult moment for both parents. My heart goes out to them. . . . [B]y my previous ruling in this case I did not mean to send a message that I don’t have any sympathy for the parents, for the mother for her drug addiction. I know that’s a very difficult problem. But I have to focus on this child, and I think that I do acknowledge that both of these parents have a bond and a relationship with this child. [¶] But we’re talking about a two year old [who] has a chance for a permanent home, and I think that this child is clearly adoptable and that possibility of a permanent home I think outweighs the detriment that there is going to be in the termination of the relationships and the potential threat with the siblings, although that may not materialize. We don’t know yet.”
Effective January 1, 2008, the Legislature amended and renumbered section 366.26. (Stats. 2007, ch. 583, § 28.5, p. __; see also id., § 37, p. __.) Because the proceedings at issue here occurred before the statutory changes, we refer to the earlier version of the statute throughout this opinion. None of the amendments effective January 1, 2008, altered the substance of the provisions we discuss herein.
DISCUSSION
I. Juan L.’s Appeal
A. Denial of Juan L’s Modification Request
Juan L. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his modification request under section 388 asking that he receive family maintenance services and that the permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 regarding L. L. be vacated.
We review a juvenile court’s ruling on a section 388 request for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.) To find an abuse of discretion in a dependency case, the reviewing court must be persuaded that the lower court’s ruling fell outside the bounds of reason (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319), a high burden to surmount.
“[U]ntil the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s interest in reunification is given precedence over the child’s need for stability and permanency.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) However, “[o]nce reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.” (Id. at p. 309.) The court can alter its previous order ending reunification services and setting the case for permanency planning if doing so is in the child’s best interest. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.) Section 388 provides “an ‘escape mechanism’ when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights. [Citation.] As such, section 388 is vital to the constitutionality of our dependency scheme . . . .” (Id. at p. 528, italics deleted.) The burden was on Juan L. to show that it would be in L. L.’s best interest to modify the prior order. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 48.)
Juan L. argues that through no fault of his own, and partly because he was working hard, he could not detect the fact and extent of Veronica C.’s substance abuse problems. He had a strong bond with L. L. and the two were very attached to each other. The Department’s occasional positive assessments of the family’s situation lulled him into thinking that “all was right with his family” until N. L. was born with a positive methamphetamine test and she and L. L. were removed. In the months following that dramatic development, Juan L.’s efforts to preserve his relationship with L. L., including abandoning his relationship with Veronica C., had resulted in changed circumstances and his daughter’s best interest would be served by maintaining the parent-child relationship.
Kimberly F. listed a number of factors for the juvenile court’s consideration in deciding a section 388 petition. (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) First, the seriousness of the reason for the dependency must be taken into account. Second, the court must look at the strength of the existing bond between parent and child. “[T]he strength of a child’s bond to his or her present caretakers, and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system . . . are also vital” (id. at p. 531) because “the disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion.” (Ibid., italics deleted.) Third, the court must consider the degree to which the problems precipitating the dependency can be and have been solved. Explaining this factor, Kimberly F. stated, “the essence of a section 388 motion is that there has been a change of circumstances. Accordingly, the nature of the change, the ease by which the change could be brought about, and the reason the change was not made before bear on any such motion.” (Ibid.)
Regarding the first Kimberly F. factor, Juan L. was not a drug user himself, but the record suggests that he often seemed hapless, powerless, and/or in denial in the face of Veronica C.’s drug abuse. On this record the juvenile court could quite reasonably conclude that he did not come to grips with Veronica C.’s drug abuse as it affected L. L. In August of 2006 Veronica C. gave birth to Juan L.’s child N. L., who tested positive for drugs in her system. N. L. was the third of Veronica C.’s six children to be born with a positive test for drugs. Moreover, Veronica C. had had legal problems with her children’s care and well-being since 1993 and Juan L. either knew it (which would show poor judgment in continuing his involvement with her) or should have known it but did not (which would call into doubt his awareness of the risks of being involved with Veronica C. and exposing the children to her problems). Despite all of the warning signs, including N. L.’s being born with a positive test for drugs, there was some evidence, albeit not conclusive (it was her word against his), that Juan L. had caused Veronica C. to become pregnant yet again. The first factor militated against the request.
Kimberly F.’s second factor is the strength of the bond between parent and child, between the child and the current caretaker, and the length of time the child has been in the juvenile dependency system. The juvenile court heard Munoz’s testimony that, given L. L.’s very young age and the good qualities of her “stable” and “loving” concurrent home, she would not be harmed by the severing of parental ties to Juan L. The implication was that because she had been in foster care for a significant part of her life, her bond with Juan L. could be expected to diminish over time.
The third consideration under Kimberly F. is the degree to which the problems precipitating the dependency can be and have been solved. The juvenile court had to decide whether Juan L.’s efforts to stabilize his life and provide a home for L. L. sufficed to ensure her safety if she were returned to him. The court was reasonably not convinced that she would be safe, if only because of the evidence that the nature of Juan L.’s relationship with Veronica C. was murky, as illustrated by evidence that they were now expecting yet another child—a situation that, in the court’s words, “will create a whole set of new possibilities for contact.” In addition, there was evidence that Juan L.’s efforts to create a home environment in which young children could thrive were either perfunctory, faltering, or inadequate. Juan L.’s current residence did not have a fully functional kitchen and the best Juan L. could tell Munoz was that he thought the kitchen would be serviceable in one to two months. Given this and other negative evidence, the court reasonably found that Juan L.’s efforts were inadequate and that he could not be trusted to protect L. L. from Veronica C. and raise her himself.
B. Evidence Supporting Adoption as Plan for L. L.
Juan L. claims that there was no substantial evidence that adoption was the correct disposition of the case. This argument rests on a premise that the exception to adoption defined in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), applies. That provision permits the juvenile court to choose an option other than adoption when the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” “If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
If section 366.26 set forth a utilitarian framework in which courts were called upon to maximize a parent and child’s aggregate welfare, Juan L.’s claim might have some merit. The record suggests that he will suffer from the ending of his parental rights, and it is conceivable that, as Juan L. argues, guardianship might be an alternative that would give L. L. stability and the retention of her bond with him. (He also mentions the possibility of long-term foster care as an alternative disposition.) But aggregate welfare maximization is not the test. The juvenile court so recognized, stating, “I think it is in the best interest to have this child adopted. . . . I do understand that this is a terribly difficult moment for both parents. . . . But I have to focus on this child, . . .” The court was correct. The best interest of the child controls (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534), and adoption, not guardianship (and still less long-term foster care), is the preferred alternative. (§ 366.26, subd. (b), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(4).) “ ‘The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “The Legislature has decreed . . . that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent plan and secure alternative that can be afforded them.” ’ ” (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.)
The juvenile court’s finding that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.) The parent bears the burden of showing that the exception justifies departing from the preference at this stage of ending parental rights. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345.)
“[T]o establish the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the parents must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact’ [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Rather, the parents must show that they occupy ‘a parental role’ in the child’s life. [Citation.]” (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.)
Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the parents had not shown a “compelling reason” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) to qualify for the exception. Munoz had observed Juan L. behaving in a loving and affectionate manner during visits. Nevertheless, he did not think it would be detrimental to end the parental relationship, and Bueno testified, in effect, that it was imperative to do so for L. L.’s well-being. In sum, Juan L. did not demonstrate that L. L. would be “greatly harmed” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575) by ending his parental rights, and the positive nature of his contacts with her were insufficient by themselves. (In re Andrea R., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108.) Munoz’s section 366.26 report described L. L. as a “happy and thriving toddler” who was curious about her surroundings. She had no major health problems and was able to bond easily; she lived in an adoptive home with her siblings; and Bueno, who was a licensed clinical social worker and an expert in permanency planning, testified that it would be in L. L.’s best interest to end her parents’ parental rights. She cited L. L.’s young age, the presence of her siblings in the home, and her need for permanence and stability as weighing in the balance.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s implicit finding that L. L.’s relationship with Juan L. did not “promote[] the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court relied on information about L. L.’s personal characteristics and behavior and the opinions of two social workers that adoption was the best choice for L. L. The court heard evidence regarding L. L.’s positive relationship with Juan L. and efforts Juan L. had made to provide for her welfare, but, for reasons supported by substantial evidence, chose instead to credit the evidence favoring the ending of Juan L.’s parental rights.
The motion of Juan L., filed October 19, 2007, to strike certain portions of the Department’s brief, is denied.
III. Veronica C.’s Appeal
Veronica C. asserts no independent claim of error. Instead, she joins in the arguments presented by Juan L. Because Juan L. has raised no meritorious argument, the same conclusion applies with regard to Veronica C.
Veronica C. further contends that if we reverse the order ending Juan L.’s parental rights, the order ending her parental rights should also be reversed. Because we find that the order regarding Juan L. is not reversible, that conclusion disposes of Veronica C.’s contention.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P. J., McAdams, J.