Opinion
No. 333057
01-24-2017
In re R. LIPSEY, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Clinton Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 14-025170-NA Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and STEPHENS and O'BRIEN, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the circuit court's order terminating his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
On appeal, respondent's only argument challenges the circuit court's determination that at least one of the statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) was proved by clear and convincing evidence. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a circuit court may terminate a parent's parental rights if it finds that at least one of the statutory grounds has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner bears the burden of proving at least one statutory ground. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review a trial court's finding that a statutory ground has been established for clear error. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To be clearly erroneous, a factual finding must be more than maybe or probably wrong. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
In this case, the circuit court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Those statutory subsections provide as follows:
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
Applying those rules to the record before us, we agree with the circuit court's statutory-grounds determination with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The conditions that led to adjudication in this matter largely focused on the impact of respondent's relationship with the child's mother, whose parental rights were also terminated, on the child. Throughout the entirety of this case, respondent and the child's mother continually refused to comply with no-contact orders, no-contact directives, and other repeated requests to discontinue contact. These orders and directives were premised on a history of domestic violence between the parents, which repeatedly included physical violence in the child's presence. Testimony throughout this case established that the child's mother was frequently unable to regulate her emotions, was prone to violent rage in the presence of child, was often verbally aggressive with service providers, would frequently become unstable and hostile during parenting times, and would threaten to kill herself. The record also reflects that the child's mother had an extensive history of mental-health issues, and she had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, paranoid personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and antisocial personality features with dependent traits. Despite respondent's assurances that he would discontinue his relationship with the child's mother, respondent maintained regular contact with the child's mother during the entirety of this case. Indeed, the record reflects that up to even a month before the termination order was entered, respondent continued regular contact with the child's mother, and he openly expressed his desire for continued contact once this case was concluded. This refusal, coupled with testimony that established that respondent's failure to terminate his relationship with the child's mother posed significant risk to the child's well-being, provided sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's statutory-grounds determination with respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
In light of our conclusion above, we need not specifically address MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). Trejo Minors, 462 Mich at 350 (providing that only one statutory ground need be proved by clear and convincing evidence). We would note, however, that similar reasoning supports these determinations as well. Similarly, while not expressly challenged by respondent on appeal, we choose to express our agreement with the circuit court's best-interests determination as well. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). As the circuit court explained, the reunification efforts made in this matter were significantly undermined by respondent's failure to appreciate the negative impact that his relationship with the child's mother was having on the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien