Summary
holding allegations that the BBA made false representations about the quality of LIBOR in the United States to induce continued reliance on LIBOR (labeled by plaintiffs as the “charm offensive”) were insufficient for personal jurisdiction purposes, but potentially relevant to plaintiffs' statute of limitations argument
Summary of this case from Bay Area Toll Auth. v. Bank of Am. Corp.Opinion
11 MD 2262 (NRB)
10-19-2015
In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation. This Document Applies to: INDIVIDUAL CASES LISTED IN APPENDIX.
MEMORANDUM
Having considered the parties letters of August 28, 2015, ECF No. 1188, September 11, 2015, ECF No. 1195, and September 18, 2015, ECF No. 1204, addressing asserted errors in LIBOR IV, this Court is today issuing an amended LIBOR IV Memorandum and Order. To assist the parties in identifying the substantive changes (as opposed to changes to pagination), attached to this Memorandum are red-lined pages showing the changes made in response to the above-mentioned letters. Dated: New York, New York
October 19, 2015
/s/_________
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2.3.4. CEMA
CEMA Joint Venture ("CEMA") is an Ohio entity that owns real estate in Akron. See Verified Compl. ¶¶ 1, 21 ("CEMA Compl."), CEMA Joint Venture v. Charter One Bank, N.A. ("CEMA"), No. 2013 CV 03 0284 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Tuscarawas Cty.), removed to No. 13-cv-904 (N.D. Ohio), transferred to No. 13-cv-5511 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 1 Ex. A. CEMA traded a LIBOR-based swap. Id. ¶¶ 6, 215.
CEMA sets out four claims for relief against its two counterparties (numbered 1, 2, 3, and 5, but not 4). Although not labeled, these claims sound in antitrust conspiracy, tortious interference, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.
2.3.5. Darby
Plaintiffs in Darby Financial Products v. Barclays Bank plc ("Darby"), No. 13-cv-8799 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y.), are two related investment and trading firms: Darby Financial Products ("Darby Financial") and Capital Ventures International ("Capital Ventures"; collectively with Darby Financial, the "Darby Plaintiffs"). See Am. Compl. ("Darby Am. Compl.") ¶ 18-19, Darby, ECF No. 36. Both traded LIBOR-based swaps. Id. at ¶ 18 & Ex. A.
The Darby Plaintiffs sue their counterparties and affiliated panel banks for fraud (including aiding and abetting), tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective business relations, civil conspiracy, and violations of the (West 2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (Consol. 2008). All relevant parties agree that these rules affect the plaintiffs in Darby (New York and Pennsylvania law for plaintiff Darby, and New York and Cayman Islands law for plaintiff Capital Ventures), FDIC (New York law and the law of each failed bank's home state), NCUA (Kansas law and the law of each failed credit union's home state), and both Principal Cases (New York and Iowa law).
The parties dispute whether New York's borrowing rule applies to certain claims brought by Fannie Mae, whose principal place of business is in the District of Columbia, and to the fraud claims brought by Salix as assignee of the Frontpoint Funds, whose principal place of business is Connecticut. While there is no doubt that Fannie Mae and the Frontpoint Funds are is a non-residents of New York, the parties dispute whether their Fannie Mae's claims accrued in New York.
Salix raises the same argument as Fannie Mae, but with greater force. We need not resolve this question in Salix because Connecticut law is no more restrictive than New York law in any manner relevant to this motion. See infra at 420.
"When an alleged injury is purely economic, the place of injury usually is where the plaintiff resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss." Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 525, 529, 715 N.E.2d 482, 485 (1999). In some circumstances, however, a plaintiff may overcome this presumption by showing that his injury was particularly connected to a state Mae Am. Compl. ¶ 13. The fact that some money flowed in and out of New York accounts is not nearly enough to support a conclusion that Fannie Mae suffered a loss in New York. This is a usual case in which we will apply the usual rule: Fannie Mae is located in the District of Columbia; Fannie Mae allegedly lost money to fraud; therefore, Fannie Mae allegedly lost money to fraud in the District of Columbia.
Salix alleges that "the investment activity at issue . . . took place exclusively in New York," Salix Am. Compl. ¶ 23, because two New York-based traders oversaw all activity related to the relevant transactions. Salix Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-24. While these facts are more compelling than those relied on by Fannie Mae, they still do not state an "extremely rare" case of "unusual circumstances" requiring application of the Lang exception. Gorlin v. Bond Richman & Co., 706 F. Supp. 236, 240 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The actions taken by the Frontpoint Funds here are "indistinguishable from the conduct of hundreds of other financial services companies that operate in New York" but are headquartered elsewhere. Deutsche Zentral Genossenschaftsbank AG, 2013 WL 6667601, at *6, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178462, at *18 (foreign statute of limitations applies to plaintiff alleging that "decisions, operations, accounting, diligence, and purchases" occurred in New York or utilized New York bank accounts).
Accordingly, the Connecticut statute of limitations applies to fraud claims assigned to Salix by the Frontpoint Funds.
3. Federal Extender Statutes
When the FDIC takes over a bank or the NCUA a credit union, federal law automatically extends the statute of limitations on any cause of action held by the bank or credit union. See 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) (2012) (NCUA); § 1821(d)(14) (FDIC). In this regard, the parties disagree on four points:
• whether a three-year or six-year extension applies to plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment;
• whether the NCUA's extension runs from the date of its appointment as a credit union's liquidating agent, if the NCUA already managed the credit union as a conservator;
• whether the length of the extended limitations period is the fixed length provided by federal law, or the greater of the federal fixed length and the applicable state law; and
• how, if at all, the doctrine of American Pipe applies to the extender statutes. (We discuss this issue within our discussion of American Pipe. See infra at 354353.)
The parties did not brief this issue, but this appears to be the crux of their competing analyses on, for example, page 59 of the Joint Limitations Spreadsheet.
6.3.3. Lenders
Some plaintiffs assert claims related to bonds or other debt instruments. The following class complaints toll at least some of plaintiffs' claims:
| Complaint | Tolling Period | Facts | Defendants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carpenters PensionFund of W. Va., No.11-cv-2883, ECF No.1 | April 27, 2011(filing date), toApril 30, 2012 (dateof consolidatedamended complaintfiled in Baltimore). | Class period: 2006to 2009.Persistentsuppression only.Claims relating topurchases of LIBOR-based products fromdefendants duringthe class period. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; CitibankN.A.; UBS AG. |
| Ravan Investments,LLC, No. 11-cv-3249,ECF No. 1 | May 13, 2011 (filingdate), to April 30,2012 (date ofconsolidated amendedcomplaint inBaltimore). | Class period: 2006to 2009.Persistentsuppression only.Claims relating todirect purchases ofLIBOR-based productsfrom defendants,receipts of LIBOR-based payments fromdefendants, ortrading of LIBOR-based derivatives(regardless ofwhether withdefendants) duringthe class period. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; Barclays BankPLC; Citibank N.A.;Credit Suisse GroupAG; Deutsche BankAG; HSBC HoldingsPLC; J.P. MorganChase & Co.; LloydsBanking Group PLC;Royal Bank ofScotland Group PLC;UBS AG; WestLB AG. |
| Insulators &Asbestos Workers | June 3, 2011 (filingdate), to April 30,2012 (date of | Class period: 2006to 2009. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; Barclays BankPLC; Citibank, NA; |
| Complaint | Tolling Period | Facts | Defendants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local #14, ECF No.11-cv-3781, No. 1 | consolidated amendedcomplaint inBaltimore). | Persistentsuppression only.Claims relating topurchases and salesof LIBOR-basedfinancial products. | Credit Suisse GroupAG; Deutsche BankAG; HSBC HoldingsPLC; J.P. MorganChase & Co.; LloydsBanking Group PLC;Norinchukin Bank;Royal Bank ofScotland Group PLC;UBS AG; WestLB AG. |
| Gelboim, 12-cv-1025,ECF No. 1 (originalcomplaint) | February 9, 2012(filing date), toApril 30, 2012 (dateof amendedcomplaint). | Class period: 2006to 2010.Persistentsuppression only.Claims againstrelating to LIBOR-based bonds that(1) were issued byFortune 500companies, (2) wereunderwritten by adefendant, and(3) paid outinterest during theclass period. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; Bank ofTokyo-MitsubishiUFJ, Ltd.; BarclaysBank PLC; CitibankN.A.; CoöperatieveCentrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A.;Credit Suisse GroupAG; Deutsche BankAG; HSBC HoldingsPLC; J.P. MorganChase & Co.; LloydsBanking Group PLC;Norinchukin Bank;Royal Bank ofCanada; Royal Bankof Scotland GroupPLC; SociétéGénérale S.A.; UBSAG; WestLB AG. |
| Complaint | Tolling Period | Facts | Defendants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gelboim, 12-cv-1025,ECF No. 12 (amendedcomplaint) | April 30, 2012(filing date), toMarch 29, 2013 (dateof dismissal). | Class period: August2007 to May 2010.Persistentsuppression only.Claims relating tocertain LIBOR-basedbonds (but not bondsissued by anydefendant, see¶ 198) that paid outinterest during theclass period. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; Bank ofAmerica, N.A.; Bankof Tokyo-MitsubishiUFJ, Ltd.; BarclaysBank PLC; CitibankN.A.; CitigroupInc.; CoöperatieveCentrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A.;Credit Suisse GroupAG; Deutsche BankAG; HSBC Bank PLC;HSBC Holdings PLC;J.P. Morgan Chase &Co.; JP Morgan ChaseBank, N.A.; LloydsBanking Group PLC;Norinchukin Bank;Royal Bank ofCanada; Royal Bankof Scotland GroupPLC; |
| Berkshire Bank, 12-cv-5723, ECF No. 1(original complaint) | November 21, 2012(filing date), toNovember 13, 2014(date of amendedcomplaint). As toGelboim class | Class period: August2007 to May 2010.Persistentsuppression only. | Bank of AmericaCorp.; Bank ofAmerica, N.A.; Bankof Tokyo-MitsubishiUFJ, Ltd.; BarclaysBank PLC; Citibank |
8.1. Amabile
The Amabile plaintiffs filed suit in New York on March 13, 2013. Federal statutes of limitations govern their federal claims, while New York law governs their unjust enrichment claim. The dates of plaintiffs' exchange-based claims range from 2005 to 2010.
Although all plaintiffs appear to be Illinois residents, defendants do not rely on New York's borrowing rule at this stage. See Def. Master App., Ex. L, at 3. It appears that Illinois's limitations period is longer than New York's.
CEA: The statute of limitations runs for two years, so claims accruing on or after March 13, 2011, are indisputably timely.
The following class-action tolling periods based on the Metzler complaints apply to the groups of claims defined in the following table:
| Group | Tolling Period | Defendants | Range ofAccrual Dates |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | April 15, 2011 toApril 30, 2012(1 year 15 days) | Bank of America Corp.;Barclays Bank PLC;Citibank, N.A.; CreditSuisse Group AG;Deutsche Bank AG; HSBCHoldings PLC; JPMorganChase & Co.; LloydsBanking Group PLC; theNorinchukin Bank; theRoyal Bank of ScotlandGroup PLC; UBS AG;WestLB AG (nowPortigon AG) | 2006 to July2007 |
| B | April 15, 2011,onward | August 2007to May 2010 | |
| C | Monday, April 30,2012, onward | CoöperatieveCentrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A.;HBOS PLC; Royal Bank | August 2007to May 2010 |
| Tolling Period | Defendants |
|---|---|
| Deutsche Bank AG; HSBCHoldings PLC; JPMorgan Chase &Co.; Lloyds Banking Group PLC;the Norinchukin Bank; theRoyal Bank of Scotland GroupPLC; UBS AG; Portigon AG(formerly WestLB AG) | |
| Monday, April 30, 2012, onward | Group B:Bank of America, N.A.; Bank ofTokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd.;Citigroup, Inc.; CoöperatieveCentrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A.; HBOS PLC;HSBC Bank PLC; JPMorgan ChaseBank, N.A.; Royal Bank ofCanada; WestdeutscheImmobilienbank AG |
| No tolling | Group C:Citigroup Financial Products,Inc.; British Bankers'Association; BBA EnterprisesLtd.; BBA Libor Ltd. |
BATA's complaint (¶¶ 307-11) implies that BATA was on inquiry notice by August 5, 2008. Therefore, claims against Group A defendants are timely, claims against Group B defendants arising on or after April 28, 2009, are timely, and claims against Group C defendants are time-barred.
Breach of contract and unjust enrichment: The statute of limitations for breach of contract runs for four years, so claims accruing on or after March 29, 2010, are indisputably timely. The statute of limitations for unjust enrichment runs for three years.
Class-action tolling applies to at least some claims, extending the limitations period as far back as April 15, 2007.
By May 29, 2008, BATA's injuries were no longer "difficult for the plaintiff to detect," so BATA's contract claims are time-barred to the extent that class-action tolling does not extend the limitations period back to the later of the accrual date or May 29, 2008.
Applying the above chart on class-action tolling, contract claims against Group A and Group B defendants are timely, while claims against Group C defendants are time-barred. Unjust enrichment claims against Group A defendants are timely, claims against Group B defendants arising on or after April 28, 2009, are timely, and claims against Group C defendants are time-barred.
Tortious interference: The statute of limitations runs for two years, so all claims are untimely in the absence of class-action tolling or a discovery rule. Class-action tolling does not apply to tortious interference claims, and BATA was on inquiry notice of its claims by August 5, 2008. Thus, all tortious interference claims are time-barred.
8.3. California Consolidated
The California Consolidated Plaintiffs filed suits in California between January 9, 2013, and November 13, 2013, and the parties agree that California law governs. The dates of their claims range from 2005 to March 2011.
Fraud and negligent misrepresentation: The statute of limitations runs for three years, so claims accruing on or after the following dates are indisputably timely.
| Plaintiffs | Filing Date | Earliest Date ofIndisputably TimelyClaims |
|---|---|---|
| Mendocino County | Nov. 13, 2013 | Nov. 13, 2010 |
| Sacramento County | July 23, 2013 | July 23, 2010 |
| Sonoma County | June 28, 2013 | June 28, 2010 |
| Regents and SANDAG | June 25, 2013 | June 25, 2010 |
| Others | Jan. 9, 2013 | Jan. 9, 2010 |
For OTC claims, essentially the same tolling applies to these plaintiffs as to BATA, above. And, like BATA, plaintiffs plead information showing that they were on inquiry notice by August 5, 2008. As a result, essentially the same OTC claims are timely for the California Consolidated Plaintiffs as for BATA.
Plaintiffs' fraud claims relating to bonds and notes were possibly tolled by the original Gelboim complaint (depending on whether each issuer was a Fortune 500 company and whether each bond was underwritten by a defendant), but not by the amended Gelboim complaint (because that complaint excluded bonds issued by a defendant) or by the Berkshire Bank or Directors Financial complaints (because none of the California Consolidated Plaintiffs are financial institutions). Therefore, plaintiffs' bond-
Such tolling does not apply to defendants not named in the original Gelboim complaint.
Class-action tolling makes the OTC claims and the following bond claims against defendants named in the original Gelboim complaint timely:
| Plaintiff | Accrual Dates of Timely Claims |
|---|---|
| Mendocino County | On or after Aug. 24, 2009 |
| Sonoma County | On or after Apr. 8, 2009 |
| Regents | On or after Apr. 5, 2009 |
| Others | On or after Oct. 20, 2008 |
By May 29, 2008, plaintiffs' Period One and Two injuries were no longer "difficult for the plaintiff to detect," so no discovery rule saves plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claims after these dates.
Tortious interference: The statute of limitations runs for two years, so claims accruing on or after the following dates are indisputably timely.
| Plaintiffs | Filing Date | Earliest Dates ofIndisputably TimelyClaims |
|---|---|---|
| Mendocino County | Nov. 13, 2013 | Nov. 13, 2011 |
| Sacramento County | July 23, 2013 | July 23, 2011 |
| Sonoma County | June 28, 2013 | June 28, 2011 |
| Regents and SANDAG | June 25, 2013 | June 25, 2011 |
| Others | Jan. 9, 2013 | Jan. 9, 2011 |
Class-action tolling does not apply to tortious interference claims, and plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of Period One and Two claims by August 2008, so all of plaintiffs' tortious interference claims accruing between August 2007 and the above dates are time-barred.
8.4. CEMA
CEMA filed suit on March 21, 2013.
Tortious interference: The statute of limitations runs for four years, so claims accruing on or after March 21, 2009 are indisputably timely. Class-action tolling does not apply to tortious interference claims, so claims accruing before that date are time-barred.
Unjust enrichment: The statute of limitations runs for six years, so claims accruing on or after March 21, 2007 are indisputably timely. Class-action tolling preserves all such claims against Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC. Claims against Citizens Bank, N.A. accruing before March 21, 2007 are time-barred. Defendants' Notice of Motion did not seek to dismiss any claims on timeliness grounds, so we will not do so. See Def. Master App.; see also Joint Limitations Spreadsheet (omitting arguments for or against timeliness of CEMA claims).
In any event, many of CEMA's claims, at least against the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, would probably survive, because Ohio recognizes cross-jurisdictional class-action tolling. claims accruing on or after November 21, 2010, are indisputably timely.
At this stage, Pennsylvania's discovery rule makes all claims timely under Pennsylvania law, so New York is the limiting factor. No discovery rule applies to unjust enrichment in New York, so claims arising before November 21, 2010, are time-barred unless preserved by class-action tolling.
The New York statute of limitations was tolled by the OTC class actions, making the following claims time-barred:
Darby alleges that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC are panel banks. If these allegations are correct, then it was a mistake for J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC to be named as a panel-bank defendants in Metzler and other class actions. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC plausibly had notice of the class actions and notice of the mistake, so (at least for purposes of this motion) class-action tolling applies to claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC as though it had been named in each of the relevant class actions.
Contract: As with unjust enrichment, Pennsylvania's discovery rule makes New York's six-year period the limiting factor at this point. Applying the same class-action tolling as above, the following claims are time-barred:
| Defendants | Tolling Period | Time-Barred Claims |
|---|---|---|
| Barclays Bank PLC; DeutscheBank AG; JPMorgan Chase &Co; JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A.; the Royal Bank ofScotland PLC; UBS AG | Apr. 15, 2011,onward | Arising beforeApr. 15, 2005 |
| | | |
| J.P. Morgan Bank DublinPLC; | No tolling | Arising beforeNov. 21, 2007 |
Fraud: The New York statute of limitations runs for the longer of six years from injury or two years from discovery (imputed for Period One and Two claims as of April 15, 2011), while the Pennsylvania statute runs for two years from discovery (imputed for Period One and Two claims as of April 15, 2012).
Applying the same class-action tolling as above, the following claims are time-barred:
| Defendants | Tolling Period | Time-Barred Claims |
|---|---|---|
| Barclays Bank PLC; DeutscheBank AG; JPMorgan Chase &Co; JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A.; the Royal Bank ofScotland PLC; UBS AG | Apr. 15, 2011,onward | None |
| | | |
| J.P. Morgan Bank DublinPLC; | No tolling | Arising beforeNov. 21, 2007 |
Tortious interference: The New York statute of limitations runs for three years from injury, while the Pennsylvania statute in the amended Gelboim complaint), to March 29, 2013. We divide defendants as follows:
| Original PrincipalDefendants(filed 8/1/2013) | New PrincipalDefendants(filed 10/6/2014) | |
|---|---|---|
| Original GelboimDefendants(tolled for as longas 1 year and 48days) | Group A: Bank ofAmerica Corp.; Bankof Tokyo-MitsubishiUFJ, Ltd.; BarclaysBank PLC; Citibank,N.A.; CoöperatieveCentrale RaiffeisenBoerenleenbank B.A.;Credit Suisse GroupAG; Deutsche BankAG; HSBC HoldingsPLC; JPMorgan Chase& Co.; LloydsBanking Group PLC;the NorinchukinBank; Royal Bank ofCanada; the RoyalBank of ScotlandGroup PLC; SociétéGénérale, S.A., UBSAG | |
| Amended GelboimDefendants(tolled for as longas 333 days) | Group B: Bank ofAmerica, N.A.;Citigroup, Inc.;HSBC Bank PLC;JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A.; WestdeutscheImmobilienBank AG. | |
| Defendants Not Namedin Gelboim(no tolling) | Group C: BritishBankers'Association; BBAEnterprises, Ltd.;BBA Libor, Ltd.;HBOS PLC. | Group D: BarclaysCapital, Inc.; ChaseBank USA, N.A.;Citigroup GlobalMarkets, Inc.;Credit Suisse AG;Credit SuisseInternational;Credit SuisseSecurities (USA)LLC; Deutsche BankSecurities, Inc.; |
Thus, it follows that all of the following bond-related claims are time-barred despite class-action tolling: Claims against Fortune 500 Group A defendants arising before May 12, 2010; claims against other defendants in Groups A, B, and C arising before August 1, 2010; and claims against Group D defendants arising before October 4, 2011.
8.14. Prudential
Prudential filed suit in New Jersey on May 19, 2014, and the parties agree that New Jersey law governs. The dates of Prudential's claims range from at least August 2007 to at least the end of 2010.
Contract and unjust enrichment: The statute of limitations runs for six years, so claims accruing on or after May 19, 2008, are indisputably timely.
Class-action tolling preserves claims arising on or after April 15, 2005 (against defendants named in the original Metzler complaint), or on or after April 28, 2006 (against defendants first named in the first amended Baltimore complaint). Prudential's bond-based contract and unjust enrichment claims for bonds purchased from defendants were tolled for 369 days against defendants named in the Carpenters Pension Fund complaint and for 353 days against defendants named in the Ravan Investments complaint.
Prudential alleges that Bank of America N.A., Citigroup Inc., HSBC Bank PLC, and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC were panel banks. If it was a mistake to name Bank of America Corp. and Citibank, N.A. in Carpenters Pension Fund and to name HSBC Holdings PLC and Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC in Ravan Investments and Insulators & Asbestos Workers, then class-action tolling applies to claims against Bank of America N.A., Citigroup Inc., HSBC Bank PLC, and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC as if each had been named in the relevant class actions.
For bonds purchased from other parties, these claims were tolled for 332 days against defendants named in the Insulators & Asbestos Workers complaint. Therefore, these claims accruing on or after June 22, 2007 against the following defendants are timely: Bank of America Corp.; Bank of America N.A.; Barclays Bank PLC; Citigroup Inc.; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank PLC; J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Royal Bank of Scotland PLC; UBS AG. If the Royal Bank of Canada is in the Fortune 500, then Gelboim tolled such claims against it for 81 days. As a result, such claims accruing before February 28, 2008 are time-barred.
Claims against other defendants accruing before May 19, 2008, are time-barred.
Fraud , negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference : The statute of limitations runs for six years, so claims accruing on or after May 19, 2008, are indisputably timely. The same class-action tolling as applies to Prudential's contract and unjust enrichment claims also applies to Prudential's fraud claims.
Moreover, we cannot discern from the pleadings that Prudential was aware of news articles regarding LIBOR before May 19, 2008, and so Prudential's claims are timely.
8.15. Salix
Salix filed suit in New York on Monday, May 20, 2013. Credit Suisse AG was added as a defendant on October 6, 2014, but this amendment (which plausibly corrects a mistake as to the identity of a panel bank) relates back. The dates of Salix's claims range from at least August 2007 to at least the end of 2010.
8.15.1. Claims Assigned by FrontPoint Funds
We need not determine from the pleadings whether the borrowing rule applies to claims assigned by the FrontPoint Funds, because Connecticut law is not more restrictive than New York law in any relevant way.
Unjust enrichment and fraud: New York statute of limitations on unjust enrichment and Connecticut statute of limitations on fraud runs for three years, so claims accruing on or after May 18, 2010, are indisputably timely.
Class-action tolling (under both New York and Connecticut law) preserves claims against the following defendants:
If, as Salix asserts, Credit Suisse AG was a panel bank rather than Credit Suisse Group AG, then it was a mistake for Credit Suisse Group AG to be named as a panel-bank defendant in Metzler and other class actions. Credit Suisse AG plausibly had notice of the class actions and notice of the mistake, so (at least for purposes of this motion) class-action tolling applies to claims against Credit Suisse AG as though Credit Suisse AG had been named in each of the relevant class actions. This analysis applies equally to Bank of America, N.A., Citigroup Inc., and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Thus, the following unjust enrichment and fraud claims are time-barred: Claims against Group A defendants arising before April 15, 2008; claims against Group B defendants arising before April 28, 2009; and claims against Group B C defendants arising before May 18, 2010.
Contract and fraud : The only defendant to move against these claims is Credit Suisse AG, on the grounds that Credit Suisse AG
XV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing opinion resolves the motions to dismiss the Individual Plaintiffs' complaints (listed in Appendix). Because no complaint is dismissed in its entirety, we do not anticipate entering partial judgment or certifying interlocutory appeal on any aspect of this opinion. The Individual Plaintiffs and defendants are directed to supply the charts described supra at 91 and 105.
The Clerk shall terminate the following defendants, against whom all claims appear to be dismissed on the merits or on statute of limitations grounds. We will direct the Clerk to terminate other defendants on jurisdictional grounds after we receive the parties' submissions regarding personal jurisdiction.
| Individual Case | Defendants |
|---|---|
| BATA14-cv-3094 | British Bankers' Association;BBA Enterprises Ltd.; BBALibor Ltd.; CitigroupFinancial Products, Inc. |
| NCUA13-cv-7394 | Credit Suisse GroupInternational; SociétéGénérale S.A. |
| Principal Fin. Grp.13-cv-6014 | Citigroup Global Markets,Inc.; Credit Suisse Securities(USA) LLC; Deutsche BankSecurities, Inc.; J.P. MorganSecurities, LLC; MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,Inc.; UBS Securities, Inc. |
| Principal Funds13-cv-6013 | Citigroup Global Markets,Inc.; Credit Suisse Securities(USA) LLC; Deutsche BankSecurities, Inc.; J.P. MorganSecurities, LLC; MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, |
The Clerk shall also dismiss Salix Capital Ltd. as a plaintiff, as that entity has assigned its claims to Salix Capital US Inc.
APPENDIX
CASE NAME CASE NO. In re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation 11-md-2262 City of Riverside et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-0597 County of San Mateo et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-0625 East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-0626 City of Richmond et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-0627 County of San Diego v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-0667 Amabile et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-1700 Maragos v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-2297 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-3952 Salix Capital US Inc. et al. v. Banc of America Securities LLC et al. 13-cv-4018 Regents of the University of California v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-5186 County of Sonoma et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-5187 San Diego Association of Governments v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-5221 26 CEMA Joint Venture v. RBS Citizens, N.A. et al. 13-cv-5511 County of Sacramento v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-5569 City of Houston v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-5616 Principal Funds, Inc. et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-6013 Principal Financial Group, Inc. et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-6014 City of Philadelphia v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-6020 Charles Schwab Corp. et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-7005 National Credit Union Administration Board v. Credit Suisse Group AG et al. 13-cv-7394 Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Barclays Bank plc et al. 13-cv-7720 County of Mendocino v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 13-cv-8644 Darby Financial Products et al. v. Barclays Bank plc et al. 13-cv-8799 Triaxx Prime CDO 2006-1 Ltd. et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 14-cv-0146 Federal Deposit Insurance Co. et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 14-cv-1757 Bay Area Toll Authority v. Bank of America 14-cv-3094 27 Corp. et al. Prudential Investment Portfolios 2 et al. v. Bank of America Corp. et al. 14-cv-4189