Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Merced County No. JP000082, Harry L. Jacobs, Commissioner.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Poochigian, J.
A.D. (mother) appealed from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her son L. After reviewing the entire record, mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she had found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal. Counsel requested, and this court granted, leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Mother has since submitted a letter to this court in which she acknowledges her mistakes and asks this court for a chance to be a mother and raise her child. Her letter does not set forth, however, a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist. (In re Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 846.) Therefore, we will dismiss this appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Mother gave birth to L. while she was incarcerated in state prison for drug-related offenses. Her anticipated release date was in the summer of 2010 and mother had no one to provide for L.’s care. Consequently, L. was detained and the underlying dependency proceedings commenced.
L. was the seventh child born to mother and whose custody she had lost. Before L.’s birth, mother also failed to reunify with and had lost her parental rights to more than one of her children due to her drug abuse and criminal conduct. Based on this history and mother’s subsequent failure to make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the other children’s removal, the Merced County Superior Court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over L., adjudged him a dependent child and removed him from parental custody. The court also denied reunification services on multiple grounds and set a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan (§ 366.26) for L.
At the section 366.26 hearing, mother asked for reunification services based on her recent participation in prison programs. The court denied mother’s requests. The court explained mother’s circumstances had not changed in a way that would cause the court to change its order given her ongoing incarceration. Also, the court found reunification efforts were not in L.’s best interest given his right to a stable and nurturing home. Having further found L. was likely to be adopted, the court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
To the extent mother asks this court for another chance, she misunderstands our appellate authority. An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is up to an appellant to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made. If an appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) Mother does not raise any claim of error or other defect against the termination order from which she appeals. Thus, we have no reason to reverse or modify the termination order. (Ibid.)
Even if we were to assume mother believes the trial court was wrong for not giving her a chance at the termination hearing to reunify with L., there was no arguable error given the law and the facts in this case. At the termination hearing, the court must focus on L.’s needs for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Whether the juvenile court should modify a previously made order due to changed circumstances rests within its discretion and its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Here, the court properly found mother’s circumstances were not changed and it would not be in L.’s best interest to delay permanence and stability while essentially awaiting mother’s prison release to see if she could establish sobriety and stability in her life. (Id. at p. 317.) There can be no arguable claim on this record that the court abused its discretion. (Id. at p. 318.)
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.