Opinion
No. C8-95-2504.
Filed May 14, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Dakota County, File No. JX9556489.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, (for Respondent State of Minnesota)
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Jean M. Mitchell, Assistant County Attorney, (for Respondent State of Minnesota)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Special Assistant Public Defender, (for Appellant L.B.K.)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Short, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).
Unpublished Opinion
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.125, subd. 2(6)(i), the trial court certified L.B.K. for prosecution as an adult on charges of: (1) aiding and abetting attempted first-degree felony murder; (2) aiding and abetting attempted second-degree intentional murder; (3) aiding and abetting first- degree aggravated robbery; (4) aiding and abetting first-degree assault; and (5) aiding and abetting second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon.
On appeal, L.B.K. argues the trial court abused its discretion by certifying him for adult prosecution because he rebutted the statutory presumption of certification with clear and convincing evidence of his amenability to treatment. We affirm.
Decision
We will not reverse the certification of a juvenile for adult prosecution absent findings so clearly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 1989); see also In re Welfare of D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1988) (employing an abuse of discretion standard in a reference case).
Until last year, Minnesota's adult certification statutes required the state to support a petition for reference to adult court by clear and convincing evidence that either (1) the child was not suitable to treatment or (2) juvenile court jurisdiction would not serve public safety. See Minn. Stat. § 260.125, subds. 2(d)(2) (describing the state's burden of proof), 3 (1992) (authorizing a prima facie case for reference under certain circumstances); D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81 (noting the state retained the ultimate burden of persuasion even in prima facie cases). As part of an effort to facilitate the certification of serious, older juvenile offenders, the 1994 legislative session enacted a presumptive certification regime for juveniles who were more than 16 years old when they are alleged to have committed either (1) an offense presumptively requiring incarceration under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines or (2) any felony involving the juvenile's use of a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 260.125, subds. 2(6)(i), 2a (1994); see also
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 Minn. L.Rev. 965, 1011-12, 1024, 1029 (1995) (discussing (1) the need to punish serious, older juvenile offenders, (2) the Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force's recommendation of presumptive certification for such individuals, and (3) the anticipated growth of certifications under the new statute). This legislative approach shifts the burden of proof to the minor, who can avoid certification only by presenting clear and convincing evidence that juvenile proceedings would serve public safety. Minn. Stat. § 260.125, subds. 2(6)(i), 2a.
In addition, the new statutory definition of public safety grounds the inquiry in objective historical criteria and diminishes the weight attached to subjective treatment considerations. Feld, supra, at 1006-12, 1029-33 (cataloging the defects of a subjective approach and explaining the new provision's objective focus). Thus, the issue of public safety turns on
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense * * *, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines, the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child * * *, including the level of the child's participation in planning and carrying out the offense and the existence of any mitigating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines;
(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child's programming history, including the child's past willingness to participate meaningfully in available programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming available within the juvenile justice system; and
(6) the dispositional options available for the child.
In considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the child's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subdivision. Minn. Stat. § 260.125, subd. 2b (1994).
It is undisputed L.B.K.'s alleged behavior falls within the presumptive certification regime. Viewed as a whole, the record establishes L.B.K.: (1) allegedly participated in crimes resulting in severe injuries, which are made more egregious by the active cooperation of three perpetrators and L.B.K.'s entrustment of a sawed-off shotgun to the younger juveniles, who were placed in great danger while L.B.K. observed from a point of safety; (2) allegedly planned the crime and outfitted its participants, thus incurring a high degree of culpability, which is not offset by any offense-specific mitigating factors; (3) participated in a similar juvenile offense less than two years before the current offense; and (4) may have behaved as a model citizen at the St. Croix Camp following his prior juvenile offense, but subsequently failed to attend the recommended substance abuse program, which suggests his inability to comprehend the need for treatment. See In re Welfare of S.W.N., 541 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn.App. 1995) (noting that, for purposes of certification, courts must accept the accuracy of the charges against the juvenile), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9, 1996). While it is true that L.B.K. would have access to an appropriate juvenile treatment program, one expert said this was not clearly the best option open to the court under the presumptive certification regime. A second expert recommended treatment within the context of extended juvenile jurisdiction, but acknowledged she did not consider the presumption in favor of certification when formulating her opinion. Under these circumstances, and taking into account the statute's particular concern for the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's prior record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding L.B.K. did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that juvenile proceedings would serve public safety. See Minn. Stat. ___.125 subd. 2b (attaching special weight to the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's prior history of delinquency).
Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.b.(8).