Opinion
No. COA15–164.
08-18-2015
In the Matter of L.B.B.
Duncan B. McCormick, for petitioner-appellee Harnett County Department of Social Services. Marie H. Mobley, for Guardian ad Litem. Blackburn & Tanner, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-appellant mother. CALABRIA, Judge. Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from an order granting permanent guardianship of her minor child, Lori 1 , to Lori's paternal grandparents. We affirm. I. Background On 23 January 2013, the Harnett County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Lori was an abused and neglected juvenile. Specifically, Lori was hospitalized and required medical treatment after sustaining head trauma, multiple bruises, and other life-threatening injuries that Lori's mother and stepfather could not reasonably explain. The medical staff determined Lori's injuries were non-accidental. The trial court placed Lori in nonsecure custody with DSS. When Lori was released from a rehabilitation center in March 2013, DSS placed her with her paternal grandparents. Lori's maternal grandparents were granted unsupervised visitation for two weekends per month. Both respondent and Lori's father were granted supervised visitation. Lori's stepfather was not entitled to any visitation. On 14 June 2013, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Lori as an abused and neglected juvenile. Respondent appealed to this Court, and the adjudication was affirmed. In re L.B.B., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 761 S.E.2d 754, 2014 N.C.App. LEXIS 517, 2014 WL 2116547 (2014) (unpublished). On 30 July 2013, the trial court found both respondent and stepfather were indicted for felony child abuse, and entered a “Formal Dispositional Order” based upon the prior abuse and neglect adjudication. Although Lori's father was on probation for a felony conviction, he was granted supervised visitation with Lori since he lived with the paternal grandparents. However, for respondent, the trial court ceased visitation and reunification efforts. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a change in Lori's permanent plan to guardianship with the paternal grandparents. On 26 September 2014, the trial court conducted a permanency planning hearing. During the hearing, a social worker testified that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since her release from the hospital and that her daily needs were being met. Lori's grandmother was employed at Campbell University and her grandfather received social security disability benefits. The paternal grandfather testified that he and his wife were willing to serve as guardians, that they understood the responsibilities of guardianship, and that they were financially able to take care of Lori. During cross-examination, respondent's counsel attempted to question the grandfather regarding his social security disability income. The trial court sustained its own objection to the question, stating that it was irrelevant since the paternal grandparents had been caring for Lori without assistance. On 14 October 2014, the trial court entered a permanency planning order awarding permanent guardianship to the paternal grandparents, and supervised visitation to the maternal grandparents and Lori's father. Respondent's visitation with Lori was “authorized in a therapeutic setting” if recommended by Lori's therapist. Further review hearings were waived. Respondent appeals. II. Standard of Review “Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C.App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C.App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192–93 (2002)). “If the trial court's findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” Id. (citing In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)). Unchallenged findings of fact are also considered conclusive on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). III. Verification Respondent argues that the trial court erred in awarding guardianship to the paternal grandparents because it inadequately verified that the grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate resources to care for Lori. We disagree. If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed in the custody of an individual other than a parent or appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to G.S. 7B–600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906.1(j) (2013); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–600(c) (2013). The statute does not “require that the court make any specific findings in order to make the verification.” In re J.E., B.E., 182 N.C.App. 612, 617, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007). 2 “It is sufficient that the court receives and considers evidence that the guardians understand the legal significance of the guardianship.” In re N.B., L.B., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 771 S.E.2d 562, 568 (2015). Moreover, “the statute does require the trial court to make a determination that the guardian has ‘adequate resources' and some evidence of the guardian's ‘resources' is necessary as a practical matter, since the trial court cannot make any determination of adequacy without evidence.” In re P.A., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 772 S.E.2d 240, 246 (2015). In the instant case, the trial court specifically found that the paternal grandparents “understand the legal significance of guardianship” and “have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.” Respondent contends that the trial court's findings were not adequately supported by the evidence. However, respondent is mistaken. The social worker testified at the hearing that, in her opinion, Lori's paternal grandparents were fit and appropriate to serve as guardians. She also testified that she had explained the legal significance of being appointed Lori's guardians to the paternal grandparents and that they understood it. When Lori's paternal grandfather testified, he stated that he had been informed what guardianship would entail and that he and his wife were ready to accept that role. This testimony supported the trial court's finding that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship. The trial court's order also included several findings regarding the grandparents' financial resources and their ability to care for Lori, which are not challenged by respondent. Specifically, the court found that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since 12 March 2013. During those eighteen months, they had not received any financial assistance from DSS. The court further found that the paternal grandfather received Social Security disability benefits and that the paternal grandmother worked at Campbell University. The grandparents' home had three bedrooms and Lori had her own bedroom. In addition, the court considered a DSS permanency planning hearing report which indicated that “[a]ll of [Lori's] daily needs, including transportation for ongoing physical and occupational therapy and counseling ... are met by” the grandparents and a guardian ad litem report which stated that Lori's financial and material needs “are being met consistently.” Therefore, sufficient “evidence of the guardian[s'] ‘resources' “ was presented, and the trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents had adequate resources to care for Lori. Id. However, respondent contends that the trial court should have considered additional evidence regarding the future financial resources of the paternal grandparents. She argues the court erred by sustaining its own objection to her trial counsel's question regarding the amount of the paternal grandfather's social security disability benefits. Respondent asserts that the court's action effectively “did not allow any further questions for the record, such as how old [the grandfather] was, how old his wife was, when she would retire, what their income would be when she retired, or what their general health was like.” Respondent cites no authority to support her argument that a trial court must inquire into and then speculate about the adequacy of a potential guardian's financial resources until the juvenile reaches the age of majority, in violation of N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6) (2013) (“The body of the argument ... shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the appellant relies.”). Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that respondent's argument has merit, she failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... [i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2013). Respondent's trial counsel did not make an offer of proof as to any of the information regarding the paternal grandparents that is complained about in respondent's brief. Because “the record does not show the substance of the excluded evidence [,] ... we are unable to determine if the ruling of the court was prejudicial.” In re Parker, 90 N.C.App. 423, 431–32, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884–85 (1988). Respondent's arguments regarding verification are overruled. IV. Visitation Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her visitation with Lori and leaving any future visitation with Lori in the discretion of Lori's therapist. We disagree. “An order that removes custody of a juvenile from a parent, guardian, or custodian or that continues the juvenile's placement outside the home shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile's health and safety.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–905.1(a) (2013). Thus, the court may prohibit visitation by a parent when it is in the juvenile's best interests and consistent with the juvenile's health and safety to do so. See In re J.S., 182 N.C.App. 79, 86–87, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007). We review an order denying visitation for an abuse of discretion. In re C.M., 183 N.C.App. 207, 215, 644 S.E.2d 588, 595 (2007). In the absence of findings that the parent has forfeited [his or her] right to visitation or that it is in the child's best interest to deny visitation [,] the court should safeguard the parent's visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the ... conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised. As a result, even if the trial court determines that visitation would be inappropriate in a particular case or that a parent has forfeited his or her right to visitation, it must still address that issue in its dispositional order and either adopt a visitation plan or specifically determine that such a plan would be inappropriate in light of the specific facts under consideration. In re K.C. & C.C., 199 N.C.App. 557, 562, 681 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the instant case, the trial court ordered that respondent “shall have no visitation or any direct contact with the juvenile. However, if recommended by the juvenile's therapist, contact is authorized in a therapeutic setting.” Respondent contends that this provision either inappropriately left her future right to visitation in the discretion of Lori's therapist or otherwise amounted to a total denial of visitation, which was not supported by the trial court's findings. Contrary to respondent's assertion, the plain language of the trial court's order clearly denies visitation and does not permit Lori's therapist to overrule this denial. The only decision left to Lori's therapist is whether respondent would be permitted to participate in Lori's therapy if the therapist determined that such participation would be beneficial. The trial court's order includes multiple findings which demonstrate why respondent's participation in future therapy sessions could be helpful for Lori in dealing with the issues raised by her abuse as well as why respondent's visitation with Lori would be inappropriate. The court found that Lori's therapist recommended no visitation for respondent because Lori “express[es] tremendous fear of [respondent] and stepfather in counseling.” The therapist also reported that Lori “fears going to the home of the maternal grandparents” because respondent lives with them and that “[w]hen talking about what she remembers about living with her mother and the stepfather, [Lori] sobs and presents a look of terror.” In addition, Lori reported to her therapist that when she suffered abuse perpetrated by her stepfather, she “would beg for her mother, but her mother would not come.” As a result, the therapist determined that Lori “believes that [respondent] did not protect her and that [respondent] prioritized the stepfather over [Lori]'s safety and well-being.” Based upon these unchallenged findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny visitation to respondent. This argument is overruled. V. Conclusion The trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate financial resources to care for Lori. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying visitation to respondent. The trial court's order is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Chief Judge McGEE and Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., concur. Report per Rule 30(e).
Duncan B. McCormick, for petitioner-appellee Harnett County Department of Social Services.
Marie H. Mobley, for Guardian ad Litem.
Blackburn & Tanner, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from an order granting permanent guardianship of her minor child, Lori1, to Lori's paternal grandparents. We affirm.
I. Background
On 23 January 2013, the Harnett County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Lori was an abused and neglected juvenile. Specifically, Lori was hospitalized and required medical treatment after sustaining head trauma, multiple bruises, and other life-threatening injuries that Lori's mother and stepfather could not reasonably explain. The medical staff determined Lori's injuries were non-accidental. The trial court placed Lori in nonsecure custody with DSS. When Lori was released from a rehabilitation center in March 2013, DSS placed her with her paternal grandparents. Lori's maternal grandparents were granted unsupervised visitation for two weekends per month. Both respondent and Lori's father were granted supervised visitation. Lori's stepfather was not entitled to any visitation.
On 14 June 2013, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Lori as an abused and neglected juvenile. Respondent appealed to this Court, and the adjudication was affirmed. In re L.B.B., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 761 S.E.2d 754, 2014 N.C.App. LEXIS 517, 2014 WL 2116547 (2014) (unpublished). On 30 July 2013, the trial court found both respondent and stepfather were indicted for felony child abuse, and entered a “Formal Dispositional Order” based upon the prior abuse and neglect adjudication. Although Lori's father was on probation for a felony conviction, he was granted supervised visitation with Lori since he lived with the paternal grandparents. However, for respondent, the trial court ceased visitation and reunification efforts. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a change in Lori's permanent plan to guardianship with the paternal grandparents.
On 26 September 2014, the trial court conducted a permanency planning hearing. During the hearing, a social worker testified that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since her release from the hospital and that her daily needs were being met. Lori's grandmother was employed at Campbell University and her grandfather received social security disability benefits. The paternal grandfather testified that he and his wife were willing to serve as guardians, that they understood the responsibilities of guardianship, and that they were financially able to take care of Lori. During cross-examination, respondent's counsel attempted to question the grandfather regarding his social security disability income. The trial court sustained its own objection to the question, stating that it was irrelevant since the paternal grandparents had been caring for Lori without assistance. On 14 October 2014, the trial court entered a permanency planning order awarding permanent guardianship to the paternal grandparents, and supervised visitation to the maternal grandparents and Lori's father. Respondent's visitation with Lori was “authorized in a therapeutic setting” if recommended by Lori's therapist. Further review hearings were waived. Respondent appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C.App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C.App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192–93 (2002)). “If the trial court's findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” Id. (citing In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)). Unchallenged findings of fact are also considered conclusive on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
III. Verification
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in awarding guardianship to the paternal grandparents because it inadequately verified that the grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate resources to care for Lori. We disagree.
If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed in the custody of an individual other than a parent or appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to G.S. 7B–600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906.1(j) (2013); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–600(c) (2013). The statute does not “require that the court make any specific findings in order to make the verification.” In re J.E., B.E., 182 N.C.App. 612, 617, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007).2 “It is sufficient that the court receives and considers evidence that the guardians understand the legal significance of the guardianship.” In re N.B., L.B., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 771 S.E.2d 562, 568 (2015). Moreover, “the statute does require the trial court to make a determination that the guardian has ‘adequate resources' and some evidence of the guardian's ‘resources' is necessary as a practical matter, since the trial court cannot make any determination of adequacy without evidence.” In re P.A., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 772 S.E.2d 240, 246 (2015).
In the instant case, the trial court specifically found that the paternal grandparents “understand the legal significance of guardianship” and “have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.” Respondent contends that the trial court's findings were not adequately supported by the evidence. However, respondent is mistaken. The social worker testified at the hearing that, in her opinion, Lori's paternal grandparents were fit and appropriate to serve as guardians. She also testified that she had explained the legal significance of being appointed Lori's guardians to the paternal grandparents and that they understood it. When Lori's paternal grandfather testified, he stated that he had been informed what guardianship would entail and that he and his wife were ready to accept that role. This testimony supported the trial court's finding that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship.
The trial court's order also included several findings regarding the grandparents' financial resources and their ability to care for Lori, which are not challenged by respondent. Specifically, the court found that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since 12 March 2013. During those eighteen months, they had not received any financial assistance from DSS. The court further found that the paternal grandfather received Social Security disability benefits and that the paternal grandmother worked at Campbell University. The grandparents' home had three bedrooms and Lori had her own bedroom. In addition, the court considered a DSS permanency planning hearing report which indicated that “[a]ll of [Lori's] daily needs, including transportation for ongoing physical and occupational therapy and counseling ... are met by” the grandparents and a guardian ad litem report which stated that Lori's financial and material needs “are being met consistently.” Therefore, sufficient “evidence of the guardian[s'] ‘resources' “ was presented, and the trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents had adequate resources to care for Lori. Id.
However, respondent contends that the trial court should have considered additional evidence regarding the future financial resources of the paternal grandparents. She argues the court erred by sustaining its own objection to her trial counsel's question regarding the amount of the paternal grandfather's social security disability benefits. Respondent asserts that the court's action effectively “did not allow any further questions for the record, such as how old [the grandfather] was, how old his wife was, when she would retire, what their income would be when she retired, or what their general health was like.”
Respondent cites no authority to support her argument that a trial court must inquire into and then speculate about the adequacy of a potential guardian's financial resources until the juvenile reaches the age of majority, in violation of N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6) (2013) (“The body of the argument ... shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the appellant relies.”). Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that respondent's argument has merit, she failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... [i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2013). Respondent's trial counsel did not make an offer of proof as to any of the information regarding the paternal grandparents that is complained about in respondent's brief. Because “the record does not show the substance of the excluded evidence [,] ... we are unable to determine if the ruling of the court was prejudicial.” In re Parker, 90 N.C.App. 423, 431–32, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884–85 (1988). Respondent's arguments regarding verification are overruled.
IV. Visitation
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her visitation with Lori and leaving any future visitation with Lori in the discretion of Lori's therapist. We disagree.
“An order that removes custody of a juvenile from a parent, guardian, or custodian or that continues the juvenile's placement outside the home shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile's health and safety.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–905.1(a) (2013). Thus, the court may prohibit visitation by a parent when it is in the juvenile's best interests and consistent with the juvenile's health and safety to do so. See In re J.S., 182 N.C.App. 79, 86–87, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007). We review an order denying visitation for an abuse of discretion. In re C.M., 183 N.C.App. 207, 215, 644 S.E.2d 588, 595 (2007).
In the absence of findings that the parent has forfeited [his or her] right to visitation or that it is in the child's best interest to deny visitation [,] the court should safeguard the parent's visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the ... conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised. As a result, even if the trial court determines that visitation would be inappropriate in a particular case or that a parent has forfeited his or her right to visitation, it must still address that issue in its dispositional order and either adopt a visitation plan or specifically determine that such a plan would be inappropriate in light of the specific facts under consideration.
In re K.C. & C.C., 199 N.C.App. 557, 562, 681 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court ordered that respondent “shall have no visitation or any direct contact with the juvenile. However, if recommended by the juvenile's therapist, contact is authorized in a therapeutic setting.” Respondent contends that this provision either inappropriately left her future right to visitation in the discretion of Lori's therapist or otherwise amounted to a total denial of visitation, which was not supported by the trial court's findings.
Contrary to respondent's assertion, the plain language of the trial court's order clearly denies visitation and does not permit Lori's therapist to overrule this denial. The only decision left to Lori's therapist is whether respondent would be permitted to participate in Lori's therapy if the therapist determined that such participation would be beneficial. The trial court's order includes multiple findings which demonstrate why respondent's participation in future therapy sessions could be helpful for Lori in dealing with the issues raised by her abuse as well as why respondent's visitation with Lori would be inappropriate. The court found that Lori's therapist recommended no visitation for respondent because Lori “express[es] tremendous fear of [respondent] and stepfather in counseling.” The therapist also reported that Lori “fears going to the home of the maternal grandparents” because respondent lives with them and that “[w]hen talking about what she remembers about living with her mother and the stepfather, [Lori] sobs and presents a look of terror.” In addition, Lori reported to her therapist that when she suffered abuse perpetrated by her stepfather, she “would beg for her mother, but her mother would not come.” As a result, the therapist determined that Lori “believes that [respondent] did not protect her and that [respondent] prioritized the stepfather over [Lori]'s safety and well-being.” Based upon these unchallenged findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny visitation to respondent. This argument is overruled.
V. Conclusion The trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate financial resources to care for Lori. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying visitation to respondent. The trial court's order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Opinion
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 14 October 2014 by Judge Addie H. Rawls in Harnett County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 July 2015.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Duncan B. McCormick, for petitioner-appellee Harnett County Department of Social Services.
Marie H. Mobley, for Guardian ad Litem.
Blackburn & Tanner, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from an order granting permanent guardianship of her minor child, Lori, to Lori's paternal grandparents. We affirm.
A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the minor child and for ease of reading.
I. Background
On 23 January 2013, the Harnett County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Lori was an abused and neglected juvenile. Specifically, Lori was hospitalized and required medical treatment after sustaining head trauma, multiple bruises, and other life-threatening injuries that Lori's mother and stepfather could not reasonably explain. The medical staff determined Lori's injuries were non-accidental. The trial court placed Lori in nonsecure custody with DSS. When Lori was released from a rehabilitation center in March 2013, DSS placed her with her paternal grandparents. Lori's maternal grandparents were granted unsupervised visitation for two weekends per month. Both respondent and Lori's father were granted supervised visitation. Lori's stepfather was not entitled to any visitation.
On 14 June 2013, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Lori as an abused and neglected juvenile. Respondent appealed to this Court, and the adjudication was affirmed. In re L.B.B., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 761 S.E.2d 754, 2014 N.C.App. LEXIS 517, 2014 WL 2116547 (2014) (unpublished). On 30 July 2013, the trial court found both respondent and stepfather were indicted for felony child abuse, and entered a “Formal Dispositional Order” based upon the prior abuse and neglect adjudication. Although Lori's father was on probation for a felony conviction, he was granted supervised visitation with Lori since he lived with the paternal grandparents. However, for respondent, the trial court ceased visitation and reunification efforts. Subsequently, the trial court ordered a change in Lori's permanent plan to guardianship with the paternal grandparents.
On 26 September 2014, the trial court conducted a permanency planning hearing. During the hearing, a social worker testified that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since her release from the hospital and that her daily needs were being met. Lori's grandmother was employed at Campbell University and her grandfather received social security disability benefits. The paternal grandfather testified that he and his wife were willing to serve as guardians, that they understood the responsibilities of guardianship, and that they were financially able to take care of Lori. During cross-examination, respondent's counsel attempted to question the grandfather regarding his social security disability income. The trial court sustained its own objection to the question, stating that it was irrelevant since the paternal grandparents had been caring for Lori without assistance.
On 14 October 2014, the trial court entered a permanency planning order awarding permanent guardianship to the paternal grandparents, and supervised visitation to the maternal grandparents and Lori's father. Respondent's visitation with Lori was “authorized in a therapeutic setting” if recommended by Lori's therapist. Further review hearings were waived. Respondent appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re J.C.S., 164 N.C.App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C.App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192–93 (2002)). “If the trial court's findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” Id. (citing In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)). Unchallenged findings of fact are also considered conclusive on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
III. Verification
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in awarding guardianship to the paternal grandparents because it inadequately verified that the grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate resources to care for Lori. We disagree.
If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed in the custody of an individual other than a parent or appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to G.S. 7B–600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906.1(j) (2013); see also N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–600(c) (2013). The statute does not “require that the court make any specific findings in order to make the verification.” In re J.E., B.E., 182 N.C.App. 612, 617, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007). “It is sufficient that the court receives and considers evidence that the guardians understand the legal significance of the guardianship.” In re N.B., L.B., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 771 S.E.2d 562, 568 (2015). Moreover, “the statute does require the trial court to make a determination that the guardian has ‘adequate resources' and some evidence of the guardian's ‘resources' is necessary as a practical matter, since the trial court cannot make any determination of adequacy without evidence.” In re P.A., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 772 S.E.2d 240, 246 (2015).
In re J.E., B.E. was decided under a previous version of the statute, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(f), with similar language to N .C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906.1(j). This Court has continued to apply J.E. to the new statute. See, e.g., N.B., ––– N.C.App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d at ––––.
In the instant case, the trial court specifically found that the paternal grandparents “understand the legal significance of guardianship” and “have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.” Respondent contends that the trial court's findings were not adequately supported by the evidence. However, respondent is mistaken.
The social worker testified at the hearing that, in her opinion, Lori's paternal grandparents were fit and appropriate to serve as guardians. She also testified that she had explained the legal significance of being appointed Lori's guardians to the paternal grandparents and that they understood it. When Lori's paternal grandfather testified, he stated that he had been informed what guardianship would entail and that he and his wife were ready to accept that role. This testimony supported the trial court's finding that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship.
The trial court's order also included several findings regarding the grandparents' financial resources and their ability to care for Lori, which are not challenged by respondent. Specifically, the court found that Lori had been living with the paternal grandparents since 12 March 2013. During those eighteen months, they had not received any financial assistance from DSS. The court further found that the paternal grandfather received Social Security disability benefits and that the paternal grandmother worked at Campbell University. The grandparents' home had three bedrooms and Lori had her own bedroom. In addition, the court considered a DSS permanency planning hearing report which indicated that “[a]ll of [Lori's] daily needs, including transportation for ongoing physical and occupational therapy and counseling ... are met by” the grandparents and a guardian ad litem report which stated that Lori's financial and material needs “are being met consistently.” Therefore, sufficient “evidence of the guardian[s'] ‘resources' “ was presented, and the trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents had adequate resources to care for Lori. Id.
However, respondent contends that the trial court should have considered additional evidence regarding the future financial resources of the paternal grandparents. She argues the court erred by sustaining its own objection to her trial counsel's question regarding the amount of the paternal grandfather's social security disability benefits. Respondent asserts that the court's action effectively “did not allow any further questions for the record, such as how old [the grandfather] was, how old his wife was, when she would retire, what their income would be when she retired, or what their general health was like.”
Respondent cites no authority to support her argument that a trial court must inquire into and then speculate about the adequacy of a potential guardian's financial resources until the juvenile reaches the age of majority, in violation of N.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6) (2013) (“The body of the argument ... shall contain citations of the authorities upon which the appellant relies.”). Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that respondent's argument has merit, she failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... [i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 103(a)(2) (2013). Respondent's trial counsel did not make an offer of proof as to any of the information regarding the paternal grandparents that is complained about in respondent's brief. Because “the record does not show the substance of the excluded evidence [,] ... we are unable to determine if the ruling of the court was prejudicial.” In re Parker, 90 N.C.App. 423, 431–32, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884–85 (1988). Respondent's arguments regarding verification are overruled.
IV. Visitation
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her visitation with Lori and leaving any future visitation with Lori in the discretion of Lori's therapist. We disagree.
“An order that removes custody of a juvenile from a parent, guardian, or custodian or that continues the juvenile's placement outside the home shall provide for appropriate visitation as may be in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile's health and safety.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–905.1(a) (2013). Thus, the court may prohibit visitation by a parent when it is in the juvenile's best interests and consistent with the juvenile's health and safety to do so. See In re J.S., 182 N.C.App. 79, 86–87, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007). We review an order denying visitation for an abuse of discretion. In re C.M., 183 N.C.App. 207, 215, 644 S.E.2d 588, 595 (2007).
In the absence of findings that the parent has forfeited [his or her] right to visitation or that it is in the child's best interest to deny visitation [,] the court should safeguard the parent's visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the ... conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised. As a result, even if the trial court determines that visitation would be inappropriate in a particular case or that a parent has forfeited his or her right to visitation, it must still address that issue in its dispositional order and either adopt a visitation plan or specifically determine that such a plan would be inappropriate in light of the specific facts under consideration.
In re K.C. & C.C., 199 N.C.App. 557, 562, 681 S.E.2d 559, 563 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court ordered that respondent “shall have no visitation or any direct contact with the juvenile. However, if recommended by the juvenile's therapist, contact is authorized in a therapeutic setting.” Respondent contends that this provision either inappropriately left her future right to visitation in the discretion of Lori's therapist or otherwise amounted to a total denial of visitation, which was not supported by the trial court's findings.
Contrary to respondent's assertion, the plain language of the trial court's order clearly denies visitation and does not permit Lori's therapist to overrule this denial. The only decision left to Lori's therapist is whether respondent would be permitted to participate in Lori's therapy if the therapist determined that such participation would be beneficial. The trial court's order includes multiple findings which demonstrate why respondent's participation in future therapy sessions could be helpful for Lori in dealing with the issues raised by her abuse as well as why respondent's visitation with Lori would be inappropriate. The court found that Lori's therapist recommended no visitation for respondent because Lori “express[es] tremendous fear of [respondent] and stepfather in counseling.” The therapist also reported that Lori “fears going to the home of the maternal grandparents” because respondent lives with them and that “[w]hen talking about what she remembers about living with her mother and the stepfather, [Lori] sobs and presents a look of terror.” In addition, Lori reported to her therapist that when she suffered abuse perpetrated by her stepfather, she “would beg for her mother, but her mother would not come.” As a result, the therapist determined that Lori “believes that [respondent] did not protect her and that [respondent] prioritized the stepfather over [Lori]'s safety and well-being.” Based upon these unchallenged findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny visitation to respondent. This argument is overruled.
V. Conclusion
The trial court properly verified that the paternal grandparents understood the legal significance of guardianship and had adequate financial resources to care for Lori. The court did not abuse its discretion by denying visitation to respondent. The trial court's order is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge HUNTER, JR., ROBERT N., concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).