Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ44667. Merrill Toole, Referee.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Lance E. Winters, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
The juvenile court sustained a section 602 petition against minor L.B. (“appellant”), finding that he had committed felony second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. At disposition, the court declared appellant a ward of the court and placed him in a camp community program for three months. Appellant challenges the disposition, arguing the juvenile court abused its discretion in not ordering—as recommended by both the Probation Department and the Department of Children and Family Services—joint supervision. We affirm.
Unless indicated otherwise, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Background
On the evening of December 30, 2008, the victim J. L. was holding her blue Sidekick cell phone, riding home on a bus in Los Angeles. She noticed two boys talking on the bus and that one of them had a similar blue Sidekick phone. As the two boys exited the bus, one nodded in the victim’s direction and said to the other boy “You got it?” The other boy nodded back, then grabbed the victim’s Sidekick, but she would not let go and was dragged from the bus. The boy who grabbed the phone eventually hurt the victim’s finger and told her “Let go, bitch.” The victim was frightened and let go of her phone, and the two boys ran away.
The victim got back on the bus, but, about one block later, she asked the bus driver to stop because she saw a police car. She got off the bus, found the officers in a nearby restaurant and told them what had happened. While talking to the officers, the victim saw the two boys who had stolen her phone walking down the street side-by-side. The victim was sure they were the same boys because she recognized the pattern on the socks of the boy who had nodded and said “You got it?” The officers apprehended the boys and found the victim’s Sidekick on the boy who had grabbed the phone and the phone’s SIM card on the other boy. The officers gave the victim her phone and she unlocked it by entering her secret security code. Her contacts were still on the SIM card the officers had recovered.
The boy who had nodded and said “You got it?” was identified as appellant. He admitted being on the bus and seeing the robbery, but he denied participating in it. He said, after getting off the bus, he bought the SIM card from someone on the street, although he knew it was stolen.
The boy who grabbed the victim’s phone is not a party to this appeal.
The District Attorney’s Office filed a section 602 petition against appellant, charging him with felony second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. The Probation Department prepared a probation report, which indicated, among other things, appellant’s age and delinquent history and the circumstances of the charged offense. The report revealed that, at the time of the charged offense, appellant was 16 years old and that, in December 2007, there had been a non-detained petition filed against him, the disposition of which was unknown. The probation report also addressed appellant’s dependency history, which is extensive and began when he was three years old. At the time of his arrest, appellant was living in a foster home, which appellant liked and appeared supportive. The probation report recommended dual supervision by the Probation Department and the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”). The report stated that removing appellant from DCSF services “would not be in [his] best interest” and that both DCFS and the Probation Department “concur that it is in the minor’s best interest to continue DCFS services and place the minor on dual supervision... it is recommended that the minor be ordered 654.2 WIC.”
The juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true beyond a reasonable doubt and sustained the petition. After the court had sustained the petition, appellant’s counsel requested that appellant be placed in his foster home. The court refused, indicating it had “agonized” over the proper disposition and had given the case a lot of thought. The juvenile court read appellant’s letter and understood the “hard life” he has had, but the court cautioned appellant that it was time for him to “turn a corner” and “go in the right direction.” The court also indicated it had read and considered appellant’s disposition report and understood this was appellant’s first sustained petition. The juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court under section 602 and committed him to the care, custody and control of the probation office for placement in a camp community program for three months.
Discussion
Appellant argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied joint supervision. To support his position, appellant points to the probation report indicating both the Probation Department and DCFS agreed it was in appellant’s “best interest to continue DCFS services and place [him] on dual supervision” and recommended that he “be ordered 654.2 WIC.” Appellant asks us “to vacate the order declaring him a ward of court” and to remand the case with directions that the juvenile court order “dual supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 752, subdivision (a).”
Before adjudication, section 654.2 permits the juvenile court to “continue any hearing on a petition for six months and [to] order the minor to participate in a program of supervision as [specified].” (§ 654.2, subd. (a).) Although the probation report here recommended that appellant “be ordered 654.2 WIC,” the record does not indicate that appellant requested informal supervision under section 654.2. And appellant cites no authority for the proposition that the issue was before the court when it was raised only in the probation report. Thus, because appellant never requested it, informal supervision under section 654.2 was not an option. (See In re Adam D. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 100, 103-104; In re Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 968.)
2. Section 725
Under section 725, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may place a minor on probation without declaring him a ward of the court. Section 725 provides in relevant part: “After receiving and considering the evidence on the proper disposition of the case, the court may enter judgment as follows: (a) If the court has found that the minor is a person described by Section 601 or 602, by reason of the commission of an offense other than any of the offenses set forth in Section 654.3, it may, without adjudging the minor a ward of the court, place the minor on probation, under the supervision of the probation officer, for a period not to exceed six months....” (§ 725, subd. (a).)
While the section 654.2 informal supervision alternative is selected prior to adjudication, the section 725, subdivision (a) probation alternative is selected at the dispositional hearing, after the court has found the minor to be a person described by section 601 or section 602, but before the court has declared the minor a ward of the court. (In re Adam D., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 103.) Importantly, probation under section 725, subdivision (a) is only an option for minors who commit “an offense other than any of the offenses set forth in Section 654.3.” (§ 725, subd. (a), italics added.)
Here, the juvenile court found appellant had committed second degree robbery, which is an offense listed in section 654.3. (§ 654.3, subd. (a) [includes offenses under Penal Code section 707, subdivision (b), which includes robbery].) In denying appellant’s request for placement in his foster home, the juvenile court noted it could not consider that option because of “the seriousness of the charge. It’s a 707(b) offense.” Thus, because appellant’s offense is listed in section 654.3, he was not eligible for probation under section 725, subdivision (a).
Even if appellant was eligible for probation under section 725, subdivision (a), however, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant probation. “In determining the judgment and order to be made in any case in which the minor is found to be a person described in Section 602, the court shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor's previous delinquent history.” (§ 725.5.) Section 725.5 does not require the juvenile court to discuss each of the listed factors. Rather, the court fulfills its obligation “when it carefully examines and takes into account the factors stated.... [I]t must be apparent from all of the surrounding circumstances that the court at least considered the appropriate factors.” (In re John F. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185.) We review the juvenile court’s commitment order for an abuse of discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.)
Although appellant claims the juvenile court abused its discretion because it considered only the gravity of the offense, respondent correctly counters, and the record reveals, that the juvenile court considered all of the required factors and did not abuse its discretion in refusing probation. The court stated it had read both the probation report (which includes appellant’s age, discusses the circumstances and gravity of the offense and notes appellant’s delinquent history) and appellant’s letter (which, according to the reporter’s transcript, discusses his difficult upbringing). When addressing appellant, the court noted he was almost an adult and it was time for him to turn a corner. Moreover, the court stated it had “agonized” over the case, thought about it for two days, and understood it was appellant’s first sustained petition. It is readily apparent, therefore, that the juvenile court considered appellant’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense and appellant’s delinquent history.
The record does not include a copy of appellant’s letter.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation and ordering appellant to serve three months in camp placement.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., ROTHSCHILD, J.