The fact that the Adversary Proceeding was resolved by way of a negotiated settlement does not invalidate the finding of nondischargeability. See In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.1994)(order by agreement has same effect as judgment on the merits) and In re Saler, 205 B.R. 737, 742, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1997); see also In re Zick, 100 B.R. 867, 869 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1989)(if parties intend their settlement to bind them on certain issues and if the consent judgment reflects that intention, collateral estoppel will apply). This Court recognizes that, at least in this District, a large number of orders regarding dischargeability are entered without the matter proceeding to trial on the merits.

See, e.g., Department of Air Force v. Carolina Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1473-74 (4th Cir. 1990); [ In re] Justice Oaks, [II, Ltd.], 898 F.2d [1544] at 1552 [(11th Cir. 1990)].In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1996); see In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994) (confirmed Chapter 11 plan binds debtor as a final judgment mn the merits); Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d 1468, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) ("'The general rule is that a confirmed plan or reorganization is binding on the debtor and other proponents of the plan.' In re Garsal Realty, Inc. (Garsal Realty, Inc. v. Troy Sav. Bank), 39 B.R. 991, 994 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).

It is well-settled that a confirmed chapter 11 plan has a binding effect on both debtors and claimants under the plan, and functions as a judgment with regard to the parties bound by the plan. See, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a); In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus, although by agreement rather than litigation, a confirmed plan of reorganization by a bankruptcy court has the same effect as a judgment by a district court, and res judicata principles bar re-litigation of any issues raised or that could have been raised in the confirmation proceedings.

The confirmation of a plan of reorganization has the equivalent effect of a judgment by the court, binding both the debtor and its creditors. See In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Chattanooga Wholesale Antiques, Inc., 930 F.2d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 1991); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 48 B.R. 356, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Act case); In re Boroff, 189 B.R. 53, 56 (D.Vt. 1995); DiBerto v. Meadows at Madbury, Inc., 171 B.R. 461, 471 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994); In re Burton Securities S.A., 202 B.R. 411, 418 (S.D.Tex. 1996). Res judicata principles apply to confirmed plans to bar the re-litigation of issues that were or could have been raised in the confirmation proceedings.

See, e.g., In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994) (The debtor's "confirmed Chapter 11 plan binds him as a final judgment . . . even though the Chapter 11 bankruptcy was later converted to Chapter 7."); In re Pierce Packing Co., 169 B.R. 421, 429 (Bankr. D.Mont. 1994); In re Blanton Smith Corp., 81 B.R. 440, 444 (M.D.Tenn. 1987); Nardulli Sons, 66 B.R. at 881; cf. Vogel v. Russell Transfer, 852 F.2d 797, 799 (4th Cir. 1988) ("A conversion to Chapter 7 does not undo what was by court order achieved by the Chapter 11 confirmation. . . ."

Farmers’ argument, however, ignores authority holding that, in the bankruptcy context, parties may stipulate to the nondischargeability of a debt. For example, in In re Laing (10th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1050, 1051, the court held that a debtor was barred by res judicata from relitigating the dischargeability of a debt when the debtor stipulated that the debt was nondischargeable. In that case, the debtor “did not actually argue and present evidence regarding the dischargeability of his debt” but instead “[t]he parties merely agreed that the debt was nondischargeable, and the court so ordered.”

Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that Frenette's claims were barred by res judicata. Compare In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The final judgment expressly declared the debt nondischargeable. Although by agreement rather than litigation, that order has the same effect as a district court's judgment on the merits.

The reaffirmation agreement signed by Frenette and his counsel contains the statements required by § 524(c).Compare In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The final judgment expressly declared the debt non-dischargeable. Although by agreement rather than litigation, that order has the same effect as a district court's judgment on the merits. The plan's stipulation, along with the order declaring the debt nondischargeable, binds Laing regardless of whether that provision is inconsistent with the bankruptcy laws because it is nonetheless included in the Plan, which was confirmed by the bankruptcy court without objection and was not appealed.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See, e.g., In re Medomak v. Canning, 922 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1990) (generally a court-approved settlement receives the same res judicata effect as a litigated judgment); accord, In Re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1994); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 900 (1990); Epic Metal Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989); Kurzweg v. Marple, 841 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, 825 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 992 (1987). III.

Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that the bar date overrides Section 503(b)(1)(D) because the Supreme Court has “held that a properly noticed and confirmed plan is binding on the noticed parties even if the plan contains provisions contrary to the Bankruptcy Code.” (Doc. 5 at 211 (citing Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 276)); see also In re Laing, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 1994) (confirmed Chapter 11 plan was binding as final judgment on the merits “regardless of whether [a] provision [was] inconsistent with the bankruptcy laws”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). In light of the Bankruptcy Court's express finding and Mr. Marcus' concession, the Court need not address whether the “notice” of claim the Administrative Claims Bar Date requires is a “request for . . . payment” prohibited by Section 503(b)(1)(D).