In re L.A. L.P.

Full title: IN THE INTEREST OF: L.A.L.P., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.P., MOTHER

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Aug 31, 2017

J-S50005-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2017)

Opinion

J-S50005-17 No. 687 EDA 2017

08-31-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.A.L.P., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.P., MOTHER

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s). CP-51-AP-0001302-2016 CP-51-DP-0002009-2012 BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MOULTON, and RANSOM, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.

A.P. ("Mother") appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which changed the permanency goal of her minor daughter, L.A.L.P. ("Child"), born in April 2009, to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351 et seq., and appeals from the decree, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). We affirm.¹

1 The appointment of separate, independent legal counsel for Child was unnecessary, as there was no conflict between Child's best interest and her legal interest. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017); In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012). --------

Child, who has profound medical challenges, has not been in Mother's care since March 27, 2014. Mother, among other deficiencies, has dismally failed in her service goals; she has failed to attend the vast majority of her supervised visits; she has failed to obtain employment; she has failed to obtain suitable housing; and she has not acquired the specialized medical training necessary to care for Child. Two DHS social workers testified to the strong bond Child has with foster mother. For instance, Ms. Rossberg attributed the tremendous progress Child has made to the effect of the bond she has with her foster mother. And Ms. Monty testified Child would suffer irreparable harm if she were removed from the foster mother's care because she has been with the foster mother for more than three years and has a bond with foster mother and the foster mother's family. She further noted Child would suffer no irreparable harm if Mother's parental rights were terminated. Child is thriving with her foster mother.

For a recitation of the complete factual background and procedural history of this case, we refer the reader to the trial court's comprehensive opinion of April 11, 2017. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/17, at 1-8.

Mother raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother's] parental rights under 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a), where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [M]other was unfit or unwilling to parent [the c]hildren?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother's] parental rights under 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a) and (b), where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that involuntarily terminating [Mother's] parental rights would best serve the emotional needs and welfare of [Child]?

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by changing the permanency goal of [Child] from reunification to adoption where [DHS] failed to provide sufficient evidence that such a goal change would be best suited for [Child's] needs and welfare?

Mother's Brief, at 3.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained that

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue."

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We may affirm the trial court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of § 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will focus, as did the trial court in its opinion, on the trial court's conclusion that termination was appropriate under subsection (a)(8), which provides as follows:

Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more

have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

We next turn to subsection (b):

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under § 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to subsection (b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section 2511(b), our Supreme Court stated that

if the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child's

"needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, "the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

"[A] parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child's] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment." In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "[W]e will not toll the well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely." In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child's life "simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.")).

Lastly, we consider Mother's issue regarding the permanency goal change. We are guided by the following:

In cases involving a court's order changing the placement goal ... to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court

disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court's inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the

[p]lacement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6365], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"). The policy underlying these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of the parents.

At each review hearing for a dependent child who has been removed from the parental home, the court must consider the following, statutorily-mandated factors:

the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; the extent of compliance with the service plan developed for the child; the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement; the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child; and, a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and footnotes omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the record and the briefs filed in this matter. There is competent evidence in the record to support the court's conclusion that Mother made grossly insufficient progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated Child's original placement. Accordingly, we agree with the court's determination that Child's best interests are served by changing the permanency placement goal from reunification to adoption and involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights. And we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in so ordering.

We affirm based on the comprehensive and well-written decision of the trial court. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/17, at 8-17.

Order and Decree affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/31/2017

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