Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Albert J. Garcia, Commissioner, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK20016.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, County Counsel and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Denise C. appeals from the order of the juvenile court denying her reunification services with her son, L.F. Appellant claims the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). DCFS concedes the inadequacy of its notice, and we remand for compliance.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant gave birth to L.F. in June 2006. They both tested positive for cocaine. Based on the positive toxicology screens and appellant’s alleged history of illicit drug use, DCFS detained L.F. and filed a petition to adjudicate him as a dependent child.
At the June 8, 2006 detention hearing, the court inquired whether appellant had any North American Indian heritage. Appellant replied, “No.” However, that same date, appellant filed a parental notification of Indian status form (JV-130), indicating that she is or may be a member of the Blackfoot tribe. L.F.’s father also filed a JV-130 form. ICWA notice was given in response to father’s form, but DCFS concedes that ICWA notice was not sent in response to appellant’s JV-130 form.
On August 11, 2005, the court denied reunification services for appellant under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5. Appellant filed a timely appeal from the order denying reunification. Father is not a party to this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The only issue raised in this appeal is the inadequacy of the ICWA notice. The ICWA requires that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,” notice must be given to both the parent or Indian custodian and the child’s tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) A minimal showing of Indian heritage, such that the child “may” be an Indian child, is sufficient to trigger the ICWA notice requirement. (In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407.) In this case, appellant’s JV-130 form triggered the ICWA notice requirement because the form was completed by a person having an interest in the child, and the completed form suggested that L.F. might be of Indian ancestry. (Former Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1439(d)(4)(A), now rule 5.664(d)(4)(A).)
Both parties agree the notice was insufficient. Although appellant claims the lack of notice here requires reversal, reversal is only appropriate where parental rights have been terminated. (In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 385.) We are aware that other courts have held that a violation of the ICWA constitutes jurisdictional error. (See Nichole K. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 779, 781.) We are persuaded that In re Brooke C., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 377, states the better view, and follow it here. Appellant’s parental rights were not terminated; the appropriate remedy is remand for ICWA compliance. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating appellant’s reunification services is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to comply with the notice provisions of the ICWA. After proper notice under the ICWA, if it is determined that L.F. is an Indian child and the ICWA applies to these proceedings, appellant is entitled to petition the juvenile court to invalidate orders that violated the ICWA. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1914; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.664(n)(1).)
We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J.