U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGEPBI Performance Products, Inc. v. NorFab Corp., 514 F. Supp. 2d 732, 743-44 (E.D. Pa. 2007); accord, In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007).

Reconsideration is considered an extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly. See, e.g., Van Buskirk v. United Group of Companies, Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) ; accord In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. Aug.1, 2007). The traditional requirement for reconsideration is either: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the existence of new evidence not previously available; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice.

Glendon Energy Co. v. Bor. of Glendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D.Pa.1993).PBI Performance Products, Inc. v. NorFab Corp., 514 F.Supp.2d 732, 743–44 (E.D.Pa.2007) ; accord , In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Aug. 1, 2007).Nor was the issue raised by the Trustee particularly complicated.

Foster v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. 2012 WL 2402895, *4 at FN1 (W.D.Pa. June 26, 2012).See also, e.g., In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007) ( Rule 59(e) motions should be granted sparingly because of the strong interest in maintaining the finality of judgments.) Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.

It is well established that a litigant moving for reconsideration must overcome a “high burden” in meeting the above standard. ABS Brokerage Servs., LLC v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3257992, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010); see also Blystone, 664 F.3d at 404 (“the scope of a motion for reconsideration ... is extremely limited”); Fanelli v. Continental Cas. Co., 2006 WL 3387187, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Nov. 21, 2006) (“reconsideration of judgment is an extraordinary remedy, and such motions should be granted sparingly”) (citation omitted); Conway v. A.I. duPont Hosp. for Children, 2009 WL 1492178, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 26, 2009) (“Parties may not use rule 59(e) motions as a vehicle to ask ... courts to rethink what they have already thought through—rightly or wrongly”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (“courts should grant such motions sparingly because of their strong interest in finality of judgment”) (citations omitted). The Receiver seeks reconsideration pursuant to the third prong of the Rule 59(e) test.

E.g., Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986); AND, it being accepted legal principles that such motions are not designed to allow a party to simply change theories, try again, thus giving them “a second bite at the apple,” e.g., Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir.1995), and that “courts should grant such motions sparingly,” In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (citations omitted); * * * *

E.g., Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986); AND, it being accepted legal principles that such motions are not designed to allow a party to simply change theories, try again, thus giving them “a second bite at the apple,” e.g., Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir.1995), and that “courts should grant such motions sparingly,” In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Aug.1, 2007) (citations omitted); AND, the Reconsideration Motion failing to present: (a) arguments not previously considered by the court; (b) any persuasive argument that the court previously committed a manifest error of law or (c) any newly discovered evidence;

E.g., Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986); AND, it being accepted legal principles that such motions are not designed to allow a party to simply change theories, try again, thus giving them "a second bite at the apple," e.g., Bhatnagar . Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1995), and that "courts should grant such motions sparingly," In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Aug.1, 2007) (citations omitted); AND, the Reconsideration Motion failing to present: (a) arguments not previously considered by the court; (b) any persuasive argument that the court previously committed a manifest error of law or (c) any newly discovered evidence;

Also, it is an accepted legal principle that "courts should grant such motions sparingly because of their strong interest in finality of judgment." In re Kuhar, 2007 WL 2245912, *2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) (citations omitted). It is hereby ORDERED that the Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

See also Williams, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 238 ("[A] motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded in a request for a court to rethink a decision it has already made, rightly or wrongly.");In re Kuhar, No. 04-36627DWS, 2007 WL 2245912, at*2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007) ("`[W]hatever may be the purpose of Rule 59(e) it . . . [was not] . . . intended to give the unhappy litigant one additional chance to sway the judge.'") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).