Since confirmation revests the property of the estate in the debtor, (as well as discharging the debtor from all dischargeable pre-petition debts), the stay of an act against the property of the estate would no longer be applicable. See In re Turning Point Lounge, Ltd., 111 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y. 1990) (automatic stay ceases to operate upon confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Or. 1985) (automatic stay expired upon confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In Re Paradise Valley Country Club, 31 B.R. 613, 615 (D.Colo. 1983) ("Since confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan has the dual effect of revesting the debtor with title to its property and discharging the debtor from all dischargeable pre-petition debts, there can be no further application of the automatic stay subsequent to confirmation"); In re Thrush, 31 B.R. 106, 107 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1983) (order granting relief from automatic stay lacked significance because six days later debtors were discharged and automatic stay was thereby lifted by operation of law).
Confirmation revests the property of the estate in the debtor, (as well as discharging the debtor from all dischargeable pre-petition debts), and the stay of an act against the property of the estate would no longer be applicable. See In re TurningPoint Lounge, Ltd., 111 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (automatic stay ceases to operate upon confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr. D.Or. 1985) (automatic stay expired upon confirmation of Chapter 11 plan); In ReParadise Valley Country Club, 31 B.R. 613, 615 (D. Colo. 1983) ("Since confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan has the dual effect of revesting the debtor with title to its property and discharging the debtor from all dischargeable pre-petition debts, there can be no further application of the automatic stay subsequent to confirmation"); In re Thrush, 31 B.R. 106, 107 (Bankr. M.D.Pa. 1983) (order granting relief from automatic stay lacked significance because six days later debtors were discharged and automatic stay was thereby lifted by operation of law).
(b) Prudential's pre-bankruptcy foreclosure proceeding vested the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Pennsylvania with constructive possession of the Debtor's mortgaged property and this Court's relief from stay order of August 1, 1990 returned constructive possession of the same to the Common Pleas Court allowing the County's in rem tax lien to become secured no later than August 1, 1990; Matter of Roloff, 598 F.2d 783 (3rd Cir., 1979); In re Stahl, 5 B.R. 148 (1980); In re Lally, 51 B.R. 204, 206 (1985). (c) The County obtained an in rem first priority tax lien no later than October 3, 1990 when this Court confirmed the Debtor's second amended plan of reorganization and thus the Debtor's property no longer was property of the bankrupt estate under Section 362(c)(1), In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (1985); In re Fortner Oilfield Services, 49 B.R. 9 (1984); (d) The County obtained a first priority secured lien for its 1990 taxes no later than October 3, 1990 upon this Court's entry of its confirmation Order.
20 B.R. at 372. Accord, In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Or. 1985). Similarly, in Prince v. Clare, 67 B.R. 270 (N.D.Ill. 1986), the district court wrote:
20 B.R. at 372. Accord, In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Or.1985). Similarly, in Prince v. Clare, 67 B.R. 270 (N.D.Ill.1986), the district court wrote:
In re Crawford, 95 B.R. 491 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich. 1988); In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bkrtcy.D.Oregon. 1985); In re Ernst, 45 B.R. 700 (Bkrtcy.D.Minn. 1985).
E.g., In re Herron, 60 B.R. 82 (Bankr.W.D.La. 1986); In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Or. 1985). Upon confirmation, the reorganized debtor returns to the commercial world without protection from post-confirmation creditors.
Accordingly, as provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) and (2), the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a) expired upon confirmation of the Debtors' Plan. In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bkrtcy.D.Or. 1985); In re Fortner Oilfield Services, Inc., 49 B.R. 9 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Texas 1984) The Debtors concede that the automatic stay terminated upon confirmation of the Plan because that is the time when the discharge is effective pursuant to § 1141(d) of the Code. They argue, however, that In re Draggoo Electric Co., 57 B.R. 916 (N.D.Ind. 1986) permits me to prohibit land contract vendor Gilbert's post confirmation collection efforts if they are inconsistent with the provision of the confirmed plan.
We note that several cases, including a decision by this Court's venerable former Chief Judge, Emil F. Goldhaber, in In re Johnson, 51 B.R. 439, 442 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1985), have implicitly followed Mason, by reference to § 1327(b), but without acknowledging the conflict between that section and § 1306. See In re Dickey, 64 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1985); In re Severson, 53 B.R. 8, 10 (Bankr.D.Ore. 1985); In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557, 558 (Bankr.D.Ore. 1985); and In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958, 959 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983). We do note an almost uncanny congregation of these cases in the courts of Oregon, including Mason, supra, which is coincidental with the fact that it was the resort of the Movant here to Oregon courts which set all of the strange wheels turning here into motion.