E.g. In re Okamoto, 491 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Kirk, 198 F. Supp. 771 (W.D.Pa. 1961); In re Murray, 14 F. Supp. 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Branche, 275 F. 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1921); In re Blount, 142 F. 263 (E.D.Ark. 1906); In re Brown, 111 F. 979 (E.D.Mo. 1901); In re Skye Marketing Corp., 11 B.R. 891 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y. 1981). The Rassis, the courts below, and our research reveal no cases in which a petition was dismissed on the basis of the alleged debtor's list alone, except where the petitioner was not diligent in seeking discovery.

They hold that creditors holding small claims for current expenses must be counted in computing the number of creditors who must join in the involuntary petition. In re Kirk, 198 F. Supp. 771 (W.D.Pa. 1961); Grigsby-Grunow Co. v. Hieb Radio Supply Co., 71 F.2d 113 (18th Cir. 1934); In re Luther, 63 F. Supp. 83 (W.D.Mo. 1945), aff'd, 151 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 681, 90 L.Ed. 1009 (1946); In re Murray, 14 F. Supp. 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Hall, 27 F.2d 999 (W.D.Pa. 1928); In re Alden, 2 F.2d 61 (D.Mass. 1924); In re Brown, 111 F. 979 (E.D.Mo. 1901). The basis of the decisions is that the exclusion of Blount is not in the Bankruptcy Act [§ 59(e) and its predecessors] and, therefore, that the courts are not justified in engrafting this additional exclusion; that the proper appeal was to Congress rather than to the courts.

The Eighth Circuit ( Grigsby-Grunow Co. v. Hieb Radio Supply Co., 71 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1934); Theis v. Luther, 151 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781, 66 S.Ct. 681, 90 L.Ed. 1009 (1946)), and the Ninth Circuit ( In re Okamoto, 491 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1974)), took a contrary position, as did also the District Courts in In re Alden, 2 F.2d 61 (D.C.Mass. 1924); In re Kirk, 198 F. Supp. 771 (D.C.Pa. 1961); In re Hall, 27 F.2d 999, 1000 (W.D.Pa. 1928); In re Colorado Lime Co., 298 F. Supp. 1053 (D.Colo. 1969). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently never ruled on this precise question.