Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stephen Marpet, Temporary Judge, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK61927.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr. County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
A juvenile court terminated Samantha T.’s parental rights to her three youngest daughters J.V., J.E., and D.M. The juvenile court said it was acting in these children’s best interest. Samantha T. appeals. Her daughters do not. We affirm.
I
Samantha T. is the mother of four. At the time of the hearing in the Superior Court, Samantha T. was 21 years old. She was 14 when she gave birth to K.M. in 2001. Since then, Samantha T. has had three more daughters: J.V.M., J.E.M., and D.M.M. The three younger daughters J.V., J.E., and D.M. are the ones most directly involved in this case. The oldest daughter K. is involved as well, but less directly, as will appear.
A
After Samantha T. gave birth to K., the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) opened a case on Samantha T. as a possible victim of sexual abuse. The DCFS closed the case when Samantha T. agreed to live with the maternal grandparents and not to return to her boyfriend, father Victor M. Within weeks, however, she resumed living with Victor M. She left K. with K.’s maternal grandparents.
Samantha T. had three more daughters, the ones directly involved in this case: J.V., J. E., and D.M. Samantha T., Victor M., and the girls lived with a paternal uncle and aunt and their three children. Samantha T. and Victor M. fought constantly. In December 2005 Samantha T. and Victor M. got into another argument. Victor M. was high on methamphetamine and watching pornography in front of the children. Samantha T. and Victor M. started yelling and cursing at each other. While Samantha T. was holding then three-month old D.M., Victor M. dragged Samantha T. across the bed. D.M. flipped onto her face into a pillow and began gasping for air. Victor M. banged his head against the wall until he passed out. Someone contacted DCFS.
B
The DCFS placed the children with their maternal grandparents on December 22, 2005. At the time J.V. was three years old, J.E. was 16 months old and D.M. was three months old. The DCFS interviewed Samantha T., Victor M., and other interested parties. The paternal uncle said Samantha T. and Victor M. were verbally combative toward each other on a daily basis, and had been for years. He overheard Samantha T. threatening to kill Victor M. or to have someone else do it.
The DCFS also learned that, when Samantha T. was 13 years old, she would sneak out of her parents’ house to hang out with La Puente gang members. She wanted to be jumped into the gang. She began using drugs and alcohol with the gang. Samantha T. and Victor M. also used alcohol together, as well as marijuana and crystal methamphetamine.
Samantha T. had been the subject of two earlier referrals to the DCFS. One was when Samantha T. delivered K. at age 14. The other was three months later when Samantha T. attempted suicide in a fit of jealousy about Victor M.
Samantha T. signed an affidavit stating Victor M. was not K.’s biological father. Victor M.’s name, however, appears on K.’s birth certificate.
Victor M., by contrast, stated he was the father of all four girls. He said he had lived with Samantha T. during each of her four pregnancies. He admitted abusing drugs and having a drug related conviction.
The DCFS filed a petition, which as amended, alleged the parents’ acts of domestic violence and drug and alcohol abuse put the children at risk of physical and emotional harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a) and (b), all further unmarked statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
At the arraignment and detention hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention and placed J.V., J.E. and D.M. with their maternal grandparents. The maternal grandparents were afraid of Samantha T. and Victor M. and were concerned about keeping the children safe. The court ordered the parents to stay away from the maternal grandparents’ home. The court permitted Samantha T. and Victor M. to have monitored visits at DCFS’s offices. The court gave DCFS authority to liberalize visits in its discretion.
The court held the adjudication and disposition hearing on January 26, 2006. On this date Samantha T. and Victor M. signed forms formally waiving their right to reunification services and relinquishing parental rights to K. As Samantha T. later explained, K. had never lived with Samantha T. and Victor M. K. had lived her entire life in her maternal grandparents’ home. K. knew only the maternal grandparents as her parents, and Samantha T. believed that relinquishing her parental rights would simplify the process for the maternal grandparents to adopt K. The court set a permanency planning hearing regarding K. for May 2006.
The court sustained the allegations of the amended petition and declared J.V., J.E., and D.M. to be dependents of the juvenile court. The court ordered the DCFS to provide reunification services to Samantha T. and Victor M. It also ordered Samantha T. and Victor M. to complete a case plan of individual counseling, couples counseling if the parents planned to stay together, parenting classes, domestic abuse counseling, and drug rehabilitation counseling, plus random drug testing once a week. The court permitted monitored visits with the children of two hours each, twice a week. The maternal grandparents had since become approved monitors for these visits.
At this hearing the court warned Samantha T. that because two of the three girls were then under three years old she would have “six months and six months only” to take advantage of the reunification services offered and to turn her life around. The court set July 27, 2006 for the six-month review hearing.
The court received an interim report in May 2006. Samantha T. had made little progress with her case plan. She had had several negative drug tests but had been a “no show” for just as many. She attended some sessions of a parenting group but hardly participated in the group discussions. Samantha T. attended some drug counseling sessions but had missed other classes. She had not yet signed up for domestic abuse or individual counseling.
Visits with the children at the maternal grandparents’ house had not gone smoothly either. Victor M. had an altercation with one of the family members and the maternal grandfather would no longer permit Victor M. in his home. Thereafter, a paternal uncle picked up J.V. and J.E. every weekend and took them to their paternal grandparents’ home where they had monitored visits with Samantha T. and Victor M.
Once Samantha T. arrived for a visit with a black eye. In April she missed three or four weeks of visits. She also failed to stay in contact with the DCFS social worker.
The court received an adoption assessment for the six-month review hearing on July 27, 2006. The DCFS concluded all four girls were likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. The paternal grandparents had expressed interest in adopting the three younger girls in the event reunification efforts failed. The maternal grandparents, on the other hand, expressed interest only in K. and the infant D.M. However, because J.V., J.E., and D.M. shared the same parents and had always lived together, the DCFS thought these siblings should not be separated.
The day before the six-month review hearing, the DCFS arranged a Team Decision Making conference with both sets of grandparents. The ultimate recommendation identified the maternal grandparents as potential adoptive parents of K. and the paternal grandparents as the potential adoptive parents of J.V., J.E., and D.M.
By the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), Samantha T. had failed to improve her compliance with the court-ordered case plan. She had completed a parenting class but the drug program had dropped her. Out of 22 drug tests since January 23, 2006, she tested negative six times and failed to show up for the drug test 15 times. Also, Samantha T. had not participated in domestic abuse or individual counseling and had failed to stay in touch with her case worker.
The court found both Samantha T. and Victor M. had not complied with the case plan and terminated reunification services. The court declared J.V., J.E., and D.M. a sibling group and set a hearing date of November 2006 to select and implement a permanent plan for the three younger girls. (§ 366.26.)
At this hearing the court also terminated Samantha T. and Victor M.’s parental rights to K.
C
In October 2006 the DCFS filed an ex parte application for an order approving an emergency removal of all four girls from the maternal grandparents’ home. While writing a report for the upcoming hearing the DCFS case worker learned Samantha T. had been sexually abused by her stepfather – the maternal step-grandfather – from the age of 13. The worker also learned Samantha T. conceived K. as a result, and that the maternal step-grandfather was in fact K.’s biological father. The worker also heard reports the maternal step-grandfather may have fathered another child with Samantha T.
Samantha T. finally admitted her stepfather had sexually molested her and that she had conceived K. as a result. Samantha T. explained when she had K. she wrote her mother that she could no longer stay in the house. Samantha T. told the maternal grandmother that if she had any questions she should ask her husband. Samantha T. never wanted to admit these facts because of the disgrace she claimed it would bring to her family.
The DCFS attempted to implement a “safety plan” to permit the children to stay in the maternal grandmother’s home. The interested parties agreed the maternal step-grandfather should leave the home and not be permitted to return. However, the next day Samantha T. reported she saw the maternal step-grandfather in the house when she woke up. The DCFS removed the four girls from the maternal grandparents’ home and placed them with the paternal grandparents.
The court held a hearing regarding the emergency removal a few days later. Counsel for the children urged the court to return the children to the maternal grandmother. Counsel said the maternal step-grandfather and K.’s father understood he was not allowed to live in the home. Counsel explained the maternal step-grandfather was only in the home to pick up his children for a scheduled appointment with the immigration department.
The children’s counsel reminded the court K. had never lived with the paternal grandparents, had lived with the maternal grandparents since birth, and their home was the only one K. knew. K. expressed anxiety after being removed from the people she considered her parents and siblings.
The court ordered the children be returned to the maternal grandmother’s home on the condition the maternal step-grandfather complied with the court’s stay-away order.
The DCFS sought writ relief. This court stayed the juvenile court’s order returning the children to the maternal grandmother pending further review. We authorized the DCFS to re-detain the children with the paternal grandparents of the younger three children, to treat these younger children as a sibling group, and to place legally freed K. with them if at all possible. (Department of Children and Family Services v. Superior Court [October 20, 2006, as clarified November 22, 2006, dismissed as moot May 15, 2007, B194441].) The four girls were returned to the paternal grandparents and prospective adoptive parents on October 20, 2006.
D
The selection and implementation hearing was to be in November 2006 but the court continued the hearing to January 2007. In the meantime the DCFS prepared reports on the children’s welfare and began an adoptive home study of the paternal grandparents. In the reports prepared for these hearings the DCFS opined it was highly likely the children would be adopted. The adoption case worker noted the paternal grandparents had already been identified as their prospective adoptive parents. Her report also stated there were no barriers preventing approval of the paternal grandparents’ adoptive home study.
This report also included information on the paternal grandparents. They had been married 32 years. They were pleasant, friendly, and family oriented. The paternal grandparents had four children and 12 grandchildren. Their 15 year old son still resided in the home. He had no juvenile record. He was then in the 10th grade in high school. The worker found him pleasant and respectful.
The paternal grandparents were both self-employed. The grandmother worked as a housekeeper in Los Angeles. She had a flexible schedule. The grandfather was a landscaper and also had electrical, plumbing, and painting skills. The paternal grandparents were fully committed to adopting all the girls. J.V. told the worker she wanted “to stay here for a long time.” J.E. and D.M. were too young to be verbal.
The girls were healthy, normal, and properly immunized. Routine medical examinations showed no medical issues. Earlier in the year D.M. received emergency medical treatment after she was unresponsive for a few minutes. D.M. was admitted to the hospital where medical personnel diagnosed a neurological problem. She was treated and released five days later. D.M. had had no symptoms since. A later medical exam detected no further complications. The girls displayed no developmental, mental, or emotional problems.
K. was doing fine in kindergarten. She had a great attitude, followed directions and was a great listener. J.V. was then in pre-school. J.V.’s teacher said J.V. was a very good student, well-behaved and eager to learn. J.V. was shy but loved to sing.
There were to be two-hour monitored visits twice a week at the DCFS’s offices. Maternal grandmother appeared for nearly every one, but Samantha T. generally appeared only once a week. Samantha T. had minimal interaction with her children during these visits. She did not encourage the children to want to be with her. The girls showed a stronger relationship with the maternal grandmother than with Samantha T. When it was time to go, the children showed no emotion. While waiting for visits to start, the children sometimes asked to go home.
Samantha T. petitioned to modify the court’s orders. (§ 388.) Her petition claimed she had made a renewed effort to comply with the court’s previous orders. She had enrolled in various programs, was working, and was undergoing drug testing. Her petition requested reunification services with the goal of reuniting with J.V., J.E., and D.M.
At a January 2006 hearing, the court placed K. with a maternal uncle, apparently at the uncle’s, K.’s and her counsel’s request. When DCFS expressed concerns about removing one of the siblings from the paternal grandparents’ home, K.’s counsel reminded the court the DCFS’s plan all along was to place K. with maternal relatives. K.’s counsel told the court, “The reason we didn’t walk it on earlier is the children were there, and . . . I wanted to make sure that he was a caretaker that was going to be willing to adopt her, that he understands the repercussions of taking the child into his home, and he does. [¶] And, again, I think it is most important to note—I understand the department keeps saying that she is placed with her biological sisters. She does not know them as her sisters. She never lived with them. She was raised by the maternal side of the family. She has never been placed with them until this case came into the system. She doesn’t know them. She is more than okay with separation. She has no desire to live with paternal grandparents, and she has made her wishes known from the very beginning. She does not want to live there, and she is fine with the separation. Her siblings are fine with it. They don’t know her as a sister.”
The DCFS pointed out things had changed in the interim and all four girls were now living together in an adoptive home. The department requested K. be returned to the paternal grandparents. The court commented, “In light of the sensitive issues of the case, the fact that we’re dealing with children that are biological siblings but have no connection with K. absent introduction of this dependency case, I think that there are extraordinary circumstances which would lead the court at this time to make a temporary order allowing the child to be placed with the uncle pending a full hearing.”
J.V. had a rough day at pre-school a few days later. She refused to follow directions, cried, and did not want anyone to touch her. When paternal grandmother asked J.V. what was wrong, J.V. told her she did not want anyone to take her away. She said she wanted to stay with the paternal grandparents. J.E. and D.M. appeared unaffected by K.’s absence. According to the worker, they seemed very happy, were adjusting well, and were attaching appropriately to their prospective adoptive parents.
The court set a hearing date for Samantha T.’s petition for modification. The court set that same date for the hearing to select and implement a permanent plan and to terminate parental rights regarding J.V., J.E., and D.M. Before that hearing date, Samantha T. filed an updated supplemental petition for modification to show her continued improvement. In her supplemental petition Samantha T. asked for the children to be returned to her care, and in the alternative, for reunification services with unmonitored overnight and weekend visits. Samantha T. said her progress showed she deserved another chance. If unsuccessful, she wanted the girls to live with the maternal grandparents, or as a third choice, with the maternal uncle. Samantha T. explained she held nothing against her parents. They had raised her. They loved her unconditionally and supported her throughout the proceedings. Samantha T. stated, ‘“[t]hey are both good parents. Whatever happened before was my fault and my responsibility. I know my dad and my mom will never hurt K[.] or the others.’”
Victor M. had been visiting with the girls on a daily basis at the paternal grandparents’ home. They interacted appropriately and the girls were always happy to see him. In the meantime, however, he had been admitted to a six-month inpatient drug treatment program.
E
DCFS prepared updated reports for the hearings. The maternal uncle stated his intention all along was to adopt K. He stated he could not adopt all four girls but at the same time could not allow K. to grow up with people she did not know. The maternal uncle explained K. knows “we are her family.” K. told various workers, as well as her counsel, she would prefer to live with the maternal grandmother, who she referred to as her “mom.” If that was not possible, then K. said she would like to stay with the maternal uncle.
The worker reported K.’s sudden removal from the home caused J.V. some concern and anxiety. J.V. asked the paternal grandparents several times why K. left and when K. would return.
The DCFS responded to Samantha T.’s petition for modification. On the plus side, Samantha T. had been working at the Cheesecake Factory up to 30 hours a week. Her employers at the Cheesecake Factory liked her and thought she worked hard. She got two promotions in her short time there. However, Samantha T.’s progress in the various programs was either unverified or less impressive than she had reported. DCFS could not verify her participation in the parenting program. She missed all her December drug counseling sessions. She drug tested only three times between October 2006 and January 2007 with two negative tests and one pending result. Samantha T. missed her domestic abuse counseling appointment. Samantha T. enrolled in school to obtain a G.E.D. but was expelled on October 10, 2006 for nonattendance. Samantha T. was then renting a room in the house of some family friends in San Diego. If the children lived with her they would all have to sleep in the same room.
The DCFS worried Samantha T. was incapable of protecting her children. She blamed herself for her own sexual abuse. Alarmingly, she thought the most appropriate caretaker for her children was the perpetrator of her abuse. She did not visit her children regularly and, when she did, interacted with them poorly.
F
The court held combined hearings on April 23, 2007. The purposes were to select and to implement a permanent plan for J.V., J.E., and D.M. (§ 366.26) and to hear Samantha T.’s petition for modification (§ 388).
The adoption home study for the paternal grandparents had been completed and approved for all four girls.
J.V. and K. were in play therapy together.
Recently, Samantha T. visited the paternal grandparents’ home with four or five young men the paternal grandmother thought were gang members. The paternal grandparents were concerned for their safety and the children’s safety. They informed the case worker. The worker checked Samantha T.’s homepage and profile on MySpace. Recent postings on her site suggested Samantha T. was still involved with gangs.
One of Samantha T.’s postings on her profile read, “‘snitches run chavalas hide, I got my cuete loaded and I’m ready to ride’” She explained that “chavalas” are “like little bitches” and a “cuete” is a gun. Another posting said “‘I have 4 baby girls that are my heart and soul and I will never again put before any lames or anyone period: I’m a gangster hyna just chillin right now in the streets of SD: I’ve met some pretty down ass fools here but not 1 that’s good enough for me I just want someone I can chill and have a good time with do fun shit if you want this hyna to give you a chance just hit me up who knows you might even find your next best friend: I’m a really loving and devoted friend: But if you get on my bad side you get the bitch in me: And trust it ain’t nothing nice so if any of you lame ass chavala ranker ass bitches are reading this yeah you know who you are trix back the fuck off cause I’m already on your asses and you know where I came from and who’s down with me so watch your fuckin backs when you think I won’t attack that’s when I strike trick ass bitches!! And best believe the last laugh will still be mine: As always:…: Baby Loka.: El Sereno x3 keep hatin bitches I’ll still be here. . . .” Samantha T. explained El Sereno x3 was a reference to her old gang and that a “gangster hyna” is a “gangster girl.”
On the other hand, Samantha T.’s participation in drug counseling and drug testing had vastly improved. She had also been regularly attending parenting classes. Samantha T. visited with the children although she missed three of nine recent visits and was late for four of the visits she attended.
Samantha T. testified at the hearing. She talked about all the great progress she had made in improving her life since leaving Victor M. and moving to San Diego. Samantha T. reported she had been drug-free for months. The court asked her to explain her MySpace postings. Samantha T. admitted “there is still a little gangster in me” but said she was “not as hard as [she] used to be.”
Samantha T. still blamed herself for being sexually abused by her stepfather. She said it would be wrong if Victor M. molested their girls because he is their “real dad,” while the maternal step-grandfather was only her “stepfather.”
Separate counsel represented Samantha T.’s daughters at this hearing. This attorney praised Samantha T. for her progress but opposed her petition to modify the court’s orders. Through this attorney, the daughters in essence told the judge that it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate Samantha T.’s parental rights to J.V., J.E., and D.M. This attorney said Samantha T.’s progress was “too little, too late.”
The court ruled against Samantha T. It did praise her for her efforts to turn her life around. But it said it was not in the best interests of the children to modify the existing orders. Accordingly, the court denied Samantha T.’s petition for modification. It also terminated Samantha T.’s and Victor M.’s parental rights to J.V., J.E., and D.M.
Samantha T. appeals from these rulings. Her daughters J.V., J.E., and D.M. do not appeal.
II
Samantha T. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her petition for modification seeking return of the girls to her care, or in the alternative, additional reunification services and unlimited unmonitored visitation. The evidence revealed changed circumstances, she says, and this change meant the girls’ best interests required the court to modify its orders.
Section 388 provides in relevant part: “Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a).)
“The petition pursuant to section 388 lies to change or set aside any order of the juvenile court in the action from the time the child is made a dependent child of the juvenile court, including the order after a permanency planning hearing. [¶] The petition for modification must contain a concise statement of any change of circumstance or new evidence that requires changing the [previous] order. The petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. As one court has explained, if the petition presents any evidence that a hearing would promote the best interests of the child, the court will order the hearing.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
After termination of reunification services, however, the parents’ interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. At this point the focus shifts to the child’s need for stability. A court “at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
The juvenile court held a hearing to consider Samantha T.’s petition to modify the court’s orders. The court found Samantha T. had in fact carried her burden of showing changed circumstances. The court commended Samantha T.’s efforts and acknowledged how much she had improved since the beginning of the case. But the court also found no evidence to show a change of orders was in the girls’ best interest. We review the court’s determination for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451; In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1704.)
There is little doubt Samantha T. had made substantial progress since leaving Victor M. and moving to San Diego to start a new life. There is also little doubt but that Samantha T. could benefit from additional DCFS services. But at this point the proceedings were not about what could benefit Samantha T. The focus, instead, was on the children and whether it was in their best interest for the court to change its orders.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Samantha T. had yet to come to terms with the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of her stepfather. She blamed herself for that abuse. She did not understand she had been the victim of this wrong. She had not yet sought individual counseling to address this issue. Nor had she sought domestic violence counseling – the very issue that brought her family to the attention of the DCFS. Samantha T. was also not yet ready to sever ties to her gangster past. The court had legitimate concerns about Samantha T.’s ability to protect her girls.
Even assuming a single room could provide proper housing for her children for overnight or weekend visits, there was no evidence these visits would help the girls. Samantha T. made no real effort to engage her children during visits she attended. She had minimal interaction with them. The girls, for their part, showed no emotion when the visits ended. Samantha T.’s daughters apparently had not bonded to her.
While Samantha T.’s progress was commendable, the juvenile court properly could conclude there was too little to “require [a] change of order.” (§ 388, subd. (a); see also, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.560(d); In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) The court had to balance Samantha T.’s progress against the girls’ need for continuity and stability. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [a dependent child’s need for continuity and stability “will often dictate the conclusion that maintenance of the current arrangement would be in the best interests of that child.”].) Most significantly, however, Samantha T. presented no evidence to show the change in order she sought was in the girls’ best interest.
On these facts, the court correctly found Samantha T. had failed to carry her burden of proving that due to a substantial change of circumstances a change of order was in the children’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 [the burden of proof is on the moving party to show by a preponderance of the evidence there is new evidence or changed circumstances which make a change of order in the best interest of the child].) Accordingly, the court’s decision to deny her petition for modification did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
III
When a court orders a hearing under section 366.26 to terminate parental rights it must direct the DCFS to prepare an adoption assessment report. (§§ 366.21, subd. (i), 366.22, subd. (b).) Among other required subjects, the adoption assessment report must provide “[a] review of the amount of and nature of any contact between the child and his or her parents or legal guardians and other members of his or her extended family since the time of placement. Although the extended family of each child shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, ‘extended family’ for the purpose of this paragraph shall include, but not be limited to, the child’s siblings, grandparents, aunts, and uncles.” (§§ 366.21, subd. (i)(2), 366.22, subd. (b)(2).)
Samantha T. contends the adoption assessment reports failed to comply with this statutory requirement because they failed to include a review of the extent of the contact J.V., J.E., and, D.M. had with their half sister K.
Samantha T. essentially admits she has forfeited her right to contest the adequacy of the reports by not raising the issue in the juvenile court. (See, e.g., In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 956, fn. 8 [“L. admits she waived [forfeited] the right to contest the adequacy of the assessment report by not raising the issue below. (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411.)”]; In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886 [“We conclude that by failing to raise the adequacy of the report below, mother waived this issue.”]; In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846 [a father who failed to object to the challenged reports below is precluded from doing so for the first time on appeal].)
However, Samantha T. asserts her failure to object in the juvenile court does not forfeit her right to contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s finding of adoptability. (See, e.g., In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 [“while a parent may waive the objection that an adoption assessment does not comply with the requirements provided in section 366.21, subdivision (i), a claim that there was insufficient evidence of the child’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the juvenile court.”]; In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561 [a party does not forfeit a claim of insufficient evidence to support a factual finding by failing to make the specific objection in the trial court]; see also, People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126 [a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a factual finding is an “obvious” exception to the appellate rule of forfeiture by failing to object in the trial court].)
Samantha T., accordingly, couches her argument instead as one of insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of adoptability. She asserts that without specific information regarding the sisters’ sibling bond since K.’s placement with her caretaker uncle/prospective adoptive father, “reasonable persons could disagree as to whether that bond precluded a finding of adoptability, and, therefore the court had insufficient evidence to support its finding.”
The juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the children will be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1060.) “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability. “The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.” (In re Brian P., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.) We review the court’s finding of adoptability to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support its finding. (Id. at pp. 623-624.)
The question of adoptability usually focuses on the child, to determine whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find an adoptive family. (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1651.) Because the focus is on the child, it is not necessary to a finding of adoptability the child already be in a prospective adoptive home. (Id. at p. 1650.) The existence of a prospective adoptive family, however, is evidence the child’s attributes make the child likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, either by the prospective adoptive family or by some other family. (In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 510.)
Factors that may make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt a child include “membership in a sibling group,” “diagnosed medical, physical, or mental handicap[s],” a child’s age of “seven years or more” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3)), or developmental or emotional problems. (In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1063, 1065.)
On the other hand, a “child’s young age, good physical and emotional health, intellectual growth and ability to develop interpersonal relationships are all attributes indicating adoptability.” (In re Gregory A., supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1562.)
The record contains clear and convincing evidence J.V., J.E., and D.M. met the criteria for a finding of adoptability. The girls were very young. By the time of the hearing J.V. was four and a half years old, J.E. was almost three years old, and D.M. was 19 months old. Each of the girls was in good physical health and none had emotional, developmental, or behavioral problems. They were already in an adoptive home. A home study had been successfully completed. The girls had already bonded with their prospective adoptive parents. It was not an impediment to their adoptability that the three girls formed a rather large sibling group. The paternal grandparents were eager to adopt all three girls and had offered to adopt their half sister K. as well.
In her reply brief Samantha T. concedes the girls met all the usual criteria for a finding of adoptability, but complains the lack of information regarding the siblings’ bond with K. defeats that finding in this case.
It is true the adoption assessment reports did not provide the court with an in-depth analysis of the potential bond between the sibling group and their half sister K. However, the court had considerable information about the girls’ relationship from other sources. (Cf. In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 503 [the failure to provide the statutorily required preliminary assessment of a potential guardian is harmless when the court receives the same information through other means]; In re John F. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1378 [“Substantial compliance with the assessment provisions has been deemed enough.”].)
Other evidence before the court showed K. had been raised by the maternal grandparents. She had lived in their home from birth. The maternal grandparents were the only mother and father she knew. As it turned out, the maternal grandfather was her father both literally and figuratively. She considered the maternal grandparents’ children her siblings. K. lived for the first time with her half siblings when they were declared dependents of the juvenile court in these proceedings. K. became anxious when she and the other girls were placed in the paternal grandparents’ home because of their emergency removal. According to her counsel, K. was unhappy there, did not want to live there, and wanted to go back to the people she knew as her family. Thus, the evidence before the court showed K.’s and the other girls’ backgrounds and familial bonds were very different. The evidence also showed they had no preexisting connection to each other. K. did not consider the girls her sisters, nor their parents her parents.
Other evidence also showed that, of the three in the sibling group, only J.V. was verbal. The two youngest girls did not appear affected by, or to understand, what was going on. J.V. apparently enjoyed being with K. When K. went to live with her uncle and prospective adoptive father J.V. asked about K. and wanted to know when she would return. Apparently what upset J.V. was fear of being removed from her paternal grandparents.
J.V.’s distress alone was not enough to deprive the three girls of the benefits of a permanent placement in an adoptive home with persons who loved and wanted them. In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the court’s finding J.V., J.E., and D.M. were adoptable and likely to be adopted.
IV
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, Acting P. J., ZELON, J.