Opinion
G055101
06-19-2018
In re JUAN MANZANARES on Habeas Corpus.
Juan Manzanares, in pro. per.; and Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 05WF3659) OPINION Original proceeding on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after a judgment from the Superior Court of Orange County, John Conley, Judge. Petition granted. Juan Manzanares, in pro. per.; and Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
In this habeas proceeding, petitioner contends his conviction for first degree murder must be reversed in light of People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), which limited the permissible theories of aiding and abetting liability for that offense. He also contends his sentence must be vacated due to sentencing error. Respondent agrees with these contentions, and so do we. The only disputed issue is whether, on remand, petitioner should be afforded the opportunity to make a record relevant to his future parole hearing. We see no reason to deny petitioner's request in that regard. Therefore, we grant his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are set forth in our prior opinion in People v. Manzanares (Mar. 19, 2010, G040381) [nonpub. opn.], which we incorporate by reference. They show that in 2005, at the age of 19, petitioner was involved in a gang fight that culminated in the shooting death of a rival gang member. Although petitioner was not the shooter, he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and other crimes based on aiding and abetting principles. The jury also found true a special circumstance allegation the murder was committed to benefit petitioner's gang. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced petitioner to life in prison without parole for that offense. As explained below, the court also enhanced petitioner's sentence significantly because his crimes were gang related and a principal fatally discharged a firearm.
On appeal, we reversed the true finding on the special circumstance allegation due to instructional error and remanded the matter for resentencing but otherwise affirmed the judgment. After the California Supreme Court denied review, the special circumstance allegation was dismissed, and the trial court resentenced petitioner; it reduced his term on the murder count to 25 years to life and left the remainder of his sentence intact.
DISCUSSION
Chiu Error
Chiu was decided in 2014, after the judgment against petitioner became final. In that case, the California Supreme Court examined which theories of aiding and abetting liability can be used to convict a defendant of first degree premeditated murder. The court held a defendant cannot be convicted of that offense under the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 166.) However, "[a]iders and abettors may still be convicted of first degree premeditated murder based on direct aiding and abetting principles. [Citation.] Under those principles, the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 167.) In other words, the state must prove the defendant acted with premeditation.
Chiu also made clear that when a first degree murder conviction is prosecuted on both theories of liability, reversal is required unless the record establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the jury relied on the legally valid theory of direct aiding and abetting. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.) These principles also apply in the context of a petition for writ of habeas corpus to cases that are already final on direct appeal. (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216.)
Here, the state relied on both the direct theory of abetting and abetting and the natural and probable consequences theory in prosecuting petitioner for first degree premeditated murder. And, as respondent concedes, the record is unclear as to which theory the jury relied on in convicting petitioner of that offense. Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and the matter must be remanded. On remand, the prosecution may accept a reduction to second degree murder or retry petitioner for first degree murder on the theory he directly aided and abetted the killing. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 168; In re Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1227.)
Sentencing Issues
Petitioner also raises several sentencing claims. Because those claims turn on the application of two complex sentencing statutes - Penal Code sections 186.22 (applicable to gang-related crimes) and 12022.53 (applicable to gun-related crimes) - we begin by providing an overview of petitioner's sentence.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On count 1, the trial court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life in prison for first degree murder. (§ 190, subd. (a).) On counts 2 thru 4, the court imposed concurrent terms of 15 years to life for attempted premeditated murder based on the fact the crimes were gang related. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5).) The gang factor also mandated a sentence of 15 years to life on count 5 for shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(B)), but the court stayed that sentence under section 654. (Although they are not at issue in this proceeding, petitioner also received stayed and concurrent midterm sentences for shooting in a school zone and street terrorism, on counts 6 and 7.)
As for the enhancements, the court sentenced petitioner to 25 years to life on counts 1 and 5 because a principal intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).) The court also imposed 20-year enhancements on counts 2 thru 4 on the basis a principal intentionally discharged a firearm during those crimes. (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)(1).) Thus, petitioner's aggregate sentence was 75 years to life, plus 60 years.
The parties agree petitioner's sentence is flawed in two respects. First, the trial court erred in imposing unstayed terms of 15 years to life on counts 2, 3 and 4. In view of the fact the crimes in those counts were gang related there was nothing wrong with the court setting petitioner's minimum parole eligibility at 15 years for those offenses. (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(4)(B) & (5).) But because petitioner did not personally discharge a firearm during those crimes, the court should have imposed and then stayed his sentence on those counts pursuant to section 12022.53. (§ 12022.53, subds. (e)(2) & (f); People v. Brookfield (2009) 47 Cal.4th 583; People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118.) The same is true as to count 5. Although respondent correctly notes the trial court stayed petitioner's sentence on that count, it issued the stay under section 654. This was technically incorrect because the stay was mandated by virtue of section 12022.53. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)
The second sentencing error also pertains to counts 2 thru 5. Because the trial court imposed concurrent terms for the crimes in those counts, it was not authorized to impose consecutive enhancements on them. (People v. Mustafaa (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1309-1311.) In light of these errors, resentencing is required.
Scope of Remand
The remaining issue has to do with the scope of the proceedings on remand. Relying on People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), petitioner contends that during the course of resentencing, he should be permitted to present evidence relevant to his future parole hearing. Respondent disagrees. In the state's view, it would be premature to order a Franklin hearing without knowing how the trial court is going to resentence petitioner on remand, and, in any event, Franklin does not apply to cases like petitioner's that are already final for purposes of direct appeal. We find respondent's arguments unavailing.
Petitioner was originally sentenced in 2008. Shortly thereafter, the courts issued a series of decisions that affected a sea change in the realm of juvenile sentencing. (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [it is cruel and unusual to sentence juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without the possibility of parole]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [mandatory sentence of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders is unconstitutional]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262 [barring de facto sentences of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders].) These decisions established that, except in the rarest of circumstances not presented here, juvenile offenders facing life-long prison terms must be given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their fitness to reenter society at some point in the future. (Ibid.)
As explained in Franklin, the Legislature responded to this directive in 2013 by enacting "a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . . [Citations].'" (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) The core of the statutory scheme is set forth in section 3051, which authorizes a "youth offender parole hearing" for anyone who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of their offense. (§ 3051, subd. (a).)
The timing of the hearing depends on the length of the defendant's sentence. For youthful offenders sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment, the parole hearing shall occur during the 15th year of their incarceration; if they were sentenced to an indeterminate term of less than 25 years to life, their hearing shall occur during their 20th year of incarceration; and if they were sentenced to 25 years to life, their hearing shall occur during the 25th year of their incarceration. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(1)-(3).)
In Franklin, our Supreme Court ruled the availability of a youth offender parole hearing is sufficient to assuage constitutional concerns about the severity of juvenile sentences "[s]o long as juvenile offenders have an adequate opportunity to make a record of factors, including youth-related factors, relevant to the eventual parole determination[.]" (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 286.) The record shall include "any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors." (Id. at p. 284.) Because the defendant in Franklin was sentenced in 2011, before youth offender parole hearings were established, he had no incentive to present such evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to ensure he was afforded a sufficient opportunity to make a record relevant to his future parole hearing. (Ibid.)
Likewise, here, petitioner was sentenced before the law respecting juvenile sentencing changed in the early part of this decade. The youth-related factors bearing on his future suitability for parole were therefore not developed at his sentencing hearing. Respondent contends that doesn't matter because, for reasons discussed above, petitioner has to be resentenced when the case is remanded to the trial court. Given the need for resentencing, respondent submits we need not decide whether petitioner is entitled to a Franklin hearing because "the court may put on the record the kinds of information that are relevant at a youth offend[er] parole hearing. Or, petitioner's sentence may not trigger a Franklin hearing under section 3051."
However, as we have explained, section 3051 generally applies to anyone who was sentenced to a determinate or indeterminate term for a crime they committed when they were age 25 or younger. (§ 3051, subds. (a) & (b).) Since petitioner committed his crimes when he was 19 years old, he comes within the purview of the statute. Moreover, contrary to respondent's suggestion, the statute does not put the onus on the trial court to make a record of the pertinent age-related factors. Instead, the court must simply ensure the parties have the opportunity to do so. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Accordingly, we reject respondent's claim it is premature to adjudicate the issue of whether petitioner is entitled to a Franklin hearing.
The statute does excludes certain categories of youthful offenders, but petitioner does not fall into any of those categories. (See § 3051, subd. (h).) --------
As to that issue, respondent contends Franklin should not be applied retroactively to cases, like petitioner's, that are already final for purposes of direct appeal. Respondent asserts, "Because Franklin did not rely on any finding of constitutional or sentencing error, and given the special nature of the remand order in that case, there is no clear legal basis for using a writ of habeas corpus to direct a superior court to hold a similar supplemental evidentiary hearing."
We disagree with the underlying premise of respondent's argument. Franklin makes clear that affording juvenile defendants the opportunity to make a record of youth-related factors bearing on their future suitability for paroles is necessary to ensure their sentences do not violate the proscription against cruel or unusual punishment. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Thus, the Franklin decision clearly has a constitutional component.
Respondent also cites practical considerations for not ordering a Franklin hearing in this case. Given that 13 years have passed since petitioner's crimes occurred, respondent questions whether it would be "efficient or effective" to hold a Franklin hearing at this stage of the proceedings. But as this court decided in In re Cook (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 393 (Cook), the sheer passage of time is insufficient to deny a defendant the chance to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. In Cook, we held habeas corpus is a proper mechanism to obtain the rights afforded in Franklin. We recognize the Supreme Court granted review of Cook and will have the last word on that issue. (See ibid., rev. granted Apr. 12, 2017, S240153.) However, here, there is an additional reason for ordering a Franklin hearing: Because the case must be remanded for resentencing for other reasons, it would not cause great expense or inconvenience to conduct a Franklin hearing in connection with the resentencing hearing. Although the state should not have to continually marshal resources to ensure the finality of criminal judgments, it would not impede the administration of justice to order a Franklin hearing under the circumstances presented in this case.
DISPOSITION
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted. Petitioner's conviction for first degree murder is reversed, his sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court shall also conduct a Franklin hearing to allow the parties to make a record relevant to petitioner's future parole hearing.
BEDSWORTH, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. THOMPSON, J.