Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD17899
Premo, J.
V.R. (mother), appeals from orders of the juvenile court adjudging her son, J.R., a dependent child of the court and bypassing reunification services for her. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 361.5, subd. (b).) We appointed counsel to represent mother in this court.
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief which states the case and the facts but raises no specific issues. (See In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952 (Sade C.).) Mother now asks this court to independently review the record and also to follow the procedure set forth in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, footnote 6 (Ben C.), by inviting mother to file her own supplemental brief. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services opposes the request, arguing that Ben C. does not require us to solicit supplemental briefs from appellants in dependency cases.
We reject mother’s request that we independently review the record. Where appointed counsel in a dependency case has been unable to identify any arguable issues for appeal, existing law does not require the appellate court to undertake an independent review of the record. The question of whether the appellate court must solicit supplemental briefing directly from the appellants in dependency cases is presently before our Supreme Court. (In re Phoenix H., review granted Oct. 10, 2007, S155556.) We decline mother’s suggestion that we await the Supreme Court’s decision on the point. Whether or not we are bound to solicit supplemental briefs from indigent appellants in dependency cases, mother has submitted a letter in this case and we have read and considered it. Since neither mother nor her counsel has raised an arguable issue, we shall dismiss the appeal.
Background
According to the briefs filed in this case, mother is a developmentally disabled adult. She has six children, the youngest of whom, J.R., is the subject of this appeal. The juvenile court adjudged J.R. to be a dependent child of the court and placed him in foster care. Mother waived reunification services. She has timely appealed.
I. Discussion
Mother’s brief raises no issues on appeal. Counsel asks this court to independently review the record and to invite mother to write on any issues she wants to raise, arguing that Ben C. requires us to solicit such input.
In the first appeal of right in a criminal case, where appointed counsel’s opening brief raises no arguable issues, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), require the appellate court to independently review the record to determine if there are any legal points arguable on their merits. Sade C. very clearly held that the basis for the Anders/Wende “independent review” procedure was not applicable to dependency appeals and should not be extended to apply to dependency appeals. (Sade C., supra,13 Cal.4th at pp. 981-994.) Sade C. reasoned that dependency appeals did not merit independent review because, among other things, “[w]hatever the benefits in ensuring that appointed appellate counsel conduct themselves as active advocates . . . the costs are greater.” (Sade C., supra,13 Cal.4th at p. 993; see also In re Sara H. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 198, 200 [stressing the need for prompt resolution of dependency appeals and rejecting the argument that Anders/Wende review is discretionary in such cases].) In 2007, Ben C. concluded that the Anders/Wende independent review process did not apply in conservatorship cases. (Ben C., supra,40 Cal.4th at p. 544.) Thus, neither Sade C. nor Ben C. requires this court to independently review the record as it would be required to do if this were the first appeal in a criminal case.
In addition to independent review, the Anders/Wende process requires that the appellant be given an opportunity to raise any issues he or she thinks should be considered. “[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court--not counsel--then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” (Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744, italics added.) Although Ben C. held that the independent review prong of the Anders/Wende process does not apply to conservatorship cases, the court stated in a footnote that when counsel in a conservatorship proceeding cannot find an arguable issue, “The conservatee is to be provided a copy of the brief and informed of the right to file a supplemental brief.” (Ben C., supra,40 Cal.4that p. 544, fn. 6.) The court did not elaborate on this instruction but we have since treated it as a directive and routinely solicit such briefs from conservatees in conservatorship cases. Sade C. did not consider whether such a process should be used in dependency cases because counsel had advised the parents that they could file supplemental briefs and they chose not to do so. (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 962.) The question, therefore, is whether footnote 6 of Ben C. should be extended to apply to dependency appeals.
Wende clarified that, where counsel has not been disqualified by representing the appeal as frivolous, counsel need not seek leave to withdraw. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 442.)
We need not reach the issue presented because counsel informed mother that she was entitled to write to the court and mother did so, submitting a letter in her own behalf. We have read and considered that letter. In it mother alleges that the social workers were biased against her and that her trial counsel did not allow her to speak to the court. She does not address the fact that she waived receipt of reunification services. Mother is clearly saddened by the result in this case but she has made no argument that would allow us to reverse it. Accordingly, neither mother nor her appellate attorney has made any colorable assertions of error. We conclude, therefore, that they have implicitly abandoned the appeal and that dismissal is the appropriate disposition. (In re Sara H., supra,52 Cal.App.4th at p. 202.)
II. Disposition
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.