In In re W.V., 204 N.C.App. 290, 295, 693 S.E.2d 383, 387 (2010), we held that the trial court's order awarding the respondent “weekly visitations supervised by petitioner” was insufficient to establish a minimum outline for visitation and required remand “for clarification of the visitation plan.” Similarly, in In re J.P., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 750 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2013), we concluded that the visitation portion of the trial court's order was inadequate where it merely required the petitioner to offer supervised visitation to the respondent every other week and failed to make findings and conclusions “as to the time, place, and conditions of an appropriate visitation plan.”

However, we conclude that any alleged error was rendered harmless by the trial court's entry of a permanent plan in its dispositional order. See In re J.P., ––– N.C.App. ––––, 750 S.E.2d 543 (2013). Claire additionally argues that the trial court erred by entering a permanent plan for the juveniles at disposition when she did not have the statutorily required notice that the trial court would consider a permanent plan.

"[A] party waives its right to notice under section 7B-907(a) by attending the hearing in which the permanent plan is created, participating in the hearing, and failing to object to the lack of notice." In re J.P. , 230 N.C. App. 523, 526, 750 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2013) (footnote omitted) (citing In re J.S. , 165 N.C. App. 509, 514, 598 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2004) ). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(a) was repealed effective 1 October 2013 and recodified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(b).

"[A] party waives its right to notice under section 7B-907(a) by attending the hearing in which the permanent plan is created, participating in the hearing, and failing to object to the lack of notice." In re J.P., 230 N.C.App. 523, 526, 750 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2013) (footnote omitted) (citing In re J.S., 165 N.C.App. 509, 514, 598 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2004)). ¶ 23 Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred in conducting a permanency planning hearing without providing adequate notice of the proceedings.

Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court." In re J.P., 230 N.C. App. 523, 525, 750 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2013) (citations omitted). Further, [w]henever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.

On remand, we instruct the trial court to make new findings on this issue that comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(c). See In re J.P. , 230 N.C. App. 523, 530, 750 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2013) (remanding for new findings where trial court failed to specify conditions of visitation as required by statute). Conclusion

The terms of the statute are consistent with our case law interpreting the visitation findings required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–905(c), the prior statute. See In re J.P., –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 750 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2013) (holding that a disposition order must, at a minimum, set out the time, place, and conditions of visitation). In this case, the trial court made a finding that squarely addresses all three requirements of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–905.

Previously, N.C.G.S. § 7B–907(a) also required 15 days' notice of a permanency planning hearing. Under the prior statute, we held that a parent waives his or her right to notice “by attending the hearing in which the permanent plan is created, participating in the hearing, and failing to object to the lack of notice.” In re J. P., ––– N.C.App. ––––, –––– 750 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2013). In this case, mother never objected to a lack of notice of a permanency planning hearing.