Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DP010046, Gary Vincent, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Michael D. Randall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Paula A. Whaley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
IKOLA, J.
Melody R. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s January 23, 2007 order reducing her visitation time with her son Joshua R. from four hours a week to one hour per week. Mother contends the court abused its discretion by reducing her visitation time without “a showing of danger to the child.” We conclude the appeal is moot and dismiss.
FACTS
In May 2004, the court declared eight-month-old Joshua a dependent child after his parents were arrested, and mother was incarcerated, for domestic violence. In October 2005, two-year-old Joshua began a 60-day trial visit with his father. Two months later, at the 18-month-review hearing, the court, pursuant to a signed stipulation, placed Joshua with father under a family maintenance plan with continued supervision and, at the recommendation of the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), terminated mother’s reunification services. In September 2006, at the first family maintenance review hearing conducted after several continuances, the court, pursuant to a signed stipulation, retained jurisdiction over Joshua, continued his placement with father with supervision, and maintained mother’s visitation at two visits a week, despite SSA’s recommendation that mother’s visitation be reduced to once a week for one hour due in part to mother’s inappropriate parenting behavior.
At the January 23, 2007 second family maintenance review hearing, the court reduced mother’s visitation to once weekly for one hour and warned mother that if her “behavior continue[d],” she would lose her visitation with Joshua. Mother timely filed this appeal from that visitation order.
While this appeal was pending, on October 2, 2007 (over eight months after issuing its January 23, 2007 order), the juvenile court terminated dependent child proceedings in this case and ordered SSA to submit exit orders. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), we took judicial notice of the October 2, 2007 order of the juvenile court terminating dependent child proceedings over Joshua (the termination order). We ordered the parties to submit letter briefs addressing the question whether the instant appeal was rendered moot by the court’s termination order. In a letter brief, mother’s appellate counsel asked this court to “wait and give appellant an opportunity to file her notice of appeal from the termination order.”
On August 23, 2007, the juvenile court issued a restraining order of which we take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). The restraining order (against mother) included a visitation order granting mother monitored visitation with Joshua for three hours per month.
DISCUSSION
“‘[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.’ [Citation.] The question of mootness in a dependency case should be decided on a case-by-case basis.” (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404-405.) Under certain limited circumstances, an appeal is not rendered moot even though the juvenile court’s jurisdiction has terminated due to the court’s dismissal of a dependency proceeding, but this is not one of those situations: Here, mother does not “appeal from an interim order which might affect further and subsequent orders of the juvenile court” (In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 329), nor does she challenge jurisdictional findings “where exercise of that jurisdiction has resulted in orders which continue to adversely affect appellant.” (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548.) Rather, mother appeals from a visitation order that has been superseded by a subsequent order. Obviously, we cannot alter the visitation that was provided to mother prior to the superseding August 23, 2007 visitation order. “Because we are unable to fashion an effective remedy, the appeal is moot.” (In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is hereby dismissed as moot.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., ARONSON, J.