Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Federico Castro, Judge. Super. Ct. No. J213237
IRION, J.
Jonah G. appeals from the juvenile court's judgment, including (1) its finding that Jonah is a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions, and that he committed vandalism, burglary and theft at a middle school and high school; and (2) its order that Jonah is required to pay a total of $2,849.32 in restitution, which he is to share as a joint and several liability with the other boys involved in the incidents. As we will explain, we conclude that Jonah's challenges to the judgment are without merit, and accordingly, we affirm.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On Saturday, May 6, 2006, Jonah, along with several other boys, including his older brother, broke into a middle school cafeteria. Jonah was 11 years old at the time. To gain access to the inside of the building, the boys used a metal rod to bend open a roll-up metal door. After they got inside the cafeteria, the boys stole numerous bottles of soft drinks and poured sticky liquid onto two cash registers and the floor.
Later the same day the boys went to a nearby high school after one boy in the group told them they could steal computers there. The boys climbed onto the roof of a high school building and took the cover off a vent in the roof. The boys lowered Jonah through the vent, and Jonah fell through the acoustic ceiling tiles to the floor and injured himself. He ran bleeding from the building, where he encountered a teacher, who tended to Jonah's injury and called the police. When questioned two days later by Police Officer Lehman Ula, Jonah admitted to being involved in the incidents at the middle school and high school.
Before questioning Jonah about the incidents, Officer Ula asked questions to determine whether Jonah understood that his actions were wrong. Officer Ula first asked Jonah to give two examples of something that was right to do. Jonah replied that doing homework and obeying teachers was right. Officer Ula then asked Jonah to give him two examples of something wrong to do. Jonah replied that stealing and fighting were wrong, and Jonah told Officer Ula that his father had taught him the difference between right and wrong. Officer Ula then told Jonah that he was being accused of burglary and asked whether he knew at the time of the incident whether it was right or wrong. Jonah replied that it was wrong. In response to Officer Ula's question about how long he had known the burglary was wrong, Jonah responded that he had known it "from the start."
A petition was filed against Jonah in juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Arising out of the incident at the middle school, Jonah was charged with one count of felony burglary (Pen. Code, § 459); one count of felony vandalism (id., § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)); and one count of misdemeanor petty theft (id., § 484). Arising out of the incident at the high school, Jonah was charged with one count of misdemeanor burglary (id., §§ 459, 17, subd. (b)(4)); and one count of misdemeanor vandalism (id., § 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)).
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) provides that, with certain exceptions, "any person who is under the age of 18 years when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court."
The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding that Jonah was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and that that Jonah was aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct. The juvenile court made true findings as to all of the counts except the count for felony vandalism arising out of the incident at the middle school, which it reduced to a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)) due to lack of evidence that the value of the property damage associated with that offense exceeded $400.
At the dispositional hearing, Jonah was placed under home supervision for 30 days and was ordered to pay restitution. The amount of the restitution was ordered at a restitution status review hearing. The trial court ordered that Jonah was to pay $2,164.32 to the middle school and $685 to the high school. The trial court ordered that Jonah and the other boys found to have participated in the incidents at the middle school and high school were "jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution to the victim(s)."
II
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court's Findings that Jonah Knew His Conduct Was Wrongful
Penal Code section 26 provides that children under the age of 14 are not capable of committing crimes "in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." This provision applies to proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. (In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232.) Jonah argues that the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. Jonah contends that although he told Officer Ula that he knew burglary was wrong, an 11-year-old boy cannot reasonably be expected to know the definition of the word "burglary," and thus his statement to Officer Ula does not constitute sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding.
The juvenile court is required to find "by clear and convincing evidence that the minor appreciated the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed." (In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.) However, on appeal we must affirm the juvenile court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) "We review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof." (In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)
"In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence . . . including the minor's age, experience and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense including its method of commission and concealment." (In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298, citation omitted.) Here, as we will explain, Jonah's own words establish that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct.
We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence that Jonah knew his conduct was wrong. Jonah told Officer Ula that he understood the difference between right and wrong, and he gave examples of wrongful conduct, which included the act of stealing. The incidents at the middle and the high school both were motivated by the desire to steal something. At the middle school, the boys broke into the cafeteria to steal soft drinks. At the high school, the boys were attempting to steal computers. Further, Jonah's statement that he knew the burglary was wrong "from the start" indicated that he was referring to the wrongfulness of the acts that he had committed, rather than simply to the wrongfulness of burglary as an abstract concept. Accordingly, whether or not Jonah knew the exact meaning of the word "burglary," his statements to Officer Ula provided substantial evidence for the juvenile court's finding that Jonah was aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct.
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Setting the Amount of the Restitution Award
The juvenile court set the amount of the restitution order at $2,164.32 for the property damage at the middle school and $685 for the property damage at the high school. The record shows that the middle school incurred expenses of $1,937.44 to repair the roll-up metal door and $226.88 to repair the cash registers, and the high school incurred an expense of $685 to replace the vent cover and ceiling tiles.
Jonah argues that the trial court erred in setting the amount of the restitution award because it was based on property damage that did not result from the crimes that the trial court found to be true. "The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion." (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.)
We elect to decide this issue on the merits rather than addressing the Attorney General's contention that Jonah's objection to the amount of the restitution order is waived because his attorney stipulated in the juvenile court to the amount of the award.
As legal authority for his argument, Jonah points out that Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (h) states that restitution may be ordered to reimburse the victim "for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct." (Italics added.) He also points out that case law interpreting Penal Code section 1202.4, which he describes as "the adult analog" to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, states that "restitution must be for economic damages resulting from the crime of which [the defendant] was convicted, not merely those 'reasonably related' to the crime." (People v. Rubics (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 452, 460, italics added.)
As the factual predicate for this argument, Jonah points out that the true finding regarding vandalism at the middle school concerned misdemeanor vandalism, which is legally limited to property damage of $400 (see Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)), and the true finding as to theft at the middle school concerned petty theft, which also has a legal limit of $400 (id., §§ 487, subd. (a), 488). Jonah argues that, accordingly, neither of those offenses could have resulted in property damage of $2,164.32 at the middle school. Jonah argues that regarding the high school incident, the juvenile court made a true finding as to misdemeanor vandalism, but the permissible amount of up to $400 associated with that offense exceeds the $685 restitution order for the damage at the high school.
We reject the factual predicate for Jonah's argument. Jonah overlooks that the juvenile court also made true findings regarding burglary at the middle school and high school, and those findings support the amount of the restitution award. At the middle school, Jonah burglarized the cafeteria by gaining entry through the roll-up metal door, causing property damage of $1,937.44. At the high school, in the course of gaining entry for the burglary of the building, Jonah damaged the vent cover and ceiling tiles, causing $685 of property damage. These items of property damage at both schools directly resulted from breaking and entering during the act of committing a burglary. The remaining $226.88 of property damage to the cash registers at the middle school was the result of the misdemeanor vandalism and is within the $400 limit for that offense.
We thus do not, and need not, address whether the legal authority cited by Jonah supports his argument.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of the restitution award.
C. The Trial Court Properly Ordered the Restitution Liability to be Joint and Several
Finally, we address Jonah's argument that the trial court erred by ordering that the restitution payment was to be a joint and several liability of all of the boys who were found to have been involved in the incidents at the middle school and high school.
We elect to decide this issue on the merits rather than addressing the Attorney General's argument that Jonah has waived this issue by not raising it in the juvenile court.
According to Jonah, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1), which authorizes the juvenile court to order restitution, cannot be interpreted to permit the imposition of joint and several liability for that restitution. In support of his argument, Jonah points to the language of the statute, which states that restitution should be in an amount "sufficient to fully reimburse the victim . . . for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h), italics added.) He argues that this language indicates that the statute "adopts a rule of several liability for the victim's damages, which provides that each defendant is liable for only that portion of the victim's damages which is commensurate with that minor's degree of fault for the damage."
We disagree. The statute's language directly contradicts Jonah's argument because it expressly authorizes the juvenile court to enter a restitution order specifying that several persons are jointly and severally liable for the amount of restitution ordered. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (a)(2), when a minor is found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, "the court shall order the minor to pay . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)." Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (h)(4) states that "[w]hen feasible, the court shall also identify on the court order, any cooffenders who are jointly and severally liable for victim restitution." Based on this statutory language, which directly addresses the issue, we reject Jonah's argument that Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 prohibits the imposition of joint and several liability for a restitution order. On the contrary, the statutory language indicates that the Legislature intended to allow such orders.
In light of the direct statutory language on this issue, we find the other authority cited by Jonah in support of this argument to be inapplicable and unpersuasive.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J., HALLER, J.