Opinion
A23-0350
09-12-2023
In the Matter of the Application of Christina Marie Johnson for a Change of Name obo Minor.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-22-5531
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Hooten, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
CAROL HOOTEN, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant-mother Christina Marie Johnson challenges the district court's denial of her application to change the name of her minor child, S.M.M. Because of our deferential standard of review, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial, and we affirm.
2. Mother and father are the parents of S.M.M., who was born in 2015 and is currently seven years old. Between 2017 and 2022 mother and respondent-father Durell Lamarr Mitchell were involved in at least seven order-for-protection (OFP) cases. In 2020, mother was granted sole legal and sole physical custody of S.M.M. Father's parenting time is currently limited to FaceTime calls with S.M.M. due to an OFP in place against him on behalf of mother and S.M.M.
3. On October 12, 2022, mother applied for a name change on behalf of S.M.M. to change the child's surname from father's surname, "Mitchell," to mother's surname, "Johnson." After a contested hearing whereby mother and two witnesses argued for the name change and father objected to it, the district court filed an order denying the name change. Mother appeals.
4. On appeal, mother, who is pro se, argues that S.M.M.'s name should be changed because it would be in the child's best interests. Father, also pro se, counters that and argues it would be in S.M.M.'s best interests if her name remained the same.
Both mother and father failed to make legal arguments or cite to authority to support their propositions. While we could decline to address the concerns raised, see State, Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue); Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn.App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal), we will grant some leeway and address the concerns on the merits. See Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987) ("[A]n appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules....").
5. We review the grant or denial of a name change under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn.App. 1994). A district court abuses its discretion when evidence in the record does not support the factual findings, the court misapplied the law, or the court settles a dispute in a way "that is against logic and the facts on record." Foster v. Foster, 802 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Minn.App. 2011) (quotation omitted).
6. Minnesota Statutes sections 259.10-.13 (2022) govern name changes in Minnesota. Section 259.10 provides that a minor child's name may not be changed unless both parents are notified of the name change application. Minn. Stat. § 259.10, subd. 1. If neither parent opposes the name change, the district court must grant the request unless, "the court finds that such name change is not in the best interests of the child." Minn. Stat. § 259.11(a). However, when a parent opposes the name change, the district court must exercise "great caution" and grant the name change "only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change." In re Application of Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn. 1981).
7. Once a child's surname has been selected, a change "should be granted only when the change promotes the child's best interests." Id. To determine the child's best interests, the district court may consider: (1) "the child's preference," (2) "the effect of the change of the child's surname on the preservation and the development of the child's relationship with each parent," (3) "the length of time the child has borne a given name," (4) "the degree of community respect associated with the present and the proposed surname," and (5) "the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment, that the child may experience from bearing the present or the proposed surname." Id. "In weighing these [Saxton] factors to reach a decision, the [district] court should set out its reasons for granting or denying the application to change the minor's surname." Id.
8. The district court applied and weighed the five Saxton factors to determine whether the name change was in S.M.M.'s best interests. The district court concluded that the first factor-the child's preference-was unclear. To support this conclusion, the district court found that mother and father gave conflicting testimony. The district court noted that mother testified that S.M.M. wants her surname to be the same as mother's surname, but father testified that he believes that S.M.M. "has not expressed a preference as much as she is afraid of upsetting mother if she does not agree with mother's proposal to change [her] name."
9. The district court evaluated the second factor, the length of time with the current name. While the district court did not note the weight it assigned to this factor, it explained that S.M.M. has had her surname for her entire life. We assume that the district court weighed this factor in favor of keeping the name the same.
10. The district court analyzed the third factor, the effect of the change on parentchild relationships. The district court explained that mother's argument that the child will feel "left out" by not having mother's name is unpersuasive because mother has other children (S.M.M.'s half-siblings) who also do not share mother's surname. Additionally, the district court found mother's desire to change the child's name to reflect mother's role as the primary caretaker unpersuasive because that reason did not promote the child's best interests but rather mother's interests. The district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of denying the name change request.
11. The fourth factor-the community respect associated with the present and proposed names-the district court determined was neutral. The district court concluded that both names were common surnames and that neither parent provided evidence that one surname either carries a special degree of community respect or lacks a positive reputation.
12. The district court evaluated the fifth factor, the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment to the child. The district court did not find persuasive mother's argument that S.M.M. feels embarrassed by not having the same surname as mother for the same reasons already discussed in the third factor. The district court acknowledged that S.M.M. might feel embarrassed being associated with father, whose conduct has resulted in multiple OFPs, and this could be harmful to S.M.M. if people "associate father's misdeeds with the child." However, the district court concluded that mother did not demonstrate how simply changing the child's surname would prevent the child from experiencing embarrassment when there are many ways of connecting a parent to a child, even when a surname is different.
13. The district court also considered whether the name change would cause S.M.M. difficulties. The district court reasoned that since S.M.M. has had her surname since birth, she has developed a connection to her name and there "is a substantial likelihood that changing [S.M.M]'s name could present difficulties with [her] records" and the sudden name change could result in the child being "teased, harassed, or embarrassed at school or in the community by others who do not understand the complexities of the situation." The district court concluded: "Although speculative, the potential impact of changing [S.M.M]'s surname could be devastating to [S.M.M]'s overall development and sense of self-esteem, self-worth, and confidence." The district court concluded that this factor weighed in favor of denying the name change.
14. After analyzing the Saxton factors, the district court concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence that changing the child's surname would promote the child's best interests.
15. Mother now argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying her request because changing S.M.M.'s name is in the child's best interests.However, based on our narrow standard of review and the limited record available to us, we conclude that the district court's factual findings support its decision that the name change is not in the child's best interests.
Mother also argues that the district court erred by not asking S.M.M. or mother's two witnesses any questions about the case at the hearing. However, mother did not order the transcript of the contested hearing. See Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn.App. 1995) (stating that the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal); Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn.App. 1990), (stating that a pro se appellant is not relieved "of the necessity of providing an adequate record and preserving it in a way that will permit review"), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990). Without the transcript, we are unable to adequately review mother's claim. See Am. Fam Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn.App. 1995), (explaining that when a transcript is not provided on appeal, our task is "limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law"), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). Moreover, the district court's order states that mother's witnesses did testify "in support of mother's application." Thus, we conclude that mother has failed to establish that the district court erred by failing to ask S.M.M. or the witnesses about the case.
16. Because the district court's factual findings support its conclusion that it is in S.M.M.'s best interests not to change her surname, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.