Opinion
No. 343628
11-27-2018
In re L. F-S. JOHNSON, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED St. Joseph Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2014-000827-NA Before: MURPHY, P.J., and O'CONNELL and BECKERING, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the termination of his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion for 91 or more days), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). On appeal, respondent challenges the trial court's determination that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests. We affirm.
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met." In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's factual determination that statutory grounds exist for termination. Id. Once the trial court has found a statutory ground for termination of parental rights, the trial court must order termination if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). At the best-interest stage, "the interests of the child and the parent diverge once the petitioner proves parental unfitness." Id. at 87. Therefore, the interests of the child, not the parent, are the focus of the best-interest stage of child protective proceedings. Id. at 88.
The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the [child's] best interests. To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the [child's] well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]The trial court may also consider a parent's substance abuse history, In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001), and the length of time the child has been in care, In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015).
This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's best-interest determination. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
On appeal, respondent does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination. Accordingly, we presume that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part by In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 352-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Moreover, the trial court did not clearly err when it found statutory grounds for termination because respondent did not seek contact with the child for over one year, respondent demonstrated a continued substance abuse problem, and respondent did not participate in services to rectify the barriers to reunification.
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of his parental rights was in the minor child's best interests. Respondent primarily argues that this Court has wrongly held that a preponderance of the evidence test, rather than a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, applies to a best-interest determination in Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. Moss is binding precedent that must be followed. MCR 7.215(J)(1). Further, our Supreme Court unanimously denied leave to appeal in that case. In re Moss, 495 Mich 856 (2013). We decline respondent's invitation to reexamine Moss and its adoption of a preponderance of the evidence standard for purposes of the best-interest analysis.
In the alternative, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the minor child's best interests, under either the clear and convincing evidence standard or the preponderance of the evidence standard. Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in its best-interest determination because respondent hinted at the possibility of a relative placement at the termination trial. At trial, however, respondent did not address whether the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) examined possible placement of the child with one of respondent's relatives. Rather, respondent focused solely on substance abuse issues. Although respondent made a brief reference to a DHHS referral to a relative, respondent did not develop the factual circumstances of the possibility of a relative placement. Similarly, on appeal, respondent does not explain the nature of this remark. "An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority." Bronson Methodist Hosp v Mich Assigned Claims Facility, 298 Mich App 192, 199; 826 NW2d 197 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An "appellant's failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue." Woods v SLB Property Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 626-627; 750 NW2d 228 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, respondent has abandoned this argument by inadequately briefing it. Furthermore, respondent did not identify a relative who was willing to serve as a caregiver for the minor child. During the 13 months that this case was pending in the trial court, respondent did not request that the DHHS investigate one of his relatives as a possible placement for the minor child. Rather, respondent fled the state with his girlfriend, ended up in jail, and failed to contact the child or the caseworker during the entirety of the trial court proceedings.
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in its best-interest determination because it favored the foster home over returning the child to respondent. Respondent's argument has no merit. When it evaluated whether termination of respondent's parental rights was in the minor child's best interests, the trial court considered the absence of a parent-child bond, the child's need for stability and permanency, the opinions of experts, including the caseworker and the lawyer-guardian ad litem, the likelihood of adoption, and the length of time the child spent in foster care. The trial court did not narrowly focus only on the benefits of the foster home. Rather, the trial court focused broadly on respondent's abandonment of the child for over a year, as well as respondent's untreated substance abuse and recurrent criminality resulting in incarceration. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating respondent's parental rights to the minor child.
We affirm.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Jane M. Beckering