Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J36356
Ruvolo, P. J.
Appellant Johnathan L. appeals from a dispositional order committing him to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum confinement period of eight years. Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the CYA because the evidence does not establish that a CYA commitment would benefit him, or that less restrictive alternatives were inappropriate or unavailable. We affirm.
We note that effective July 1, 2005, the CYA was redesignated the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 1710, subd. (a), 1703, subd. (c).) For convenience we will continue to refer to the Division of Juvenile Facilities as the CYA.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was 15 years old at the time of the misdemeanor and felony offenses underlying this appeal.
In March 2006, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed in Solano County alleging that on February 14, 2006, appellant committed two misdemeanor offenses: petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)), and providing false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)). When appellant failed to appear for arraignment, the juvenile court issued a bench warrant.
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In May 2006, an amended section 602 petition was filed alleging that on May 14, 2006, appellant committed three felony offenses: second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211); assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); and elder abuse causing injury (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)). With respect to the robbery and assault charges, it was further alleged that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on a victim who was 70 years of age or older.
The court recalled the prior bench warrant and ordered appellant detained at juvenile hall. On June 27, 2006, appellant admitted the petty theft and robbery counts, and admitted the truth of the enhancements regarding the victim’s age. The remaining counts were dismissed.
At the contested dispositional hearing held on August 25, 2006, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court and committed him to the CYA for the maximum term of eight years.
This appeal followed.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Misdemeanor Offenses
According to the dispositional report, on February 14, 1006, appellant left a department store without paying for a $45 basketball jersey that he had concealed under his shirt. When stopped by a police officer, appellant provided a false name. The police officer later discovered appellant’s true name and identified him as a “habitual runaway.”
B. Felony Offenses
The probation department intake assessment report provided the details of the assault and robbery. On May 14, 2006, appellant followed the 78-year-old victim, who was at the cemetery to visit his deceased wife on Mother’s Day. The victim was at the mausoleum for less than a minute when the appellant suddenly struck him from behind. Appellant punched the victim in the temple, which knocked the victim to the ground and caused his elbow to shatter. While the victim lay on ground, appellant struck him at least six more times and took his car keys out of his pocket. Appellant then fled the scene in the victim’s car that had been parked in front of the cemetery.
A bystander in the mausoleum area came to the victim’s aid and called the police. The bystander did not see the suspect, but noticed a bicycle on the grass that was approximately 10-15 yards from where he found the victim. There were fresh marks in the grass that were consistent with someone riding a bicycle through it.
The victim was transported to the hospital. As a result of the attack, the victim suffered a subdural hematoma. The victim told the police that he parked his car, walked into the mausoleum area, and was standing by his wife’s crypt, when he was struck.
Several hours later, the police located appellant and the stolen car. Appellant was taken into custody, after attempting to hide from the police in a nearby restroom. Appellant waived his Miranda rights and told the police that while riding his bicycle through the cemetery, he saw the victim park his car, and he followed him to obtain the car keys. Appellant said that he walked up behind the victim and punched him in the temple. However, he admitted that he may have actually punched the victim in the head five or six times. Appellant claimed that he was “ ‘high’ ” on marijuana at the time of the incident.
Shortly after appellant’s detention, the probation department submitted a joint assessment (§ 241.1) with the child welfare services division that reiterated much of the information contained in the intake report concerning the assault and robbery, and added information regarding appellant’s dependency history. Appellant was not currently a dependent child, but he had been in protective custody from March 2003 through October 2004. It was reported that appellant routinely went to school filthy and smelling of urine, and that he was covered in bruises from daily beatings by his mother. The neglect and physical abuse allegations were determined to be unfounded. However, a March 2003 allegation of caretaker incapacity was substantiated. Appellant’s mother had been offered reunification services, but she did not want to reunify with her son. Appellant was subsequently placed with his paternal grandmother, who adopted him in October 2004. The section 241.1 report did not recommend that appellant be declared a dependent child, as there was no indication of abuse or neglect since he had been living with his grandmother.
C. Psychological Evaluation
While appellant was detained at juvenile hall, Dr. Robert Wagner, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological evaluation of appellant. After administering various psychological tests, Dr. Wagner concluded that appellant appeared to be suffering from major depression, moderate conduct disorder, and polysubstance abuse (alcohol and marijuana). Dr. Wagner further noted that appellant appeared be developing Borderline Personality Disorder. However, due to appellant’s age, formal diagnosis was deferred. Dr. Wagner also detected the possibility of mild Bipolar Disorder. Dr. Wagner opined that appellant “lacks empathy for people. This is no doubt rooted in his own abuse, but it marks a deficit in his ability to successfully interact with people in constructive ways. He is unlikely to be able to express a deep feeling of remorse as he lacks the ability to empathize.” Dr. Wagner recommended that appellant be evaluated for medication to assist in his underlying depressive disorder. He further recommended weekly therapy to address appellant’s depression, anger, abandonment issues, and substance abuse. It was also recommended that appellant’s possible Bipolar Disorder and prominent Borderline personality traits be considered by his treating physicians. Finally, Dr. Wagner recommended that appellant participate in anger management classes, and that he remain clean and sober.
D. Dispositional Report
In addition to recounting the nature of the underlying offenses, the probation department’s dispositional report provided further information regarding appellant’s attitude and response to the offenses, academic performance, substance abuse, collateral contacts at juvenile hall, and prior delinquent activities.
With respect to the misdemeanor offenses, appellant told the probation officer that he had often stolen clothing and other items while “ ‘on the run’ ” to support himself, and this was the first time he had been caught. According to the report, appellant “seemed to think his behavior was no big deal.” Appellant also acknowledged he gave the police officer a false name to avoid being returned to his grandmother’s custody.
With respect to the robbery, appellant stated that he had been at a party that had lasted through the night. At the party, he smoked marijuana throughout the night and consumed alcohol in the early morning hours. Appellant also said he took one Ecstasy pill. Appellant was riding his bicycle to the mall, when he saw the victim pull into the cemetery. Appellant said he saw the car and wanted it. Appellant admitted that he waited for the victim to get out of the car, and then approached him from behind and pulled the victim to the ground. Appellant further admitted that he hit the victim several times in head, took his keys, and drove away in the victim’s car. Appellant stated that he felt bad about hurting the victim. However, when the extent of the victim’s injuries were explained, appellant “appeared apathetic.”
With respect to appellant’s academic performance, he had started the ninth grade in September 2005. However, he did not attend school starting in January 2006 though May 2006. Appellant stated that he was “a runaway during this time frame and was working versus going to school.” Appellant’s discipline record, dating back to July 2000, included entries for violence against other students, classroom disruption and defiance, as well as numerous truancy reports and suspensions.
The dispositional report noted that appellant was initially behaving at an acceptable level at juvenile hall. However, appellant’s behavior began to deteriorate as he became “comfortable with his detainment.” While at juvenile hall, appellant became involved in a verbal confrontation with another ward during class. Appellant was subsequently suspended from class for two days for disruption of class and defiance.
The dispositional report noted that appellant’s first criminal offense was committed in April 1999, when, at age 8, he was cited for vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594). According to the report, appellant had been throwing rocks and breaking windows at his apartment complex. The police department probation team handled this citation with a “ ‘no action letter.’ ” In October 2000, at age 9, appellant, along with three other minors, attacked another minor in the same cemetery as the underlying offense. Appellant was cited for battery (Pen. Code, § 242) and placed on a “suspended action contract for one year” and the case was closed one year later. In April 2002, at age 11, appellant was cited for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4), and exhibiting a deadly weapon, other than a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(1)). According to the dispositional report, appellant had been verbally abusive to a female student in his class. Appellant also pinched the student’s buttocks and threw a book at her. The probation department referred appellant to the Family Intervention Program. At the time of the referral, appellant had been receiving intensive mental health services through the county. Due to the intensive services, appellant’s case was closed at the intake level. In January 2003, at age 12, appellant was cited for burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) for stealing gloves from a drugstore. Appellant was placed on diversion, which was successfully closed six months later. Then in April 2004, at age 13, appellant was cited for vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594), and placed on diversion, which successfully closed one year later.
The dispositional report indicated that the probation department could have recommended a CYA commitment, in light of the seriousness of the offense and the vulnerability of the victim. However, “based on the absence of any formal, structured intervention via the Court or Probation,” the probation department recommended a long-term commitment to Fouts Youth Facility (Fouts).
E. Defense Sentencing Statement
Prior to the dispositional hearing, appellant’s trial counsel submitted a “Defense Sentencing/Disposition Statement.” In this statement, defense counsel requested that the trial court follow the probation department’s recommendation and sentence appellant to Fouts. Defense counsel noted that appellant, for the first 13 years of his life, had been a “young and blameless victim of severe psychological, emotional, physical abuse and neglect by his drug addicted mother and her violent boyfriends.” Defense counsel argued that CYA was a “failed institution and that the less restrictive alternative of Fouts was available and would be in the best interest of appellant and the community. In support of this position, defense counsel attached numerous exhibits, which included appellant’s psychological evaluation by Dr. Wagner, as well as various documents regarding the conditions at the CYA.
F. Dispositional Hearing
At the contested dispositional hearing held on August 25, 2006, the prosecution presented testimony from the victim, E.S., and his two adult children. E.S. testified that the attack happened at approximately 8:30 a.m. As a result of the attack, E.S. was hospitalized for 11 days and underwent major surgery, which resulted in screws and a metal plate being inserted in his arm. E.S. is required to undergo weekly physical therapy that is very painful. The attack left E.S. with permanent nerve damage. E.S. testified that he had been making weekly visits to his wife at the cemetery for about two years, but now he no longer visits her because he is afraid for his personal safety.
E.S.’s son, B.S., testified that his father had been a very independent person prior to the attack, but now he feared everything. B.S. said that E.S. had been in and out of consciousness for approximately five to six days following the attack.
E.S.’s daughter, D.W., testified that her father has been very depressed since the attack, and that he no longer does the same activities as before. She said that her father will live the rest of his life in pain, with permanent limitations on his arm.
Defense counsel presented the testimony of Daniel Macallair, the executive director of the Center on Juvenile Criminal Justice, who was qualified by the juvenile court as an expert on the CYA. Macallair explained that the CYA is currently operating under a consent decree, which resulted from a lawsuit alleging that the CYA has failed to adequately protect wards in its custody. In the consent decree, the State of California acknowledged that it has been unable to curtail the violence at the CYA, and that it was not providing adequate educational, mental health services, medical care, and substance abuse treatment. Macallair further explained that a remedial plan was completed in July 2006, but it has been plagued with a “number of starts and stops.” One of the goals of the remedial plan is to reduce the population at existing facilities and to expand the ratio of staff to wards to reduce the level of violence. Macallair conceded that the rates of violence have fallen as the populations at some of the facilities have fallen. However, he testified that the “gang culture that fosters those conditions is still wide spread, . . . [and] still predominates in all of the institutions. You still have a . . . custodial and punitive oriented staff, which . . . makes it much more difficult to institute a rehabilitative model, which is why . . . it will take many years.” Macallair said it would take approximately 5 to 10 years to implement the changes.
The juvenile court took judicial notice of the consent degree and the various reports emanating from Farrell v. Harper (Super. Ct. Alameda County, No. RG003079344), a taxpayer suit against the director of the CYA (Farrell papers).
Macallair testified that there was nothing about the CYA that was therapeutic or rehabilitative. He further opined that a CYA commitment was not likely to render someone who may be violence-prone to be less violent. Rather, according to Macallair, the CYA “reinforces violence as a way of achieving personal needs.” However, when asked on cross-examination whether the CYA should still receive new wards, Macallair conceded that given lack of current options, the CYA must “remain as one piece of the current continuum.” He further conceded that there are certain rehabilitative programs that only the CYA is allowed to provide because it is a locked facility.
Cyndie Senf, appellant’s probation officer, testified that she recommended that appellant be committed to Fouts based on his age and lack of formal probation or court intervention. Senf stated that Fouts is the most punitive commitment facility outside of the CYA. She further stated that Fouts is a behavioral modification program with numerous programs. Senf’s supervisors agreed with the recommendation. Senf noted that appellant had successfully completed diversion for a prior offense and now lived in a stable home with his grandmother; however, appellant often ran away from home.
On cross-examination, Senf acknowledged that appellant had received informal probation on five prior occasions. She was aware that in October 2000, appellant, along with three other minors, attacked an individual at the same cemetery. The group hid behind some grave stones and attempted to break the leg of the victim. Two years later, appellant committed assault with a deadly weapon, sexual assault, and exhibited a deadly weapon other than a firearm. Then in 2003, he committed burglary, and in 2004 committed vandalism. Senf acknowledged that appellant’s criminal conduct had become more sophisticated, violent and callous with each new offense. Senf recommended Fouts because it was not a local facility, which she thought might discourage appellant from running away. She was not familiar with the programs offered at the CYA.
Bruce Lillis, a field services manager for the probation department, testified that he reviews potential CYA cases to ensure that the dispositional recommendation is sound and consistent. Lillis stated that appellant’s age and his first-time offender status were taken into consideration in making the recommendation to Fouts as opposed to the CYA. On cross-examination, Lillis conceded that he was not aware of any programs at Fouts that are not offered at the CYA.
Appellant’s grandmother and his pastor made statements in support of appellant. Appellant apologized to the court and to the victim, and stated that the court would not see him or have to deal with him again.
After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court selected the CYA as the appropriate disposition based upon the dual articulated findings of appellant’s limited criminal history and the “magnitude of the crime” of the crime he committed, which was “extremely severe.” The court acknowledged that appellant had a “tragic lifestyle,” and that despite calls to Child Protective Services, appellant was not protected from the abuse by his parent. However, the court stated that it could not overlook the fact that appellant was “clearly capable of committing grave harm to the community.” The court determined that the behavior modification program at Fouts was not long enough to teach appellant how to become a productive member of society. The court further explained: “Punishment is not a goal of the juvenile court[,] . . . [h]owever, it is a part of a person’s rehabilitation to know that what they did is wrong and they’re being punished for it. [¶] It is a part of every behavior modification program that there is a cause and effect and the impact of the gravity of what he did, I think, is something that [appellant] needs to learn and it’s not going to be easy for him to learn for the reasons I’ve articulated so far. But the very impact of commitment to the [CYA] is a part of his rehabilitation that he understand that what he did is wrong, that the way he was raised was wrong, that there is a better life and that his community . . . is waiting for him and that when he is paroled from the [CYA] he embrace that community with the tools that he has learned at the [CYA].” Based on appellant’s age and prior record, the juvenile court did not impose the maximum term of 10 years 2 months, but determined that 8 years would be sufficient for the CYA to accomplish the goals of rehabilitating appellant.
III.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the CYA because the evidence does not establish that a CYA commitment would benefit him, or that less restrictive alternatives were inappropriate or unavailable.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The juvenile court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate rehabilitative and punitive measures for offenders. (§ 202; In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473; In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) An appellate court will not lightly substitute its judgment for that of the juvenile court, but rather must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the decision and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.)
To determine whether substantial evidence supports a CYA commitment, we examine the record presented at the dispositional hearing in light of the purposes of the juvenile law. (§ 202; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.) Since 1984, section 202 has required that courts commit delinquent minors “in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, [to] receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances.” (§ 202, subds. (b) & (e)(5); In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 57; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.) Although the 1984 amendment places a greater emphasis on punishment and societal protection, rehabilitation remains a critical objective of the juvenile law. (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.) To commit a minor to the CYA, the juvenile court must be “fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the [CYA].” (§ 734.) Accordingly, the rehabilitative purposes of a CYA commitment are satisfied when there is 1) evidence in the record demonstrating probable benefit to the minor, and 2) evidence supporting a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396.)
B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Committing Appellant to the CYA
1. Probable Benefit
There is no rigid test for determining whether a commitment to the CYA would benefit a minor. (See, e.g., In re Martin L. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 534, 543-544.) Instead, the court must consider the individual circumstances in light of the potential reformative, educational, rehabilitative, treatment, and disciplinary benefits the CYA may provide to the minor. (See §§ 202, 734; In re Gerardo B. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1258-1259.) Factors include the minor’s age, the seriousness of the minor’s criminal conduct, the minor’s mental and physical needs, the minor’s prior record, the extent of the minor’s need for a controlled environment, the threat the minor poses to the community, and the efficacy of prior dispositions in rehabilitating the minor. (See §§ 202, 734; In re Geraldo B., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1258-1259; In re Anthony M. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 491, 503-505; In re Jesse McM. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 187, 191-193.) In determining whether commitment to the CYA would be of benefit to the minor, the court may also consider “punishment as a rehabilitative tool [;]” however, a minor should not be committed to the CYA solely on retributive grounds. (In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396; § 202, subd. (e)(5).) Rather, the juvenile court must focus on both the need for public protection and the best interests of the minor. (§ 202; In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.)
Appellant contends the CYA commitment was an abuse of discretion because it was based on the gravity of the offense alone. We disagree. The juvenile court acted in conformity with the policies announced in section 202. (See In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 576-577.) Appellant committed an extremely violent offense on a particularly vulnerable victim that has permanently altered the victim’s quality of life. Appellant’s sole explanation for the brutal attack was that he saw the victim’s car and he wanted the keys. The court found appellant’s offense was so serious that the protection of the public required that he be committed to the CYA.
The gravity of the offense is by statute a proper consideration at disposition. (§ 725.5; see also In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330.) The court considered not only the gravity of the offense, but also the other unique circumstances to appellant. In committing appellant to the CYA, the juvenile court considered appellant’s psychological evaluation, which concluded that appellant was suffering from major depression, moderate conduct disorder, and polysubstance abuse. The evaluation also revealed that appellant was developing a Borderline personality and could possibly be suffering from Bipolar Disorder.
The juvenile court was also sympathetic to appellant’s prior abuse, but stated that it could not ignore that appellant was “clearly capable of committing grave harm to the community.” The record in this case clearly indicates that the CYA commitment was predicated on factors other than a desire to punish appellant because of the seriousness of the offense. Specifically, the record reflects that a CYA commitment was required to protect society and to rehabilitate appellant.
However, appellant maintains that given the deplorable and violent conditions, together with the lack of adequate parole services, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the CYA commitment would be of probable benefit to him. In support of this contention, appellant relies on Macallair’s testimony, as well as the Farrell papers. The documents are familiar to this court. While detailing inadequacies in some of the CYA’s programs, they do not purport to demonstrate that appellant will not benefit from any of the programs offered at the CYA. Even assuming many of the CYA programs are seriously deficient, the programs exist, wards participate in them, and some benefit from them. (See In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 153.) Moreover, Macallair acknowledged that there has been a reduction in violence at the CYA as the population decreases, that minors should still be committed to the CYA, and that the CYA has unique rehabilitative programs that only a locked facility could provide.
Appellant further argues that the juvenile court failed to engage in any particularized consideration of his rehabilitative needs, and whether (and how) those needs would be met at the CYA. Appellant has cited no authority that imposes a requirement on a juvenile court to delineate with specificity the types of programs the court contemplates the minor needs in order to achieve rehabilitation. Indeed, that is the function of the CYA, and those needs may change over the period of confinement. Although it is true that at the dispositional hearing the juvenile court did not expressly state why it thought appellant would probably benefit from a CYA commitment, it is clear from this record that appellant’s mental and physical condition and qualifications render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory discipline or other treatment provided by the CYA. (§ 734.) The “CYA, with its specialized institutions and rehabilitative programs tailored to the delinquent’s sophistication and need for security [citation] offered the promise of probable rehabilitative benefit to [appellant].” (In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 153.) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant would benefit from the programs offered by the CYA.
2. Less Restrictive Alternatives
To justify the conclusion that lesser disposition options would be unsuitable for a minor, there must merely be some evidence that alternatives were considered, and that a CYA commitment would best lead to the rehabilitation of the minor and protection of society. (See In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 182-184, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1396; In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal App.4th at pp. 473-474; In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 298.) Thus, there is no requirement that a commitment to the CYA be used only as a last resort after all other alternatives have been tried and failed. (In re Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 183.)
Accordingly, California courts have upheld CYA commitments even for first-time offenders without first attempting a less restrictive placement where the circumstances demonstrate that such alternatives are inappropriate or unavailable. (See, e.g., In re Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 183 [minor’s escape from juvenile hall by means of force and violence demonstrated that less restrictive placement would have failed]; In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473 [vicious attack on two victims during robbery; refusal to take responsibility for the crimes]; In re Willy L. (1976)56 Cal.App.3d 256, 265 [serious pattern of delinquent activity including burglary and drug offenses].) If there is evidence in the record showing that the court considered less restrictive placements, the fact the judge does not state on the record his or her consideration of those alternatives and reasons for rejecting them will not result in reversal. (In re Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 184; In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.)
Here, the decision of the juvenile court to commit appellant to the CYA fully comports with these legal principles, and we discern no abuse of discretion. The felony offenses committed by appellant have grave implications for the safety and protection of the public. Appellant preyed on an elderly victim while he was visiting his deceased wife at the cemetery on Mother’s Day. After repeatedly striking the victim, appellant took the victim’s car keys and fled the scene in the victim’s car. Appellant stated that he did not mean to hit the victim, but he saw the car and wanted it, and that he just wanted to get the victim’s keys. The juvenile court determined that the “context of this crime is basically trivial, it is an automobile ride,” however given the severity of victim’s injuries the court concluded that it would take longer than the one-year program at Fouts for appellant to appreciate “the impact that he has on people.”
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting Fouts strictly based on the length of the program without any evidence that the program would be ineffective or inappropriate in rehabilitating him. Appellant cites In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327, 337, footnote 7, for the proposition that a commitment to the CYA, as opposed to a camp placement, strictly on the need for long-term incarceration constitutes an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s reliance on In re Michael R. is misplaced. In re Michael R. followed the approach of In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557, that alternative dispositions must be considered, and that CYA commitment was reserved for only the most serious cases, and only after all else has failed. (In re Michael R., supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 335.) However, the contention that In re Aline D. precludes a CYA commitment unless progressively restrictive placements have been attempted is unsound. (See 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Parent and Child, § 957, pp. 1159-1160.) “To the contrary, the circumstances in a particular case may well suggest the desirability of a Youth Authority commitment despite the availability of such alternative dispositions as placement in a county camp or ranch. [Citation.]” (In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18, 27.)
Here, the trial court determined that long-term incarceration was needed for appellant’s rehabilitation and that Fouts would not suffice because of the time needed for such treatment. (See In re Abdul Y. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 847, 868-870 [CYA commitment affirmed where long-term incarceration required for rehabilitation and camp disposition insufficient due to length of program].) Although appellant is a first-time offender, as discussed, this in itself does not indicate that a CYA commitment is inappropriate. (Id. at p. 870; In re Willy L., supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at p. 264.) Appellant’s criminal conduct was extremely serious. Moreover, appellant has a history of running away and has engaged in escalating, aggressive (though nonadjudicated) conduct that supports the conclusion that a CYA commitment was necessary to promote rehabilitation and protect society.
Citing In re Michael R., supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at page 335, footnote 5, and People v. Chi Ko Wong(1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 719, appellant argues that his prior police contacts cannot form the basis of his CYA commitment. However, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court improperly based the CYA commitment based on appellant’s prior contacts. Moreover, in light of the statutory mandate that the court be “fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory education discipline or other treatment provided by the [CYA],” (§ 734), there is no abuse of discretion in considering appellant’s past behavior. (See, e.g., In re Jimmy P., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1683-1684 [juvenile court may consider dismissed allegations in determining proper disposition]; In re Abdul Y., supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 869-870 [history of aggressive, though nonadjudicated conduct, supported conclusion CYA commitment required to promote rehabilitation and protect society].)
Nevertheless, appellant claims that the probation department did not recommend a CYA commitment, but recommended placement at Fouts. It has long been the rule in California that courts are not bound by the views of the probation department. (See, e.g., In re Tyrone O., supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 153.) An appellate court must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the disposition, and must affirm findings that are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Asean D., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 473; In re Michael D., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.) On this record, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in committing appellant to the CYA.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.