Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD11717
McAdams, J.
The mother of a dependent child brought this appeal following a dispositional hearing. We shall dismiss the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
The child whose interests are at issue here is J.M., a girl born in 2000. This is the second dependency proceeding involving the child.
First Dependency
In March 2000, a petition was filed on behalf of newborn J.M., pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The proceeding was initiated by the Social Services Agency of the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (the Department). The child was removed from the mother’s care, based on risk from the mother’s developmental disability.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court bypassed the mother for reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).) Before deciding to do so, the court ordered two psychological evaluations of the mother. Both evaluators concluded that the mother was unable to utilize reunification services as a result of her mental disability.
The juvenile court may bypass a parent “suffering from a mental disability... that renders him or her incapable of utilizing [reunification] services.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).)
One evaluator concluded that the mother “suffers from a developmental disability (borderline intelligence) and consequently is unable to care for her child. She is also unable to benefit from reunification services to adequately care for her child within twelve months.” The other evaluator likewise concluded that the mother’s “mental disabilities render her unable to care for and control her child adequately, and the disability renders [her] incapable of utilizing Reunification Services, even if Reunification Services were provided for twelve months.”
The father was offered reunification services, successfully completed his case plan, and was reunified with the child. The dependency was dismissed in June 2001.
Current Dependency
In April 2009, the Department filed a petition initiating the current dependency proceeding. The father had dropped the child off at the children’s shelter because he felt overwhelmed and unable to care for her. The father admitted slapping the child, leaving a red mark on her cheek. He also admitted that he had a history of abusing methamphetamines and refusing to drug test. The father suffered from bipolar disorder but did not take his medication.
In reports prepared for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department recommended removal from the father’s custody and the provision of reunification services to him. With respect to the mother, the Department relayed her expressed desire for custody of J.M., but questioned whether the mother’s level of functioning and her coping skills would allow her to successfully parent the child. Initially, the Department requested a continuance of the disposition hearing to assess the mother for services. Thereafter, still requesting a continuance, the Department sought updated psychological evaluations, at one point to assess the mother for non-reunification, and at another point to assess her ability to benefit from services. Finally, relying on the mother’s psychological evaluations from the prior dependency, the Department recommended outright bypass of reunification services to her. (See § 361.5, subd. (b).)
The court conducted a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing on June 9, 2009.
Jurisdiction
At the hearing, all parties submitted to jurisdiction. The court sustained the allegations of the third amended petition and assumed jurisdiction over J.M.
Disposition
The court then proceeded immediately to the disposition hearing. The father submitted on the Department’s recommendations. The mother contested the recommendation to bypass her for services. She requested immediate placement of the child with her, with family maintenance services, or eventual return to her custody, with family reunification services. In support of her request, the mother submitted a brief from her counsel as well as her own testimony.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered reunification services for the father. Instead of bypassing the mother, as the Department had recommended, the court ordered two new psychological evaluations of the mother. The court scheduled a hearing sixty days later for receipt of the evaluations. The mother requested immediate disposition so that she could start engaging in services. At the mother’s request, the court clarified that disposition was “being ordered” for the father that day and “continued for 60 days for the mother.” The court specifically found “good cause to go beyond the 10 day limit for disposition for mother based on the evidence in this case.” (See § 352, subd. (b); § 358, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.686(a); In re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1361.)
Appeal
In July 2009, the mother filed this timely appeal. She asserts that the juvenile court erred by effectively bifurcating disposition, offering reunification services to the father but continuing the hearing as to her in order to evaluate her ability to utilize services. The Department disagrees with the mother’s assertions. It maintains that a timely, contested disposition hearing was held as to all parties and that the court acted properly in deciding to continue the issue of whether to offer the mother reunification services pending receipt of the evaluations.
In October 2009, concurrent with the filing of her appellate reply brief, the mother filed two documents in this court: (1) a motion to augment the record to include a subsequent juvenile court order bypassing the mother for services; and (2) opposition to dismissal of the appeal as moot.
In December 2009, this court requested supplemental briefing from the Department on the following questions: (1) Should the court grant the mother’s motion to augment the record to include the juvenile court’s subsequent order, which was made on September 30, 2009? (2) If so, does that order render the appeal moot?
The Department responded by letter brief, answering both questions in the affirmative. In reply, the mother implicitly acknowledges that her appeal is moot, but she nevertheless asks us to address its merits, arguing that the important subject matter of the challenged order “will always evade review.”
DISCUSSION
We consider the dispositive question of augmentation and its effect at the threshold. We conclude that the proper course in this matter is to augment the appellate record as requested and to dismiss the appeal as moot.
1. The motion to augment should be granted.
Both parties support augmentation of the appellate record to include the juvenile court’s order of September 30, 2009, apparently made after receipt of the new psychological evaluations. At the September 30th hearing, the court found “the mother incapable of utilizing family reunification services.” The court therefore ordered that the mother “shall not receive Family Reunification Services, but will receive services to facilitate visitation only.”
It is proper to augment the appellate record in a juvenile dependency case to include a document that shows that the appeal is moot. (In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422; compare In re Anna S. (Jan. 13, 2010, D055036) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2010 Cal.App. Lexis 30 *1, *11].) We do so here.
2. The appeal should be dismissed as moot.
A case is moot when the reviewing court cannot provide the parties with practical, effectual relief. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) In such cases, the appeal generally should be dismissed. (Ibid.; In re Ruby T. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1204; In re Jody R. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1615, 1621-1622; In re Guardianship of Melissa W. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1300-1301.)
Even if a case is technically moot, the court has inherent power to decide it where the issues presented are important and of continuing interest. (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 253, fn. 4; In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 74, fn. 5 [issue of de facto parent’s standing was a matter of “continuing public importance”]; In re Anna S., supra, __ Cal.App.4th __ [p. *12] [propriety of juvenile court’s reliance “on a nonfinal appellate opinion” in the case was a matter “of continuing public importance”]; In re Jody R., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1622 [issue of involuntary joinder of parent’s live-in companion was “a matter of significant public interest”].) That is particularly true when the issue is likely to recur yet evade review. (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1190, fn. 6; In re Anna S. [at p. *12]; In re Jody R., at p. 1622.)
Nevertheless, the power to resolve a moot case should not be exercised where the court’s decision “would be unlikely to provide guidance for future... disputes, because the... issues presented... are essentially factual in nature and therefore require resolution on a case-by-case basis.” (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 215.)
That is the situation presented here. In this case, the pivotal substantive issue is fact-based. The mother’s appeal turns on an interpretation of the juvenile court’s words and actions at the contested disposition hearing held on June 9, 2009. A decision by this court thus is unlikely to provide guidance in future cases. For that reason, we decline to decide the merits of this moot appeal.
DISPOSITION
The mother’s appeal is dismissed as moot.
WE CONCUR: Elia, Acting P.J., Mihara, J.