Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD223114
RAYE, J.R. J., mother of the minor (mother), appeals from juvenile court orders declaring the minor to be a dependent of the court and removing him from mother’s physical custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, 361, 395.) Mother contends the jurisdictional findings and removal orders were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
At the time these proceedings were initiated, mother was a dependent child of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court and placed in foster care with her foster mother. Mother’s son (the minor) was 18 months old and living with mother in the foster mother’s home. A section 300 petition had been filed and the minor removed from mother’s custody a year earlier because mother was briefly incarcerated, but the minor had been returned to mother and the petition ultimately was dismissed.
These proceedings were initiated on December 4, 2006, when the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor, alleging mother had failed to provide care and support for the minor since November 23, 2006, and had not made arrangements for the minor’s care in her absence. The social worker reported that the foster mother had contacted DHHS to report that mother had been absent from the home without permission, leaving the minor with the foster mother, for approximately a week. Mother called the foster mother every day from the Bay Area to check on the minor. Mother would say she was coming home but kept “missing the Greyhound Bus.”
When these proceedings were initiated, the father of the minor was incarcerated; he remained incarcerated through the time this appeal was filed. Although he is participating in the proceedings in the juvenile court, he is not a party to this appeal.
On November 30, 2006, mother called the foster mother to say she would not be returning home and would send someone to pick up the minor. The foster mother told the emergency response social worker that she did not trust mother’s ability to take care of the minor and was concerned for the minor’s well-being. The foster mother also reported that mother was unstable, not ready to be a mother, currently a prostitute, and possibly involved in drugs.
An intake social worker interviewed mother over the telephone on November 30, 2006. Mother told the social worker she was in Fremont visiting her sister. Mother also denied that she was absent from her placement without permission. She claimed her foster mother told her that she could leave, and that her foster mother would care for the minor if mother paid her.
Another intake social worker interviewed mother over the telephone the following day. Mother was still in the Bay Area. This time, mother claimed she had left the minor without making arrangements for his care because she had been “kidnapped by some dude.” She did not, however, contact law enforcement because she did not want the police involved and was “not trippin’ on it.” Mother claimed the “dude” let her call to check on her baby every day. During the interview, mother said she would return to Sacramento that same day. Later that day, mother left the social worker a Sacramento telephone number, but the number was inoperable. Mother did not return to her foster home, and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Mother appeared at the originally set detention hearing. She was appointed counsel, who requested a continuance, and mother was ordered to appear at the continued detention hearing. Mother, however, did not appear at the detention hearing. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, and a jurisdictional/disposition hearing was set for December 29, 2006. The court ordered visitation and reunification services for mother in the interim.
The jurisdictional/disposition hearing was continued numerous times for various reasons. The January 26, 2007, social worker’s report reflected that mother was attending her weekly supervised visitation with the minor and was behaving appropriately during visits. Mother maintained she had not run away, but rather, had been kidnapped by four men she had hitched a ride with after her car broke down. Her foster mother stated mother needed supervision with the minor and could not handle the minor on her own. Mother admitted she was not in a place to take the minor at the time and wanted more time to get herself “together.”
An amended section 300 petition was filed on May 22, 2007. The amended petition alleged mother had left the minor without provision for care and support from November 23, 2006, until the minor was taken into protective custody on November 30, 2006. The petition further alleged that mother did not make arrangements for the minor in her absence, was absent without permission from her juvenile dependency placement during that time, gave inconsistent statements as to her whereabouts, had frequently been absent without permission from her placement, had not followed the rules and conditions of her placement, and had demonstrated by her behavior that she was unable to safely parent the minor on a consistent and stable basis.
The social worker filed an addendum report on May 22, 2007, stating that mother had been continually absent without permission from her placement. She had not been cooperative or consistent, had failed to maintain contact with the social worker, and had not been following the rules and conditions of placement. Mother also had failed to attend visits with the minor consistently. A protective custody warrant had been issued for mother on April 24, 2007.
Mother appeared in court on May 22, 2007, for the scheduled jurisdictional/disposition hearing. Her counsel explained that mother “has recognized that she has been making some very poor choices,” and that mother had met with her long-term placement worker about going into placement that day. Her counsel also informed the court that mother “wants the Court to know that she is anxious to begin a pattern of compliance with the rules of placement.” Counsel for DHHS informed the court that DHHS had been unable to transport mother to previous hearings because mother had not been in her placement or present when they had made the effort. The matter was continued for a contested hearing.
A pretrial hearing took place on June 19, 2007. Mother appeared for the hearing but left before it began because she was ill. She had turned 18 years of age on June 4, 2007. DHHS informed the court that mother had recently left her placement and they did not know where she was residing, and asked the court to order mother to disclose her current residence to DHHS. Mother’s counsel informed the court that she had signed a request to terminate mother’s dependency status a week earlier, that mother was living with her father, and that counsel would provide that address to the court and DHHS.
The contested jurisdictional/disposition hearing was held on July 30, 2007. Mother was present at the hearing. DHHS stipulated that after the May 22, 2007, report was filed, mother had “resurfaced” and was no longer a dependent child of the court. Mother’s counsel stated she was living with a person named “Laquita.” No further evidence was submitted.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the amended petition, declared the minor a dependent child of the court, ordered the minor removed from mother’s custody, and ordered reunification services.
Mother appealed.
I
Jurisdiction
Mother claims the order adjudging the minor a dependent of the juvenile court must be set aside because the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
“[B]efore courts may exercise jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) there must be evidence ‘indicating the [minor] is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.’” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388, quoting In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823, italics omitted.)
The purpose of section 300 is to protect children from parental conduct or omissions that place them at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§§ 300, subd. (b), 300.2.) Although there must be a present risk of harm to the minor, the juvenile court may consider past events to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court protection. (In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.) The California Supreme Court has observed that, depending upon the circumstances, a “past failure [can be] predictive of the future.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424.)
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the judgment or order is supported by substantial evidence. “Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and not the reviewing court. The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” (In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639.)
Here, contrary to her suggestion, mother’s behavior did not simply demonstrate a single, one-week indiscretion eight months earlier. Nor did the evidence indicate that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing mother was stable and could provide for and protect the minor. To the contrary, in addition to leaving her child without arranging for his care, mother continued, over the course of the eight months prior to the jurisdictional hearing, to regularly absent herself from placement, to fail to follow the rules of placement, to fail to comply with informal services attempts, to fail to visit the minor, and to fail to notify the social worker of her whereabouts. Mother “resurfaced” only a month prior to the jurisdictional hearing, after she emancipated from the system herself. Yet, as the juvenile court noted, because mother had emancipated from the system, she no longer had the fallback support of leaving her child with a licensed foster parent. Although mother’s counsel argued that she had begun to engage in services, there was no evidence she had begun services and no evidence she had made any progress in any newly started services. Indeed, the juvenile court found her progress had been “minimal.”
In sum, there was ample evidence, based on mother’s past and ongoing behavior, for the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was at risk as a result of the failure or inability of mother to adequately supervise or protect him. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
II
Removal
Mother also contends the order removing the minor from her physical custody must be set aside because there was insufficient evidence the minor was in substantial danger if he remained at home and that there were less drastic alternatives to removal.
DHHS has asked us to dismiss this portion of mother’s appeal as moot, since the juvenile court returned the minor to mother’s care and custody on January 29, 2008 -- during the pendency of this appeal. Mother argues the appeal is not moot because she may suffer some prejudice in the future if she is involved in another action, and she should be given this “opportunity to clear her name of the stigma associated with [the] finding [that the minor would be at risk in her care].” She acknowledges, however, that she is no longer seeking return of the minor, since he is already in her care.
DHHS provided, and requested we take judicial notice of, a certified copy of the juvenile court’s January 29, 2008, order returning the minor to mother’s custody. Having received no objection, we take judicial notice of said order. (Evid. Code, §§ 455, subd. (a), 459.)
“[O]ur duty is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions.” (In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193.) Here, there does not appear to be a justiciable controversy since the dispositional order of which mother complains is no longer in effect or adversely affecting mother. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.)
This case differs significantly from In re Joel H., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, upon which mother relies. There, the minor had been placed with a relative. (Id. at p. 1189.) The juvenile court determined, based on insufficient evidence, that the relative and her husband had abused the minor and entered an order permanently barring the relative from custody. (Id. at p. 1192.) Although the juvenile court subsequently returned the minor to his mother’s custody, the appellate court found the relative’s appeal not to be moot, since it would be res judicata and would permanently bar her from serving as custodian in the future. (Id. at p. 1193.)
Here, no permanent order was made and the dispositional order removing the minor has no such res judicata effect. In any event, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order removing the minor from mother’s custody.
The juvenile court’s power to remove a minor from the home is addressed in, and limited by, section 361. Subdivision (c) of section 361 provides, in pertinent part: “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence [that]: [¶] (1) There is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody. . . .”
Here, the juvenile court made these findings by clear and convincing evidence. Although mother argues there was insufficient evidence to make these findings, the same evidence that supports the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor supports the minor’s removal. Mother had demonstrated a pattern of absenteeism, irresponsibility, and noncooperation with respect to the care and protection of the minor. Her foster mother had reported that mother was unable to care for the minor by herself, and there was no evidence to suggest anything had changed in that regard. In fact, as noted by the juvenile court, since emancipating from the system herself, mother no longer had the support of a licensed foster parent to fall back on, creating an even higher risk for the minor. Additionally, although mother had “resurfaced” about a month earlier, there was no evidence regarding her current living arrangements, other than her counsel’s representation that she had first been living with her father and was currently living with someone named Laquita. There was no evidence that mother’s current residence was stable or appropriate for the minor or that mother was in a position to provide for and protect the minor.
DHHS’s motion for partial dismissal for mootness is denied.
The record also establishes that there were no reasonable “less drastic” alternatives to removal. Mother asserts that a family maintenance order was a reasonable alternative. The record belies this claim.
Mother has a history of moving and failing to notify DHHS of her whereabouts, of refusing to cooperate with DHHS, and of refusing any voluntary services. At the time of the disposition hearing, mother had recently moved in with someone named Laquita, although DHHS had not yet assessed the residence to determine whether it was appropriate and safe for the minor. Mother had purportedly begun services, but there was not yet any pattern of compliance with services or evidence of progress being made in services. Under such circumstances, the juvenile court was justified in determining that family maintenance services would be inadequate to protect the minor.
In sum, the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor would be at risk in mother’s care, that removal of the minor was necessary, and that less drastic alternatives would be inadequate.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s judgment and orders are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , Acting P. J., ROBIE , J.