Because the granting of an adoption over the objection of the natural parent necessarily curtails that person's parental rights, the court must weigh the factors considered in proceedings to terminate parental rights under D.C. Code § 16-2353[] before the adoption petition will be granted." In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1076-77 (D.C. 2005) (footnotes and one citation omitted). As relevant here, those "TPR" factors are:

In any event, while the inquiry at the second, best-interest stage of the analysis is "not to determine whether the adoption petitioners would be better parents, or would provide a better home for the children," In re J.L. , 884 A.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C. 2005) ; see In re S.L.G. , 110 A.3d at 1287-88 ("this court has admonished that a termination of a natural parent's rights may not be based on a direct comparison of the natural parent with the adoption petitioners"), the trial court is to consider "all persons involved with the child ... in relationship to the best interests of the child," and "[t]he child's relationship with the adoption petitioners may have a bearing on the TPR decision," In re S.L.G. , 110 A.3d at 1288. See also D.C. Code § 16-2353(b)(3) (court shall consider "the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent ... and/or caretakers, including the foster parent ") (emphasis added); D.C. Code § 16-2353(b)(2) (court shall consider "the physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the degree that such affects the welfare of the child ...") (emphasis added).

In any event, while the inquiry at the second, best-interest stage of the analysis is "not to determine whether the adoption petitioners would be better parents, or would provide a better home for the children," In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C. 2005); see In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d at 1287-88 ("this court has admonished that a termination of a natural parent's rights may not be based on a direct comparison of the natural parent with the adoption petitioners"), the trial court is to consider "all persons involved with the child . . . in relationship to the best interests of the child," and "[t]he child's relationship with the adoption petitioners may have a bearing on the TPR decision,"

This court has recognized that the judge in an adoption case "acts as parens patriae on the child's behalf, and `should do her (or his) best to obtain all of the information needed to effect a judicious disposition.'" In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1079 (D.C. 2005) (quoting In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470, 476 (D.C. 1996)). We have also said, however, that "the judge's statutory duty to consider evidence of the child's opinion does not transform into any `obligation to investigate the case on the judge's own initiative. . . .'"

But opposing adoption (and the consequent termination of parental rights) is not the same thing as grasping the opportunity to be a parent to your child. And counsel candidly acknowledged "we don't know where it will go[.]" See In re J.L ., 884 A.2d 1072, 1078 (D.C. 2005) ("wait and see" approach strongly disfavored by public policy and federal legislation). Nor is it enough that appellant may have "had a genuine interest" in getting to know his daughter.

She held that K.C. was too young to express an opinion regarding his own best interests, which is consistent with our case law holding that whether to elicit testimony from children on this point is "within the judge's discretion, taking into account whether children are old or competent enough to voice an opinion." In re J.L. , 884 A.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. 2005). We have also observed that, "in many cases the most probative evidence of the child's opinion may lie in statements the child has made to others such as psychologists or in the child's past behavior," id. at 1079-80 (citations omitted), and the reviewing judge did take note of statements that K.C. had made to his play therapist, as well as K.C.'s behavior outside of his mother's care. Based on this evidence, the magistrate judge found, and the associate judge affirmed, that this factor weighs in favor of termination.

See, e.g., In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1078 (D.C. 2005) (holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that this statutory factor weighed in favor of waiving the mother's consent to adoption because the adoptive couple provided the children with a stable and permanent family home for nearly four years, whereas, despite sincere efforts, the biological mother had not shown that she can stay sober, and this demonstrated an inability to provide for the children's physical, mental, and emotional needs). On the other hand, neither the mother, L.H., nor the father, D.P., has been able to provide their children with the same type of stability and permanence displayed by petitioners.

To decide whether it is, the court must still consider the statutory factors[.]”).In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.2005). “Parental rights, therefore, may not be terminated solely because of poverty, ill-health, or lack of education or sophistication, but only upon a high showing that such a drastic measure is necessary in order to protect the best interests of the child.”

`Indeed, common sense suggests that in many cases the most probative evidence of the child's opinion may lie in statements the child has made to others such as psychologists or in the child's past behavior, rather than in testimony given in the formal surroundings of a court proceeding.'" In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1079-80 (D.C. 2005) (quoting In re T.W., 623 A.2d 116, 117 (D.C. 1993)). We have differentiated between the

This is not the case, and it cannot be the case where the government seeks to strip a parent of rights that "are of such grave importance that they are classified as fundamental." In re J.L., 884 A.2d 1072, 1076 n. 3 (D.C. 2005) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). It is not immediately clear why, as H.O. argues, the same sort of notice is not given in waiver cases as in termination, when the ultimate effect on the natural parent is the same. It is true that, in H.O.'s case, the statutory termination notice had been given to him, albeit a year and a half previously in November 2005, in connection with the District's motion to terminate parental rights.