Over a three-year period with more than 150 opportunities for weekly visitation, Mother visited E.B.M. approximately twelve times; Mother's visitation history fell significantly short of the Department's minimum requisite goal of one visitation a month. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 309-10 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (holding "it is clear that [the mother] did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact" with her child when she visited her child between six and eight times in a twelve- month period); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (visiting only twelve times in nine months despite weekly scheduled visits supported termination for constructive abandonment). Additionally, Mother does not dispute that she failed to attend any of E.B.M.'s medical appointments or rehabilitation sessions.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). On the first element, the record indisputably shows that A.W. and J.K. were removed from Appellant on December 11, 2002 and were thereafter placed in the temporary managing conservatorship of TDFPS. As to the second element, whether TDFPS made reasonable efforts to return A.W. and J.K. to Appellant, she acknowledges that TDFPS offered the required services to her, but Appellant asserts that the record is "virtually silent on actual efforts made to return the children to her."

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N); In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

Additionally, Mother failed to complete therapy and the parenting classes as required, and there is no indication that Mother had steady housing and employment at the time of trial. SeeIn re J.J.O. , 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (attending only half of her parenting classes, lacking steady housing and employment, and missing opportunity for counseling and psychological evaluation, among other factors, demonstrated parent's inability to provide child with safe environment).

In our review of the evidence, we must "provide due deference to the decisions of the factfinder, who, having full opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand, is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses." In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86-87 (Tex. 2005)); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that appellate court "should not supplant the [factfinder's] judgment with its own"); see also In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 632 (Tex. App - Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (explaining that, in bench trial, trial court judges credibility of witnesses and determines weight to be accorded to testimony). Predicate Grounds

See, e.g., In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App.-Waco 2016, pet. denied) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother's failure to provide safe environment where mother failed to provide Department with any information about her living or employment circumstances, failed to make child support payments, failed to seek out and accept counseling services, refused to take required drug tests, and failed to even maintain contact with her child); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (evidence legally and factually sufficient to show mother had demonstrated inability to provide her child with safe environment when mother failed a drug test, attended only half of her parenting classes, and did not complete a psychological evaluation or participate in counseling). Likewise, considering all evidence in the record, we conclude the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction about the truth of the allegations against Mother.

Here, the evidence is undisputed that appellant had no contact with his children for the entirety of the almost two-year case; therefore, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm conviction or belief that appellant did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the children. See In re K.G., 350 S.W.3d 338, 355 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (deeming evidence factually sufficient to support this element where it was undisputed parent had not seen the child in almost five months prior to trial); M.C., 300 S.W.3d at 310 (holding mother did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child when she visited only six to eight times in a twelve-month period); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 628-29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support finding that mother had not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child when mother made only twelve visits during a nine-month period). C. Inability to Provide the Children with a Safe Environment

Although Father testified that he was defending Mother and his unborn child when he shot the man and that the "only reason" he "signed" the family assault convictions was because they were "[p]lea deals," the trial court could have found his testimony not credible. See In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (noting that, in bench trial, trial court determines credibility of witnesses and weight to be accorded to their testimony); see alsoIn re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (discussing appellate review of witness credibility issues in context of parental termination case). Father also admitted that he knew that Mother was using illegal substances but allowed Child to remain in Mother's care.

Although Father denied that there had been domestic violence between him and Mother in the presence of the children and claimed that the Department and the police had falsified reports and paperwork, the trial court reasonably could have disbelieved this testimony and credited the evidence of domestic violence between Father and Mother before the children were removed and Father's illegal drug use and criminal activity during the pendency of this case in reaching its endangerment determination. See In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 632 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (explaining that, in bench trial, trial court judges credibility of witnesses and determines weight to be accorded to their testimony); see also In re S.B., No. 07-19-00146-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 9695, at *29 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 5, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (observing that "as the trier of fact, the trial court resolved credibility issues and conflicts in the evidence against [parent]" and concluding that evidence was sufficient to support predicate ground for termination). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of his children.

J.S.C.'s visitation history fell significantly short of the Department's minimum requisite goal of two visitations a month as directed by the service plan. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 309-10 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (holding "it is clear that [the mother] did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact" with her child when she visited her child between six and eight times in a twelve-month period); In re J.J.O., 131 S.W.3d 618, 628-30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (visiting only twelve times in nine months despite weekly scheduled visits supported termination for constructive abandonment). Even J.S.C.'s incarceration for several months during the case does not weigh against the existence of overwhelming evidence that he failed to visit or maintain significant contact with his children.