Opinion
J-S06022-14 No. 1668 MDA 2013 No. 1669 MDA 2013 No. 1670 MDA 2013 No. 1671 MDA 2013 No. 1672 MDA 2013
03-28-2014
IN RE: J.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.J., SR., FATHER IN RE: K.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.J., SR., FATHER IN RE: O.J. APPEAL OF: S.J., SR. IN RE: S.A.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.J., SR., FATHER IN RE: Q.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: S.J., SR.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0056
Appeal from the Decree August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0057
Appeal from the Decree August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0058
Appeal from the Decree August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0059
Appeal from the Decree August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0060
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.
S.J., Sr., ("Father") appeals from the decrees entered on August 19, 2013, in the York County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his five natural children. We affirm.
On June 6, 2013, the York County Office of Children, Youth & Families ("CYF" or "agency") filed petitions for the involuntary termination of Father's and L.N.'s ("Mother") parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The children who were the subjects of the petitions are Q.J., a female, born in September of 1998; K.J., a female, born in December of 1999; O.J., a female, born in January of 2003; J.J., a male, born in April of 2007; and S.A.J., a female, born in November of 2010.
An involuntary termination hearing was held on August 19, 2013. Although represented by counsel at the hearing, Father did not attend the hearing. The orphans' court received testimony from the following witnesses: Jana Emig, the CYF casework supervisor for this family from October of 2009, to March of 2013; Kerry Boley, the CYF caseworker from March of 2013, through the time of the subject proceedings; Herbert Chissell, M.D., via telephone, a licensed psychiatrist at Torrance State Hospital Regional Forensic Psychiatric Center; and Mother. In addition, the orphans' court conducted an in camera interview of the three oldest children together, then ages fourteen, thirteen, and ten, in the presence of the Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL") and the court-appointed special advocate ("CASA"). The court also conducted an in camera interview of J.J., then age six, in the presence of his three older sisters, the GAL, and the CASA.
The record reveals that Father had appeared in the courthouse on the morning of the hearing, but left before the hearing commenced. N.T., 8/19/13, at 7, 9-10.
Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the three oldest female children. Therefore, the hearing proceeded against Mother with respect to the petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights to the two youngest children only, J.J. and S.A.J. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied CYF's petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to J.J. and S.A.J.
The testimonial evidence revealed that CYF became involved with this family in July of 2009, prior to the birth of S.A.J., due to a report alleging deplorable home conditions. N.T., 8/19/13, at 13. At that time, CYF learned that the children had never been enrolled in school, had no birth certificates, and had no medical immunizations or any medical records. Id. at 14. The children were placed in the protective custody of CYF in late August of 2009, following the York City Police Department locating them with L.N. ("Mother") in a hotel. Id. at 13. The four older children were adjudicated dependent on September 21, 2009. S.A.J., who was born prematurely, was adjudicated dependent on February 4, 2011, prior to her discharge from the hospital.
Father last visited with the four older children on March 24, 2010. N.T., 8/19/13, at 29, 73. Father has never met S.A.J. Father was incarcerated from July of 2010, to January of 2013. Initially, in July of 2010, he was incarcerated on a charge related to carrying firearms without a license. Id. at 19-20. In September of 2010, Father was charged with five counts of endangering the welfare of children. Id. at 20. Further, while incarcerated, Father was charged with a probation violation and with a charge relating to theft. Id.
The record reveals that, on July 19, 2012, while his charges were pending, the York County Prison referred Father to Torrance State Hospital Regional Forensic Psychiatric Center for the determination and/or restoration of his competency to stand trial. Id. at 56. By report dated November 6, 2012, Herbert Chissell, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist at Torrance State Hospital, opined that Father had stabilized sufficiently and was competent to stand trial. See Report, 11/6/12, at CYF Exhibit #12. Father was subsequently convicted on the charges of endangering the welfare of children. N.T., 8/19/13, at 20. On March 5, 2013, Father was sentenced to time served and two years of probation for endangering the welfare of children and one year of probation for carrying firearms without a license. Id.
At a time not specified in the record, Father pleaded nolo contendere to the charge related to carrying firearms without a license. N.T., 8/19/13, at 20. The charge against Father relating to theft was dismissed. Id.
Although not specified in the certified record, we presume Father's conviction for endangering the welfare of children related to the four older children involved in this appeal because S.A.J., the youngest child, was not born at the time the charges were brought against Father.
Father has had no contact with Q.J., K.J., O.J., and J.J. since at least September of 2010, at which time a no-contact order was issued in connection with a bail stipulation, as the charges related to Father endangering the four older children involved in this appeal. The no-contact order continued through the time of Father's sentencing in March of 2013. Id. at 28. The record indicates that the no-contact order was also made applicable to S.A.J., the youngest child, upon her birth in November of 2010. Further, a no-contact order was issued in April of 2013, with respect to all of the children. Id. at 29.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans' court, on the record and in open court, granted CYF's petitions as to Father and provided its rationale. N.T., 8/19/13, at 5-8. By decrees dated and entered on August 19, 2013, the court involuntarily terminated Father's parental rights. Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.
On appeal, Father presents the following issues:
1. Whether the lower court erred in allowing the testimony and report of Dr. Herbert Chissell, a licensed psychiatrist at Torrance State Hospital, in a termination of parental rights proceeding where said report and testimony pertained to the Father's competency in a criminal matter and not to his ability or competency to properly parent his children[?]Father's brief at 9.
2. Whether the lower court erred in involuntarily terminating the Father's parental rights when he was incarcerated and not permitted to have any contact with the children[?]
3. Whether the lower court erred in not finding that [CYF] failed to provide the Father with supervised visitation with his children upon his release from prison as set forth in the Family Service Plans[?]
We review this appeal according to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 614 Pa. 275, 284, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminatingIn re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
Instantly, we conclude the trial court properly terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
. . .
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
. . .
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
With respect to section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite analysis as follows:
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63.In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In his first issue, Father argues the orphans' court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony and report of Herbert Chissell, M.D., a licensed psychiatrist at Torrance State Hospital, because Dr. Chissell's report was not relevant to the involuntary termination matter; rather, it was relevant to Father's competency in a criminal case. Upon review, we conclude Father has waived this issue.
Initially, Father's counsel objected during the hearing to the admissibility of Dr. Chissell's report, introduced as exhibit #12, because it was not relevant to the termination matter. N.T., 8/19/13, at 51. CYF's counsel responded to the objection by agreeing that the report was issued solely with respect to Father's competency in his criminal case. CYF's counsel further stated,
Dr. Chissell acknowledged on cross-examination by Father's counsel that his report had nothing to do with whether or not Father could properly parent his children. N.T., 8/19/13, at 59.
. . . I think the significance of the evaluation is in regard to the Axis I and Axis II diagnoses.
In addition, there is a specific recommendation that was made. I think in light of the lack of commitment by the father in regard to the services being provided for the family and to him specifically, I think it gives us additional insight as to father's mental state and his mental health.
Dr. Chissell testified that he provided an Axis I diagnosis of delusional disorder, persecutory type, for Father, and an Axis II diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder. N.T., 8/19/13, at 57. His recommendation upon Father's discharge from Torrance State Hospital was for Father to continue his medication prescribed to treat his paranoid thinking. Id. at 60.
Id.
In light of the objection by Father's counsel to the admissibility of the report, the court permitted Dr. Chissell's testimony, with an opportunity for cross-examination, and reserved its decision regarding the report until after the testimony. Id. at 52. Father's counsel did not object to the testimony of Dr. Chissell, and proceeded to cross-examine him. Id. At the close of CYF's testimonial evidence, CYF expressly requested the admission of multiple exhibits, including, but not limited to, exhibit #12. Id. at 117-118. Upon inquiry by the court regarding whether he objects to the admission of CYF's exhibits, Father's counsel responded that he did not. Id. at 118. Therefore, we conclude Father has waived this issue on appeal. See MacNutt v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 932 A.2d 980, 992 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, litigants must make timely and specific objections during trial).
Even if Father did not waive this issue, we would discern no abuse of discretion by the court in admitting the testimony and report of Dr. Chissell. See Freed v. Geisinger Medical Center, 910 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (stating that, when reviewing a decision regarding the admissibility or exclusion of evidence, "we may reverse only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or error of law. . . . In addition, [t]o constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party"). Here, the trial court did not rely on Dr. Chissell's testimony and report in terminating his parental rights. Rather, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court stated it "relied on Dr. Chissell's testimony for the purpose of determining psychological diagnoses made with regard to Father and services provided to him." Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/13, at 3. As such, we discern no prejudice, nor does Father assert any prejudice, due to the court's evidentiary ruling.
In his second issue, Father argues the court erred in involuntarily terminating his parental rights when he was incarcerated and not permitted to have any contact with the children. Specifically, Father argues that, because of the no-contact order in effect from September of 2010, to March 5, 2013, and from April of 2013, through the time of the subject proceedings, "[t]here was nothing he could do to maintain . . . a place of importance in the lives of his children. . . ." Father's brief at 23. Father's argument relates to termination under section 2511(a)(1), which provides grounds for termination when a parent, "by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). Father's argument provides no basis for this Court to disturb the decrees.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained that, in determining whether to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), it recognized that some of Father's failure to perform his parental duties "was beyond his control in that he was not permitted to have any contact with the [c]hildren." Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/13, at 4. Therefore, it "did not base its decision to terminate Father's parental rights on § 2511(a)(1) or the adverse effect Father['s] ... lack of contact had on his relationship with the [c]hildren, but [rather] did so based on the remaining sections cited in CYF's petition including Father's failure to address or acknowledge the conditions that brought the [c]hildren into care." Id. Specifically, the court reasoned, in part:
. . . it was Father's failure to acknowledge or address the conditions that brought the [c]hildren into care, evidenced by Father's refusal to participate in the Family Services Plan, Father's failure to accept assistance in finding housing and acquiring parenting skills, and Father's failure to work toward successful reunification instead of arguing that there was no justification of removal of the [c]hildren from his care, that led this [c]ourt to determine that the termination of Father's parental rights is in the best interest of the [c]hildren.Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/13, at 5 (citations to record omitted). As previously stated, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., supra. We conclude, as further developed below, that the court properly terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b). For these reasons, Father's second issue fails.
In his third issue, Father argues the court erred in not finding that CYF failed to provide him with supervised visits with the children upon his release from prison, as set forth in his Family Service Plans ("FSP"). We disagree.
The record reveals that an initial FSP was developed for Father on September 23, 2009. Thereafter, the FSP goals were revised every five or six months through April 23, 2013. A recurring FSP goal established after Father's incarceration was to attend supervised weekly visits and demonstrate positive interaction with the children during the visits upon his release from prison. After his release from prison, Father did request visits with the children. N.T., 8/19/13, at 85.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court stated that CYF did not act inappropriately when visits were not initiated after Father's release from prison "particularly given Father's failure to work on his goals or access any services." Trial Court Opinion, 10/11/13, at 6. Further, the court explained why CYF did not initiate supervised visits:
The [three oldest] children, Q.J., O.J., and K.J., have all been adamant with this Court that they do not wish to have any contact with their Father. They remain fearful of him and do not want to resume contact of any kind with him for fear of what might occur. J.J. has indicated to the Court that he has very little, if any, recollection of his father and has no desire to initiate any contact, and S.J. has never known her father, as she has never been in his presence. Additionally, case supervisor Jana Emig testified that Q.J., O.J., and K.J. all have unhealthy bonds with Father and do not want to visit with their Father for fear of being returned to the environment from which they were removed. K.J.[, the second oldest child,] reported to this Court that she does not think that any of the [c]hildren should have to go see their Father. Q.J.[, the oldest child,] reported that she believes her Father is "cruel and mean, evil and hateful."Id. at 5-6 (citations to record omitted). As the record supports the court's findings, we discern no abuse of discretion. Moreover, Father does not assert that the failure of CYF to initiate supervised visits precludes termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), and neither do we so conclude for reasons discussed below. Therefore, Father's final issue fails.
The orphans' court provided the following rationale for terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a) on the record and in open court:
[F]ather has done really little to nothing to address the conditions that brought these children into care as he spent the better part of the last four years, arguing that there was no justification for the removal [of the children] from his care and custody, rather than working towards finding a way for successful reunification to occur.N.T., 8/19/13, at 6-7. The testimonial evidence supports the court's findings.
Services have been offered to him to assist in finding appropriate housing, to assist in acquiring parenting skills, which this Court believes were both absolutely the minimum efforts necessary to achieve reunification given the deplorable environmental conditions from which the children were removed. Father chose not to take advantage of those services even since his release from incarceration or during the period prior to his incarceration.
Ms. Emig, the CYF supervisor for this family from October of 2009, to March of 2013, testified that Father objected to either his first or second FSP established by CYF. Id. at 70-71. She testified on cross-examination by the GAL:
Q. What was the nature of [Father's] objection?Id. at 71. Ms. Boley, the CYF caseworker from March of 2013, through the time of the subject proceedings, testified on cross-examination by Father's counsel with respect to her interaction with Father, as follows:
A. From what I recall, of course, it was him stating that he did not agree with what was written in the FSP, the family service plan, such as the reason why the agency became involved.
Of course, the goals outlined he did not feel that I think certain goals had to be accomplished for him to get his children back.
Q. Ms. Boley, how would you describe [your] relationship with the father?Id. at 94-96.
A. I have had a few interactions with [Father], and they . . . have not been pleasant interactions with him.
Q. [ ] What concerns has [Father] expressed to the agency?
A. [Father], the few times we have spoke[n], has talked about him investigating the agency, about things that weren't done correctly when asked about specific examples. He's not always able to give specific examples, just saying that we should know what they are, know about them, that things weren't done, handled correctly.
. . .
Q. So, [Father's] primary focus has been on how the agency has been handling the whole matter?
A. Yes.
Ms. Emig testified that Father's FSP goals from the outset included, but were not limited to, maintaining safe and stable housing and attending parenting classes. N.T., 8/19/13, at 67-68. She testified that Father was offered services with respect to the housing goal, but he declined them, and he has done nothing to meet that goal or the parenting class goal. Id. at 68, 71-72. Ms. Emig testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Since the adjudication of dependency, what specific services have been offered to father?Id. at 41. Ms. Emig testified that Father was not in a position as of the date of the termination hearing to provide for the care, safety, and protection of the children. Id. at 44. Likewise, Ms. Boley, the CYF caseworker at the time of the termination hearing, testified that Father has made no progress in addressing his FSP goals. Id. at 79.
A. In regards to father, he at the very beginning in 2009, had been working with the Pressley Ridge In-Home Team along with mother, which at that time they did close unsuccessfully due to noncompliance by both parents.
Father then had been offered prior to his incarceration the opportunity for housing assistance through the agency, which he declined.
. . .
During father's incarceration, it had been outlined in the family service plan for him to complete parenting classes within the prison. He had failed to do so. Upon his release from prison, it had been asked that he still continue with completing parenting classes. He failed to do so.
. . .
Ms. Emig testified that, since his release from prison in January of 2013, Father resided with his sister in York, Pennsylvania, and, one month before the termination hearing, he began residing with another sister who also lives in York. N.T., 8/19/13, at 23.
The foregoing testimonial evidence demonstrates that Father's repeated and continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal has caused the children to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being. Further, the cause of Father's incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by him because he continues to resist services and to be uncooperative with CYF. Therefore, we conclude the record evidence supports termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
With respect to section 2511(b), Ms. Emig testified that Q.J., K.J., and O.J. have an unhealthy bond with Father. N.T., 8/19/13, at 35. She testified that the three oldest children are fearful of Father and do not want to see him or have any contact with him. Id. Ms. Boley's testimony regarding how Q.J., K.J., and O.J. feel about Father is consistent with that of Ms. Emig. See id. at 89. There is no evidence of a bond between J.J. and Father, since J.J. was two years old at the time he was placed, and nearly three years old when he last saw Father. Likewise, there is no evidence of a bond between S.A.J. and Father, since S.A.J. has never met Father. Therefore, the testimonial evidence does not reveal the existence of a parent-child bond between Father and any of the children. In addition, Ms. Emig testified that pre-adoptive resources have been identified for all of the children. Id. at 50. The children are all doing well in their foster home placements. Q.J., K.J., and O.J. are placed together in a foster home, and J.J. and S.A.J. are placed in separate foster homes. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in concluding that terminating Father's parental rights "would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare" of the children. We further observe that the Guardian Ad Litem filed a joint brief with CYF in support of the orphan's court decision to terminate Father's parental rights with respect to all five of the children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed. Judgment Entered. ___________________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary