Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SJ09012616
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant J.J. appeals a juvenile court order declaring her a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after the court found she loitered with the intent to commit prostitution (Pen. Code, § 653.22, subd. (a)) and falsely identified herself to the police (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). The court placed her on probation in her mother’s home. Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that she loitered with intent to commit prostitution. We will affirm.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 30, 2009, the Orange County District Attorney filed an amended juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging that 17 year-old appellant loitered in a public place with the intent to commit prostitution (§ 653.22, subd. (a)) and that she falsely identified herself to the police (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). Appellant denied the allegations. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that a prima facie case existed and ordered appellant detained.
Except as otherwise indicated, all further dates refer to the year 2009.
A jurisdictional hearing was held on April 30 and May 1, and the following evidence was adduced.
At 9:15 p.m. on April 7, Garden Grove police officers Michael Viscomi and Troy Haller, in separate vehicles and locations, were investigating vice crimes such as prostitution in an area of Harbor Boulevard and Westminster Street. Harbor Boulevard was well-known for street prostitution. Officer Viscomi testified that the area was colloquially called “the Harbor circuit” and “the Harbor trac[k]” because prostitutes walk up and down the street “like they are driving a circular race track.” He stated that 95 percent of the prostitutes came from outside Orange County.
Officer Viscomi drove south on Harbor. As he approached Westminster, he saw two males and two females walking north; the men were about 40 yards in front of the females. Officer Viscomi recognized one of the females, an adult identified as Shaquinta Antonio, as someone he had “briefly arrested” for prostitution at some earlier time; the other female was appellant. Officer Viscomi became suspicious because the four appeared to be together although they were walking separately. This was consistent, in his experience, with prostitution: males supervising female prostitutes will walk apart so as not to deter potential customers.
Appellant and Antonio crossed Harbor to the east sidewalk and continued walking north; the males remained on the west sidewalk, walking north. The females were walking slowly and appeared to be monitoring the traffic by periodically turning their heads to observe the passing cars and paying particular attention to cars with unaccompanied male drivers. The females were not gesturing towards or signaling any of the passing vehicles. Once, the two males looked over at the two females. Officer Viscomi focused his attention on the two females. He noted that appellant was wearing a long black jacket over a dress, both of which were approximately knee-length, and high heels. Officer Haller had focused his attention on the two men, one of whom was walking a dog.
Five to ten minutes after Viscomi first saw appellant and Antonio, he saw a small green car turn right from Harbor onto Quatro and pull over at the curb. Appellant turned on Quatro while Antonio continued walking north on Harbor. Appellant approached the open passenger window of the green car and spoke to the car’s male driver, the only occupant, for less than 30 seconds. Appellant then walked back to Harbor Boulevard and continued walking north; the green car drove away.
In the meantime, Antonio had continued walking north on Harbor and was about 20 yards ahead of appellant. Antonio approached the driver’s window and spoke to the male driver and sole occupant of a blue car that had just pulled off Harbor and into a parking lot. After 30 seconds, Antonio walked back to Harbor and waited for appellant to catch up with her. They resumed casually walking north on Harbor.
After seeing appellant and Antonio continue north on Harbor, Officer Viscomi moved his car so he could continue observing them, a drive that took at least one minute. After moving to a position further north, he saw only Antonio. Viscomi drove around, looking for appellant, but could not find her.
He joined other police investigators, including Officer Haller, who were parked in a lot on the southeast corner of Harbor and Trask Avenue. Officer Haller had set up in that location because the parking lot “was known for prostitutes hanging out and contacting johns.” Officer Haller watched the two males walk into the parking lot at Harbor and Trask. They then proceeded to an alleyway that provided access to businesses on Harbor Boulevard. The area was near a poorly-lit bus stop known to be a place where prostitutes lingered, “waiting for johns.” Haller testified that the businesses served by that area of the parking lot were closed at that hour, and, besides parking, there was “no other reason for anybody to go to that location.” Haller did not see the men again for over an hour. He saw Antonio walk over to the alley. When she emerged, she walked to the bus stop, monitored traffic, and left the area walking south, out of Haller’s view.
After disappearing from view, appellant appeared again at Harbor and Trask about 20 minutes later. Officer Haller, who was observing the parking lot and had a clear view of the only walking approaches, did not see appellant walk into this area. He did, however, see appellant emerge from a dumpster enclosure shortly after several vehicles drove away. She then walked to the east end of the alley where the two males had located themselves.
Appellant was in the alleyway for 10 or 15 seconds and then exited westbound toward Harbor Boulevard. When she reached Harbor, she walked north toward Trask Avenue and then turned, walking eastbound on Trask.
Officer Viscomi decided to contact her. He got out of his car, walked to the south sidewalk on Trask and waited for appellant to approach him. When she was about five or six yards away, Viscomi identified himself as a police officer and asked to speak with her. He asked appellant about the men he had seen her with; she replied that she did not know them. Officer Viscomi asked her what she was doing out walking on Harbor Boulevard. She said she was “just walking around looking at things,” and gave her name as “Aja Robinson.” Viscomi then told appellant she was under arrest for loitering with the intent to commit prostitution and placed her in handcuffs. Another officer, Officer Ramirez, had just arrested Antonio. Viscomi radioed Ramirez, requesting that he take custody of appellant and transport Antonio and appellant to the Garden Grove Police Department jail.
Officer Viscomi’s surveillance of appellant began at 9:15 p.m. and concluded between 10:20 and 10:30 p.m. The distance on Harbor Boulevard from the intersection with Westminster to the intersection with Trask is approximately one-half to six-tenths of a mile.
Officers Viscomi and Haller and another officer then arrested the two males they had seen earlier walking on Harbor Boulevard. Officer Haller seized two condoms and $139 in cash from one of the men. The cash consisted of thirteen $1 bills, five $5 bills, one $10 bill, two $20 dollar bills, and one $50 bill.
As Officer Ramirez was preparing to transport appellant and Antonio to jail, appellant said her name was Aja Robinson, and said her date of birth was August 9, 1987. Ramirez drove appellant and Antonio to the jail for booking. Appellant then told Ramirez her real name and a different date of birth. Appellant ultimately gave her true date of birth and admitted that she was a minor.
Later, at the police department, Viscomi learned that appellant was not Aja Robinson and that she was a minor. Viscomi took appellant out of the police department jail and over to the juvenile justice center.
Viscomi interviewed appellant at juvenile hall. She denied working as a prostitute on Harbor Boulevard. She admitted giving the false name of Aja Robinson. Appellant was in possession of two packaged condoms similar to the condoms seized from one of the men, and a third condom of a different brand. When Viscomi asked her why she would carry condoms if she was not working as a prostitute, appellant said she was on her way to visit her boyfriend. She said she had known the two men, Brian and Cedric, and Antonio, for about four weeks.
Officer Viscomi testified that, in his opinion, both appellant and Antonio were loitering with the intent to engage in prostitution. Viscomi also stated that, in his experience, it was common for persons arrested for prostitution to lie about their identity. Both Viscomi and Haller testified that neither appellant nor Antonio had actually waved at, signaled, or beckoned drivers in passing cars.
Defense Case
Appellant testified that she lived in Hayward and went to Orange County to visit a friend. On the night in question, she was out with her boyfriend, her boyfriend's cousin Cedric, and Antonio. They had taken the bus and were going out to dinner at a “Chinese cuisine place.” Appellant was dressed for dinner. Appellant could not remember the name of the restaurant, but it was “in the plaza where we were seen all standing.” They had not made it into the restaurant because they were arrested as they waited outside for a delivery of marijuana from a friend of appellant’s boyfriend. Appellant had arranged for and paid for the marijuana when she walked up to her boyfriend’s friend’s car on Quatro. Her boyfriend was standing in the alley smoking a cigarette with the others when appellant paid his friend.
Appellant denied that she was loitering with intent to engage in prostitution. She said she had the condoms for her boyfriend. She admitted giving the officer a false name when she was arrested.
At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing on May 1, the Orange County Juvenile Court sustained the petition. On May 4, the court rescinded disposition orders it made on May 1, found that appellant’s legal residence was in Alameda County, and transferred proceedings to that county for disposition.
On May 28, the Alameda County Juvenile Court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed her on probation, and ordered her to reside in her mother’s home. The court ordered a restitution fine of $25. Among other conditions, the court ordered appellant to complete 40 hours of volunteer work, 26 weeks of Weekend Training Academy, and 120 days of home supervision.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 1.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088, quoting In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must “ ‘consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Romero (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 15, 18.) In making this determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 312.) Thus, if the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Roderick P. (19720 7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809.) Unless it is clearly shown that “on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the [jury’s] verdict,” we will not reverse. (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)
B. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
In issuing its ruling from the bench, the juvenile court found the following facts: appellant “was in an area that is known for prostitution activity;” she “was walking slowly... at about 9:15 p.m. on Harbor Boulevard, northbound;” she was “walking without purpose;” she was “walking with a female that has a prior prostitution record;” appellant and Antonio “crossed over Harbor Boulevard together;” they both “were monitoring traffic... [by] looking over their shoulder at the traffic;” they both separately approached a different vehicle “and spoke to the lone male driver;” two males were walking near appellant and Antonio, which “could be indicative of those two males being present to protect and/or watch over two females that are engaging in acts to solicit prostitution;” appellant had condoms “on her person,” which in itself did not prove anything but showed that “she was prepared for that act;” and appellant “gave a false name and date of birth” to the officers, which showed that “she was trying to hide something, consciousness of guilt.”
The court also observed that appellant said the two males were walking with her and Antonio; that the four of them were walking together, not separately. That being the case, the court wondered aloud, “why didn’t her boyfriend who was the friend of this dealer, why didn’t the boyfriend approach and give this person money to his friend to purchase the marijuana? [¶] Why would this girl, 17-year-old girl, at night, on a strange street, in a strange city, approach the vehicle and give the money to this lone person in the vehicle if all four of them were all together? You would certainly have thought that it would be reasonable that her boyfriend would have done so instead of her.”
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends the juvenile court’s finding of loitering with the intent to commit prostitution must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of the requisite intent. Specifically, appellant argues there was no evidence that she “engaged in any blatant and repeated conduct that would give rise to a permissible inference of the prohibited intent.”
Section 653.22, subdivision (a), provides: “It is unlawful for any person to loiter in any public place with the intent to commit prostitution. This intent is evidenced by acting in a manner and under circumstances which openly demonstrate the purpose of inducing, enticing, or soliciting prostitution, or procuring another to commit prostitution.”
Subdivision (b) of section 653.22 specifies a nonexclusive list of circumstances that may be considered to determine whether a person loiters with the requisite intent. Subdivision (c) states that the factors listed in subdivision (b) are “particularly salient if they occur in an area that is known for prostitution activity,” but permits consideration of all relevant circumstances to determine whether a person has the requisite intent. (§ 653.22, subd. (c).) “Intent must be determined based on an evaluation of the particular circumstances of each case.” (Ibid.)
The full text of section 653.22, subdivisions (b) and (c), is as follows:
A finding of specific intent may be based upon circumstantial evidence. (People v. Mitchell (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 312, 321.) Intent is inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. “Where the evidence is sufficient to justify a reasonable inference that such intent existed, the verdict may not be disturbed.” (People v. Clark (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 293, 296.)
Appellant argues that section 653.22 prohibits only blatant and repeated conduct which openly demonstrates the intent to engage in prostitution. She cites subdivision (b), paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), which list as circumstances that may be considered such conduct as “repeatedly” beckoning, stopping, or engaging in conversation with passersby, “repeatedly” stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles by hailing the drivers, waving arms or other bodily gestures, and, while driving a motor vehicle, “repeatedly” contacting or attempting to contact pedestrians or other motorists. (§ 653.22, subd. (b)(1), (2), (4).) Such open and obvious conduct did not occur in this case, according to appellant, and thus there could be no permissible inference of the prohibited intent.
Appellant concedes that the circumstances here were “arguably suspicious:” she was walking in a high prostitution area together with Antonio who had a previous prostitution arrest; appellant appeared to be monitoring traffic; she approached and spoke with a lone male driver for less than 30 seconds; and two men appeared to be monitoring her and Antonio. These circumstances, argues appellant, were not enough. She contrasts the instant case with People v. Pulliam (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1430 (Pulliam), in which a police officer observed the defendant for 15 to 20 seconds in a high prostitution area and saw her, “wearing a tight-fitting black miniskirt and a jacket partially unzipped to reveal the inner portions of her breasts,” while “standing on the sidewalk waving her arms toward a passing vehicle.” (Id. at p. 1432.) In addition, when approached by the officer, the defendant admitted her intent to engage in prostitution. (Ibid.)
We disagree with appellant that only the most blatant and obvious conduct indicative of soliciting for prostitution can evidence the requisite intent under section 653.22. Appellant’s interpretation ignores and runs contrary to the language in subdivision (c), which provides that “[t]he list of circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) is not exclusive;” that “[a]ny other relevant circumstances may be considered;” and that “[i]ntent must be determined based on an evaluation of the particular circumstances of each case.” (§ 653.22, subd. (c).)
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we have no trouble concluding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding. As articulated by that court, appellant was out walking at night in a high prostitution area, accompanied by a woman with a previous arrest for prostitution; they walked slowly and without purpose, periodically turning their heads to monitor the passing cars; they both approached and spoke briefly with the lone male driver of two separate cars that pulled off the main road; appellant was in possession of several condoms; she was hundreds of miles from home, not visiting or staying with any family members, and gave a false name and date of birth to the police.
Other evidence in support of the ruling was Officer Viscomi’s testimony that female prostitutes will often work together for reasons of safety or so that a more experienced prostitute can train an inexperienced one. The evidence also showed that appellant was wearing a dress and high heels despite intermittent rain that evening. She disappeared from view for about 20 minutes and subsequently emerged from the area of a dumpster enclosure without having entered the area on foot. She was in possession of several condoms, two of which were the same brand as those carried by one of the men. Her explanations for being in the area were inconsistent: On the night she was arrested, she told the police that she did not know the two men and was “just walking around looking at things;” at trial she testified that one of the men was her boyfriend and that the four of them were buying marijuana and going out to dinner. The particular circumstances of this case provide ample support for the juvenile court’s ruling.
In addition, as respondent points out, appellant’s conduct in monitoring the traffic by periodically looking over her shoulder and paying particular attention to cars with a lone male driver showed appellant’s attempts to attract the attention of passing males within the meaning of section 653.22, subdivision (b)(2). In addition to “hailing the drivers” and “waving arms,” the statute expressly includes “making any other bodily gestures” in stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles. (§ 653.22, subd. (b)(2).) By approaching the green car and speaking briefly with the driver, appellant also “engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage” the driver in conversation within the meaning of the statute. (§ 653.22, subd. (b)(2).)
Finally, the Pulliam case does not support appellant’s contention that the intent to engage in prostitution must be evidenced by blatant and repeated conduct. First, the issue in Pulliam was whether section 653.22 was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the court concluded it was neither. (Pulliam, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1437, 1439.) Second, there was no suggestion in Pulliam that the requisite intent under section 653.22 could only be evidenced by blatant and obvious behavior. Clearly, the facts in Pulliam were more obviously and immediately indicative of loitering with intent to commit prostitution, than the facts in the instant case. However, we are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to prohibit loitering with the intent to commit prostitution only when the intent is manifested by conduct that is so glaringly obvious and instantly recognizable. On its face, the statute applies more broadly and requires “an evaluation of the particular circumstances of each case.” (§ 653.22, subd. (c).)
Indeed, the key factor was Pulliam’s admission when approached by the officer that “she was there to engage in prostitution but had just arrived and had made no money that night.” (Pulliam, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1432.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.
“(b) Among the circumstances that may be considered in determining whether a person loiters with the intent to commit prostitution are that the person: [¶] (1) Repeatedly beckons to, stops, engages in conversations with, or attempts to stop or engage in conversations with passersby, indicative of soliciting for prostitution. [¶] (2) Repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles by hailing the drivers, waving arms, or making any other bodily gestures, or engages or attempts to engage the drivers or passengers of the motor vehicles in conversation, indicative of soliciting for prostitution. [¶] (3) Has been convicted of violating this section, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 647, or any other offense relating to or involving prostitution, within five years of the arrest under this section. [¶] (4) Circles an area in a motor vehicle and repeatedly beckons to, contacts, or attempts to contact or stop pedestrians or other motorists, indicative of soliciting for prostitution. [¶] (5) Has engaged, within six months prior to the arrest under this section, in any behavior described in this subdivision, with the exception of paragraph (3), or in any other behavior indicative of prostitution activity.
“(c) The list of circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) is not exclusive. The circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) should be considered particularly salient if they occur in an area that is known for prostitution activity. Any other relevant circumstances may be considered in determining whether a person has the requisite intent. Moreover, no one circumstance or combination of circumstances is in itself determinative of intent. Intent must be determined based on an evaluation of the particular circumstances of each case.”