We review de novo a trial court's denial of a juvenile's motion to dismiss. In re J.F. , 237 N.C. App. 218, 225, 766 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2014). "Where the juvenile moves to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, ... and (2) of [juvenile] being the perpetrator of such offense."

See, e.g. , State v. Starr , 365 N.C. 314, 319, 718 S.E.2d 362 (2011) ("We pause to provide guidance to trial court judges" regarding how to "exercise [their] discretion" in order "to ensure compliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a)."); In re J.F. , 237 N.C. App. 218, 227, 766 S.E.2d 341 (2014) ("We briefly address this jurisdictional issue to provide guidance to trial courts faced with similar situations in the future."). Here, the text and purpose of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1344(f)(3) demonstrate that there are limits to a trial court's discretion under these circumstances.

"The sufficiency of a juvenile petition is a jurisdictional issue that this Court reviews de novo." In re J.F., 237 N.C. App. 218, 221, 766 S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014).

The petition in a juvenile action serves the same purpose as an indictment or other charging instrument in a criminal case." In re J.F., 237 N.C. App. 218, 221, 766 S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014) (citation omitted). As a result, we employ the same facial validity analysis applicable to indictments to juvenile petitions.

The general rule is that "an appeal from a trial court order ‘stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment appealed from, or upon the matter embraced therein.’ " In re J.F. , 237 N.C. App. 218, 227, 766 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2014) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-294 (2017) ). At this stage in the proceedings, "[t]he lower court only retains jurisdiction to take action which aids the appeal and to hear motions and grant orders that do not concern the subject matter of the suit and are not affected by the judgment that has been appealed."

Pending the appeal, the trial judge is generally functus officio, France v. France, 209 N.C. App. 406, 410, 705 S.E.2d 399, 404 (2011), and "is thereafter without power to proceed further until the cause is returned by mandate of the appellate court." In re J.F., 237 N.C. App. 218, 227, 766 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "Where a party appeals from a non appealable interlocutory order, however, such appeal does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, and thus the court may properly proceed with the case."

See, e.g., In re J.F., ___ N.C. App. ___, 766 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2014) (vacating juvenile adjudication for insufficient evidence). In light of our disposition, we need not address Anthony's remaining argument on appeal.