Opinion
H12CP17017279A
01-21-2020
In re Jernie L.-W.[*]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: January 22, 2020
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Gilligan, Robert G., J.T.R.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
R. Gilligan, JTR
By termination of parental rights petition filed with the court on August 13, 2018, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") petitioned the court to terminate the parental rights of Sabrina W. ("Mother") as those rights pertain to the minor child, Jernie L-W., born June 10, 2009. Proper service of process on Mother has been confirmed and notice of the trial was properly given in accordance with tie applicable provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes and the Practice Book Counsel was appointed for Mother and the minor child. There is no known action pending in any other court concerning custody of the minor child nor any claim of Native American affiliation. The court finds that it has jurisdiction of this matter.
Jernie’s biological father, Ramon L. ("Father") died December 21, 2017.
Procedural History
On December 6, 2017, DCF applied for an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody ("OTC") and filed a neglect petition in Jernie’s interest. The OTC was issued on December 6, 2017 (Taylor, J.) and sustained by the court on December 15, 2017 (Taylor, J.). On February 13, 2018, Jernie was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF. (Dannehy, J.)
As noted, the subject termination of parental rights petition was filed August 13, 2018. At the initial plea hearing on the petition on September 13, 2018, the court found that Mother, whose whereabouts were unknown, was served with notice by publication and the court defaulted Mother for failure to appear. (Dannehy, J.) On October 25, 2018, DCF’s permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption was approved by the court. (Dannehy, J.) On November 8, 2018, Mother appeared, was advised of her rights and the court vacated the prior default. (Dannehy, J.) The court ordered a psychological evaluation of Mother and interactional assessment between Mother and Jernie which was submitted June 9, 2019. (Exhibit J.) On September 5, 2019, the court again approved DCF’s permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption. (Dannehy, J.)
The Trial and the Evidence Presented
A trial was conducted on October 7 and 24, 2019. Counsel for DCF, Mother and the minor child were present.The court advised Mother of her rights pursuant to In re Yasiel, 317 Conn. 773 (2015).
The court heard testimony from the petitioner’s witnesses, DCF social worker supervisors, Kiara Mojica and Daniel Reyes, DCF social worker, Heather Czerwinski, supervisor of childrens’ therapy at Wheeler Clinic, David Barringer and Jernie’s foster mother, Lourdes S. Mother offered testimony from her therapist, Alicea Thompkins, LCSW and Claudine Reid, a case manager at Chrysalis Center. The court admitted DCF Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K and Mother’s Exhibit 1, all of which were admitted as full exhibits by agreement of the parties.
After the presentation of DCF’s case, Mother was advised that the court was not inclined to draw an adverse inference from her silence if she declined to testify. Counsel for Mother reported that Mother elected not to testify and rested.
Legal Standard
A hearing on termination of parental rights consists of two phases: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63 cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901 (1991); Practice Book § § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure of the respondent to rehabilitate, "in the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role the child’s life within a reasonable time." In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234 (2011); In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495 cert denied 263 Conn. 917 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000). If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756 (2007). "In the dispositional phase ... the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 479 (2011); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529 cert. denied 287 Conn. 902 (2008).
Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. See In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Supp. 23, 24 (1988); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7.
"Clear and convincing evidence, the required standard of proof in termination actions, has been described in both quantitative and qualitative terms. For example, clear and convincing evidence has been defined as a level of persuasion lying between the usual civil requirement of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence and the requirement in criminal cases of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Another and more qualitative definition is that clear and convincing evidence is proof sufficient to satisfy a court beyond an average certainty." In re Shannon S., 41Conn.Sup. 145, 151 (1989).
Findings
The court was able to closely observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses and determine the validity, cohesion, and the credibility of their testimony. The court has reviewed and considered the documentary evidence admitted as full exhibits. The court makes the following findings herein by clear and convincing evidence based on an independent assessment of all the credible and relevant testimony and documents admitted to evidence at the trial.
Mother was born November 22, 1971 and is 49 years old. She has a child protection history with DCF dating back to September 1992. On September 8, 1992, child abuse was confirmed due to Mother’s exposure of illegal substances to her infant child, Kyarie C. (9/07/92). Kyarie C., now an adult, was not in Mother’s care as a child. (Exhibit K., p. 10.)
DCF’s records indicate that Mother has a history of struggling with mental health and substance abuse issues. Mother reported that her drugs of choice were cocaine and alcohol and she has a past diagnosis of depression and anxiety. (Exhibit K, p. 4.) She has a reported history of domestic violence as the perpetrator with Jernie’s father. Mother has a criminal history including a conviction on April 11, 2008 for felony possession of narcotics for which she was sentenced to two years in jail, execution suspended, two years probation and a conviction on December 7, 2010 for violation of probation. (Exhibit K., p. 8.)
DCF received a report from the Hartford Police that Mother was reported to have "left" Jernie with Father in January 2009 for Father to care for her. One year later, Mother arrived at Father’s residence on January 4, 2010 under the influence and began a domestic dispute with Father for which Mother was arrested and neglect was substantiated by DCF. (Exhibit B., p. 3.)
Due to Mother’s ongoing issues with her mental health and substance abuse, Father made application to the Hartford Probate Court for the removal of Mother as guardian of Jernie. At a hearing on September 2, 2010, Mother consented to her removal as co-guardian and the Hartford Probate Court granted sole guardianship and custody of Jernie to Father. (Exhibit D.)
On November 14, 2017, DCF received a report from the social worker at Hartford Hospital that Father was hospitalized with a life threatening illness and requested that the hospital permit Jernie, who was 8 years old at the time, to stay with him at the hospital because Jernie’s mother had a substance abuse history and he feared for her safety. Father became unresponsive before Mother’s identity could be verified. Mother’s identity was subsequently obtained from Father’s adult daughter and on November 21, 2017, a DCF investigative social worker met with Mother and Jernie at Father’s apartment where Mother reported she had been living with Jernie for two and one-half years. There was no furniture in the apartment and Mother informed the social worker that she and Jernie were sleeping on the floor with a blanket. DCF applied for an ex parte order of temporary custody which was granted on December 6, 2017. (Taylor, J.)
Father died on December 21, 2017. Mother was assessed due to her history of substance abuse and when she tested positive for drugs, DCF explored other relatives for Jernie’s placement. DCF placed Jernie with Father’s former spouse, Lourdes S., with whom Jernie had an ongoing relationship.
On November 22, 2017, Mother was referred to The Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse and mental health evaluations. Following the evaluations, Mother was referred to Intensive Outpatient Services (IOP). Mother was discharged from IOP on December 29, 2017 for non attendance at her appointments.
In January 2018, DCF referred Mother to Wheeler Clinic again. On January 9, 2018, Mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. On January 19, 2018, Mother was again discharged from the program for failing to attend appointments. Mother was referred to Community Health Services for individual counseling and medication management. Mother did not attend her appointments. (Exhibit K, p. 9.)
On January 18, 2018, Mother was referred to Therapeutic Family Time (TFT) at The Village for Families and Children for parenting education and supervised visits with Jernie. As noted, Jernie was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on February 13, 2018 and Mother was issued specific steps for reunification with Jernie. (Exhibit C.) At her last visit with Jernie on March 2, 2018, Mother reported to DCF that she was sleeping in hallways and under bridges. DCF filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 13, 2018. Mother’s whereabouts became unknown until October 24, 2018 when DCF received a call from The Stonington Institute reporting that Mother was admitted to an inpatient program the previous day.
Adjudicatory Grounds
DCF alleges the following adjudicatory grounds in the termination of parental rights petition: (i) General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A), i.e., that Mother has abandoned Jernie in the sense that she has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child, and (ii) General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), i.e., that the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and that Mother has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, Mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
Abandonment (Ground A)
DCF has alleged that Mother abandoned Jernie. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) establishes an adjudicatory ground for termination of parental rights upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that "the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child."
The issue of parental abandonment presents a question of fact. See In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 244, 250 (2000); see also In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 128; In re Rayna M, 13 Conn.App. 23, 36 (1987). "It is a question of fact for the trial court which has the parties before it and is in the best position to analyze all of the factors which go into the ultimate conclusion that [the statutory standard of abandonment] has been satisfied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14 (1981). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129 (1997).
It is not necessary for DCF to provide reasonable efforts toward reunification to a parent who has been found to have abandoned a child. General Statutes § 17a-111b(b); see also In re Paul M., 148 Conn.App. 654, 666 cert. denied, 311 Conn. 938 (2014).
Our courts have addressed the general obligations of parents to their children in our society. "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." In re Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9489), 183 Conn. 11, 14 (1981).
"A parent abandons a child if the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ... General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). Abandonment focuses on the parent’s conduct ... Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child’s welfare ... Section 17a-112[ (j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918 (2008). "It is not lack of interest alone which is the criterion in determining abandonment. Abandonment ... requires failure to maintain interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child." (Internal quotation marks omitted, citations omitted) In re Paul M., 148 Conn.App. 654, 665 cert. denied, 311 Conn. 938 (2014).
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the court finds the following. Jernie has experienced multiple traumas in her young life including the deaths of her grandmother and Father and her mother’s disappearance and failure to maintain personal contact with her. (Exhibit J, Psychological Evaluation, Exhibit K, Social Study p. 4.) The adjudicatory ground of parental abandonment, in part, recognizes the detrimental effect that a parent’s failure to maintain contact can have on a child. When the psychological evaluator asked Mother "[Mow she thought her whereabouts being unknown for nearly 7 months impacted her daughter especially after the recent death of her father" Mother replied it must have been "scaly." (Exhibit J., Psychological Evaluation p. 10.) During Mother’s absence, "Jernie continued to ask about Mother and how she wanted to see her. She [Jernie] becomes upset when talking about her and cries." (Exhibit K., p. 4.)
The evidence showed that Mother remained missing from her last visit with Jernie on March 2, 2018 until October 24, 2018 when she reported her whereabouts to DCF. The adjudicatory date for a finding of parental abandonment however, is the date the termination of parental rights was filed, which was August 13, 2018.
Despite the detrimental effect that Mother’s absence may have had on Jernie, the court is mindful that a finding of parental abandonment as an adjudicatory ground is based on the respondent parent’s conduct. As noted, Mother last visited with Jernie on March 2, 2018. Although Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown from March 3, 2018 to October 24, 2018 when she reported to DCF that she was entering an inpatient treatment program at The Stonington Institute, the adjudicatory date for the determination of whether the ground of abandonment has been proven is the date of the filing of the petition. Evidence as presented that, as of August 13, 2018, when the petition was filed, Mother had maintained no contact with Jernie through DCF or through her foster mother since March 2, 2018. (Exhibit K., Social Study p. 6.) During that period of 164 days, Mother failed to express love and affection to Jernie; failed to express or communicate any personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of Jernie; and failed to maintain any responsibility, concern or interest in Jernie’s welfare. According to the unchallenged Social Study in support of the petition, since her last visit with Jernie on March 2, 2018, Mother provided no financial support, sent no cards or letters, including on Jernie’s birthday and made no inquiry about Jernie’s welfare or inquiry of any kind. (Exhibit K., p. 7.)
Our Appellate Court in In Re Paul M., supra, noted that the respondent parent in that case was unable to point to any statute or case law that imposed a minimum time period pursuant to which parental abandonment occurs as a matter of law and the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that parental absence for 142 days was sufficient to find abandonment.
In the present case, the court finds that DCF has proved by clear and convincing evidence, that, as of the adjudicatory date, Mother had abandoned Jernie as defined in General Statutes § 17a-113(j)(3)(A).
Failure to Re-habilitate (Ground B-1)
DCF has also alleged, as adjudicatory grounds, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), i.e., that the child has been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and that Mother has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, Mother could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.
Prior Neglect Finding
On February 13, 2018, Mother stood silent to the allegations in the neglect petition filed by DCF, Jernie was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families. (Dannehy J.) The requisite finding required under General Statute § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) that the child has been adjudicated neglected in a prior proceeding has been proved.
Reasonable Efforts
General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that the court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parent(s) and made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). Therefore, the court must first determine in the adjudicatory phase of a termination of parental rights proceeding, whether DCF has met its burden to prove that it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parents. See In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-49 (2009).
With respect to the statutory element of reasonable efforts to locate and reunify required for termination pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1), the court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.
Reasonable Efforts to Locate the Respondent
DCF’s efforts to locate Mother have not been questioned. At the time that the petition was filed, Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. DCF filed an affidavit of diligent search for Mother including contact with her adult daughter Kyarie who did not know Mother’s whereabouts. DCF applied for an order of notice by publication which was granted. Mother was served with notice of the proceedings by publication in The Hartford Courant on August 18, 2018. Proper notice of the petition by publication was found at the initial plea hearing. (Dannehy, J.) The court finds by clear and convincing evidence chat DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Mother and accomplished the same.
Reasonable Efforts to Reunify the Child with the Respondent
General Statutes Section 17a-112(j)(1) requires that in a termination of parental rights proceeding, the court also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parent(s). "The word reasonable is the linchpin which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof." In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 48 (2005). "Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ... defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ... [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619 (2007); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255 (2000). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934 (2003). "[T]he department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552 (2009).
Reasonable Efforts to Re-unify Mother and Jernie
DCF referred Mother to Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse and mental health evaluations and subsequent treatment. Following the evaluations, Mother was referred to Intensive Outpatient Services (IOP). In January 2018, DCF referred Mother to Wheeler Clinic again. DCF referred Mother to The Village for Families and Children for Therapeutic Family Time (TFT) to address her parenting issues and for supervised visits with Jernie. Mother was referred to Community Health Services for individual counseling and medication management. DCF provided case management services, transportation assistance and individual bus passes to attend services and supervised visitation with Jernie.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Jernie.
Mother’s Failure to Re-Habilitate
As noted, DCF has alleged that Mother has failed to achieve that level of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of Jernie, Mother could assume a responsible position in JemiCs life. At the time that Jernie was removed by DCF and placed in foster care, Mother’s presenting issues were her substance abuse, unaddressed mental health and parenting issues. To address those issues, Mother was issued specific steps which, inter alia, required her to take part in counseling, make progress toward her identified treatment goals and cooperate with her service providers at The Wheeler Clinic, The Village for Families and Children and Community Health Services. Mother was additionally ordered to take all her medications as prescribed. (Exhibit C.) The court incorporates the findings with regard to Mother’s lack of compliance with the specific steps as set forth above in this memorandum of decision.
As noted, DCF filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 13, 2018. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown until October 24, 2018 when DCF received a call from The Stonington Institute reporting that Mother was admitted to an inpatient program the previous day. On November 8, 2018, the court vacated Mother’s default for failure to appear. (Dannehy, J.)
On December 11, 2018, Mother was successfully discharged from the inpatient program at The Stonington Institute and entered a residential program at The Salvation Army for relapse prevention, mental health treatment and medication management. The program generally lasts six to nine months, is highly structured and requires zero tolerance or the resident is discharged. (Exhibit I, p. 5.) Mother was required to provide three urine screens per week and all screens were negative. (Exhibit J., p. 24.)
Mother’s specific steps required her to participate in Jernie’s therapy "as recommended by the child’s therapist." (Exhibit C.) David Barringer, supervisor of child therapy at Wheeler Clinic, testified that Jernie received weekly therapy sessions with Rosalie Martinez from January 2018 through May 2019. When asked by DCF’s counsel if Mother had participated in Jernie’s therapy, the DCF social worker replied "no." On cross examination, however, DCF acknowledged that Jernie’s therapist had changed and that Jernie was without an assigned therapist for some period of time. After Martinez left Wheeler Clinic in May 2019, Jernie later began therapy sessions with Gabrielle DeFord. Social worker Czerwinski testified that when she asked DeFord whether Mother could participate in Jernie’s therapy, DeFord told her that she needed more time to work with Jernie alone to establish a working relationship before Mother could participate. The court finds that Mother’s lack of participation in Jernie’s therapy was not due to any fault on her part.
Psychological Evaluation
In April 2019, the court ordered a psychological evaluation of Mother and an interactional assessment of Mother and Jernie. (Dannehy, J.) Dr. Ciaramella’s report was issued June 9, 2019. (Exhibit J.) As of the date of her interview with Dr. Ciaramella in May 2019, Mother reported that she had been sober for seven months. (Exhibit J., p. 10.) In preparation for her psychological evaluation, Dr. Ciaramella contacted Priscilla Nelson, Mother’s therapist at the Salvation Army. (Exhibit J., p. 3.) Nelson reported that she conducted an intake interview on 1/03/19 and has been working with Mother on substance abuse, developing coping skills and relapse prevention. Nelson also reported that Mother requested and was provided with group parenting education. Priscilla Nelson reported that Mother was highly invested in her recovery. (Exhibit J, p. 24.)
The ultimate issue in evaluating re-habilitation is whether the parent has gained the insight to care for his or her child. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999). In her evaluation, Dr. Ciaramella reported that Mother "presented as highly invested in her treatment and ready to take responsibility for how her addictions have impacted her child." (Exhibit J., p. 7.) Dr. Ciaramella opined that, as of May 2019, Mother’s insight and judgment were improving and she appeared to be on the road to recovery. (Exhibit J, p. 7 and 29.) Mother’s therapist, Priscilla Nelson, described Mother as "insightful." (Exhibit J., p. 24.)
Moreover, Dr. Ciaramella found that Mother has the "capacity to develop an even healthier relationship with her daughter in the future should she continue with her life of recovery and maintain her sobriety." Dr. Ciaramella noted that it was significant that she found "evidence that mother is making her recovery about her daughter and not just her own needs." (Exhibit J, p. 32.)
With regard to the referral question concerning Mother’s current psychological functioning, Dr. Ciaramella reported that her psychological functioning "appears to be fair and improving." (Exhibit J, p. 30.) Dr. Ciaramella concluded that "[A]fter much shame, guilt, remorse and self destruction, Sabrina appears to be on the road to recovery and committed possibly for the first time in her life to living a life of recovery and not just going through the motions." (Exhibit J, p. 29.)
With regard to the court referral question and request for Dr. Ciaramella’s opinion of whether Mother could achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, Mother could resume a responsible position in Jernie’s life, Dr. Ciaramella opined that should Mother maintain her sobriety, remain compliant with her medication and treatment recommendations, "It stands to reason that within six months to one year Sabrina may be situated and stable enough to reunify with her daughter" and if Mother remained compliant and an integral participant in Jernie’s therapy, "this time frame would be more than sufficient." (Exhibit J, p. 34.)
The report date of the psychological evaluation is June 9, 2019.
As to the referral question of whether it would be detrimental or beneficial to allow further time for the re-establishment of a parent-child relationship, Dr. Ciaramella opined that to allow further time would be "highly beneficial to both parties." (Exhibit J, p. 35.) With regard to her recommendation for Jernie’s placement, Dr. Ciaramella responded "At this time, it is recommended that Jernie remain in the care of her current fictive kin placement.This is primarily due to the fact that mother does not have a residence and is unemployed at this time ." (Exhibit J, p. 33, emphasis added.)
When interviewed by Dr. Ciaramella, Priscilla Nelson reported that Mothr was about to enter the final phase of the recovery program which involved assisting Mother with finding employment and a transition from The Salvation Army. Nelson reported that The Salvation Army has post recovery housing available where Jernie could reside with Mother but to be eligible for the program, Mother would need to secure employment and pay rent. (Exhibit J, p. 24 and 25.)
Mother completed the four-phase Salvation Army program in mid-July 2019 and moved to a sober house in September 2019. Like the Salvation Army residential program, the sober house does not allow children to reside with their mothers. (Testimony of social worker Czerwinski.)
As part of her evaluation, Dr. Ciaramella also contacted Leonie Roberts at The Community Renewal Team (Exhibit J, p. 3.) Roberts reported to Dr. Ciaramella that Mother was "doing well" and was working on employment and housing. (Exhibit J, p. 25.)
At the conclusion of the trial, Mother continued to reside in a sober house and was unemployed. Claudine Reid, a case manager with the Chrysalis Center, testified that Mother was referred to her agency by Mother’s therapist at CRT. Reid testified that Chrysalis works to secure housing for families that are involved with DCF and homeless veterans. At the time of trial, Reid was assisting Mother to secure housing and with her search for employment. Reid testified as to Mother’s prospective housing situation. Reid described the selection process and status of Mother’s situation. Upon discharge from a sober house, a person in Mother’s position would be admitted to a shelter and placed on a waiting list for appropriate housing as the same became available. Reid testified that it is possible that Mother could be ranked at the top of the waiting list and receive housing promptly or the process could take up to two years. On cross examination, social worker Czerwinski acknowledged that Mother requested that DCF refer her to supportive housing but Czerwinski explained that is not the policy of DCF to make such referrals if the approved permanency plan is not reunification.
On August 2, 2018, the court approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption.
"[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her own life, but rather whether she has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 840 (1999). Although Jernie was not individually assessed, Dr. Ciaramella opined, based on her collateral contact with Jernie’s clinician at Wheeler Clinic, that Jernie displayed no gross or special issues that would interfere with her daily functioning. Dr. Ciaramella found that Jernie has no needs that require a specialized placement. (Exhibit J, p. 30.)
Dr. Ciaramella was requested to assess whether Mother has a good understanding of Jernie’s needs and the capacity to meet them. Dr. Ciaramella’s response was that "At this time, it appears that mother has a good understanding of what Jernie needs and is developing the capacity to meet those needs. She is not there yet but she is on her way." (Exhibit J, p. 32.)
The decisive consideration in assessing the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate requires a determination of whether the respondent parent has sufficiently addressed the issues and parental deficiencies that gave rise to DCF involvement to the degree that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child’s life, or will be able to do so in the reasonably foreseeable future. Personal rehabilitation does not require that a parent be a perfect or ideal parent who is capable of providing his or her child adequate care without support services.
On the basis of the credible testimony and the documentary evidence, the court finds that DCF has failed to sustain the burden to prove, by the rigorous standard of clear and convincing evidence, that Mother has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in Jernie’s life as required by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
Disposition
DCF has proved the adjudicatory ground of abandonment and therefore the court must address the dispositional phase of this proceeding and determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental rights of Mother. "The best interests of the child include the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of his or her environment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Janson R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15 (2011). "In arriving at that decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in General Statutes [17a-112(k) ]." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528 (2001). Those factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven nor is there any requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence before termination can be ordered. In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422-23 (2012). Moreover, not all factors need be given equal weight in determining the child’s best interest. In re Nevaeh W., 317 Conn. 723, 739-40 (2015).
As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to DCF’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining whether terminating the parental rights of Mother is in Jernies’s best interest.
General Statutes § 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings previously found in this Memorandum of Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. 17a-112(k), the court makes the following written findings by clear and convincing evidence.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent(s) and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent(s) .
DCF offered Mother regularly scheduled visits with the child. DCF referred Mother to substance abuse screening and treatment, mental health and parenting programs. DCF provided foster care and case work services for the child and Mother.
The court finds, given the totality of the circumstances and the evidence in this case, that the reunification services offered to Mother, provided and made available by DCF, were timely and appropriate.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time .
The court incorporates by reference here the factual determinations made in the foregoing findings with respect to services offered and provided. The court finds that DCF made reasonable efforts as set forth herein to reunite the family as required by federal law.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order .
The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings made in this memorandum of decision with respect to the specific steps ordered and all other court orders issued.
The court finds that DCF complied with all applicable court orders. The court finds that Mother failed to comply with significant court orders during the period when she made her whereabouts unknown.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody and control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties .
Jernie’s biological father is deceased.
The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights notes that Mother "was appropriate, bonded and able to attend to Jernie’s immediate needs" (Exhibit K, p. 5.) "Mrs. W. interacted well with Jernie during her visits and presented as nurturing. It appeared that Mrs. W. and Jernie were very bonded." (Exhibit K, p. 6.)
Dr. Ciaramella was also requested to assess the relationship between Mother and Jernie. Dr. Ciaramella found "The relationship between [Mother] and Jernie is intact. They clearly are bonded." (Exhibit J, p. 32.)
The DCF Social Study in Support of Permanency Plan acknowledges "Mrs. W. and Jernie visit each other every other Friday for two hours, and it is clear that they have an attachment with one another." (Exhibit I, p. 7.)
Jernie has resided with, and been cared for, by a "fictive kin" foster parent, Lourdes S. since December 2017. The child has developed an appropriate bond with her foster mother.
5. The age of the child .
Jernie was born May 6, 2009. She is ten years old.
6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future .
Although Mother needs to make further adjustments to her circumstances, by securing employment and housing, Mother has made significant efforts to change her circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of Jernie to return to her care in the foreseeable future as demonstrated by the evidence.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent .
There was no evidence of any unreasonable act or conduct of any person, or adverse economic circumstance, that prevented Mother from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Jernie.
Best Interest of the Child
CGS § 17a-112(j) requires that, before granting a petition for termination of parental rights, the court must find "by clear and convincing evidence ... (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ..." The best interest standard is specific to each child and gives the court broad discretion to consider all the factors that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determining whether terminating the respondent Mother’s parental rights would be in Jernie’s best interest, the court has considered various factors, including her interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of her environment, her age and needs, the length and nature of her stay in foster care; the lack of contact with or relationship with her birth parent, the foregoing seven statutory factors and the court’s findings thereon. The court has also balanced Jernie’s need for stability and permanency against the interest in preserving family integrity. "The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State." (Citations omitted.) In re Carla C., 167 Conn.App. 248, 264 (2016).
"It is indisputable that protecting the physical and psychological well-being of children is a compelling, as well as legitimate state interest." In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 244, 260 (2000). The Wheeler Clinic therapist supervisor, David Barringer, testified that Jernie identified two major traumas in her life which were the death of her father and not being able to be with Mother.
Our law recognizes the importance of a child’s attachment and bond to a parent.
When asked by counsel, the DCF social worker testified that Jernie is "very connected" to Mother, "loves her" and ideally would like to live with her. The record is replete with evidence, as set forth above, that Jernie is very attached and bonded with Mother.
Although the court is required to make its own independent determination as to the best interest of the child, a parent-child interaction conducted by a court-appointed professional may be given consideration in determining whether the termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child.
At the request of the court, Dr. Ciaramella conducted an interactional assessment of Mother and Jernie. Dr. Ciaramella’s evaluation described the interaction as "significant for the ease and comfort expressed and observed between the two" and concluded that it was "evident that a bond and attachment is clearly established." (Exhibit J, p. 23.)
With regard to the referral question of the likely impact on the child if visits with Mother were to stop or be reduced, Dr. Ciaramella opined that the impact would be "significantly negative ... With mother now back in her life and seemingly on the road to recovery, stopping visits would be likely significantly detrimental to her emotional well-being." (Exhibit J., p. 34.)
The standard of clear and convincing evidence "should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted, In re Tyawane, 85 Conn.App. 528, 539 (2004). Moreover, "[I]nsistence upon strict compliance with the statutory criteria before termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption proceedings can occur is not inconsistent with concern for the best interests of the child ... A child, no less than a parent, has a powerful interest in the preservation of the parent-child relationship ..." In re Carla C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 264-65.
Having carefully considered and weighed all the credible testimonial and documentary evidence admitted at trial and made the factual findings set forth herein, the court independently finds, that DCF has failed to prove, by the rigorous standard of clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parental rights of Mother is in Jernie’s best interest.
Having duly considered the foregoing, the petition to terminate Sabrina W.’s parental rights to Jernie L.-W. is denied.
Judgment shall enter accordingly. [*] In accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 46b-142(b) and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Superior Court.