Opinion
H12CP15015893A
11-21-2016
In re Jeremiah G. [1]
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael R. Dannehy, J.
This case presents a petition by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Latanya G. and Delvis S. to their child, Jeremiah G., DOB 01/22/15.
On April 12, 2016, DCF filed a petition to terminate parental rights. The parents were properly served. Mother appeared in court and was appointed counsel. Father did not appear and a default judgment entered against him.
The statutory ground alleged in the petition against the mother was that the child had been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, and that as a parent, she had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child. C.G.S. 17a-112(j)(1)(B)(i).
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the court determined that the respondent mother was not competent. She has had an intellectual developmental disorder since childhood. School records indicate that she operated at a second grade level in high school. Mother has a full scale IQ of 57 which puts her in the mentally deficient range. She thinks in a very concrete fashion. She has both short-term and long-term memory deficits. There is no cure for cognitive impairment. Given the chronic nature and severity of her intellectual impairment, her competency cannot be restored. Therefore, a guardian ad litem was appointed for her.
In making its decision to proceed to trial and to grant no further continuances for mother to regain her competency, the court reviewed the case of In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 564, 613 A.2d 780 (1993). In examining the due process issues implicated, our Supreme Court found that " there is a cognizable risk that a parent unable to assist his or her attorney or to understand the proceedings might suffer an erroneous termination of parental rights regardless of whether a guardian ad litem has been appointed pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 45a-708(a)." In re Alexander V., supra, 563. In weighing that risk, the court had reviewed the procedural safeguards set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to provide assistance in the decision to proceed with the trial. As previously found, in the case of In re Aida M. and Carmelo O., Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, H12-CP96-000640, and H12-CP96-00064, (March 25, 1997, Foley, J.), the court concludes that the multi-factored balancing test set forth in Mathews must be considered to ensure that all due process rights of the incompetent parent have been addressed before proceeding to a trial on the merits. It is an effort to balance the interests of the incompetent mother in maintaining her family, free of coercive state interference, with the interest of the child's right to a safe and healthy childhood. The first of the four concerns in Mathews is:
1. " Is it likely that the evidence presented could be refuted by a competent parent?" In this case, there is clear and convincing evidence of failure to rehabilitate. The testimony was consistent that mother lacked the ability to safely parent this child.
2. The second concern is " whether the parent could be restored to competence within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child?" The evaluators were of the opinion that due to the depth and persistence of the respondent's cognitive impairments that no intervention could restore her to competency.
3. " If the mother were competent, is there proof of the existence of or prospect of an existing parent-child relationship?" There is evidence that a parent-child relationship exists but due to mother's limitations she will never be able to safely parent this child.
4. " Was the respondent mother effectively represented by counsel and the guardian ad litem, given the difficulties attendant to such representation?" In this case, prior to the date scheduled for trial, the guardian met with the respondent and her attorney to develop a trial strategy. She attended the trial and conferred with mother and the attorney for mother. After the direct examination of each witness the court recessed and gave mother, her attorney, and the GAL, an opportunity to discuss issues to be raised on cross examination.
The court concludes that all of the factors to be considered by the court under a Mathews' analysis support proceeding to trial. The likelihood of an erroneous termination decision is slight in view of the substantial evidence establishing the failure to rehabilitate. That remote possibility is greatly outweighed by the child's needs, and the opportunity for counsel and her guardian to prepare for the trial. The court concludes that the due process protections to which she is entitled have been provided to mother in the conduct of this trial. Permitting any further delay will not necessarily result in any further improvement in mother's condition and the child's best interests require the court to proceed without further delay.
* * *
The matter was tried to the court on October 31, 2016. The respondent mother was present and was represented at trial by counsel as well as a guardian ad litem. Also present were attorneys for DCF and the child. The attorneys were given the opportunity to cross examine witnesses as well as to call witnesses and present evidence. The petitioner offered nine exhibits. Mother introduced two exhibits. The court also took judicial notice of several items. The child's attorney did not present evidence.
The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter and that there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child. The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence and testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respective mother.
Facts
The court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
On February 10, 2015, DCF filed an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) and a Petition of Neglect on behalf of Jeremiah G. The OTC was sustained on February 20, 2015 and Jeremiah was adjudicated a neglected child and committed to DCF on December 10, 2015. The petition to terminate parental rights was filed on April 12, 2016. Specific steps were issued at the time the OTC was sustained and again at the time of the adjudication and disposition.
DCF became involved shortly after Jeremiah's birth on January 22, 2015. They were contacted by a hospital social worker who had concerns about mother's ability to care for the child. At the time of birth the child had feeding problems and required the insertion of a feeding tube. The social worker reported that mother was cognitively limited and had difficulty processing information. She was receiving SSI but didn't remember the name of her payee. Latanya G. reported that she was residing with Carlton H., who was not Jeremiah's father, in an abusive and exploitive relationship. This relationship continued through January 2016. Carlton H. and his sister, who was mother's payee for SSI benefits, were appropriating some of her funds as well as her food stamps. Mother complained that at times she lacked sufficient food supplies. She claimed that Carlton had brought her to New Jersey where she was mistreated by his " friends, " forcing her to take a bus back to Hartford.
At the time of Jeremiah's birth, Mother did not have suitable housing or baby supplies. In his evaluation, Dr. Franklin indicated that mother is subject to exploitation by males. When DCF became involved, they initially developed a safety plan under which Mother would live with the maternal grandmother who would supervise mother and her child. DCF advised mother that she could not leave the residence with the child. Two days later, the grandmother notified DCF that mother was leaving and DCF applied for the OTC.
Mother is diagnosed with a life threatening illness. As a result of this, St. Francis hospital referred her to The Wellness Connection, an agency that provides mother with case management services. She is also provided with meals Monday through Friday. A nurse assists mother with setting up her weekly medications. Additionally, the agency assists mother with her daily routine, finances, housing and nutrition. Mother is provided with a budget and her rent and utilities payments are monitored for payment. She receives assistance with scheduling appointments. At the time the petition was filed mother was not fully cooperating with the agency. As of the trial date, Mother's level of cooperation has increased and she is making progress in managing her own affairs.
The Wellness Connection provides a very interactive program. The case manager assigned to mother sees her three to four times a week. She has observed Mother with Jeremiah. She indicated that mother often requires direction with the child and is unable to multi-task. She becomes easily distracted when conversing with another person and supervising Jeremiah. On one occasion during a team meeting, mother was holding the child when he began to fidget. This caused mother to become overwhelmed and the staff had to intervene. Based on the observation of the case manager, and her familiarity with mother's limitations, she believes that mother is incapable of independently parenting this child on a full-time basis.
Mother's ability to safely parent Jeremiah is a critical issue in this case. In order to address mother's parenting deficiencies, DCF referred mother to a parenting program, Triple P, in April 2015. Due to her cognitive limitations and her inability to grasp instructions, she was discharged within two weeks. DCF then obtained a psychological evaluation of mother which was performed by Dr. Derek Franklin in June 2015. Among other recommendations, Dr. Franklin suggested that mother participate in a parenting program specifically designed for young mothers with young children. DCF then referred mother to a parenting program run through CREC. The program was from July through November 2015. Recognizing that mother's skills were still deficient, the program was extended another six months from January to June 2016. Mother worked with Rosa Flores who was the Program Coordinator with 23 years of experience. She tailored her approach to compensate for mother's limitations, often using visual cues and instructional aides. She provided coaching and role modeling. At the conclusion of the program she felt that mother was unable to parent the child by herself and would require around the clock assistance on a daily basis. Mother's inability to adapt to changing circumstances would render her unable to respond in an emergency. She would not be able to follow instructions even if she were able to call 911. These problems would become exacerbated as the child aged and his developmental needs changed. Ms. Flores indicated that she was unaware of any program that could provide this level of assistance. She did not support reunification. DCF attempted to enlist family members that would allow mother and Jeremiah to live with them so they could provide supervision, but they were unable to find any volunteers.
The social workers assigned to this case have made similar observations. While mother's attendance at scheduled visits has been somewhat inconsistent, for the most part, mother is appropriate during visits. She clearly loves her child, however, she has difficulty dealing with unexpected events and will require intervention by the social worker or the case aide.
In his evaluation, Dr. Franklin expressed grave reservations about mother's ability to parent independently, and when informed of Ms. Flores' observations and opinions, he concluded that his clinical findings had been corroborated. He was of the opinion that reunification could not be effectuated without compromising Jeremiah's safety. The court finds his testimony, that it is highly unlikely that mother will improve her ability to parent considering her cognitive deficits, an IQ of less than 60, and her concrete way of thinking, to be very compelling.
Jeremiah is placed with a paternal relative and has resided in that home since May 2015. He is very bonded to the family and they are addressing all his needs. He is treated as a member of the family by his foster parents and sibling. They have a cordial relationship with mother, allowing her to visit, and plan to keep her involved should Jeremiah's placement become permanent.
Reasonable Efforts
In order to terminate parental rights absent consent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence that it made " reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent . . . unless the Commissioner of Children and Families shall make reasonable efforts to reunify a parent with a child or the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). " Because the two clauses are separated by the word 'unless, ' this statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts." In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009). Additionally, reasonable efforts are not required when the court has approved a permanency plan other than reunification pursuant to subsection (k) of section 46b-129 General Statutes § 17a-111b(a).
In reviewing reasonable efforts, " [t]he word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts mean doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2001). The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2006). The court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents.
The primary issues leading to the child's removal were the mother's cognitive limitations and its impact on her ability to safely parent her child. There were additional concerns about mother's substance abuse and mental health housing, adequate income, and domestic violence.
The Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his mother. Shortly after the Order of Temporary Custody was sustained, DCF referred mother to a parenting program. When it became apparent that mother lacked the capacity to participate in a traditional parenting program, DCF obtained a psychological evaluation to determine the basis for mother's limitations and for recommendations as to what services should be offered to her to facilitate reunification. After obtaining the evaluation, DCF referred mother to a parenting program that incorporated mentoring, modeling, and visual cues; essentially what was recommended by the evaluator. After mother completed the four-month program it was clear that she had not made significant progress. DCF then arranged for mother to have an additional six months of parenting education. Despite mother's hard work and efforts, she failed to reach a position where she could independently care for the child. DCF also provided mother with supervised visits twice a week and during those visits coached mother on child care. Additionally, mother was allowed to visit the child in the foster family's home without DCF supervision. Any expectation that DCF should provide 24/7 assistance would be unreasonable.
In order to address substance abuse issues, as well as mental health issues, mother was referred to Community Health Services (CHS) in March 2015. She completed the substance abuse portion and currently engages in mental health counseling where she has made progress.
DCF attempted to refer mother to the Department of Developmental Services but was unable to do so because the Hartford Board of Education did not provide the necessary records.
Mother's mental health and substance abuse issues were not major barriers to reunification. Her ability to safely parent the child is the critical issue. Due to her cognitive limitations she is unable to benefit from efforts to reunify. Despite ten months of fairly intensive parenting education, the consensus is that mother cannot independently care for her child as a result of her cognitive limitations and concrete thinking. She lacks the ability to adapt to changes in the child's demeanor and would not be able to respond appropriately in an emergency. Consequently, the court finds that mother is unable to benefit from reunification efforts.
The court approved a plan of Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption on January 20, 2016. It should be noted that DCF continued to provide parenting education, visitation, and mental health services after they filed their permanency plan of termination.
Adjudication
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1. The petitioner is required to prove at least one of the grounds alleged in its petition by clear and convincing evidence.
Failure to Rehabilitate-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1)(B)(i) as to Respondent Mother and Father
If the parents of a child who has been found by the court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fail to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, grounds for termination exist. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1)(B)(i). " Personal rehabilitation, [as used in the statute] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent (and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage his own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Zowie N., 135 Conn.App. 470, 503, 41 A.3d 1056, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916, 46 A.3d 170 (2012). Furthermore, " [i]n making its determination, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 233 (2011).
The parent's compliance with the court-ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication are relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibility of a parent than he or she was at the time of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).
The presenting issues at the time of the child's removal were: mother's ability to care for the child, her mental health, substance abuse and housing. Mother has substantially complied with specific steps issued by the court. She addressed a minor issue with substance abuse. She is consistently participating in mental health counseling and has made progress. She has housing and assistance in maintaining it through case management services provided by Connection.
The critical issue is whether mother has developed the capacity to safely parent Jeremiah considering his age and his needs. Unfortunately she has not achieved a level of parental competency that would permit Jeremiah to return to her care and she lacks the family or social support to assist her to independently care for the child on a fulltime basis. Despite extensive parenting education, coaching, modeling and supervised visitation, the court cannot find that mother could assume the responsibility of caring for her child independently on a full-time basis. This opinion is shared by those who have observed mother's interactions with the child. They are unanimous in their opinion that mother would not be able to respond to the child's needs in a crisis or emergency situation. The social workers involved in the case have had to intervene to care for the child when mother becomes overwhelmed. Her parenting coach has observed mother's inability to adapt to meet the child's needs and feels that the child would be at risk should mother resume her role as an independent caretaker. That sentiment is shared by mother's case manager at the Connection program. Dr. Franklin has expressed grave concerns as to mother's ability to effectively parent the child. The observations by the various coaches, mentors, and social workers corroborate his clinical opinion.
DISPOSITION
General Statute § 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory ground alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights has been proven. Before making a decision on whether or not to terminate the respondents' parental rights, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set out in General Statute § 17a-112(j). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows.
(1) The timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.
As referenced above, the Department has offered numerous services to facilitate the reunion of the mother with her child. They provided references to address parenting, mental health and substance abuse. They provided mother with regular visitation. Referrals were made at the inception of the case and have continued through the time of trial.
(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 as amended from time to time.
DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and child by referring her to parenting programs, individual counseling, housing assistance, case management services and by providing visitation.
(3) The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations.
The court issued specific steps to the parties. DCF has fulfilled its expectations by making timely and appropriate referrals for services. Mother has complied for the most part with the expectations. Visitation has not always been as consistent as possible.
(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.
There is a positive bond between mother and child. Jeremiah appears to be comfortable and content with his mother. He is also bonded to his foster family with whom he has resided since May 2015.
(5) The Age of the Child
Jeremiah is two years and ten months old.
(6) The effort of the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions; and (B) the maintenance of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child.
Mother has made a valiant attempt to adjust her circumstances. Despite maintaining contact with the child, DCF and the foster parents, she has been unable to reach a level of sufficient parenting ability.
(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable act of the other parent or any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.
Mother did not face unreasonable interference from any person and no economic circumstance preventing her from establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child. Mother was provided with legal representation at no cost as well as transportation assistance for visitation with Jeremiah. She also was provided, without cost, several programs that would have addressed her parenting deficiencies.
Best Interests of the Child
The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 511.
In determining the issue of the best interests of the child, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Jeremiah that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue. The parents are incapable of resuming their parental roles and no alternatives have been proffered. See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), cert. granted in part, 307 Conn. 950, 60 A.3d 739, and cert. granted in part, 308 Conn. 925, 64 A.3d 119, (2013); In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013).
Father's rights were terminated in a separate hearing on October 31, 2016.
The court has considered Jeremiah's best interests, including his health, safety and need for permanency. " It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty . . ." Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982). While bonded to his mother, the child is also bonded to his foster family with whom he has lived since March 2015.
This is a very sad case. There is no question that mother loves Jeremiah and he dearly wants to be with his mother. She has worked extremely hard to learn how to be a responsible parent for him but the evidence is overwhelming that Jeremiah would not be safe if he were reunified with his mother. It is not a situation that will improve with time or with further education. In fact, the situation will get worse as Jeremiah grows older and his developmental needs change. There is no evidence that mother could develop family supports or social networks to supervise her care of the child. When balancing the prospect of mother being able to independently care for Jeremiah against his right to grow in a safe and nurturing environment, the evidence clearly and convincingly points to termination.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence and statutory considerations, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights, the court further finds by clear and convincing evidence, based upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Latanya G., mother of Jeremiah G. Accordingly, the court hereby terminates her parental rights to Jeremiah G.
The court appoints the Department of Children and Families as Statutory Parent for the child and orders the filing of a status report within thirty days of the filing of this decision.
SO ORDERED.