This deference extends to "substantive determinations" on "dispositional matters—such as ... whether termination is necessary"— In re Rebecca K.C. , 213 W. Va. 230, 235, 579 S.E.2d 718, 723 (2003) (per curiam), because "we recognize[ ] that ‘the circuit court is the better-equipped tribunal’ to make" such decisions, id. at 233, 579 S.E.2d at 721 (quoting In re Emily , 208 W. Va. 325, 340, 540 S.E.2d 542, 557 (2000) ). "[C]ritical" yet "unreviewable intangibles[,]" In re J.C. , 232 W. Va. 81, 87, 750 S.E.2d 634, 640 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting State ex rel. Diva P. v. Kaufman , 200 W. Va. 555, 562, 490 S.E.2d 642, 649 (1997) ), may escape our notice "from a vista of a cold appellate record[,]" State v. Potter , 197 W. Va. 734, 751, 478 S.E.2d 742, 759 (1996) ; therefore, we refuse to "overturn a finding simply because [we] would have decided the case differently," Tiffany Marie S. , 196 W. Va. at 226, 470 S.E.2d at 180, syl. pt. 1, in part.

; accord In re J.C., 232 W.Va. 81, 89, 750 S.E.2d 634, 642 (2013) (per curiam) ("Here, the mother's request for an improvement period fails in two ways. First, . . . she does not state nor does the record reflect that she filed a written motion for an improvement period as required by West Virginia Code § 49-6- 12.").

We have said this before. SeeIn re J.G. , 240 W. Va. 194, 202, 809 S.E.2d 453, 461 (2018) ("As plainly stated therein, West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2) permits a post-adjudicatory improvement period ... upon written motion ...."); accordIn re J.C. , 232 W. Va. 81, 89, 750 S.E.2d 634, 642 (2013) (per curiam) ("Here, the mother's request for an improvement period fails in two ways. First, ... she does not state nor does the record reflect that she filed a written motion for an improvement period as required by West Virginia Code § 49–6–12.").