Opinion
D040720.
7-23-2003
In re JASON J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON J., Defendant and Appellant.
The juvenile court committed Jason J. to the California Youth Authority for a maximum term of nine years four months after declaring him a continuing ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) based on a true finding he committed residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459/460). Jason contends the trial court erred in denying him a jury trial.
FACTS
On June 4, 2002, Isabel Shaffer awoke to see a boy she identified as Jason in her home. She screamed and the youth fled. She looked through a window and saw two boys running off. Shaffer called 911. Police arrived and found a broken window apparently used to gain entry into the home. Money was missing from Ms. Shaffers purse and her sons wallet and Timex sunglasses were missing. While a responding officer was at the Reflections School a "couple" blocks away from Ms. Shaffers home checking attendance records, Jason and a companion came in. They had been absent. The officer saw glass in Jasons hair and asked him how it got there. Jason said he did not know. Jason had a pair of Timex sunglasses.
Jason testified that his companion broke a window at Shaffers house, but he ran and did not enter the house.
DISCUSSION
Citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976, In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467, and In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, Jason recognizes that "both the United States and California Supreme Courts have rejected [his claim] in the past." He argues this precedent should no longer be followed because in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (Apprendi), and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (Ring), the United States Supreme Court held that no one may be punished for acts not found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apprendi, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the lower court rather than a jury found true a hate crime enhancement to the adult defendants conviction of unlawfully possessing a firearm. The Supreme Court held this was not a sentencing issue that could be resolved by the judge finding the charge is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court said, "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) In Ring, the Supreme Court applied this principle to the penalty determination in a capital punishment case. (Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 609.) Neither Apprendi nor Ring supports the overruling of the line of cases holding that a juvenile charged with a crime does not have a right to a jury trial, because the juvenile court system exists to attempt to rehabilitate minors rather than merely punish them for committing a crime. (See In re Myresheia W., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 740-741.) While we frequently hear the argument that the juvenile laws have been amended to favor punishment, we have not yet reached the point where we are able to say it is no longer the law that juveniles charged with criminal acts are not entitled to jury trials. It is for the Supreme Court to reconsider this question if it chooses to do so. Our task is simple; we will apply the law as the Supreme Court has stated it. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McDONALD, J.