Opinion
1 CA-MH 24-0045
11-26-2024
IN RE THE MATTER OF: JAMES K.
Coconino County Legal Defender's Office By Jada Streiff & Joseph Carver Counsel for Appellant Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff By Jessica Armfield Counsel for Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County No. S0300MH202400064 The Honorable Elaine Fridlund-Horne, Judge AFFIRMED
Coconino County Legal Defender's Office
By Jada Streiff & Joseph Carver
Counsel for Appellant
Coconino County Attorney's Office, Flagstaff
By Jessica Armfield
Counsel for Appellee
Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court's decision, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
McMURDIE, JUDGE:
¶1 James K. appeals the superior court's mental health treatment order requiring him to undergo involuntary outpatient and inpatient treatment. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In February 2024, an application was filed for James's emergency admission to the Guidance Center ("Center") for an evaluation. On February 15, 2024, James, who was detained in the jail at the time, was transferred to the Center for evaluation.
¶3 On February 16, 2024, Dr. Altenberg and another doctor conducted psychological evaluations. Dr. Altenberg diagnosed James with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, and both physicians determined James was a danger to others and persistently or acutely disabled. The Center petitioned for court-ordered treatment that same day. James was transferred back to the jail four days later because he assaulted a staff member at the Center.
¶4 On February 28, 2024, the superior court held a hearing on the petition for court-ordered treatment. Dr. Altenberg testified that she did not know what medications or treatment James received in the 72 hours before the hearing because he was in the jail, and she did not re-evaluate him because she did not think his status had changed. After the close of the evidence, James's counsel asked the court to deny the petition because the Center did not present evidence of James's treatment status while in the jail.
¶5 Over James's counsel's objection, the court continued the hearing to allow the Center to obtain evidence of James's jail treatment status. The court determined that a continuance would be less prejudicial to James than dismissing the petition and allowing the Center to refile. The court thus rejected James's counsel's argument that the Center's failure to prove their case was not good cause for a continuation and that the petition should be dismissed.
¶6 The court held the continued hearing on March 1, 2024. Dr. Altenberg testified, based on information from a nurse practitioner at the jail, that James's refusal to comply with treatment persisted. The court found James was persistently or acutely disabled and ordered him to undergo combined inpatient and outpatient treatment for up to 365 days, with inpatient treatment not to exceed 180 days.
¶7 James appealed the treatment order. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 36-546.01.
DISCUSSION
¶8 James argues the superior court abused its discretion by continuing the hearing on the Center's petition for court-ordered treatment. He also argues that the continuance violated his procedural due process rights.
¶9 We review for an abuse of discretion the superior court's decision to grant a continuance. In re Maricopa County Superior Ct. No. MH2003-000240 , 206 Ariz. 367, 369-70, ¶ 10 (App. 2003). We review the due process issue de novo because it presents a question of law. In re MH 2006-002044, 217 Ariz. 31, 33, ¶ 7 (App. 2007).
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Continuing the Hearing for More Evidence of James's Treatment Status.
¶10 James argues the superior court abused its discretion by continuing the hearing to allow the Center to present more evidence. The Center argues the court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the evidence. We agree.
¶11 The superior court has broad discretion when deciding whether to grant a continuance or to reopen a case to hear more evidence. See MH2003-000240, 206 Ariz. at 369, ¶ 9; see also State v. Sanchez, 124 Ariz. 505, 506 (App. 1979). The superior court abuses its discretion if it "exercises its discretion in a manner that is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." In re MH 2008-002238, 1 CA-MH 08-0064, 2009 WL 2634726, at *2, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. Aug. 27, 2009) (mem. decision) (citing Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 42, ¶ 11 (App. 2008)).
¶12 Generally, a court must hold a hearing on a petition for court-ordered treatment "within six business days after the petition is filed." A.R.S. § 36-535(B). A court may continue the hearing at either party's request if the party shows good cause. Id. "Good cause" to grant a continuance is a "substantial reason . . . that affords a legal excuse," and requiring good cause prevents "[u]nnecessary and [u]nreasonable delays." See State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 225 (1975) (good cause to continue a criminal trial) (quoting State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 380 (1957)); see also In re MH2013-000134, 1 CA-MH 13-0026, 2013 WL 5273042, at *3, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Sept. 17, 2013) (mem. decision) (Allowing a patient to exercise their right to an independent medical evaluation constitutes good cause for a continuance.).
¶13 James contends that the Center's failure to present evidence of his treatment status while in jail was not "unexpected or unavoidable," the typical reason for a continuance because the Center said it was prepared to proceed with the hearing. Although the Center was aware of James's jail transfer, the record does not establish that the Center could have expected the court to request evidence of James's treatment status in the jail. And as stated by Dr. Altenberg, James had refused treatment and medications, which was unlikely to change during the week that he was in jail. Further, A.R.S. § 36-533(A) does not require evidence of a patient's condition right before the hearing. See A.R.S. § 36-533(A) (petition requirements); see In re Mental Health Case No. MH 94-00592, 182 Ariz. 440, 444-45 (App. 1995) (Petitioner need not present evidence of a patient's current behavior to prove persistent or acute disability.). Thus, the record suggests that the court's reason for granting the continuance was unexpected.
¶14 If the court needed more evidence before deciding whether to order involuntary treatment, it had the discretion to request more evidence from the Center. See MH2003-000240, 206 Ariz. at 369-70, ¶¶ 9-10 (The court has broad discretion to grant a continuance.); cf. State v. Riggins, 111 Ariz. 281, 283 (1974) (The court has discretion "in the furtherance of the interests of justice" to reopen a case for more evidence after the parties have rested.). The court said it could not "enter an order on assumptions" because it was missing evidence of whether James was taking his medications and voluntarily accepting treatment. See A.R.S. § 36-540(A) (The court must find the patient "is either unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment" by clear and convincing evidence.). Further, considering whether it had good cause to continue the hearing, the court reasoned that dismissing the petition would be more prejudicial to James than continuing it for a couple of days because refiling a petition could take up to two weeks. Thus, the court did not err by continuing the hearing for more evidence of James's treatment status.
B. The Continuance Did Not Violate James's Procedural Due Process Rights.
¶15 James argues the continuance caused him to be in detention longer than permitted by statute. A court must hold a hearing on a treatment petition six days after the petition's filing but may continue the hearing for three days at the petitioner's request if good cause is shown. A.R.S. § 36-535(B). The court-ordered treatment statutes "have been narrowly tailored by the legislature and must be strictly followed," In re MH 2007-001264, 218 Ariz. 538, 539, ¶ 6 (App. 2008), because the treatment involves "a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." Id. (quoting In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. 74, 77, ¶ 14 (App. 2007)).
¶16 The superior court held the first hearing one business day after the time allowed by statute. See A.R.S. § 36-535(B). The Center filed the petition on February 16, 2024, and the court held the hearing on February 28, 2024, seven business days later. The initial hearing violated the statute's requirement, but James waived this argument. See A.R.S. § 36-535(B); see also In re MH2017-005515, 1 CA-MH 17-0054, 2018 WL 4090657, at *2, ¶¶ 14-15 (Ariz. App. Aug. 28, 2018) (mem. decision) (Although the court held the hearing one day late, the patient waived the argument by failing to raise it in the superior court.). Having waived the timeliness of his initial hearing, James's detention during the two-day continuance period (continued hearing on March 1, 2024) was permitted by law. See A.R.S. § 36-535(B).
Presidents' Day, occurring on February 19, 2024, is a federal holiday and the superior court was closed. See Superior Court Clerk's Holiday Schedule 2024, Coconino County Clerk of the Superior Court (Oct. 29, 2024, 3:15 PM), https://www.coconino.az.gov/1971/Clerks-Holiday-Schedule.
¶17 James also contends the superior court violated his procedural due process rights by continuing the case to allow the Center to present more evidence, relying on the factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Center responds that the continuance did not constitute a due process violation because James was heard, and the court conducted a full and fair hearing.
Although Mathews addressed the deprivation of a property interest, we have applied Mathews in cases involving liberty interests. In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 181, ¶¶ 9-10 (2010) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).
¶18 "Due process . . . requires that [the patient] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own." In re Jesse M., 217 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 9 (quoting Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967)); see also A.R.S. § 36-569(B). In the context of commitment proceedings, we evaluate the patient's liberty interests, the State's interests, and the effect of the continued hearing "on the accuracy and fairness of the process." See In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 182, ¶ 12 (2010).
¶19 While civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, continuing the hearing for two days to obtain more evidence before ordering involuntary treatment "serves important governmental interests and does not significantly increase the risks of an erroneous deprivation." See MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. at 182, ¶ 13. James failed to show that he was not provided the appropriate procedural safeguards. Although James failed to appear at either hearing, his counsel could examine witnesses, present evidence, and rebut the Center's evidence against James at the initial and continued hearings. See State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 237, 241 (1965) (Permitting more evidence after the close of the case is not prejudicial when the other party can rebut the added evidence presented.).
¶20 James argues the continuance violated his due process rights because dismissal was the correct remedy. This argument goes to whether the court abused its discretion in continuing the hearing, which we addressed above, not to procedural due process. See In re MH 2020-001729, 1 CA-MH 20-0033, 2020 WL 6501858, at *4, ¶ 21 (Ariz. App. Nov. 3, 2020) (mem. decision). Thus, the superior court did not err by continuing the hearing for more evidence.
CONCLUSION
¶21 We affirm.