Opinion
No. M08-CP05-004957-A
June 15, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
This memorandum of decision addresses a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition brought to terminate the parental rights of Teresa B. (Teresa), (DOB: 1/12/63), the biological mother, and John Doe, (DOB: unknown), the biological father of Jamal B., (Jamal) (DOB: 10/15/02).
The court finds the following by clear and convicting evidence.
The history of the file reflects that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) has been involved with this family since 1999 for issues including physical neglect, substance abuse, criminal recidivism, domestic violence, transience and homelessness.
The family was also involved with the Department of Social Services (DSS Md.) in the State of Maryland in 1998 for issues related to physical neglect, substance abuse, criminal recidivism and homelessness. Teresa also had a prior history with that agency.
On 9/23/98, DSS Md. in Cecil County took custody of Jamal's siblings, Jerek G. (Jerek), (DOB: 7/29/96) and Shalena G. (Shalena), (DOB: 2/11/98), after Teresa had been arrested for larceny and drug charges. The children were placed in foster care. Teresa subsequently moved to the State of Connecticut. In 5/99, 10/99, and 8/00, she requested that DSS Md. reassess her situation through the Interstate Compact process in order to facilitate reunification with Jerek Shalena in Connecticut. On each occasion, DCF recommended against reunification based upon a lack of sufficient substance abuse treatment and inadequate housing. DCF also expressed concern over issues of domestic violence and mental health.
On 9/23/01, Teresa's parental rights as to Jerek and Shalena were terminated, and they were adopted by a relative.
On 8/8/02 in Superior Court, Geographical Area Nine, Middletown, Teresa was convicted of the crime of Larceny in the 4th Degree. She received a suspended sentence and probation.
On 10/15/02, Teresa gave birth to Jamal in Middletown. At the time of his birth, Jamal tested positive for having been exposed to cocaine in utero. Teresa tested negative for substances at that time.
On 10/18/02, DCF received a referral from Lisa Wiernasz, coordinator for the Advocacy program at the Women and Children's Center. DCF's investigation revealed that Teresa had been successfully discharged from the Advocacy program on 9/1/02, but had tested positive for cocaine during a follow-up drug test on 10/4/02. Teresa had denied substance abuse at that time.
After Jamal's test had proved positive for cocaine, Teresa then admitted that she had abused cocaine during the pregnancy.
On 10/30/02, Teresa completed an Advanced Behavioral Health (ABH) evaluation and a hair test. The hair tested provided positive for cocaine in all three panels.
DCF substantiated allegations of neglect against Teresa and transferred her case to treatment.
On 11/12/02, Teresa began attending substance abuse treatment at Connections. She was also prescribed medication there for depression.
On 12/2/02 in Superior Court, Geographical Area Nine, Middletown, Teresa was convicted of the crime of Larceny in the 5th Degree. She received a suspended sentence and probation.
On 12/9/02, Teresa completed a hair test through Rushford Center, which proved positive for cocaine.
On 3/10/03, Teresa was evicted for non-payment of rent.
On 3/12/03, Teresa and Jamal entered the Red Cross Shelter. While at the shelter, Teresa re-engaged with Connections substance abuse treatment. She attended group therapy and individual counseling there also. Teresa was also working part-time for the Middletown Press.
On 3/28/03, Teresa moved into her own apartment under a Section 8 certificate. DCF and St. Vincent DePaul's assisted her with the security deposit and her first month's rent.
On 3/31/03, Teresa admitted abusing heroin with Ronnie C., (Ronnie), her boyfriend, in her apartment.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Ronnie is also known as Nasheed.
On 4/10/03, Teresa completed another hair test, which proved positive for cocaine and heroin.
On 4/16/03, Teresa entered into and signed a service agreement stating that she would not allow Ronnie into her home until he completed an ABH substance abuse evaluation and followed its recommendations. Teresa also agreed that she would not continue to abuse substances.
As of 9/16/03, Ronnie had failed to participate in a substance abuse evaluation.
On 5/19/03, Teresa tested positive for low levels of heroin. She denied any substance abuse.
On 5/22/03, a representative of Connections contacted DCF to report that Teresa's attendance in the program was inconsistent, and expressed concern regarding Connections' ability to allow Teresa to continue in the program due to her attendance issues.
On 5/30/03, Teresa admitted to DCF that she had to quit her job due to scheduling difficulties and the fact that Child Support of Maryland contacted her and was garnishing her wages. She stated she was not aware of her positive drug test from 5/19/03. She claimed that she had taken medication that a co-worker had given her for a headache.
Teresa admitted that Ronnie continued to visit her home, but did not live there. She indicated that she supervised Ronnie's contact with Jamal.
On 6/6/03, DCF personnel observed Ronnie leaving the parking lot of Teresa's apartment and embarking on a bus. There was no answer at Teresa's apartment, but DCF personnel observed that both Teresa and Ronnie's names were on the apartment mailbox.
On 6/11/03, Teresa admitted to DCF personnel that Ronnie had lived in the home for a short period while she was away in Maryland due to her father's death. Teresa did not admit that Ronnie was living in the home full-time.
On 7/8/03, Teresa was unsuccessfully discharged from Connections outpatient treatment program for non-compliance. Connections' recommendations included intensive outpatient treatment or inpatient residential treatment.
On 7/10/03, in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 8th District, located in Middletown, (SCJM 8th), DCF filed a Neglect Petition on behalf of Jamal.
On 1/15/04, in SCJM 8th, (Driscoll, J.), Jamal was adjudicated neglected and was placed under protective supervision for 6 months. He remained in Teresa's care and custody. On 7/15/04, protective supervision expired, and DCF closed its case.
In 10/04, Jamal's pediatrician made a referral to DCF, indicating that Teresa had failed to have Jamal seen for routine medical care and immunizations.
On 1/28/05, in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 6th District, located in Waterbury, (SCJM 6th), DCF filed a Neglect Petition on behalf of Jamal. DCF alleged that he had been denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and that he had been permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being.
On 2/9/05, in SCJM 6th, (Moore, J.), DCF sought and obtained an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) for Jamal. The court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove Jamal from his home. The court also issued ex parte specific steps for the respondent mother.
More specifically, DCF claimed:
On 10/28/04, it received a referral stating that mother has cancelled 5 doctor's appointments for Jamal and that she has stated to personnel at the doctor's office that she is overwhelmed with Jamal's behaviors.
On 10/28/04, mother admitted that she has been unable to get out of bed for over 1 week, due to her mental health issues. She also reported that she was not compliant with her medication and her therapy.
On 11/22/04, mother was evicted, due to non-payment of rent. She and Jamal were forced to reside in a shelter.
On 1/22/05, the Waterbury Police Department made a referral to DCF concerning this family. Officers indicated that as a result of a recent arrest of Teresa, Jamal had been left in Ronnie's care at the St. Vincent dePaul Shelter until Teresa could be bailed out of jail.
On 2/4/05, DCF received a report from the New Opportunity Early Childhood Program, indicating that Teresa and Jamal were homeless. The Salvation Army Shelter had indicated Teresa was no longer welcome there as a result of violating shelter regulations on 2/2/05.
On 2/8/05, Salvation Army Shelter staff reported to DCF that Teresa was requesting shelter placement as she and Jamal could no longer stay with her friends. The shelter reported that they could not accommodate Teresa and Jamal. Teresa told DCF personnel that she and Jamal could no longer stay with her friend as it violated her friend's lease. Teresa said that she, Jamal, and Ronnie took a bus to Philadelphia on 2/7/05 to stay with Ronnie's family. She indicated that they waited the entire night at the bus station for his family to pick them up. When no one showed to pick them up by morning, Teresa and Jamal took a bus back to Waterbury.
Teresa stated that she and Jamal had no place to stay.
Teresa reported to DCF that she does not know who Jamal's biological father is due to her heavy substance abuse during the time when the child was conceived.
On 2/18/05 in SCJM 6th, (Ginocchio, J.), the respondent mother, who was represented by counsel, appeared in court. Teresa agreed to sustain the OTC and entered denials as to the neglect petition. The court issued preliminary specific steps, which Teresa signed. She also agreed to submit to a hair test and a urine test.
John Doe, who was given notice by publication, failed to appear.
On 3/16/05 in SCJM 6th, (Ginocchio, J.), John Doe, who was given notice by publication, failed to appear as to the neglect petition and was defaulted.
On 3/24/05, in SCJM 6th, DCF filed a TPR petition concerning Jamal, alleging abandonment, and failure to rehabilitate, and no ongoing relationship as to John Doe, and failure to rehabilitate as to Teresa.
On 4/20/05, in SCJM 6th, (Ginocchio, J.), neither respondent parent appeared. John Doe, who was given notice by publication, failed to appear as to the TPR petition and was defaulted. Counsel appeared on Teresa's behalf pro forma denials were entered for her.
On 4/25/05, in SCJM 6th, DCF filed a Motion to Change Venue.
On 4/28/05, in SCJM 6th, (Ginocchio, J.), the court granted, by agreement, DCF's Motion to Change Venue, and ordered the case transferred to SCJM 8th.
On 11/4/05, in SCJM 8th, DCF filed its Motion to Review Permanency Plan (MRP). The PP called for TPR as to both parents and adoption, as well as a finding of no further efforts towards reunification with either biological parent.
On 11/10/05 in SCJM 8th, (Dyer, J.), the respondent mother, who was represented by counsel, appeared in court. Teresa entered a nolo contendre plea to the neglect allegations. After a canvass, the court accepted the plea, adjudicated Jamal neglected, and committed him to the care and custody of DCF until further order of the court. The court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove Jamal from his home. The court also issued new specific steps for Teresa.
The court also transferred this matter to Superior Court for Juvenile Matters-Child Protection Session, located in Middletown (CPS), for trial. The court also indicated that the PP should be consolidated with the TPR trial.
On 1/18/06, in CPS, DCF filed a Motion For Ex Parte Order To Subpoena And Surrender Confidential Records, as well as a Motion To Disclose Confidential Records.
On 1/18/06, in CPS, this court granted, ex parte, DCF's Motion For Ex Parte Order To Subpoena And Surrender Confidential Records.
On 2/24/06, in CPS, (Bear, J.), the court granted DCF's Motion To Disclose Confidential Records, by agreement.
On 3/20/06, in CPS, DCF filed its Motion For Judicial Notice.
On 3/29/06, in CPS, this court commenced trial in this matter as to the TPR, and the PP. Prior to the commencement of trial, the court granted DCF's Motion for Judicial Notice and its oral Motion to Protect the Identity of Foster Parents. The trial was concluded on the same date.
DCF orally expanded its motion to include the 11/10/05 adjudication of Jamal as neglected and his subsequent commitment.
For the reasons stated below, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, the TPR issues against the respondent parents and in favor of the petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF.
This court has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of this child.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court has reviewed the neglect and TPR petitions and the exhibits, which included the TPR social study. The court has also reviewed the various motions and objections to same which are the subject of this trial and has taken judicial notice of the record. The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.
The court also took judicial notice of the pleadings, petitions, motions, summaries of facts, specific steps, transcripts and court memorandum not related to any judicial pretrials or case status conferences. The court did not review any status reports, social studies or evaluations not otherwise entered into evidence as full exhibits. See In re Stacy G., 94 Conn.App. 348, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006).
"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M. 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . ." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).
John Doe has been found in default for failing to appear and participate in the TPR proceedings. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent father was given notice pursuant to the Practice Book. Pursuant to Practice Book § 32a-2, establishing that juvenile hearings are essentially civil proceedings, the default against John Doe effectively admits the truth of the petitioner's material allegations. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732-33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings "is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition"); see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000). This admission satisfies the petitioner's obligations.
TERESA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)
Teresa was born on 1/12/63 in North East, Maryland, the daughter of the late Willard B. and Josephine B. She has a brother and 2 sisters. Her brother resides in the Midwest, while her sisters reside in California and Maryland, respectively.
On 4/6/05, Teresa was evaluated by Community Health Center (CHC). During the course of this evaluation, Teresa indicated that she was a victim of extensive childhood sexual abuse by her brother, uncle and cousin. She further indicated that she has a relationship only with her sister in California. Teresa told CHC personnel that she has no relationship with her brother due to the sexual abuse. Her other sister and her mother do not speak to her due to her relationships with black men.
Teresa is a high school graduate. She also spent 1 year in college in Maryland.
Teresa has worked various retail jobs. She was also employed by the Middletown Press, a delicatessen and by Dunkin' Donuts. At the time of the TPR trial, she was employed by Wendy's, and had been so employed since 2/06.
Teresa has 4 other children: David, age 23, Diamond, age 15, Jerek and Shalena. Diamond lives with her father in Maryland. Teresa's parental rights to Jerek and Shalena were terminated in 2001.
Teresa has been involved in an intermittent relationship with Ronnie since 2001. They have a troubled relationship, replete with incidents of arguments and domestic violence.
Teresa has an extensive substance abuse treatment history, which includes McDonough House-Bridgewater for 30 days in 2001, Rushford Center halfway house for 4 months, Connections in 2002, Women and Children's Center in 2002, Connections in 2004 and 2005, Rushford in 2005, Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center (ADRC) in 2005, and the Institute of Living (IOL).
Teresa has convictions in Connecticut for Larceny in the 4th Degree, Larceny in the 5th Degree, and Larceny in the 3rd Degree. She had at least 1 criminal case pending at the time of the TPR trial. Also, at the time of the TPR trial, Teresa was wanted by the Middletown Police Department for Larceny in the 6th Degree, Failure to Appear and Violation of Probation. Teresa also has a conviction for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in Maryland.
Teresa has a history of transience and homelessness. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa is not eligible for Section 8 housing due to a prior eviction. At trial, Teresa testified that she was presently living in Hartford with a friend.
Department of Adult Probation Officer Stoppa testified that Teresa had failed to report to him as required, and had failed to make restitution as ordered. He also indicated that Teresa was transient and was whereabouts unknown with APO on 2-3 occasions.
On 3/9/06, Teresa was unsuccessfully discharged from the IOL outpatient substance abuse treatment program due to excessive absenteeism. She was referred to Community Health Services (CHS).
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa was tested for substance abuse 9 times while she was a patient at IOL. The results were negative.
On 2/18/05, Teresa failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation and drug test at Morris Foundation.
On 3/14/05, Teresa attended a substance abuse referral at Connections. She tested positive for cocaine.
On 4/7/05, Teresa failed to appear for a hair test at Connections.
On 6/5/05, Teresa failed to appear for a hair test at Rushford.
On 9/23/05, Teresa tested positive for cocaine at the Rushford Center.
On 10/21/05, Teresa's hair tested positive for cocaine at the Rushford Center.
On 12/5/05, Teresa tested negative for illegal substances at ADRC.
On 2/14/06, Teresa's hair tested positive for cocaine at ADRC.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa failed to appear for scheduled drug testing on 3/22/06, 3/24/06 and 3/27/06. After Teresa missed her initial 3/24/06 appointment, DCF social worker Espittia found her and drove her to ADRC to be tested on the same day.
Teresa's 3/24/06 test proved positive for illegal substances. Teresa has an extensive psychiatric history.
At her 4/6/05 CHC evaluation, Teresa reported past auditory hallucinations. CHC personnel diagnosed her as suffering from a bipolar disorder and an obsessive compulsive disorder. Teresa also reported auditory hallucinations to Rushford Center personnel on 4/14/05.
At the time of her successful discharge from ADRC on 12/13/05, ADRC personnel diagnosed her as suffering from opioid and cocaine dependence and bipolar disorder (Type II). They prescribed Prozac, Trileptal and Seroquel.
At the time of her unsuccessful discharge from IOL on 3/9/06, IOL personnel diagnosed Teresa as suffering from continuous opioid and cocaine dependence and bipolar disorder.
Teresa suffers from osteoarthritis, and has had back surgery.
JOHN DOE (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)
DCF has no information concerning the identity and background of Jamal's putative biological father, John Doe, as he did not come forth to either DCF, SCJM 8th, or CPS to provide any information about himself. Teresa indicated that she was unable to identify John Doe due to her heavy substance abuse at the time of conception.
JAMAL (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS § 45a-717(e)(1).)
Jamal was born in Middletown on 10/15/02, the issue of the relationship between Teresa and John Doe. At the time of his birth, Jamal tested positive for having been exposed to cocaine in utero. Teresa tested negative for substances at that time.
On 10/18/02, DCF received a referral from Lisa Wiernasz, coordinator for the Advocacy program at the Women and Children's Center. DCF's investigation revealed that Teresa had been successfully discharged from the Advocacy program on 9/1/02, but had tested positive for cocaine during a follow-up drug test on 10/4/02. Teresa had denied substance abuse at that time.
After Jamal's test had proved positive for cocaine, Teresa then admitted that she had abused cocaine during the pregnancy.
On 10/30/02, Teresa completed an APH evaluation and a hair test. The hair tested provided positive for cocaine in all three panels.
DCF substantiated allegations of neglect against Teresa and transferred her case to treatment.
On 7/10/03, in SCJM 8th, DCF filed a Neglect Petition on behalf of Jamal.
On 1/15/04, Jamal was adjudicated neglected and was placed under protective supervision for 6 months. He remained in Teresa's care and custody.
On 7/15/04, protective supervision expired, and DCF closed its case.
On 1/28/05, in SCJM 6th, DCF filed a Neglect Petition on behalf of Jamal.
On 2/9/05, in SCJM 6th, (Moore, J.), DCF sought and obtained an OTC for Jamal.
On 2/18/05, in SCJM 6th, the OTC was sustained.
On 3/24/05, in SCJM 6th, DCF filed a TPR petition concerning Jamal.
On 11/10/05 in SCJM 8th, (Dyer, J.), the court adjudicated Jamal neglected, and committed him to the care and custody of DCF until further order of the court.
On February 23, 2005, St. Raphael's Hospital conducted a multidisciplinary evaluation of Jamal. He was found to have cognitive and language delays. He was referred to the Birth to Three program for further assessment and services.
Jamal is a challenging child with significant special needs. He is defiant and aggressive at times. His behaviors include kicking, hitting, biting, and throwing items. In his previous foster home, Jamal had many tantrums.
In the fall of 2004, Teresa reported that Jamal exhibited out of control behaviors, and that she could not manage them.
The clear and convincing evidence elicited during the TPR trial indicates that DCF referred Jamal to Downeyside for a pre-adoptive foster placement in 4/05. Carolyn Goodrich, the regional director of Downeyside, indicated that, upon entry, Jamal had speech and cognitive development delays. Additionally, he was not toilet trained, was difficult to understand, spoke little, and was frustrated due to his speech problems.
Jamal has been in his present placement since 4/28/05. There are 4 other boys in the foster home who are adopted, aged 16, 12, 9 and 6 years old. He shares a bedroom with the 6-year-old boy. Goodrich indicated that Jamal idolizes one of his foster brothers. The foster brothers find Jamal to be a pest at times, but nevertheless accept him as a brother.
Jamal is caring and affectionate with the foster parents, and refers to them as "Dad" and "Daddy." He looks to them for affection.
Jamal enjoys attending visits with Teresa. He is excited to see her at visitation, and becomes upset when she does not appear for visits.
Jamal attends a school program. His school system will be conducting an educational evaluation in the near future.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Jamal is medically up to date and has no outstanding medical concerns.
The present foster parents have indicated an interest in adopting Jamal.
RELATIVE RESOURCES
The clear and convincing evidence shows that there are no relative resources for placement of Jamal. Neither parent has offered any viable relative resources.
SIBLINGS
There was no evidence presented as to whether Jamal has any knowledge of, or relationship with, any of his half-siblings.
ADJUDICATION
On 11/10/05 in SCJM 8th (Dyer, J.), the court adjudicated Jamal neglected, and committed him to the care and custody of DCF until further order of the court.
The court is next called upon to determine whether the petitioner has met its burden of proving the allegations presented by the pending TPR petitions. Practice Book § 35a-3.
"A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights [under § 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child. "(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 827, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005).
In the adjudicatory phase of these proceedings, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to 3/24/05, the date upon which DCF filed the TPR petition in SCJM 6th. With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation brought against the respondent parents, and no ongoing relationship brought against the respondent father, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist as to both respondent parents.
"Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).
Practice Book § 35a-7(a) generally provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment . . ."
"Despite Practice Book [§ 35a-7(a)] and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under § 17a-112(c)(3)(B), the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.26 83 (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of, "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in original.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.
LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing that such efforts are not appropriate." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). In this context, "[r]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 547, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).
"Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert, denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only "reasonable" efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).
In this case, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parents and to maintain contact with them. The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the respondent father failed to initiate contact with DCF.
The State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF provided the following services to the respondent mother Teresa, or that the following services were provided to her:
ADRC: substance abuse testing and treatment
APO: supervision and monitoring
Catherine's Place: substance abuse treatment/transitional housing
CHC: mental health services, substance abuse testing and treatment, housing program
Connections: substance abuse testing and treatment, pilot program for housing
DCF: case management services, visitation, transportation assistance
Community Renewal Team: housing assistance
Department of Social Services (Ct.) (DSS)
Eddy Center Shelter
IOL: substance abuse testing and treatment
Jones Program
Mercy Housing
Middlesex Hospital Center for Behavioral Health (MHCBH): Dual Diagnosis Program
Middlesex Hospital: parent aide services
Morris Foundation: substance abuse testing and treatment
My Sister's Place: transitional housing
Nehemiah Housing
NOW Shelter
Rushford Center: substance abuse testing and treatment
St. Vincent DePaul Shelter
Salvation Army Shelter
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa failed to fully comply with most of the services to which she was referred.
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent mother Teresa with her son. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 917, 879 A.2d 893, and 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005).
On 2/9/05, in SCJM 6th, (Moore, J.), the court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove Jamal from his home.
On 11/10/05, in SCJM 8th, (Dyer, J.), the court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove Jamal from his home.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF was unable to provide services to John Doe, due to his failure to initiate or maintain contact with DCF, his failure to make himself available for services, his failure to engage in the services and his failure to participate in the proceedings.
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunite John Doe with Jamal. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Brendan C., supra, 89 Conn.App. 524.
Based on the clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances present in this case, the court finds that neither respondent parent is able and/or willing to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). Their serious issues clearly and convincingly make them unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 504-05, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 350, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).
The court finds that the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that Teresa was aware of her issues and deficits and had received specific steps addressing said issues. However, the clear and convincing evidence also shows that, despite this notification, Teresa remains unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification services.
The court further finds that the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that John Doe remains unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification services. His failure to participate in these proceedings, or show any interest in his son, shows his deficits in this vital area.
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts at reunification are not appropriate for either respondent parent with regard to Jamal.
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION AS TO JOHN DOE ABANDONMENT — CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)
The petitioner first alleges that John Doe abandoned Jamal, within the meaning of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of clear and convincing evidence supporting this allegation, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(q), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for the termination of parental rights where "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ."
"Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . General Statutes [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112[(j)(3)a)] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care: (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 11691 In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn.App. 839-40.
CGS § 17a-112(q) establishes that the provisions of CGS § 17a-112 "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."
The clear and convincing evidence related to John Doe's conduct reveals that, from the date of the commitment to the date of the filing of the TPR petition as to Jamal, the respondent father failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn.App. 839.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that, between the aforementioned dates, John Doe failed to maintain any contact with his child. John Doe also failed to maintain any contact with DCF. He never contacted DCF in order to set up a visitation schedule or to seek services to aid in reunification with Jamal.
John Doe has never sent any cards or gifts or other communications to Jamal, nor has he maintained regular contact with DCF to inquire about Jamal's well-being.
John Doe has never attended any administrative case reviews (ACR), treatment planning conferences (TPC), or court appearances concerning Jamal.
John Doe has not provided financial support to Jamal, nor has he been in contact with Jamal.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that John Doe has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of Jamal as evidenced by his total lack of involvement in visitation and by his failure to inquire and follow-up on Jamal's situation.
When the adjudicatory date is applied, the evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that John Doe has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn.App. 840. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that John Doe has abandoned Jamal, within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)
The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that John Doe's parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Jamal has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent father has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render him able to care for his child. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of CGS § 17a-112(q), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ."
"Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her] child's life. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999) . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah Ann. K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001); In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).
[Editor's Note: Footnote 15 was not included in the original Memorandum of Decision.]
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that John Doe has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his child's life]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005); In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 668, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001). First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study, exhibits, and the witnesses' testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father has not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports, the exhibits and the testimony, which showed that John Doe has been unable to achieve his rehabilitation.
In deciding the failure to rehabilitate issues, the court is aware that the evidence in this case does not reflect that specific steps were ever imposed upon John Doe, who failed to appear in court on the neglect and TPR plea dates and were defaulted. Where, as here, one of the grounds for the TPR petition is based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(1), however, our courts have determined that the use of specific steps is not requisite to assessment of the degree to which a parent has, or has not, achieved rehabilitation in the context of a child protection case. The Appellate Court has repeatedly confirmed that, "[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by [DCF]. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); see also In re Migdalia M., ( 6 Conn.App. 194, 206, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986))." (Emphasis added.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that John Doe has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his child's life]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the credible evidence and testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that the respondent father has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that John Doe has done nothing towards achieving his rehabilitation.
The credible evidence establishes that John Doe has shown no interest in Jamal. His sole contribution to this child has been limited to the submission of the genetic material necessary for this child's conception.
The failure of the respondent father to show any interest in his son during the period of between the commitment and the filing of the TPR petition is sufficient grounds for concluding that he has not achieved statutory rehabilitation.
Jamal has been in DCF custody since 2/8/05. Since that date, John Doe has never contacted DCF and has never inquired about the health or welfare of his child. He has never seen Jamal. He has made no attempt to involve himself in his son's life or show concern about him.
John Doe has never sent Jamal any cards or gifts since he has been in DCF custody, nor has he displayed a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Jamal's welfare. John Doe has never provided physical care or financial support for his child. He has never offered a plan for the care of Jamal.
Despite the services that were available to be offered, John Doe has failed to demonstrate that, within a reasonable time considering Jamal's age, needs and special needs, he could assume a responsible position in Jamal's life.
This court concludes that John Doe has failed to correct the factors that led to the initial commitment of his child, in as far as he is concerned. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that, from the date of commitment through the date of the filing of the TPR petition, and continuing through the time of trial, John Doe has not been available to take part in his son's life, and, based on his failure to involve himself with services and with his child, he will never be consistently available to Jamal. The credible evidence in this case clearly and convincingly shows that John Doe has not offered himself as a placement resource for his child since Jamal came into DCF custody. John Doe has not been available to cooperate with DCF referrals. There is no evidence that John Doe has undertaken any parenting education or counseling programs in order to rehabilitate himself and assume the responsibilities of safe, responsible and nurturing fatherhood.
When one also considers the high level of care, patience and discipline that Jamal's needs and special needs require from his caregiver, it is patently clear that John Doe is not in a better position to parent his child than he was at the time of Jamal's commitment, and still remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent his child. Effectively, John Doe is no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [he] had been at the time of the child's commitment." In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 367, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). See In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 670. ("[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department"); see also In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 125; In re Migdalia M., supra, 6 Conn.App. 206.
Even if John Doe was finally capable of realizing and correcting his problems, it would be exceedingly rash to expect him to be able to parent his child at any time in the near future, if ever.
If John Doe were to appear and wish to be seriously considered to be a viable reunification resource for his son, he would have to successfully complete various referrals and programs designed to aid in his rehabilitation. He would need to establish himself in the community and show, over a substantial period of time, that he has resolved his outstanding issues. He would have to obtain appropriate housing and income, as well as an appreciation of safe, responsible and nurturing parenting skills before reunification could be contemplated. Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Jamal's need for permanence and stability would not allow for the time necessary for John Doe to attempt rehabilitation, even if he wished to do so, and/or were capable of doing so.
Given the age, sensibilities and needs of the child involved, and given John Doe's failure and/or inability to correct his deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that he would be able to achieve rehabilitation from his various issues so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.
Jamal needs a parent/parents who are able to effectively care for him now. He cannot wait for the remote possibility that his biological father will appear and address his issues successfully. Jamal is unable to wait for John Doe to show that he has rehabilitated himself and is ready to assume his parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384, 784 A.2d 457 (2000).
Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that John Doe failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
In making this assessment, the court notes that it is unable to assess the parenting abilities of the parent from a historical perspective, due to John Doe's failure to appear and participate in this case. In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).
Continued foster care is detrimental to Jamal's development; he requires a permanent home which is safe and nurturing.
Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that it is not foreseeable that John Doe is capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed the respondent father's parenting deficits as they relate to his child's need for a safe, responsible and nurturing parent who can meet Jamal's requirements and needs for emotional stability, security and consistency.
The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that to allow John Doe further time to rehabilitate himself, if that were possible, and to assume a responsible position in the life of his son, would not be in the best interests of Jamal.
LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP — CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)
The State has alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between John Doe and Jamal. This means that, based on the evidence produced, the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met, on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(q), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF.
CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . ."
CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) "requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 470, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).
The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following.
The court incorporates, by reference, the abandonment findings set forth in previous parts of this decision.
John Doe has never met Jamal, visited him or had any contact with him.
John Doe has not provided any financial or emotional support for Jamal since he has been in the custody of DCF.
John Doe has never provided care for Jamal, or been in custody of Jamal.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Jamal exhibits no bond or affection toward John Doe and would not recognize him as his father. The clear and convincing evidence shows no evidence of Jamal possessing any present and positive memories of his father. He would not seek comfort from John Doe, nor go to John Doe to have his needs met.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that John Doe has been unable and/or unwilling to adjust his circumstances to allow for his child to be returned to his care.
Jamal has been in foster placement with the same family since 4/28/05. He needs safe, committed, responsible and firm caretakers. The respondent father's obvious failure to involve himself in Jamal's life demonstrates his lack of capacity to develop an appropriate parental relationship with his son.
Obviously, Jamal needs a family now, not later. To allow further time for John Doe to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of this child. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter, and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between John Doe and his son Jamal.
With regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).
To allow further time for John Doe to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to Jamal's best interests. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between John Doe and Jamal
The court incorporates, by reference, all previous reasonable efforts findings.
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION AS TO TERESA PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)
The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that Teresa's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As the child has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for them. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of CGS § 17a-112(q), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.
Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion Teresa has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her children's lives]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. See In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 259; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study, exhibits, and witnesses' testimony, including Teresa's own testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that Teresa has not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which show that Teresa has been unable to achieve her rehabilitation.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa's issues are those of criminal recidivism, mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence, parenting deficits, transience and residential instability and a failure to complete and benefit from counseling. The clear and convincing evidence also shows that Teresa has been placed on notice to address her issues in the past.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that, on 2/18/05, in SCJM 6th (Ginnochio, J.), and on 11/10/05, in SCJM 8th, (Dyer, J.), the court ordered specific steps for Teresa.
Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced and unannounced, and visits by the child's court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to fully comply with this step.
On 9/2/05 and 11/25/05, Teresa failed to appear for scheduled visits with Jamal.
The clear and convincing evidence indicated that Teresa failed to appear for scheduled drug testing on 3/22/06, 3/24/06 and 3/27/06. After Teresa missed her initial 3/24/06 appointment, DCF social worker Espittia found her and drove her to ADRC to be tested on the same day.
Keep your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney, and the attorney for the child.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa failed to fully comply with this step.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa failed to keep DCF abreast of her frequent residence changes. She also failed to keep DCF aware of her telephone numbers.
On 10/28/05, Teresa failed to disclose her present address to DCF personnel.
Participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to fully comply with this step.
Teresa was evaluated by CHC for mental health services on 4/6/05. She began attending appointments there on 9/27/05. Her treatment there was interrupted by inpatient substance abuse treatment at ADRC in 12/05.
Teresa was referred to Rushford Center for substance abuse treatment, and commenced treatment there on 4/13/05. While there, she also received individual counseling. She failed to attend as required, and, on 9/8/05, was discharged unsuccessfully for that reason.
Teresa was re-referred to Rushford Center on 9/13/05 and commenced treatment again on 9/23/05. She was discharged successfully from its intensive outpatient program on 10/31/05. Rushford Center recommended that she continue treatment in a partial hospitalization program.
DCF re-referred Teresa to CHC on 3/20/06 for both substance abuse and mental health services. She was scheduled to commence treatment there on 4/6/06.
Prior to the filing of the 2nd neglect petition, Teresa had received mental health services at MHCBH.
Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention.The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to fully comply with this step.
On 2/18/05, Teresa failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation and drug test at Morris Foundation.
Teresa completed a substance abuse assessment and drug screen at Connections on 3/14/05. Connections recommended that she complete a hair test and attend their weekly women's group.
Teresa attended the group only once, on 3/22/05, and never returned. She also failed to submit to the scheduled hair test appointment on 4/7/05.
Teresa was referred to Rushford Center for substance abuse treatment, and commenced treatment there on 4/13/05. She was an inpatient until 4/27/05, and participated in their intensive outpatient program afterwards. While there, she also received individual counseling.
Rushford reported to DCF that Teresa's attendance was sporadic. She also failed to submit to the scheduled hair test appointment on 6/22/05.
On 9/8/05, Rushford Center discharged Teresa unsuccessfully for non-compliance and failure to attend.
Teresa was re-referred to Rushford Center on 9/13/05 and commenced treatment again on 9/23/05. She was discharged successfully from its intensive outpatient program on 10/31/05. Rushford Center recommended that she continue treatment in a partial hospitalization program.
On 12/5/05, Teresa was admitted to ADRC as an inpatient. She was successfully discharged on 1/5/06 and was referred to an intensive outpatient program at IOL. She commenced the IOL program on 1/10/06.
Teresa failed to attend IOL as required and was discharged unsuccessfully on 3/10/06.
DCF re-referred Teresa to CHC on 3/20/06 for both substance abuse and mental health services. She was scheduled to commence treatment there on 4/6/06.
Submit to random drug testing: time and method of the testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa failed to fully comply with this step.
On 2/18/05, Teresa failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation and drug test at Morris Foundation.
On 3/14/05, Teresa attended a substance abuse referral at Connections. During that evaluation, she tested positive for cocaine.
On 3/22/05 and 3/31/05, while in treatment at Connections, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
On 4/7/05, Teresa failed to appear for a hair test at Connections.
On 5/13/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested positive for the presence of cocaine in her system.
On 6/5/05, Teresa failed to appear for a hair test.
On 6/16/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested positive for the presence of cocaine in her system.
On 6/22/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested positive for the presence of cocaine in her system.
On 6/29/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
On 7/6/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
On 7/14/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
On 7/18/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
On 9/23/05, during an evaluation at Rushford Center, Teresa tested positive for the presence of cocaine in her system.
On 10/19/05, while in treatment at Rushford Center, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system.
While a patient at IOL between 1/10/06 though 3/10/06, Teresa tested negative for the presence of substances in her system on 9 different occasions. She submitted her last sample there on 2/27/06.
On 2/14/06, at ADRC, Teresa submitted a hair sample tested positive in all 3 segments for the presence of cocaine in her system.
On 3/15/06, DCF referred Teresa to ARDC for drug screening.
The clear and convincing evidence indicated that Teresa failed to appear for scheduled drug testing on 3/22/06, 3/24/06 and 3/27/06. After Teresa missed her initial 3/24/06 appointment, DCF social worker Espittia found her and drove her to ADRC to be tested on the same day. The 3/24/06 test proved positive for the presence of illegal substances within Teresa's body.
Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa failed to fully comply with this step.
On 2/18/05, Teresa failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation and drug test at Morris Foundation.
Teresa completed a substance abuse assessment and drug screen at Connections on 3/14/05. Connections recommended that she complete a hair test and attend their weekly women's group.
Teresa attended the group only once, on 3/22/05, and never returned. She also failed to submit to the scheduled hair test appointment on 4/7/05.
Teresa was referred to Rushford Center for substance abuse treatment, and commenced treatment there on 4/13/05. She was an inpatient until 4/27/05, and participated in their intensive outpatient program afterwards. While there, she also received individual counseling.
Rushford reported to DCF that Teresa's attendance was sporadic. She also failed to submit to the scheduled hair test appointment on 6/22/05.
On 9/8/05, Rushford Center discharged Teresa unsuccessfully for non-compliance and failure to attend.
Teresa was re-referred to Rushford Center on 9/13/05 and commenced treatment again on 9/23/05. She was discharged successfully from its intensive outpatient program on 10/31/05. Rushford Center recommended that she continue treatment in a partial hospitalization program.
On 12/5/05, Teresa was admitted to ADRC as an inpatient. She was successfully discharged on 1/5/06 and was referred to an intensive outpatient program at IOL. She commenced the IOL program on 1/10/06. Teresa failed to attend IOL as required and was discharged unsuccessfully on 3/10/06. On 3/15/06, DCF referred Teresa to ARDC for drug screening.
The clear and convincing evidence indicated that Teresa failed to appear for scheduled drug testing on 3/22/06, 3/24/06 and 3/27/06. After Teresa missed her initial 3/24/06 appointment, DCF social worker Espittia found her and drove her to ADRC to be tested on the same day.
Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has complied with this step.
Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation, and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has complied with this step.
Secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to fully comply with this step.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to maintain stable employment.
At the time of the TPR trial, Teresa was employed at Wendy's. She started employment there in 2/06.
On 9/29/05, Teresa began employment at a delicatessen, but held the job for only 1 week.
On 9/23/05, Teresa indicated to Rushford Center personnel that she was unemployed and received disability payments.
On 3/14/05, Teresa indicated to Connections personnel that she was unemployed and received disability payments and food stamps. She told them that she worked 1 day at Dunkin' Donuts in 2005. Prior to Dunkin' Donuts, Teresa had been unemployed since 5/03. CT Page 11672
No substance abuse.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa did not comply with this specific step.Teresa tested positive for the presence of cocaine or other illegal substances in her system on the following dates:
3/14/05
5/13/05
6/16/05
6/22/05
9/23/05
2/14/06
3/24/06
On 4/6/05, Teresa reported to CHC personnel that she used crack cocaine 2 days prior to her evaluation.
On 4/14/05, Teresa reported to Rushford Center personnel that she used crack cocaine on 4/12/05.
On 9/23/05, Teresa reported to Rushford Center personnel that she used crack cocaine 1 time within the past 30 days.
On 12/6/05, Teresa reported to ADRC personnel that she used crack cocaine and heroin on 12/3/05.
No further involvement with the criminal justice system. Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and comply with conditions of probation or parole.The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has not complied with this step.
As indicated above, the clear and convincing evidence indicated that, on various dates, Teresa tested positive for cocaine. Additionally, Teresa has admitted to service providers that she abused cocaine. Her possession of this substance violated Connecticut law.
Additionally, Teresa has failed to comply with the conditions of her probation. At the time of the TPR trial, there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest, charging her with Violation of Probation.
Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child.There was no evidence submitted indicating that Teresa did not comply with this step.
Visit the child as often as DCF permits.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa did not fully comply with this step.
On 9/2/05 and 11/25/05, Teresa failed to appear for scheduled visits with Jamal.
This court concludes that Teresa has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of her son. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that, from the date of commitment through the date of the filing of the TPR petition, and continuing through the time of trial, Teresa has not been effectively available to take part in Jamal's life, and, based on her substance abuse issues, mental health issues, gross parenting deficits, domestic violence, transience, and her failure to benefit from services, she will never be consistently available for her son.
Although Teresa has attended various referrals and programs for counseling, she has failed to complete the ones relating to her substance abuse and mental health problems, and has failed to show any consistent benefit from any of these referrals. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that she has failed to improve her parenting ability to acceptable standards. The credible evidence in this case clearly and convincingly shows that, despite DCF's efforts on her behalf and her own efforts, Teresa remains incapable of providing a safe and nurturing environment for her child. When one considers the level of care, patience and discipline that children require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Teresa is not in a better position to parent Jamal now than she was at any other time during these proceedings, and that she remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent him. Effectively, she was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [she] had been at the time of the [child]'s commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn.App. 367. See In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 670 ("[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department"); see also In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); In re Migdalia M., supra, 6 Conn.App. 206.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has attended numerous referrals for her substance abuses issues, dating back to 2001. Unfortunately, she has failed to achieve any lasting sobriety despite these numerous attempts at treatment. Although Teresa has had short periods when she has not abused substances, inevitably she returns to substance abuse.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa was still abusing substances almost to the eve of the TPR trial.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has not maintained consistent mental health services. She has failed to maintain her individual therapy throughout the pendency of this case.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has not maintained adequate housing. Throughout the pendency of this case, she has lived in shelters and with various friends.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to cooperate with APO during the pendency of this case.
The credible evidence establishes that Teresa has continually exhibited poor judgment in the upbringing of her son.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has not benefitted from the referrals and counseling that she has attended and still remains unable and/or unwilling to provide a safe, responsive and nurturing environment for her child. She still lacks the ability to exercise sound and responsible judgment on behalf of Jamal. Her refusal to commit to sobriety has, unfortunately, condemned her to failure in terms of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent.
Despite the services that were made available to Teresa and the services that she utilized, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she has failed to demonstrate that, within a reasonable time considering Jamal's age, needs and special needs, she could assume a responsible position in his life.
Continued foster care is detrimental to Jamal's development; he requires a permanent home that is safe and nurturing.
Sadly, the clear and convincing evidence shows that there is no amount of time that Teresa could be given that would allow her to realize and correct her problems, much less that she could accomplish this in a reasonable period of time. The reports and the testimony indicate that Teresa's prospects of reunification with her son are bleak, in view of her inability to maintain sobriety.
Based upon the above, it would be exceedingly rash to expect Teresa to be able to parent her child at any time in the near future, if at all. Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Jamal's need for permanence and stability would not allow for him to spend more time in foster care on the slim hope that Teresa might overcome her issues and to be able to be a safe, responsive and nurturing parent.
Given the age, sensibilities, needs and special needs of the child involved, and given Teresa's failure and/or inabilities to correct her deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that she will be able to achieve rehabilitation from her various issues and her failure to engage in and benefit from counseling so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.
Despite the services that were offered to her, Teresa has failed to demonstrate that within a reasonable time considering Jamal's age, needs and special needs, she could assume a responsible position in the child's life so as to make reunification in his best interests.
Jamal needs parents who are able to effectively care for him now. He cannot wait for the exceedingly remote possibility that Teresa might address her mental health issues, her substance abuse issues, her domestic violence issues, her housing issues, eliminate her parenting deficits, rectify her failure to consistently attend and benefit from counseling and referrals, and acquire sufficient parenting ability to care for him one day. He cannot wait for Teresa to show that she has rehabilitated herself and is ready to assume her parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the [child] at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384.
In making this assessment, the court must review the past and present status of the child at issue and assess the parenting abilities of the parent from a historical perspective. In re Tabitha P., supra, 39 Conn.App. 361.
In making this assessment the court incorporates, by reference, the previous information in this decision concerning Jamal and his siblings.
For dispositional purposes, the historical perspective of Teresa's parenting, unfortunately, shows the same substance abuse and failure to comply with and/or benefit for DCF and services providers.
The court would note that the clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa has failed to improved her ability to manage her own life, much less that of any child.
Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Teresa has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).
Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that it is not foreseeable that Teresa is capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed Teresa's past failures at personal rehabilitation and her parenting deficits and deviancies as they relate to Jamal's need for a safe, responsible and nurturing parent who can meet his requirements and needs for emotional stability, security, and consistency.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that to allow Teresa further time to rehabilitate herself, if that were possible, and to assume a responsible position in Jamal's life would not be in the best interests of Jamal.
DISPOSITION
As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn.App. 827; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n. 15, 613 A.2d 748 (1993). In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book § 35a-9.
SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS
The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by CGS § 17a-112(k) based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate the respondent parents' individual parental rights. See In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn.App. 835.
TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(1)
The State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF provided the following services to the respondent mother Teresa, or that the following services were provided to her:
ADRC: substance abuse testing and treatment
APO: supervision and monitoring
Catherine's Place: substance abuse treatment/transitional housing
CHC: mental health services, substance abuse testing and treatment, housing program
Connections: substance abuse testing and treatment, pilot program for housing
DCF: case management services, visitation, transportation assistance
Community Renewal Team: housing assistance
DSS
Eddy Center Shelter
IOL: substance abuse testing and treatment
Jones Program
Mercy Housing
MHCBH: Dual Diagnosis Program
Middlesex Hospital: parent aide services
Morris Foundation: substance abuse testing and treatment
My Sister's Place: transitional housing
Nehemiah Housing
NOW Shelter
Rushford Center: substance abuse testing and treatment
St. Vincent DePaul Shelter
Salvation Army Shelter
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent mother Teresa to facilitate her reunification with her child and made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her child. In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258-60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa failed to utilize these services as indicated and failed to gain any appropriate benefit from these services.
Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Teresa is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts as far as Jamal is concerned. CGS § 17a-112(j)(1). Her serious issues clearly and convincingly made her unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts with Jamal in a timely manner. In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App 528, 535-36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).
The court further finds that the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that Teresa was aware of her issues and deficits and had received specific steps addressing said issues. Additionally, Teresa had other child protection cases involving her older children for similar issues. The clear and convincing evidence shows that despite having knowledge of the nature of her issues, Teresa remained unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification services with Jamal.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF was unable to provide services to John Doe, due to his failure to initiate or maintain contact with DCF, his failure to make himself available for services, his failure to engage in the services and his failure to participate in the proceedings.
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunite John Doe with Jamal. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Brendan C., supra, 89 Conn.App. 524.
Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that John Doe is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts as far as Jamal is concerned. CGS § 17a-112(j)(1). His serious issues clearly and convincingly made him unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts with Jamal in a timely manner. In re Tyqwane V., supra, 85 Conn. App 535-36.
The court will incorporate, by reference, all reasonable efforts findings previously made that are listed above in this decision.
This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts at reunification are not appropriate for either Teresa or John Doe with regard to Jamal.
REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — CGS § 17a-112(k)(2)
This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that neither Teresa nor John Doe are presently able and/or willing to benefit from such reunification services as are contemplated by the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Teresa with Jamal. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 478-79, 771 A.2d 244 (2002).
The court further finds that the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that Teresa was aware of her issues and deficits and had received specific steps addressing said issues. However, the clear and convincing evidence also shows that, despite this notification, she remained unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification services.
Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunite John Doe with Jamal. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Brendan C., supra, 89 Conn.App. 524.
Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that both Teresa and John Doe are individually unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts as far as Jamal is concerned. CGS § 17a-112(j)(1). Their individual serious issues clearly and convincingly make either one unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts with Jamal in a timely manner. In re Tyqwane K., supra, 85 Conn.App 535-36.
The court will incorporate, by reference, all reasonable efforts findings previously made that are listed above in this decision.
This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts at reunification are not appropriate for either Teresa or John Doe with regard to Jamal. CT Page 11681
COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — CGS § 17a-112(k)(3)
The clear and convincing evidence shows that, on 2/18/05, in SCJM 6th, (Ginnochio, J.), and on 11/10/05, in SCJM 8th, (Dyer, J.), the court ordered specific steps for Teresa.The court incorporates, by reference, its previous findings made in this decision concerning the respondent mother's compliance with the specific steps.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Teresa has failed to comply with most of the steps ordered by the court.
The court did not order specific steps for John Doe.
THE CHILD's FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(4)
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Jamal has a bond with Teresa, and enjoys visitation with her. He is excited to see her at visitation, and becomes upset when she does not appear for visits.
Jamal is caring and affectionate with the foster parents, and refers to them as "Dad" and "Daddy." He looks to them for affection.
Jamal has been in his present placement since 4/28/05. There are 4 other boys in the foster home who are adopted, aged 16, 12, 9 and 6 years old. He shares a bedroom with the 6-year-old. Downeyside regional director Goodrich testified that Jamal idolizes one of his foster brothers.
The foster brothers find Jamal to be a pest at times, but, nevertheless, accept him as a brother.
Jamal has never seen John Doe and has no relationship with him.
AGE OF THE CHILD — CGS § 17a-112(k)(5)
Jamal was born oh 10/15/02, and is 44 months old.
PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — CGS § 17a-112(k)(6)
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither Teresa nor John Doe are able and/or willing to make realistic and sustained efforts to conform their individual conduct to acceptable parental standards.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that DCF has made numerous referrals for Teresa through the pendency of this case. Unfortunately, these referrals have done little or nothing to assist her in addressing her most important issues, substance abuse, mental health and housing. As of the date of the TPR trial, Teresa was still recently abusing substances, was still homeless and was a wanted fugitive.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that John Doe has still failed to come forward to take responsibility for Jamal, or to help support him. He has failed to present himself to DCF or the court in this matter.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that despite DCF's best efforts, neither Teresa nor John Doe are either able and/or willing to take the steps necessary in order to even attempt to become a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for Jamal. Neither respondent parent is able to care for his or her son appropriately and to provide him with the safety, care, permanence and stability that he needs and deserves.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither Teresa nor John Doe have made the changes necessary in her or his lifestyle that would indicate that either would be a safe, responsible and nurturing parent for Jamal.
The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that to allow either Teresa or John Doe further time to rehabilitate herself or himself, if that were possible, and to assume a responsible position in Jamal's life would not be in the best interests of Jamal.
EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILD — CGS § 17a-112(k)(7)
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, APO or third parties prevented either Teresa or John Doe from maintaining a relationship with Jamal, nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD — CGS § 17a-112(j)(2)
The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of the parental rights of Teresa or John Doe would be in Jamal's best interests. Applying the appropriate legal standards to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.
The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child . . ."
In determining whether termination of Teresa or John Doe's parental rights would be in Jamal's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with his foster parents and his biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance the child's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
"[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).
Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Jamal's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either respondent parent.
Teresa has battled her primary issues, substance abuse, mental health, transience, homelessness, domestic violence, a failure to engage in and benefit from services, and overall poor judgment and poor decision making, for years. The clear and convincing evidence presented in the TPR trial shows her no closer to the goal of safe, responsible and nurturing parenthood than she was at the time Jamal was taken into DCF custody. She has shown little to no progress towards resolving any of her issues successfully.
The clear and convincing evidence presented in the TPR trial shows that Teresa tested positive for the presence of illegal substances in her system as late as 3/24/06, 6 days prior to the commencement of the TPR trial. She has failed to remain substance free for any significant period. Her housing remains inappropriate. Her other issues, such as mental health, domestic violence, and parenting remain either continuously under treatment, or unaddressed.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa's numerous issues remain clearly antithetical to safe, responsible and nurturing parenting, and are also antagonistic to Jamal's best interests.
Teresa's issues have cost her the custody of all of her children; her parental rights to 2 of her children were terminated in the State of Maryland.
Teresa is facing criminal charges in connection to her violation of probation and other matters. These factors also make her future as a caretaker for Jamal uncertain.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa cannot keep Jamal safe and cannot care for him properly. The clear and convincing evidence also shows that Teresa has failed to gain insight into the efforts that she needs to make in order to become a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for her child. The clear and convincing evidence shows that her judgment and conduct still remain questionable, and have not improved since Jamal was taken into DCF care and custody.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that John Doe has made no efforts towards rehabilitation.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that John Doe has had no contact with Jamal since he was born. He has failed to make the least effort to contact Jamal or to contact DCF on his own behalf. John Doe has utterly failed to show any concern or interest in his son. He has never contacted DCF concerning Jamal or appeared in court to show concern about Jamal's situation. He has never contacted DCF to arrange visitation with his son.
The clear and convincing evidence also shows that neither respondent parent has gained insight into the efforts that he or she needs to make in order to become a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for Jamal. The clear and convincing evidence shows that both Teresa and John Doe's judgment and conduct still remain questionable, and have not improved since Jamal was taken into DCF care.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that Jamal cannot afford to wait any longer for either Teresa or John Doe to rehabilitate herself or himself. Each has been given more than ample time to accomplish this, without success.
The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time that the respondent parents need to attempt to rehabilitate themselves and to attempt to establish themselves in the community as safe, nurturing and responsible parents, if that were possible, is time that Jamal cannot spare.
Teresa and John Doe's individual parental performances clearly and convincingly show that each one lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role. Their individual failures to address their issues in a timely manner and their individual failures to successfully address their individual parental deficits clearly and convincingly show that it is unlikely that either Teresa or John Doe will ever be able to conform her or his behaviors to appropriate parental standards or be able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for Jamal.
Based upon Teresa and John Doe's individual behaviors and performances so far, this court cannot foresee either respondent parent in this case ever having the ability or the patience to follow the regimen necessary for Jamal to maximize his abilities and achievements.
The child's attorney indicated that the TPR of Teresa and John Doe would be in his client's best interests.
Teresa argued that the TPR should not be granted, and testified on her own behalf. She indicated that DCF failed to assist her, and that, with housing assistance, she could care for Jamal. At final argument, Teresa's attorney also contended that DCF had provided insufficient support for her client, and that there was love and affection between Jamal and Teresa.
Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence indicates that it would be extremely rash to place the responsibility for Jamal's life, development and well-being on his biological mother. This court finds that Teresa's representations and claims are an insufficient basis on which to risk this special-needs child's health, emotional well-being and future achievements. The clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF fulfilled its obligation of making reasonable reunification efforts as to Teresa. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn.App. 547; see also In re Brendan C., supra, 89 Conn.App. 524.
As previously pointed out, it is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384.
The issues that Teresa presented with in 2001 remain unchanged and, sadly, not improved. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that allowing Teresa further time in which to rehabilitate herself will not result in Teresa utilizing the time or the services to effect positive changes so she can serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent to Jamal. She has already been given that opportunity, and has nothing to show for it.
The court has reviewed the information relating to the respondent mother's past personal history. Giving her representations the full benefit of the doubt, it is obvious that the conduct of those individuals who have mistreated, abused and sexually exploited her as a child was nothing short of disgusting, depraved and loathsome. There is little doubt that this disturbing trauma has had a major negative impact on Teresa's life, and has, probably, played no small part in putting her in her present straitened situation. Unfortunately, the court must deal with the situation as presented by the testimony and the evidence before, not as one might wish it had been — or should have been.
The court is aware of the bond between Jamal and Teresa, and has considered it carefully.
However, the Appellate Court has affirmed trial court decisions granting TPR in the face of a strong relationship between a respondent parent and child if TPR is in the best interests of the child. In re Tyqwane V., supra, 85 Conn. App 535; In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 106, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, CT Page 11687 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).
There is no question that Jamal has a strong bond with Teresa. However, this bond is insufficient to stay a TPR if a ground is proven and it is in the best interest of a child to terminate the parent's rights. Like the mother in In re Tyqwane V., supra, 85 Conn.App. 535, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Teresa "[has] exercised, [continues) to exercise and will in the future exercise poor judgment in regard to [Jamal]."
Jamal has been in foster care for 15 months. He needs stability, nurturing and permanence in a home with caregivers who are not beset by overwhelming substance abuse issues, mental health issues, domestic violence eruptions, homelessness, gross parenting deficits, or criminal recidivism problems.
What is certain is that any further delay in permanency and stability will only worsen Jamal's situation, and that he can wait for these necessities no longer.
Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development . . ." In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence," when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The court is obliged to agree with the child's attorney and DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Jamal is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parents as caretakers.
The State and DCF have recommended the TPR of Jamal. There has been absolutely no evidence to establish the unreasonableness of this request.
Having balanced Jamal's individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Teresa or John Doe, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to the respondent parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.
Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Teresa and John Doe as to Jamal is in the best interests of the child in question.
ORDER OF TERMINATION
WHEREFORE, after due consideration of Jamal's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship he has with his foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:
That the parental rights of Teresa B. are hereby terminated as to the child Jamal B.
That the parental rights of John Doe are hereby terminated as to the child Jamal B.
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Jamal for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or families, or other permanent placement for him.
That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law.