Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD226282, JD226283, JD227688
BUTZ, J.
Christina G., mother of the minors (Brianna, Jacob and Sarah), appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her petition for modification of prior orders, terminating her parental rights, and adopting a permanent plan with the goal of adoption for the minors. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Mother abused methamphetamine for many years. She relapsed several times while receiving over 18 months of reunification services. Well after those services were terminated, on the day of the scheduled permanency plan hearing, she petitioned to modify prior orders to provide for further reunification services, alleging she had completed drug rehabilitation and had been reunified with a child in another county. The juvenile court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by not granting this petition. We shall conclude the record supports the court’s findings that mother did not show a sufficient change of circumstance nor show that it would be in the best interest of the minors to provide further reunification services to her at that late date.
Mother also contends the juvenile court should not have terminated her parental rights, because her relationship with the minors established a statutory exception to termination. We shall conclude the record supports the court’s finding that termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minors, and therefore the basis for the statutory exception was not established.
We shall affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
Leland C., father of the minors, also appeals, but only from the order terminating his parental rights. We denied his request to construe his notice of appeal more broadly. In his letter brief, the father’s sole claim is that if we reverse the case as to mother, we must reverse as to him. (See In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 208.) Because we reject mother’s claims, perforce we reject father’s sole claim, and we do not address it further.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 26, 2005, the Solano County Child Welfare Services office filed petitions alleging that Heather (15), Brianna (4), Thomas (3) and Jacob (13 months) were dependent children because mother and father had methamphetamine problems that “periodically” rendered them incapable of caring for the children, and mother had an untreated bipolar disorder that “compromises” her ability to care for them. Other allegations are not relevant on appeal.
An intake report in part explained that mother had not followed through with previous recommendations that she attend substance abuse counseling, and during a home visit on September 14, 2005, Heather reported that mother used methamphetamine, and mother admitted she was not taking medication for her bipolar condition. Mother stated she was “‘overwhelmed’ and could not handle all the children” with Heather in the home. Shortly after that visit, mother disappeared with Brianna, but on September 21, 2005, father reported that Brianna had been returned home. All of the children except Heather were detained. Later, mother was found in a motel, and Heather reported that her mother had left her alone overnight with a “tweeker” (sic) in a motel room.
On September 27, 2005, the court detained all of the children.
On November 18, 2005, jurisdiction was established when father admitted allegations of drug abuse, and mother admitted drug abuse, that she may have an untreated bipolar disorder, and that she failed to ensure the minors had appropriate supervision and care.
The dispositional report prepared in December 2005 states mother, born in 1975, receives SSI disability for a bipolar disorder, which she treats by using illicit drugs, and she admitted using methamphetamine “for many years, mostly to relieve stress.” She was pregnant, and in a drug program. Father did not respond to inquiries, but had previously admitted to long-term methamphetamine use, and past cocaine and heroin use. The report stated that father and mother “have a very volatile history and it appears that their drug use increases when they are together. They will soon be the parents of five children and need to engage in relationship counseling so that they can co-parent without violence and substance abuse.” Continued out-of-home placement was recommended for all of the children.
On January 11, 2006, the court placed the children with the welfare department, with supervised parental visitation. The court ordered reunification services, including requiring mother to abstain from drugs, submit to drug testing, and participate in drug and other counseling.
A six-month review report dated June 6, 2006, stated mother was progressing well, but there had been a two-month period when she became “really depressed, unmotivated and overwhelmed,” left her substance abuse program and made little contact with the social worker, allegedly due to pregnancy depression. This period ended and she “seemed to have renewed energy for her fight for her children,” and became fully compliant. Her drug testing was negative. However, the social worker was not convinced mother could handle “all of her children at one time,” in part because they each required “a lot of attention and interaction.” Father had done nothing to comply with the case plan except visit the children, and he had tested positive for drugs. By this point, Heather was on “runaway status.”
After a hearing on June 28, 2006, the court found a substantial risk that the conditions leading to jurisdiction would recur, continued the out-of-home placement, ordered continued reunification services, and scheduled a 12-month review hearing.
A 12-month review report states mother had tested positive for alcohol three times, but negative for drugs. Her recovery program was concerned that this could signal a relapse, but mother was contesting the results of the most serious test, showing a blood-alcohol level of 0.24 percent. Father was still noncompliant, and was abusive to the social worker. Heather was still AWOL. The social worker agreed that if mother continued to test negative, there would be a transition or “family maintenance” plan to return the children to her.
After the 12-month review hearing on November 15, 2006, and a continued hearing on December 5, 2006, the court approved the transition plan as to mother, terminated further services to father, issued a warrant for Heather, and set an 18-month review hearing.
An 18-month review report filed May 3, 2007, stated that Jacob and Brianna had been reunited with mother, Thomas was in a foster home with the goal of returning him to mother, and Heather, who had been surviving as a prostitute, was now in juvenile detention. Mother had been reunited and bonded with Jacob and Brianna, but because Thomas had “severe temper tantrums” and had acted out violently on a home visit, the social worker and mother agreed to delay his return to the home until mental health and other services could be provided to address his needs. “[M]other felt she needed to have more time as a recovered addict to deal with the reintroduction of her family, and Thomas’[s] severe tantrums were causing her frustrations.” Mother had completed her drug program in March 2007, and had delivered her baby, Sarah. The report was generally favorable, and recommended reuniting Thomas with mother, with continued family maintenance services. Heather could not be reunited because of her drug problem, which would interfere with mother’s recovery.
A revised status review report filed on June 12, 2007, described an unannounced home visit that took place on May 10, 2007, a week after the initial, favorable report had been filed. In short, father was present in the home, although he was not allowed unsupervised contact; mother said she did not want to reunite with Thomas; the home was dirty, with dry feces smears in two places; and mother admitted Heather had been staying with her, without the knowledge of the social worker. Mother had allowed a person known to her to be a sex offender to stay in the home without notifying the social worker, even after he had been arrested at the home. The report also noted that mother’s attendance at mental health and other sessions had become sporadic. Mother had moved to Sacramento.
The revised report explained that returning Heather or Thomas to mother was not feasible, and reunification services had to be terminated as to them, with permanent plans of long-term foster care. The report recommended that Jacob and Brianna stay at home, with further family maintenance services for six months.
At the 18-month review hearing on June 13, 2007, the juvenile court adopted the revised recommendations, including continued drug testing and counseling for mother.
On August 17, 2007, a motion to transfer the case to Sacramento County was filed, alleging mother had moved there with Jacob and Brianna. On August 22, 2007, the motion was granted as to those two children.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) prepared an in-home review report (§ 364) dated November 9, 2007. Mother had tested negative for drugs, but had missed tests and attended only two abstinence meetings, allegedly because of her need to travel to Solano County to maintain visits with Thomas. The report recommended continuing Jacob and Brianna as dependents and providing mother additional services.
At an unreported hearing on November 28, 2007, the court continued the review hearing to give the social worker more time to evaluate mother’s progress.
In an addendum to the in-home review report, filed on December 18, 2007, the social worker reported that, despite an order by the court at the November 28 hearing, mother had not contacted the social worker, and she had missed many drug tests, although the three tests she had completed in October and November were negative. At an unannounced home visit on December 15, 2007, mother claimed she had been too stressed to contact the social worker, and she was not able to provide evidence of abstinence meeting attendance.
On December 20, 2007, the juvenile court continued the matter, but mother agreed to attend drug court and was ordered to stay in contact with the social worker.
On January 17, 2008, the court adopted the review report and set another review hearing for July 3, 2008.
On June 11, 2008, supplemental petitions (§ 387) were filed, alleging that mother had used methamphetamines and had not completed court-ordered individual counseling; further, the children had untreated head lice. A detention report states mother admitted using methamphetamine and agreed to enter a program, but had not kept in contact with the social worker. Mother left Jacob and Brianna at the Sacramento Children’s Receiving Home; Thomas and Heather remained in foster care under the jurisdiction of Solano County; and Sarah was with her maternal aunt and uncle.
On June 12, 2008, the court detained Jacob and Brianna, and granted mother supervised visitation.
The next day, a new petition was filed as to Sarah (then nearly two years old), alleging mother’s drug abuse placed her at risk of harm, and mother had failed to comply with services designed to remediate her parenting problems. On June 16, 2008, the court placed Sarah with the maternal aunt.
A report filed on July 1, 2008, states mother admitted using methamphetamine. The maternal grandmother had been living with the family, but when she was committed to a hospital in April 2008, “mother began to utilize unauthorized child care providers. [Mother] no longer has the financial support of the maternal grandmother’s income to assist with the monthly expenses, which added to [mother’s] stress.” The report recommended sustaining jurisdiction as to Sarah, denying any further services to mother or father, and permanent plans of adoption (later changed by agreement to guardianship) be made for Sarah, Jacob and Brianna. Jacob and Brianna were still at the receiving home, and Sarah was now with her paternal aunt and uncle. Thomas remained under the jurisdiction of Solano County, and Heather, again, was AWOL.
Counsel for Jacob, Brianna, and Sarah filed a pretrial statement agreeing with the recommendation. Before the hearing, these children were placed together.
On July 29, 2008, some 30 months after reunification services began, the Department and the minors’ counsel agreed the matter should be set for a termination hearing (§ 366.26), with a goal of guardianship, as a sibling group. Mother’s counsel objected to everything, and in particular to bypassing services as to Sarah. The court sustained the jurisdictional allegations as to Sarah and the supplemental petitions as to Jacob and Brianna, found they comprised a sibling group, and adopted the proposed findings, except for setting a date of November 20, 2008, as the date for a termination hearing. Reunification services were terminated.
On September 25, 2008, the social worker filed requests (JV-180) to change the existing court orders, alleging the foster parents are not interested in guardianship, the minors were adoptable, two prospective adoptive families had been identified, and mother had “left her residential treatment program” on July 29, 2008, the day of the prior hearing. On October 16, 2008, the court changed the permanent plan to adoption.
The termination (“selection and implementation”) report filed on January 23, 2009, states mother had begun a drug program, attended meetings three times each week, and was randomly drug tested. She had begun treatment for her bipolar disorder. She had had appropriate, supervised visits with the minors, though sometimes Jacob and Brianna would become upset later. On November 21, 2008, the minors were placed with an adoptive family. During monthly visits, the minors saw Heather with mother, and they saw Thomas monthly.
Mother was doing well at reunifying with Thomas, and was generally compliant in Solano County. She admitted using methamphetamine on November 2, 2008, and missing some treatment sessions in October; however, she was in compliance and deemed “clean” since November 3, 2008. Despite this progress, the report recommended terminating parental rights, because of mother’s long history of relapses, unsuccessful reunification services where she twice failed to reunify with Jacob and Brianna, her “history of going on-and-off” bipolar medication, and because the minors “have been dragged back and forth in the system and had multiple placements in foster care. The children have a chance for permanency in a foster home, where the family has an approved adoptive [home study] and are committed to adopting” the three minors.
At the February 5, 2009 hearing, father showed up unexpectedly, as he had dropped out of the picture. After hearing father’s views, the juvenile court appointed counsel for father and continued the matter.
A report filed on March 3, 2009, stated that neither mother nor father had contacted the social worker since the last hearing. Both Jacob and Brianna liked their current home, and all three children referred to their caregivers as “mom” or “mommy” and “dad” or “daddy.” Later, the social worker clarified that she had traded phone messages with father, and that the children’s therapist recommended against allowing him to visit them.
On March 17, 2009, the scheduled date of the termination hearing, mother petitioned to modify the current court orders (§ 388), alleging that Thomas had been reunited with mother in Solano County on March 4, 2009, and the Solano County drug court case manager had written a favorable report dated February 3, 2009, regarding mother’s diligence in addressing drug issues.
The court continued the termination hearing several times. At the continued termination hearing that began on May 11, 2009, mother testified that she had been living at the Christian Help Center in Vallejo, a transitional living program, for four or five months, and could stay there for up to two years. She participated in a substance abuse program known as Project Aurora three days per week, down from five at the recommendation of the program director, was subject to random drug testing, and was attending abstinence meetings and individual counseling. She had been with Project Aurora since October 2008. Her only positive drug test was caused by prescription pain medication taken for a back injury. She was taking Prozac for her bipolar disorder, which “really balanced” her and helped her stay sober, because she can now focus and no longer has anxiety or panic attacks. She was using relapse prevention techniques to avoid known triggers, such as unhealthy relationships. She had been sober since October 2008. She denied that she had admitted using drugs on November 2, 2008. She admitted that she started using methamphetamine when she was 15, and used daily from ages 19 to 21. She testified she was “clean” for four and a half years until she had had a miscarriage in 2003.
Mother testified that while receiving reunification services in Sacramento, she had not been “working” her program, and her bipolar condition had not been treated. Now she has more support, such as at the Solano County drug court, where she is doing extremely well. Thomas, now seven, had ADHD and was in a special education program. He shared a room with mother. His behavior had stabilized. She had taken Thomas on supervised visits with the three minors “[o]nce a month for an hour.” The other children were always happy to see him. If they were returned to her, they, too, would live at the transitional center.
There was testimony mother did well in supervised visits with Thomas, as well as the other children.
On May 12, 2009, Courtney Tindall, the case manager for the Solano County Dependency Drug Court, testified. She was in contact with mother weekly, since October 22, 2008, and mother was in compliance, except for her self-reported relapse in November. Tindall explained that as for a separate incident involving pain medication, mother had had a prescription.
Heather testified she was now 18. She sees her mother every day and they “are in sobriety together. We do meetings and stuff like that together.”
The court denied mother’s section 388 petitions because “both prongs have failed”; that is, mother did not show a sufficient change of circumstances and did not show it would be in the best interests of the minors. The court found the minors (Brianna, Jacob and Sarah) were adoptable, and there was not “such a strong relationship” with mother, father, Thomas or Heather, to conclude that they should not be adopted. The court terminated parental rights and set the matter for a postpermanency review hearing on October 29, 2009.
Mother timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
As indicated above, the juvenile court concluded mother’s efforts to change her life came too late. While the record shows she loves her children and wants to reunite with them, we make these preliminary observations: “Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 (Marilyn H.); see Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 73.) “Expressions of love and concern do not equate to the day to day care and devotion the average parent expends on behalf of children. The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it.” (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038.)
We shall now address mother’s specific claims of error.
I. Order Denying Section 388 Petition
Mother contends she had a “very warm, close relationship” with the minors which benefitted them and that, therefore, the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition seeking further reunification services. As we shall explain, although mother cites the appropriate standard of review, she does not apply that standard in making her arguments: Instead of showing the juvenile court abused its discretion, she merely reargues the facts, which she construes in the manner most favorable to herself.
Section 388, subdivision (a) provides in part: “Any parent... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court... for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.”
The California Supreme Court has discussed section 388 petitions as follows: “At a hearing on a motion for change of placement, the burden of proof is on the moving party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is new evidence or that there are changed circumstances that make a change of placement in the best interests of the child. [Citations.] [¶] After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interest of the child.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; see Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.)
“This determination [is] committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established. [Citations.] As one court has stated, when a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding, ‘“a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].”’ [Citations.] And we have recently warned: ‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (In re Stephanie M., supra,7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)
The following factors should be considered in determining a section 388 petition: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532 (Kimberly F.).)
One of the functions of section 388 is to provide “an ‘escape mechanism’ when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of parental rights.” (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 528, see Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309 [“a means for the court to address a legitimate change of circumstances while protecting the child’s need for prompt resolution of his custody status”].)
However, a petition that “would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) This is such a case.
In this case, mother simply reweighs the evidence, or makes what amounts to an argument to the juvenile court. She points out that by the time of the termination hearing, she had been drug-free for six months; she was in a carefully structured program to help her avoid relapsing; she was on appropriate medication to control her bipolar disorder; and her son Thomas had been returned to her by the Solano County juvenile court.
In In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, the juvenile court declined to hold a hearing on a section 388 petition and the specific issue was whether the parent had demonstrated a prima facie basis for a hearing. (Anthony W., at pp. 250-251.) But the court also observed that simply because a parent addresses a drug problem and maintains contact with a minor does not mean the best interests of the minor require maintaining the parent-child relationship: “At this point in the proceedings, on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children’s interest in stability was the court’s foremost concern, outweighing any interest mother may have in reunification. [Citation.] Mother made no showing how it would be [in] the children’s best interest[s] to continue reunification services, to remove them from their comfortable and secure placement to live with mother who has a long history of drug addiction and a recurring pattern of domestic violence in front of the children. The children should not be made to wait indefinitely for mother to become an adequate parent.” (Id. at pp. 251-252.)
The above passage from Anthony W. cogently describes this case.
In In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, we find this pertinent passage: “Carl’s seven months of sobriety since his relapse in January, while commendable, was nothing new. He had a history of drug use dating back to his college days, and since then his periods of sobriety alternated with recurring drug use. Even after the initial detention of his children, it took Carl six months before he was able to stay sober for any length of time. Then, after eight months of sobriety, he still succumbed to the temptation of illegal drugs. As Carl’s counselor confirmed, relapses are all too common for a recovering drug user. ‘It is the nature of addiction that one must be “clean” for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform.’ ([Kimberly F., supra,] 56 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 531, fn. 9.) In Carl’s case, 200 days was not enough to reassure the juvenile court that the most recent relapse would be his last.” (Cliffton B., at pp. 423-424.)
Similarly, mother had been “clean” for six months, but the record shows she was born in 1975, has been using methamphetamine since she was 15, and repeatedly relapsed after periods of sobriety or substance abuse treatment. In such circumstances, her present sobriety, while laudable, is unpersuasive. As the Department observes, for the last four to five months she had been in a structured program and a transitional living center, and she had recently reunited with one child (Thomas). The court could conclude there was no likelihood that when she left the program and housing center, and had three more children to care for (Brianna, Jacob and Sarah), the additional stress and lack of structure would not once again overwhelm her, causing her to relapse.
Mother also contends the record shows it would be in the best interests of the minors to reunify. She claims that in 2008 she placed Jacob and Brianna at the receiving home, and Sarah with relatives, because, knowing she had relapsed, she wanted to “reduce any trauma to the children, rather than have them removed by the social worker.” The record is more plausibly interpreted to show that she abandoned her children to pursue her own lifestyle choices.
Mother states that in 2008, “[t]he children had problems adjusting to foster care because of their bond with their mother.” She cites a report to that effect made shortly after she effectively abandoned the children in June 2008. But by the time of the termination hearing, the reports showed the children were happy at their new prospective adoptive home.
Mother contends that by February 2009, the reports showed her supervised visits went well, but the social worker’s report also states: “[A]fter visits, it was reported by the care provider that Jacob and Brianna would have occasional outbursts, nightmares, or be more emotional for a few days.” Mother states that the fact the children became emotional after visits “would reasonably infer the children continued to be closely emotionally connected to their mother.” Another interpretation is that the visits upset them.
Mother contends the children reported being upset about not seeing their mother again and the prospect of being adopted. It is indeed tragic that the children have to face such a change, but that does not show it would have been in their best interests to return them to their mother. Although they may have retained some bond with her, that does not compel the conclusion that it would be in their best interests to deny them a stable home where they are also bonded.
As demonstrated, mother views isolated pieces of evidence in her favor to show that her petition had merit. But she disregards the long history of relapses, and equates her six-month period of sobriety as proof that the problems leading to dependency have been solved. On this record, given the long record of relapses by mother, and more importantly, the needs of the children for stability, she has not shown an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court.
II. Order Terminating Parental Rights
Mother contends the juvenile court improperly terminated her parental rights, because she established an exception to the presumption of termination. Again, her claim amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence.
At the termination hearing, the court must select one of the statutorily enumerated alternative permanent plans. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1)-(5).) “The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.] If a court finds a child adoptable, it must terminate parental rights” absent exceptional circumstances in which it would be detrimental to the child to do so. (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416; see In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
Mother contends the following exception is applicable to her case: “[T]he court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: [¶]... [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
To demonstrate this exception applied, mother had the burden to show “a compelling reason” not to terminate parental rights, specifically, that she had “regular visitation and contact” with her children and that they “would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) She had the “burden of proving that termination would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; see In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding on this point for substantial evidence. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
The term “benefit” as used in this exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) has been construed to mean “the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H., supra,27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
A history of positive visitation is not sufficient, of itself, to establish this benefit. (In re Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1418-1419 [“No matter how loving and frequent their contact with the girls, appellants had not occupied a parent role”]; In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [“pleasant and cordial father-son visits are, by themselves, insufficient”].) Nor does it appear mother saw the children more than once per month. In part mother faults the court for not addressing whether her visitation with the children was “regular.” No such objection was lodged in the juvenile court; therefore, she has forfeited the claim, because we presume the court was aware of the necessary findings and made them, whether or not they were articulated on the record. (See People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) The record is unclear on the frequency of the visits. One report indicates mother visited the minors at least monthly, and she testified to monthly visits with Thomas and the three minors, but it was not clear whether or how often she saw the minors without Thomas. One witness testified there were “[m]aybe about 14” supervised visits since December 2008. The social worker’s report states the visits “were reported to be appropriate” but did not describe their frequency. If mother had additional evidence of visits, it was up to mother to introduce it in the juvenile court and cite the relevant part of the record on appeal, which she has not done.
Mother also claims she “had the children in her custody for an extensive period of time.” She states she had Sarah “until she was about two” and Sarah “was not yet three” at the termination hearing, and states she had Jacob and Brianna from birth until September 2005, after which they “were placed back in their mother’s custody by May 2007, and lived there until June 2008.” This passage ignores the fact that the significant gaps are very unsettling for small children.
Mother contends the minors have a strong relationship with her and that their therapist “reported the children were sad about their mother.” Mother miscites the relevant page, but her reference is to a letter from a counselor who had met the minors four times as of February 26, 2009, and states: “The children present in a typical manner for children who are adjusting to a new family environment.... The children express concern and sadness for their birth Mom, but to date, have not mentioned anything about their birth father.” Although this document supports mother’s assertion in part, it does not show that the children were so “sad” that it would be in their best interests to further delay a stable home. It supports the view that the adjustment into a new family structure is going well, as shown by other evidence.
The report also notes that Jacob and Brianna may have “symptoms of Reactive Attachment Disorder.” This refers to a serious disorder caused by the lack of a stable home during their early years. This highlights what we said at the outset: No matter how strong mother’s love for the minors, it is unfair to deprive them of a stable home just in case mother’s current, and commendable, period of sobriety becomes permanent: “Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)
“‘The essential feature of Reactive Attachment Disorder is markedly disturbed and developmentally inappropriate social relatedness in most contexts that begins before age 5 years and is associated with grossly pathological care.... [T]he condition is associated with grossly pathological care that may take the form of persistent disregard of the child’s basic emotional needs for comfort, stimulation, and affection...; persistent disregard of the child’s basic physical needs...; or repeated changes of primary caregiver that prevent formation of stable attachments (e.g., frequent changes in foster care).’” (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 7, fn. 4.)
In short, mother has not demonstrated that the record before the juvenile court compelled it to find that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the children. Substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that mother did not carry her burden of proof to show that an exception to the presumption of termination applied. Accordingly, we reject mother’s contention of error.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed as to both mother and father.
We concur: SIMS , Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.