Opinion
No. 16–P–394.
12-08-2016
William J. JACKSON'S case.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
William J. Jackson worked for an entity that managed apartment buildings. In May of 2010, Jackson was injured on the job when he was struck by a car. He returned to work about one week later, but was terminated from his employment within approximately one month (apparently for reasons unrelated to his injury). Pursuant to a conference order, Jackson received temporary partial incapacity benefits for the period from June 21, 2010, to January 20, 2011. Both sides appealed, but later abandoned those appeals, and the temporary benefits are no longer at issue. In November of 2012, Jackson filed his current claim for weekly incapacity benefits, asserting that the 2010 injury caused him various continuing symptoms that prevent him from working.
The record reflects that prior to November, 2012, Jackson received unemployment benefits for at least much of the intervening period.
Jackson was examined by an impartial medical examiner (IME), who provided at least some support for his claim to being disabled as a result of the 2010 injury. The IME's report and her deposition testimony were submitted to an administrative judge (AJ) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA). The AJ allowed each party to submit extensive additional medical evidence. After considering the evidence, the AJ found the report of the IME "less probative on the issues before me than the report of [the insurer's main medical expert]," and he concluded that Jackson "has not satisfied his burden of persuasion." DIA's reviewing board summarily affirmed the AJ's denial of benefits. On Jackson's further appeal, we affirm the decision of the reviewing board.
To the extent that Jackson argues that the AJ was obliged to accept the IME's opinion, that is wrong as a matter of law. See, e.g., Coggin v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 42 Mass.App.Ct. 584, 589 (1997). To the extent that Jackson argues that, for one reason or another, the AJ erred by accepting the insurer's medical evidence as overcoming the opinion of the IME or any additional medical evidence submitted by Jackson, that argument fails for a different reason. Jackson did not include in his record appendix the IME's report, the transcript of her deposition, or any of the other medical evidence before the AJ. We lack a basis for evaluating the merits of Jackson's arguments, and his appeal fails for that reason, if for no other. See Mass.R.A.P. 16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975); Mass.R.A.P. 18(a), as amended, 425 Mass. 1602 (1997). See also Shawmut Community Bank v. Zagami, 30 Mass.App.Ct. 371, 372–373 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 411 Mass. 807, 812 (1992).
There are two forms of medical evidence that are arguably properly before us, both as a result of actions taken by the insurer. One is a report that was prepared by the original IME who had been appointed with respect to Jackson's claim for temporary benefits. The insurer included that report in its supplemental record appendix. The other is comprised of record excerpts included in Jackson's brief that the insurer acknowledged in its brief accurately reflect what the witnesses had stated. However, the limited pieces of the record before us provide little, if any, help to Jackson, and, in any event, we cannot assess Jackson's arguments without examining the medical evidence as a whole.
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Decision of reviewing board affirmed.