The party asserting abuse of discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse. In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 423, 42 P.3d 215, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1112 (2002).          Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Finding that the Best Interest of the Children Dictated No Change in Placement?

Working from this definition of verification, we next consider the purpose of the verification requirement. In In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 422, 42 P.3d 215 (2002), a panel considered whether the statute's verification requirement applied to those who had not been personally served with process. In finding that the statutory verification did not apply, and thus the court had jurisdiction, the panel reviewed K.S.A. 38-1591, now K.S.A. 38-2273.

" As this court pointed out in the show cause order, K.S.A.2004 Supp. 38-1502(e) includes the State as an "interested party."          [34 Kan.App.2d 323] Citing legislative history and In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 42 P.3d 215, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1112 (2002), the State implicitly argues that K.S.A. 38-1591(e) is solely directed toward a parent whose rights have been terminated. This court, in In re J.A. stated:

In doing so, the court must give primary consideration to granting custody to a relative of the child. See In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 423, 42 P.3d 215, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1112 (2002); K.S.A. 38-1584(b)(4).        The League admits that it is governed by similar considerations in making a placement decision.

As provided in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-3104(d), the petition required "personal service" on Maggie, meaning it had to be presented directly to her and could not simply be left with another adult with whom she resided. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-303(d)(1)(A) ; see In re J.A. , 30 Kan. App. 2d 416, Syl. ¶ 4, 42 P.3d 215 (2002). The order provided Baker's address as the place Maggie could be found.

K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2273(e) requires that every notice of appeal shall be verified by the appellant and failure to have the required verification shall result in the dismissal of the appeal. This requirement was designed to alleviate the problem of attorneys who were bound to proceed with appeals for a parent even if the parent was disinterested or could not be located. See In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 422, 42 P.3d 215,rev. denied 274 Kan. 1112 (2002). But K.S.A.2011 Supp. 38–2273(e) provides that every notice of appeal shall be verified by the appellant only “if the appellant has been personally served at any time during the proceedings.”

T.R. appeared at the hearing without counsel and was excused by the court given her earlier parental rights relinquishment. The court found that DCF's efforts to remove P.R. from the foster parents' home in favor of the maternal aunt and uncle was an abuse of the agency's discretion because it failed to properly consider whether such placement would actually be in P.R.'s best interests, citing In re J.A ., 30 Kan. App. 2d 416, 421, 42 P.3d 215 (2002). The court concluded that the child's best interests were served by granting custody to the foster parents to pursue adoption.

This court reached the same conclusion in In re J.A., 30 Kan.App.2d 416, 422-23, 42 P.3d 215 (2002) ("[The verifications] required the parent(s) to 'acknowledge their wish to continue appeal at every level of appeal or the appeal shall be dismissed.'").

This requirement was designed to alleviate the problem of attorneys who were bound to proceed with appeals for a parent even if the parent was uninterested or could not be located. See In re J.A. , 30 Kan. App. 2d 416, 422, 42 P.3d 215 (2002). Mother's notice of appeal was timely filed on March 3, 2021; a separate verification of the notice was filed on May 26, 2021; the docketing statement was timely filed on June 14, 2021.

They identify several factors a court must consider in determining whether an adoption is in the best interest of a child. See In re J.A. , 30 Kan. App. 2d 416, 425-26, 42 P.3d 215 (2002). They then support many of these factors with information that does not appear to be in the record.