Opinion
No. 0-358 / 99-1803.
Filed July 26, 2000.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. Block, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A minor child appeals a district court ruling adjudicating him delinquent for committing second-degree criminal mischief. AFFIRMED.
Kellyann M. Lekar of Roberts, Stevens Lekar, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, and Melissa L. Smith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Habhab, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code § 602.9206 (1999).
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . On March 11, 1999, the State charged Joshua A. with committing delinquent acts of second-degree criminal mischief in connection with a series of tire slashings in Waterloo. At trial several witnesses testified they had accompanied Joshua in the tire slashings.
Andrew R. testified that he, Joshua, Terry and Shane were at Joshua's house watching wrestling when they decided to go to the gas station. Andrew further testified that on the way back Joshua slashed a tire in the parking lot of the Bluebird Lounge. Then he, Terry, and Shane slashed tires along the curve part in the road. He stated the second time they went out, he, Joshua, and Shane acted as lookouts while Terry slashed more tires.
Shane testified they were at Joshua's house watching wrestling when he, Joshua, Terry and Andrew went to the gas station to purchase some soda. He testified Joshua slashed a tire in the parking lot of the Bluebird Lounge on the way back from the gas station. He stated the second time they went out, he, Joshua, Terry, and Andrew all participated in slashing tires.
Joshua's witnesses testified they only saw him leave the house for a brief period to go to the store. Joshua's stepfather testified that Joshua only left once for five or ten minutes and never left the house again. His mother testified Joshua left only once for a short time, and that she told him to stay home the rest of the evening and complete his homework. Joshua's brother testified he was riding in the car taking the other boys home at the end of the evening and heard them laughing about the tires they slashed.
After the close of the State's evidence, Joshua moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove Joshua committed the alleged delinquent acts. On September 13, 1999, the juvenile court denied Joshua's motion for judgment of acquittal finding there was sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt Joshua committed the offense of criminal mischief in the second degree. The court placed Joshua on one-year probation.
On appeal, Joshua argues the juvenile court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal and concluding there was sufficient evidence he had committed delinquent acts since there was no corroborative evidence other than accomplice testimony.
II. Standard of Review . "Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, but are special proceedings that serve as an ameliorative alternative to the criminal prosecution of children." In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1996). We review juvenile delinquency proceedings de novo. In re S.M.D., 569 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Iowa 1997). While we give weight to the fact findings of the juvenile court, especially credibility determinations, those findings do not bind us. J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d at 587. It is for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed a delinquent act. Iowa Code § 232.47(10) (1999). A delinquent act is "[t]he violation of any state law . . . which would constitute a public offense if committed by an adult. . . ." Iowa Code § 232.2(12)(a) (1999).
III. The Merits . Joshua contends the State's only evidence of his participation in the tire slashings was presented through the testimony of accomplices Andrew and Shane. He argues the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(3). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(3) requires that testimony of an accomplice be corroborated:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice or a solicited person, unless corroborated by other evidence which shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
Corroboration is required to ensure "that a conviction will not result from an accused's statements that were misunderstood or not intended to be taken seriously or upon fabricated testimony of the person allegedly solicited." State v. Williams, 315 N.W.2d 45, 58 (Iowa 1982). Corroboration evidence may be direct or circumstantial. State v. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 1997). Corroboration need not be strong. State v. Jones, 511 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Iowa App. 1993). It must, however, support some material part of the accomplice's testimony and tend to connect the accused to the commission of the crime. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d at 176. Corroborative evidence is insufficient if it merely supports accomplices' testimony tending to show defendant's opportunity to commit a crime. In re R.M.O., 433 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Iowa App. 1988).
Pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(3), we now search the record to find independent evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony. Andrew and Shane's testimony was corroborated by defendant's twelve-year-old brother, R.G., Jr.
R.G., Jr., Joshua's little brother, testified that Joshua left the house once on the night in question with Terry, Andrew, and Shane. Otherwise, according to R.G., Jr., Joshua spent the entire time on the couch watching wrestling. R.G., Jr., also testified that he went along on the ride when the boys were driven home and the boys attempted to slash more tires and were laughing about the tires they had slashed.
The sufficiency of corroboration testimony is normally a question of fact. In re Dugan, 334 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Iowa 1983). Whether it was sufficient is for the trier of fact to decide. State v. Jones, 511 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Iowa App. 1993) (holding the total evidence presented against defendant was not overwhelming but was unquestionably sufficient to support a guilty verdict); see also In re Dugan, 334 N.W.2d at 304-5 (holding ten-year-old Richie Woods sufficiently corroborated the testimony of an accomplice). The juvenile court found that testimony showed beyond a reasonable doubt that those not engaging in the actual slashing of the tires did assist as lookouts for the others. The court further found that Joshua not only participated in the slashing, but also conspired in the ongoing criminal activity in his participation as a lookout. The court therefore adjudicated Joshua delinquent for his commission of the criminal mischief charge.
The corroborative evidence need not be strong, nor must it confirm every material fact of the accomplice's testimony. In re Dugan, 334 N.W.2d at 305; see also State v. Willman, 244 N.W.2d 314, 315-16 (Iowa 1976) (holding that even though the State produced no direct evidence to corroborate the accomplice's testimony, the circumstantial evidence taken together, legitimately tends to connect defendant with the commission of the crime charged). We find the juvenile court did not err in refusing to dismiss the delinquency petition for lack of sufficient corroborative evidence and affirm the juvenile court's finding that Joshua is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.4.
AFFIRMED.