Opinion
J-S20014-19 No. 1578 WDA 2018
05-20-2019
IN THE INTEREST OF: H.R.J., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.J.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000067-2018 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
A.J. ("Father") appeals from the Order granting the Petition filed by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families ("CYF"), and involuntarily terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, H.R.J. ("Child"), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We affirm.
The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child's mother, A.K. ("Mother"). Mother has not filed an appeal from the termination of her parental rights, nor is she a party to the instant appeal.
Child was born to Father and Mother in October 2011. On July 26, 2016, Child was admitted to Children's Hospital with bruising to her face, chest, lower back, buttocks and thighs. Father admitted to striking Child, and was subsequently charged with and convicted of simple assault of a victim less than six years old. Father was sentenced to twelve months of probation, and ordered to attend anger management and parenting classes, and to have no unsupervised contact with Child.
CYF subsequently became aware of Father's abuse of Child, and requested a shelter hearing. On July 27, 2016, following a hearing, Child was adjudicated dependent. Child was placed into the home of her paternal grandfather and his paramour.
On March 19, 2018, CYF filed Petitions seeking the involuntary termination of Father's and Mother's parental rights to Child. On October 9, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court granted CYF's Petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(2), (5), (8), and (b). Father timely filed a Notice of Appeal and a Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the [P]etition to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[ ]2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?Father's Brief at 6.
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[ ]2511(b)?
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations omitted).
As we discussed in [ In re ] R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010),] there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
We will address Father's claims together. First, Father alleges that CYF failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Father was unable to care for Child pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8). See Father's Brief at 18-21. According to Father, CYF's case rested largely on the fact that Father failed to consistently attend therapeutic sessions through Three Rivers Adoption Council, ("TRAC"). Id. at 20. Father argues that his attendance at the TRAC sessions was not a prerequisite to reunification, and therefore, his failure to attend all of the sessions could not be a basis for termination. Id. at 20-21. According to Father, the classes were designed to assist with the reunification process, and the evidence at the termination hearing proved that Father had positive interactions with Child and displayed positive parenting skills. Id.
In his second claim, Father alleges that CYF did not present clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Father's Brief at 21-24. Father claims that Child would suffer an emotional setback if Father's parental rights were terminated. Id. at 22-23. Father points to the testimony of Dr. Neil Rosenblum, who stated that it "would be a disaster for [Child] to totally be shut out from having contact with [Father,]" and that Child "needs her relationship with [Father]...." Id. at 22 (citation to record omitted). Father argues that permanent legal custody, rather than adoption, would better serve Child's interests. Id. at 23-24.
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in [subsection] 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to [subsection] 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court may affirm the trial court's decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
Here, we will consider subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. ...
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as follows:
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. ...
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination under [Section] 2511(a)(2):
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. In In re
E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child's "needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations and quotation marks omitted; brackets omitted).
A parent's abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child's feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. ... Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in connection with a child's feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated that the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition, and that "[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent." See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he continued attachment to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding." Id.
Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child's best interests). "[A] parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child's] potential in a permanent, healthy, [and] safe environment." In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Father's claims and concluded that they lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/19, at 4-7 (pages unnumbered). We agree with and adopt the sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis with regard to Father's claims. See id.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/20/2018
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