Opinion
NO. 01-15-00855-CV
02-02-2017
IN THE ESTATE OF FRANKIE LEE SETSER, DECEASED
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 and Probate Court Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. PR35159
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court found that a handwritten 2014 will signed by Frankie Lee Setser was executed with the requisite formalities but concluded that it was too vague and ambiguous to express Setser's testamentary intent, identify the property Setser bequeathed, or revoke Setser's 1993 will. Therefore, by two separate orders, the trial court denied an application to admit the 2014 will to probate and admitted the 1993 will to probate as a muniment of title instead. Charles Edward Heim, the proponent of the 2014 will, appeals. We reverse the trial court's orders and remand this cause to that court for entry of an order admitting the 2014 will to probate and denying admission of the 1993 will to probate as a muniment of title.
Background
When Frankie Lee Setser died in June 2014, his daughter, Mundy Boggs, successfully applied to probate a will made by Setser in 1993 as a muniment of title. Boggs was the sole beneficiary under the 1993 will. Afterward, Charles Edward Heim, a good friend of Setser's, moved for a new trial and filed an application to admit to probate a handwritten will made by Setser approximately four months before his death. This will was signed by Setser and two accompanying witnesses and provided: "I, Frankie Lee Setser will my property to Charles Edward Heim, 2748 County Road 32, Angleton, Texas 77515-7749," which was the address of the residence that Heim shared with Setser. Other than a date, this will had no further terms.
The trial court granted the motion for new trial and presided over a bench trial regarding the validity of the competing wills. After hearing the evidence, the trial court made findings of fact, including that:
• the date on the handwritten 2014 will was made by Heim rather than Setser, but the handwritten will postdated Setser's 1993 will;
• the 2014 will did not name an executor of Setser's estate and did not address "other matters customarily found" in a will;The trial court concluded that the 2014 will did not "provide much guidance" and did not explain what Setser intended by "my property," including whether that phrase included all, some, personal, real, or other property. Thus, the trial court held that the 2014 will failed because it was "too vague and ambiguous" to set forth Setser's testamentary intent or identify the property bequeathed. The trial court further held that the 2014 will was too vague to impliedly revoke Setser's 1993 will. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order denying Heim's application to admit the 2014 will to probate and entered a second order admitting the 1993 will to probate as a muniment of title.
• the 2014 will, which was signed by Setser and attested by two witnesses who testified to its validity, gave Setser's "property" to Heim; and
• the 2014 will was made with the formalities required by the law, provided that the will sufficiently expressed Setser's intent.
Discussion
Heim contends that the trial court erred by concluding that Setser's handwritten 2014 will is too vague and ambiguous to be admitted to probate. Heim maintains that Setser's unqualified bequest of his property to him can only be interpreted to mean all of his property and therefore impliedly revokes the 1993 will by disposing of Setser's entire estate contrary to the 1993 will's terms. Boggs responds that the 2014 will is too vague and ambiguous to admit to probate because it does not explicitly state that it disposes of all of Setser's property or identify the categories of Setser's property it bequeaths, if less than all of it.
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court's ruling on a probate application for an abuse of discretion. Stoll v. Henderson, 285 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). When a trial court rules arbitrarily or unreasonably without reference to guiding rules or principles, it abuses its discretion. Id. It likewise abuses its discretion if it incorrectly construes or applies the law, because a trial court does not have any discretion to misconstrue or misapply the law. Webre v. Black, 458 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
In an appeal from a bench trial, we give the trial court's fact findings the same weight as a jury's verdict. Thompson v. Smith, 483 S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). When, as here, there is a complete reporter's record, challenged fact findings are binding only if sufficient proof supports them. Id. Unchallenged fact findings, however, are controlling unless the contrary is proven as a matter of law or there is no evidence to support them. McAleer v. McAleer, 394 S.W.3d 613, 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
B. Applicable law
The meaning of an unambiguous will, one which can be given a definite interpretation, is a question of law for the court. White v. Moore, 760 S.W.2d 242, 243-44 (Tex. 1988); Pickelner v. Adler, 229 S.W.3d 516, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). When a will is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, then it is ambiguous and its interpretation usually is a fact issue. El Paso Nat'l Bank v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 615 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. 1981); Alpert v. Riley, 274 S.W.3d 277, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). If, however, the extrinsic evidence concerning the testator's intent is undisputed, the interpretation of an ambiguous will remains a question of law for the court. Brown v. Payne, 176 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex. 1943). A court may declare a will void for uncertainty only if it is so unintelligible that it is absolutely impossible to ascribe meaning to it even after extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent is considered. Adams v. Maris, 213 S.W. 622, 627 (Tex. 1919); Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1941, writ dism'd).
When interpreting a will, we focus on the testator's intent as expressed in the actual language of the will. San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 2000). We may not redraft a will in the guise of interpreting it. Id. If the will is unambiguous, we are confined to its express terms. Id. We may consider extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent only if the terms of the will are ambiguous. Id.; Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2016). We generally interpret the words of a will according to their plain, ordinary meaning unless the will shows that they are used in another sense. Stephens v. Beard, 485 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If the law accords a word a technical legal meaning, courts ordinarily presume the testator intended this technical usage unless the will indicates otherwise. Lacis v. Lacis, 355 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). But informal language used by a layman who drafted his will without the aid of an attorney will be interpreted liberally, rather than technically, to effectuate his intent. Welch v. Straach, 531 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. 1975).
The Texas Estates Code governs the validity of wills. We construe its provisions consistent with their predecessors in the Probate Code and its antecedent statutes absent a material change in the law. See TEX. EST. CODE § 21.001 (enactment of Estates Code intended to restate law "without substantive change").
A handwritten will is made with the requisite formalities so long as it is in the testator's handwriting and signed by him. TEX. EST. CODE §§ 251.051-.052; Ajudani v. Walker, 177 S.W.3d 415, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The will need not be dated; accordingly, if a date appears on the document it need not be in the testator's hand. Maul v. Williams, 69 S.W.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Tex. 1934); Price v. Taliaferro, 254 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Nor does the will need to name an executor or other personal representative of the estate in order to be valid. TEX. EST. CODE §§ 251.051-.052, 304.001(a); see In re Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d 463, 466-67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Handwritten wills may be very brief and informal and nonetheless be valid. E.g., Gillispie v. Reinhardt, 596 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming admission to probate of handwritten will that was undated and did not appoint an executor but was signed by the testator and included just three substantive sentences).
A will need not contain an express revocation clause in order to revoke a prior one. TEX. EST. CODE § 253.002; May v. Brown, 190 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. 1945). Absent a revocation clause, a new will impliedly revokes a prior one to the extent of any inconsistency. Adams, 213 S.W. at 627. If it makes a contrary disposition of the testator's entire estate, the new will completely revokes the prior one. Cason v. Taylor, 51 S.W.3d 397, 410 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.). Revocation is usually but not always a question of fact. Id. at 411. Once prima facie proof of the possibility of revocation is introduced, the proponent of a prior will has the burden to prove that it was not revoked. Turk v. Robles, 810 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
C. Analysis
The issue on appeal is whether Setser's handwritten 2014 will is so vague or ambiguous that it cannot be admitted to probate. We hold that it is not.
The trial court reasoned that Setser's use of the term "property" without qualification rendered the 2014 will too vague or ambiguous to enforce. On the contrary, when used without qualification the term "property" is unambiguous. When used in a will, an unqualified reference to "property" encompasses everything of exchangeable value that the testator owned. Ellet v. McCord, 41 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1931, writ ref'd). "Property" is synonymous with "estate" and includes assets of every category. Van Hoose v. Moore, 441 S.W.2d 597, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As the Supreme Court of Texas stated in another context, the ordinary meaning of "property" includes every type of valuable right and interest, including but not limited to real and personal property and tangible and intangible property. State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, 883 S.W.2d 190, 200 (Tex. 1994). In its ordinary usage, the term "property" is comprehensive. Womack v. Womack, 172 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. 1943); April Sound Mgmt. Corp. v. Concerned Prop. Owners for April Sound, 153 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.).
As the ordinary meaning of "property" is well-settled and Setser used that term without restriction in his handwritten 2014 will, the will is susceptible to only one interpretation—it unambiguously bequeaths all of Setser's property to Heim. Apart from the parties' dispute about the meaning of "property," it is undisputed that Setser's will effected an entirely different disposition of his estate than his prior 1993 will, inasmuch as the 2014 will bequeathed his property to Heim and the 1993 will bequeathed it to Boggs. Thus, the 2014 will impliedly revoked the 1993 will as a matter of law. See Adams, 213 S.W. at 627; Cason, 51 S.W.3d at 410. As Boggs does not challenge the trial court's finding that the 2014 will was made with the requisite formalities and the record contains some evidence that it was made with the requisite formalities, we conclude that the trial court erred by not admitting Setser's handwritten 2014 will to probate instead of his prior 1993 will.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order denying Heim's application to probate the handwritten 2014 will and its order admitting the 1993 will to probate as a muniment of title. We remand this cause to the trial court so that it may enter an order admitting Setser's handwritten 2014 will to probate and denying admission of the 1993 will to probate as a muniment of title.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.