Opinion
No. 10-07-00078-CV
Opinion delivered and filed December 19, 2007.
Appealed from the 413th District Court Johnson County, Texas, Trial Court No. D200605543.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice, GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA. (Justice VANCE concurs in the judgment)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
P. K. appeals the trial court's order terminating the parent-child relationship between P. K. and her son I. K. We affirm.
In several issues, P. K. contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. The attorney ad litem for I. K. did not file a brief.
The petition of Appellee, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, alleged that P. K. committed several predicate acts for termination under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(1), and also alleged under Section 161.003 that P. K. was unable to care for I. K. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D)-(E), (N)-(O) (Vernon Supp. 2007), § 161.003(a) (Vernon 2002). P. K. argues that the evidence of each of those grounds of termination was legally and factually insufficient. P. K. does not separately argue her issues. P. K. does not argue that the evidence that termination was in I. K.'s best interest was insufficient. See id. § 161.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2007). The Department disputes only the evidence of endangerment of and inability to care for I. K. See id. §§ 161.001(1)(E), 161.003(a).
In conducting a legal sufficiency review in a parental termination case:
[A] court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusion and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to be incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence.
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)) (alteration in J.P.B.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp. 2007), § 101.007 (Vernon 2002).
In a factual sufficiency review, . . . a court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. . . . [T]he inquiry must be "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266-67 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)) (internal footnotes omitted) (alterations added).
"Only one predicate finding under section 161.001(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).
In P. K.'s third issue, she contends that the evidence that she endangered I. K. was legally and factually insufficient. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(E). The trial court may find a predicate act for termination if the court finds that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." Id. "`Endanger' means `to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.'" In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)); see In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685, 702 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). "Although `"endanger" means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.'" M.C. at 269 (quoting Boyd at 533); see S.A.P. at 702.
The Department points to evidence that P. K. was incarcerated for about the last 8½ months that she was pregnant with I. K. While incarcerated, P. K. refused to have a sonogram, refused to go to appointments with her obstetrician, refused to take prescribed medications, and assaulted another inmate by attempting to choke her. P. K. stated to another inmate that "that she would have the baby in jail and kill the baby before she'd let [the Department] take the baby" and that P. K. "was trying to self abort in the jail." (2 R.R. at 59, 60.) P. K. does not point to any evidence contrary to the trial court's finding.
P. K. argues, "It is not clear if [the Department's investigator] spoke to the officers at the jail to get context to [P. K.'s admissions] and to ascertain their trustworthiness. It is possible that these statements were made purely out of the frustration of the situation [P.] K[.] found herself in." (Br. at 16-17 (internal citation omitted).) The Department points, however, to testimony concerning P. K.'s admissions from a jail nurse supervisor, not from the investigator. Moreover, a reasonable factfinder could have resolved the evidence in favor of its finding and believed the evidence of P. K.'s admissions to be clear and convincing.
P. K. also argues, "Imprisonment does not, standing alone, constitute engaging in conduct that endangers the child's emotional or physical well-being." (Br. at 17 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533-34)); see In re D.J.J., 178 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). But here the evidence of P. K.'s endangerment of I. K. is not limited to evidence of P. K.'s confinement.
After looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding of endangerment, we hold that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. The evidence of endangerment was legally sufficient.
After giving due consideration to evidence that the trial court could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, we hold that the evidence was such that the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that P. K. endangered I. K. The evidence of endangerment was factually sufficient.
We overrule P. K.'s third issue. Having overruled P. K.'s third issue, we need not reach her other issues.
Having overruled P. K.'s third issue, we affirm.