Opinion
No. S12Y1087.
2012-05-7
In the Matter of Charles Matthew HUTT.
Charles Matthew Hutt, Atlanta, for the appellant. Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel, and Carmen Rojas Rafter, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta, for the appellee.
Charles Matthew Hutt, Atlanta, for the appellant. Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel, and Carmen Rojas Rafter, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta, for the appellee.
Anthony B. Askew, Connie P. Henry, Atlanta, for the Other Party.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Charles Matthew Hutt (State Bar No. 774444) is a member of the Florida Bar and was admitted to practice law in Georgia on December 3, 2010. Hutt filed a petition for voluntary discipline pursuant to Georgia Bar Rule 4–227(b) after the Supreme Court of Florida entered an order suspending him from the practice of law in that state for 45 days for his admitted violations of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct. See Florida Bar v. Hutt, SC11–1992, 2011 WL 6800654 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2011); Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(a) (attorney shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct), (c) (attorney shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). For the reasons that follow, we grant the voluntary petition and suspend Hutt from the practice of law in Georgia for the next 45 days.
According to Hutt's petition, in October 2009, approximately one month after he was admitted to the Florida Bar, he began his employment as a junior associate with a high-volume civil litigation firm in Jacksonville, Florida. Hutt was assigned to work primarily on foreclosure cases, where it was his firm's customary practice to file an affidavit of attorney fees at the summary judgment stage. The fee affidavits were usually very similar, if not identical, with only the captions and dates changed. The purported affiant on the fee affidavits was “Attorney X,” whom the firm had hired to train junior associates. Attorney X also reviewed foreclosure files on a few occasions. Hutt's employer told him that Attorney X had given the firm permission to sign his name on attorney fee affidavits in his absence. Hutt's employer also said that signing Attorney X's name on the fee affidavits was common practice in the office and that Hutt was expected to do so. Feeling pressured as both a new employee and a new attorney, Hutt signed Attorney X's name on fee affidavits on numerous occasions. Aside from the signatures, the affidavits Hutt signed were accurate.
A judge eventually recognized the signature on the fee affidavits as a forgery and brought the matter to the attention of the Florida Bar. The Florida Bar determined that Attorney X did not give the firm permission to sign his name on the fee affidavits in his absence. Hutt had no prior disciplinary history, and he cooperated in the resulting investigation, which led to a prosecution against Hutt's former employer. On December 22, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida entered an order suspending Hutt from the practice of law in Florida for 45 days. Hutt served the Florida suspension from January 3 to February 18, 2012.
About a month later, on March 13, 2012, Hutt filed a petition for voluntary discipline in this Court, agreeing to accept a 45–day suspension as reciprocal discipline and urging us to make the suspension retroactive to the dates of his Florida suspension. Hutt contends that he did not practice law in either Florida or Georgia during that period and that he is not currently representing any clients in Georgia. The Georgia Bar has responded, stating that it supports the acceptance of Hutt's petition and that a 45–day suspension is the appropriate reciprocal discipline, but not addressing Hutt's request for entry of the suspension nunc pro tunc. See Rule 9.4(b) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (governing reciprocal discipline).
It appears that Hutt's disciplinary violations arose out of conduct encouraged by his employer, a high-volume civil litigation firm. Although serious, the violations occurred at a time when Hutt was a very inexperienced lawyer; he had no prior disciplinary history; and he cooperated in the Florida disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, the Georgia Bar has no objection to the imposition of a 45–day suspension as reciprocal discipline. For these reasons, we accept Hutt's petition for voluntary discipline and impose a 45–day suspension.
However, we decline Hutt's request to enter the suspension nunc pro tunc. Hutt stopped practicing law in Florida on January 3, 2012, not voluntarily but because the Supreme Court of Florida had suspended his Florida license. Hutt claims that he voluntarily ceased practicing law in Georgia from January 3 to February 18, 2012, but he has submitted no documentation supporting this claim, and he says he currently has no Georgia clients, which suggests an alternate explanation for not practicing law in Georgia.
We emphasize ... that when an attorney requests entry of a suspension or voluntary surrender order nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer's responsibility to demonstrate that [he or she] voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date on which the[ ] law practice ended, and that [he or she] complied with all the ethical obligations implicated in such a decision, such as assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating the transfer of client files and critical information about ongoing cases to new counsel.
In re Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157, 702 S.E.2d 136 (2010). See also In re Sossomon, 290 Ga. 677, 677–78, 725 S.E.2d 243 (2012) (rejecting request to make reciprocal discipline suspension judgment retroactive to period of suspension in another state where the attorney's “decision to voluntarily cease practicing law in Georgia had not been documented”); In re Levin, 289 Ga. 170, 174, 709 S.E.2d 808 (2011) (declining to make suspension retroactive “because, although Levin stopped practicing law for six months, he did not remove himself from practice in anticipation of future suspension”).
Furthermore, Hutt offers no explanation for waiting until nearly three months after the Florida suspension was imposed, and a month after it ended, to file his petition for voluntary discipline in Georgia. See Rule 9.4(b) (“Upon being suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction, a lawyer admitted to practice in Georgia shall promptly inform the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of Georgia of the discipline.”). As a result, making our suspension retroactive would effectively mean imposing no reciprocal discipline on Hutt. See Sossomon, 290 Ga. at 677, 725 S.E.2d 243. We decline to mitigate Hutt's discipline in this manner.
Accordingly, we accept the petition for voluntary discipline, but we decline to enter our decision nunc pro tunc. Respondent Charles Matthew Hutt is suspended from the practice of law in Georgia for the next 45 days.
Forty-five-day suspension.