Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. J513849E, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
George D. appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his minor son, Hunter W., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) George contends his due process rights were violated because the court failed to enforce its visitation order, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to establish a beneficial parent-child relationship with Hunter. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2008 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b) alleging newborn Hunter was at risk of harm because his mother, Samantha W., had a mental illness that caused her to lose custody of four other children, and George was incarcerated for failing to register as a convicted sex offender under Penal Code section 290. Despite George's status as a sex offender, Samantha did not believe George posed any risk to Hunter. George did not acknowledge Samantha posed a risk to Hunter. At a detention hearing, the court gave Agency discretion to arrange visits between George and Hunter when George was no longer incarcerated.
George was released from jail on March 24, 2008, with instructions to register as a sex offender within five days or face another violation. He had been arrested three times in three years for failing to register. George was reluctant to discuss his background with the social worker, stating only that he received disability benefits due to schizophrenia. He admitted he could not raise a child without Samantha's help. He was resistant to participating in services, especially therapy, which he referred to as "mind control." The social worker arranged supervised visits for George and Hunter beginning April 1, 2008.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petition, declared Hunter a dependent, removed him from parental custody and placed him in foster care. The court ordered reunification services for George, including supervised visits with Hunter.
Several weeks later, the probation department told the social worker that because of George's status as a convicted sex offender, George could not have contact with any children, including Hunter, unless there was a specific order from family court. The social worker tried to contact George's assigned probation officer to ask about changing the probation requirement to allow George to visit Hunter, but the probation officer did not return the call.
In a report prepared for the six-month review hearing, the social worker recommended terminating services and setting a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. George had not maintained contact with the social worker and his whereabouts were unknown. George had participated in a psychological evaluation, and the evaluator recommended against reunification with Hunter because of George's severe mental illness. George had not participated in any services, and had not visited Hunter due to his convicted sex offender status. At a six-month review hearing in February 2009 the court terminated services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
In an assessment report, the social worker recommended adoption as Hunter's permanent plan. Hunter was highly adoptable and numerous families were available to adopt him. His caregivers, who had adopted two of Hunter's siblings, wanted to adopt him.
The social worker's efforts to find George were unavailing. George's mental health caseworkers were concerned because he had not contacted them for six months. George had an outstanding felony warrant for failing to register as a convicted sex offender.
The social worker allowed two visits between George and Hunter before learning George could not have contact with children due to his sex offender status. When George tried to visit Hunter in June and September 2008 he was told he needed authorization from his probation officer or the criminal court, but he never obtained it.
At a selection and implementation hearing in August 2009 the court received into evidence Agency's reports. George offered no affirmative evidence. His counsel argued the terms of George's parole prevented him from having contact with Hunter, thus prejudicing his ability to establish a beneficial parent-child relationship. The court found Hunter was adoptable and none of the exceptions to adoption applied. The court terminated parental rights and referred Hunter for adoptive placement.
DISCUSSION
George contends his due process rights were violated because Agency suspended his visits with Hunter and the court failed to enforce its visitation order, thereby preventing him from establishing a beneficial parent-child relationship with Hunter. He asserts failure to provide supervised visits infected the eventual outcome of the case.
A
As a general rule, a parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from claiming error on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Application of the forfeiture rule, although not automatic, is designed to keep litigants from acquiescing and later seeking relief for error that could have been prevented or cured. (Ibid.; In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 412.) Although we have discretion to excuse forfeiture, we exercise that discretion rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. (In re S.B., supra, at p. 1293.) This is especially true in dependency proceedings where "considerations such as permanency and stability are of paramount importance." (Ibid.)
Here, George did not object or ask the juvenile court to enforce its visitation order when Agency suspended visits. Nor did he argue his status as a convicted sex offender was not a proper basis to deny him visitation. If George believed he was erroneously prevented from having contact with Hunter, he "had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan. ' "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." [Citation.]' (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416; see also People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1223-1224 [even constitutional rights may be forfeited].) Even after being told he could request authorization for visits from his probation officer or the criminal court, he never did so. By his silence and acquiescence, George has forfeited his right to claim error on appeal. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)
Further, by claiming he did not receive the visitation to which he was entitled, George is in effect challenging the court's reasonable services finding made at the six-month hearing at which the court set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing. The order setting that hearing is not appealable unless the parent first files a timely petition for extraordinary writ review. (In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 447-448 [attack on findings subsumed within a referral order must be raised by writ]; California Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Failure to comply with this procedure precludes subsequent review by appeal. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(2).) Because George did not challenge the lack of visitation in a writ petition, the court's findings and visitation order are now final and not subject to our review in this appeal. (See In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667.)
B
In any event, no reversible error or due process violation occurred in this case. At the time the court made its order for supervised visits between George and Hunter, it was not aware of George's probation condition prohibiting contact with minors. Once the social worker learned of the probation condition, she tried to get it changed to allow for visits with Hunter, but the assigned probation officer did not respond to her telephone call. When George asked about visits, he was advised to get authorization from his probation officer or the criminal court. He failed to do so.
George argues he lost his parental rights because he was prejudiced by the court's failure to properly enforce its visitation order. However, this argument ignores the evidence. A psychological evaluation showed George was severely mentally ill, with many risk factors for parenting and protective issues. The evaluator believed it was highly unlikely George could reunify with Hunter, and recommended against it. George did not maintain contact with the social worker, inquire about Hunter's well-being or participate in reunification services. Despite Agency's efforts to find him, George's whereabouts remained unknown. Under these circumstances, the lack of visitation did not affect the outcome of the proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., HALLER, J.