Opinion
No. 05-04-00264-CV
Opinion Filed September 23, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 366-53152-03.
Affirm.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and O'NEILL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of H.T.S.'s biological parents and to adopt H.T.S. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. In four issues, appellant generally contends the trial court erred in (1) in denying her petition and (2) failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Appellant is H.T.S.'s biological aunt. When H.T.S. was thirteen years old, he moved to Texas from Taiwan to live with appellant. H.T.S.'s biological parents remained in Taiwan. Approximately six months after H.T.S. moved to the United States, appellant filed the instant suit seeking termination of H.T.S.'s parents' rights based upon their affidavits of relinquishment of parental rights. She also sought to adopt H.T.S. After a hearing on appellant's petition, the trial court denied it. This appeal followed.
We will begin by addressing appellant's fourth issue in which she complains of the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Shortly before appellant filed her brief, the record in this case was supplemented with the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, we resolve the fourth issue against appellant.
See In re S.A.W., 131 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.); Posner v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit of Tex. Dep't of Human Servs., 784 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex. App-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
In the first three issues, appellant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to terminate H.T.S.'s parent's rights. According to appellant, the trial court should have terminated H.T.S.'s parent's rights because it had jurisdiction to do so and because venue was proper in Collin County. However, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do not show the trial court denied termination solely because of appellant's alleged failure to establish venue or jurisdiction. Rather, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that it was not in H.T.S.'s best interest for his parents to relinquish their parental rights. This finding alone would justify the trial court's denial of the petition for termination. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002).
Although the trial court mislabled its best interest finding as a conclusion of law, we may treat it as a finding of fact. See Ray v. Farmers' State Bank of Hart, 576 S.W.2d 607, 610 n. 1 (Tex. 1979); Sears Roebuck Co. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 53 S.W.3d 382, 386 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
Appellant has nevertheless failed to challenged this separate ground for denying the petition for termination. When a separate and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm. See Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 368 (Tex. 1999); Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 924 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). Because appellant has failed to challenge all grounds that support the trial court's judgment, we resolve the first three issues against appellant.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.